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3INTRODUCTION
The starting point of my thesis on the Cooperation Agreements 
concluded by the Community with Maghreb countries (Morocco, 
Tunisia, Algeria) is the fundamental inconsistency which exists in 
the Mediterremean policy of the EEC: the Community is both a
partner and a competitor with Mediterranean countries.
In fact, on one hand, the EEC member States and Maghreb 
countries are mutually dependent, from the point of view of economy 
and security. On the other hand, they have diverging interests and 
are in competition in many economic fields.
Third Mediterraneem countries represent the third most 
important market for Community exports (after EFTA countries and 
the US). It is clear, therefore, that only the steady development 
of this market can guarantee the absorption of Community exports.
The economic gap between the EEC and Maghreb States underlies 
many of the social problems currently encountered in the Maghreb: 
high unemployment, resurgence of religion and a population 
explosion which increases food requirements and exacerbates the 
unemployment situation. Moreover, the economic division between 
Maghreb countries and the Community can be further enlarged by the 
EEC integration with EFTA States and, on a long term basis. Eastern 
European States.
The political and social instability deriving from this 
situation is to be feared by the Community since Maghreb and 
Mashrak countries are not only producers of raw materials, like 
natural gaz and oil, but their territories are passages for 
Community energy supplies.
On the other hand, the Community is the traditional point of 
reference for these countries. Two thirds of trade from Maghreb is 
directed to the EEC1.
1 RICCI,L. II Maghreb e l'Europa Com.Int. 1990, p. 549-567.
4In the following paragraphs I will provide some examples of 
the complementary and conflicting aspects of the economic 
relationships between the EEC and Maghreb.
As has been mentioned above, the Community is a key market 
for exports from Maghreb, which are essentially raw materials: 
minerals and agricultural products.
The export of agricultural products consists of olive oil, 
wine, tomatoes. The very narrow or even non-existent inter-regional 
market2 makes the Community a fundamental outlet for these types 
of products.
It should be considered, moreover, that the cultivation of 
some of these products was introduced during colonialism for 
exclusive use by the colonial mother country. Domestic consumption, 
therefore, remains very limited which further emphasizes the 
importance of foreign (Community) markets.
The case of Algerian wine is significant in this respect, if 
one takes into account that it represents 80% of agricultural 
exports for this country and that only a very limited percentage 
of the production is locally consumed3.
Agricultural exports, however, are in competition with 
Community agricultural production.
It should be remembered that the EEC, in particular since the 
entry of Spain and Portugal4, is self-sufficient for the majority 
of Mediterranean products.
Thus, competition for Community producers is tougher due to
2 Trade between Algeria and Morocco was interrupted in 1974 
and was resumed only recently.
3 Efforts of reconversion in Algeria led to a decrease of 
vineyards from 365,000 h. in 1962 to 245,000 in 1979. The objective 
are 210,000 see DUPOUY,A. Le statut juridique de la coopération 
entre l 'Algerie e la CEE Rev. Algerine des sciences iur.ec. et vol. 
1979, p. 2 ff.
4 The adaptation of mechanism required by Spanish and 
Portuguese memberships will be discussed in Part II, Chapter II of 
this thesis.
the fact that the mechanisms of common agricultural policy applied 
to Mediterranean products are less protective than those applied 
to milk and cereals producers.
Further still, Maghreb products have to face the competition 
of EEC products also on third country markets. Prices offered by 
Community producers would in fact be higher than those actually 
paid if it was not for the difference between Community and 
international prices being reimbursed through the common 
agricultural policy.
The Maghreb constitutes a "safety-valve" for the Community 
surpluses of cereals. For its part, Maghreb is highly dependent on 
imports to cover its alimentary needs although, until the 50s, both 
Morocco and Tunisia exported cereals.
One of the causes of this situation is the demographic growth: 
the Maghreb population is forecast to a approximately 80 million 
people in 2000 with a high percentage of people less than 25 years 
old (65% of the population in 1986) and an unemployment rate of 
35*.
Food requirements, in particular cereals as the basic dietary 
intake of the diet in these countries, therefore grow progressively 
in correlation with the increase of population, and are mainly 
covered by imports. Low prices applied by the Community (to get rid 
of surpluses) have discouraged local production. At present, the 
increase of the population has led to an increase of imports with 
negative consequences in the balance of payments of these 
countries, the subsequent raising of prices has led to the much 
publicized social disorders.
Food self sufficiency, therefore, becomes a key priority for 
these countries. Although this objective cannot be reached in the 
immediate future, the achievement of this goal would mean a loss 
or a shrinkage of a market absorbing at least part of the Community 
surpluses.
5
With regard to industrial products', exports from Maghreb 
States to the Community (textile products) are also on competition 
in the Community market in relation to both national industry and 
with imports from other third developing countries. It should, 
moreover, be taken into account that recent development programmes6 
for Maghreb countries seek an improvement in productivity and a 
strengthening of exports, which would be fostered by low cost 
working force. Likewise, the development of a national chemical 
industry could take advemtage of raw materials which, so far, have 
primarily been exported. This industry could, prospectively, enter 
in competition with a Community industry.
Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisia workers have traditionally 
emigrated to the Community, and to certain Member States in 
particular. For Maghreb countries, emigration means guaranteeing 
a low price work force for these countries and a outlet for the 
high levels of unemployment. Moreover, salaries sent to the 
countries of origin are an important entry source in the balance 
of payments of these countries.
Recently, however, the worsening of the economic situation has 
led to an increase of the migratory pressure towards the Community. 
The latter's Member States are, for their part, facing a period of 
economic recession and of higher unemployment and are less inclined 
to open their doors to developing countries' workers whose presence 
triggers social tensions, which would have otherwise remained 
quiescent in period of economic stability
From what has been observed above, it must be observed that 
the level of competition between the economy of the EEC and of 
Maghreb is not the same in all economic sectors. In some cases
6
5 See KHADER,B. Le debolezze dell'industrializzazione nel 
mondo arabo Politica int. 1986, pp. 135-144.
6 GAZZO,Y. Les économies arabes face i la crise: solution
libérales et limites Maghreb Mashrak 1988, pp. 48-67; HARIK,I. 
Privatisation et développement à la meurocaine: la loi sur le
transfert au secteur privé de certaines entreprises publiques 
Ibidem pp. 84-101.
competition is not present but rather latent and can become actual 
as a consequence of an economic recession (see the example of 
exports of textile products or the case of migrant workers).
It can also be submitted, on the basis of the above 
observations, that the economic development of Maghreb countries 
might emphasize or at least make the level of competition which 
exists in certain sectors significant. If this hypothesis is 
correct, this would lead to tension between the development of 
Maghreb and the enhanced competition between Maghreb and the 
Community. On the other hand it should also been considered that 
the development of Maghreb countries respond to a fundamental 
interest of the EEC and is the declared objective of its policy.
It should in fact be taken into account that the main 
instrument used by the Community to encourage economic and social 
development of the countries of this geographic area is the 
cooperation agreement.
The keystone of the agreement is the preferential treatment 
based on the theory whereby development can be stimulated by an 
increase of exports. On this basis Maghreb countries are granted 
unilateral duty free entry of their products in the market of the 
EEC.
One should ask how the opening of market can be reconciled 
with the existence of competitive production which could, on the 
contrary, lead to the adoption of protectionist instruments.
This hypothesis, however, could be mediated by the existence 
between the two economies of a relation of partnership which, if 
developed, could contribute to the achievement of the established 
objective.
A principal aim of this thesis is to exeuaine, from the legal 
point of view, the veurious provisions of the cooperation agreement 
concluded by the Community with each Maghreb countries.
My first question examines whether this inconsistency is 
revealed in the agreement, or whether the existence of competitive 
interests can prejudice the relations which the agreement aims at
7
establishing between the partners.
The second research question relates to the status of these 
agreements in the framework of the treaty-based relationships of 
the Community with third countries.
The most sophisticated theory of classification of Community 
agreements has been made by C. Flaesch-Mougin1.
According to this author, the practice of the Community 
clearly shows that it departed from the typology provided for in 
the Treaty, as based on the well-known distinction between
association and trade agreements.
It soon beceme clear that these two instruments were not 
sufficient when the Community started to enlarge its relationships 
with third countries. A number of political, economic and legal 
factors led the Community to develop its instruments from a
quantitative and qualitative point of view.
The result is a complex system of agreements concluded with 
third countries throughout the world, differing considerably as 
regards the flexibility of the application of the instruments
expressly provided for in the Treaty in the field of external 
relations and other which were not conceived to this scope but 
endorsed by the Court of Justice, whose case-law is particularly 
revolutiomury in this sector.
C. Flaesch-Mougin proposes an hypothetical classification of 
these agreements.
Community agreements are set up on an axis the opposite ends 
of which are represented, at one hand, by the absence of
relationships with third countries and at the other by accession 
to the Community
8
7 Les accords externes de la Cee. Essai d'une typologie Ed. 
Université de Bruxelles, Bruxelles, 1979.
* Correctly, the hypothesis of the accession is not considered 
by Flaesch-Mougin as a part of external relations, since accession 
means that the third state becomes member.
9Agreements are thus classified on the basis of the links they 
establish between the Community and the third state.
Agreements limited to the regulation of exchanges of one 
product or which govern a specific sector of activity are closer 
to the first end (absence of agreements). Association agreements 
on the contrary are at the other end (near accession), since those 
types of agreements establish the closest link that the Community 
is able to esteüslish with a third state, through the extension of 
the free circulation of goods, services, capitals and workers and 
providing for harmonization of some policies such as agriculture.
Other typologies, although elaborated to a lesser extent than 
that of Flaesch-Mougin have been proposed.
Another typology is suggested by MISHLANI,ROBERT, STEVENS, 
WESTON9.
Their classification regards the relationships of the 
Community with developing countries10.
The criterion for the classification applied by these authors 
is that of preferential treatment offered by the Community to 
developing countries. Graphically, the typology is represented as 
a pyramid.
Agreements providing for a preferential treatment are at the 
top of the pyramid (Lomé Convention for instance), whereas those 
providing for a less privileged treatment are closer to the base 
of the pyramid.
The criterion proposed by Flaesch-Mougin, whereby the 
agreements are classified according to the extent of relationships 
between the EEC and third countries, is also applied in a typology
9 MISHLANI,P., ROBERT, A., STEVENS,C., WESTON,A. The Pyramid 
of privilege STEVENS,C. (ed) EEC and Third World: a Survey. Vol.I, 
Holmes & Meier, London, 1981, pp. 60-82.
10 Although this classification also cover autonomous actions 
of the Community (like the SGP) this element does not weaken the 
validity of this example.
represented by the image of the concentric circles11.
The center represents the Community and the circles represent 
the agreements concluded by the Community with third countries: the 
closer the circle to the center, the stronger the link established 
with the Community.
None of these typologies, however, seems to offer a correct 
representation of treaty-based relationships with the Community.
It is clear that the application of the criterion of intensity 
of the link and that of preferential treatment lead to two 
different classifications which represent diverse aspects of the 
reality.
Each typology could be correct even if their results were 
different.
Time would modify the classifications, since the agreements 
reflect the political, economic, social and legal changes and 
evolutions taking place in the international community. Therefore, 
the Community's partners and the relationships established between 
them are subject to a parallel evolution (let us take for example 
the changes taking place in Eastern Europe and the new agreements 
concluded with the EEC) .
My criticism does not concern the criterion of classification 
(intensity of relationships or preferential treatment) but the 
methodology applied which seems to invalidate these typologies.
When speaking of methodology, I refer to the manner of 
selecting agreements which are included in the same class, or, in 
other words, to the choice of elements which lead Flaesch-Mougin 
to the consideration that a number of agreements concluded by the 
EEC with different partners establish, between contracting parties, 
relations having the same intensity and can, therefore, be placed 
in the same position in her hypothetical axis.
Flaesch-Mougin and other cited authors classify the agreements 
on the basis of the provisions contained therein.
10
11 PESCATORE,P. La constitution, son contenu, son utilité, 
Rev.Dr.Suisse 1992, p. 64.
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For instance, Flaesch-Mougin classifies, as free-trade 
agreements, those agreements providing for the elimination of 
tariff and non-tariff obstacles (customs duties, quotas, measures 
of equivalent effects), tlocation and dumping, provisions related 
to competition and payments concerning exchanges.
Agreement of association of free-trade12 are the agreements 
which, if compared with those mentioned above, contain provisions 
in the field of services, capital and workers. Agreements designed 
by Flaesch-Mougin as "accords commerciaux forts13" have a more 
restrictive content since they provide for the elimination of 
tsuriff and non-tariff agreements, dumping and aids.
This type of agreement can be distinguished from the classic 
non-preferential trade agreement ("accord commercial période 
transitoire"), which provides for the elimination or the reduction 
of quotas and customs duties.
Mishlani, Robert, Stevens and Weston seem to apply the same 
methodology when they place the agreements on the pyramid according 
to the preferential treatment established in the agreements.
Thus, for instemce, in order to place the agreements with 
Maghreb countries after the Lomé Convention and after those 
concluded with Greece, Spain and Portugal and before the agreements 
with Mashrak countries, from the top of the pyramid, they consider 
the provisions of the agreements establishing preferential 
treatment (abolition of duties, quotas, measures of equivalent 
effect for industrial products and duties reduction for 
agricultural products) and financial aid contained in these 
agreements.
However, this method and the classification deriving from its 
application, frames the treaty-based relationships between the 
Community and third countries in a fixed pattern which does not 
correctly represent its complexity.
12 See p. 210.
13 See p. 206.
All these studies, in fact, omit the consideration of the 
question of the interpretation of the agreement provisions.
If the classification of agreements is based on their content, 
two agreements with identical provisions will be included in the 
same class.
If, however, the provisions of these two agreements are 
interpreted in a dissimilar memner, the relationships that the 
agreements establish between the Community and the two third 
countries will have a different value, as regards the intensity of 
the links and as regards the preferential treatment if this is 
established.
A different interpretation would affect the classification of 
the agreements.
Let us give an example of this thesis.
Supposing that the Community concludes two agreements with two 
countries prohibiting the application of customs duties, quotas and 
measures of equivalent effect applied to the trade of industrial 
products and prohibiting discrimination in the field of social 
security for workers regularly employed in each country being 
extended to the members of their families.
In accordance with the usual practice, none of these 
agreements clarifies the meaning of "measures of equivalent 
effects" and "fernily" of the workers.
If one applies the method of Flaesch-Mougin, i.e. if one 
classifies the agreements according to their content, than the 
agreements in our example would be included in the same category, 
since they contain identical provisions and would create links 
having the same intensity between the contracting parties.
Let us now presume that a restrictive interpretation of the 
notions of measures of equivalent effect and of family is applied 
only to one of the two agreements. For example, measures of 
equivalent effect would cover only those regulations which 
discriminate against imported products compared to national ones 
and the notion of family would not be extended to parents.
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In this case is unlikely that the two agreements could be 
included in the same category since the level of liberalization of 
exchanges and the level of integration established by them would 
be highly different.
One could argue that the interpretation of the provisions can 
modify the classification of agreements having the same content, 
but an agreement of global cooperation establishing a preferential 
trade regime creates closer relationships than a non-preferential 
agreement limited to few products.
This observation does not seem to undermine the thesis 
submitted.
Although a priori analysis of the content of the agreements 
could identify two or three general categories of agreements, a 
complete typology of Community agreements based on this methodology 
would offer a limited and partial vision of the reality it tries 
to classify.
There exist different provisions in the cooperation agreements 
whose range can significantly vary according to the interpretation 
that is offered.
The second aim of my emalysis will therefore be the 
examination of these provisions to verify their possible 
interpretation and how such different interpretations can modify 
the range of preferences and of advemtages granted by the Community 
to its Mediterranean partners.
This thesis is therefore based on two hypothesis.
The first one is that the competition between the EEC and 
Maghreb cannot have but a negative influence upon the agreement.
The second hypothesis is that the interpretation of its terms 
affect the relationships established between the psurties under the 
agreement.
It can also be submitted that the two hypotheses are 
interrelated.
As far as interpretation is concerned, the question is the 
following "which elements affect the interpretation of a
13
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provision?" This should correctly be determined according to the 
scope pursued by the agreement, but it can also be submitted that 
the interests of one of the contracting parties could prevail and 
thus the provision could be interpreted to favor the latter.
I will go back to this hypothesis in the concluding
observations.
The choice of exeunining cooperation agreements with Maghreb 
is not accidental.
These agreements in fact seem to gather a number of important 
elements which make them a good example for the type of analysis 
suggested:
-t he agreements have been "experienced" since they were
concluded more than 15 years ago;
- these countries are located in a particular geographic area 
and have a strategic imporzance both as a source and a passage for 
Community's oil supplies;
- the level of complementarity and competition between the 
economies is very high.
Although cooperation agreements were concluded separately by 
the Community with each Maghreb country, they were conceived as 
part of the same system and pursue the same objectives. This
implies that their provisions are practically identical.
In this thesis, therefore, I will refer to the Articles of the 
Cooperation Agreement concluded with Morocco. The provisions of the 
other agreements will be referred to only when they substantially 
differ from those contained in the agreement with Morocco.
The thesis is divided into four main parts.
In the First Part I will analyze the legal framework of the 
agreements starting from the question of the choice of the legal 
basis, concluding procedures, the creation of common institutions 
and the status of the agreement and of derived legislation in the
25
Community legal order.
I will then discuss the provisions regulating the 
relationships between the parties in the field of trade (Second 
Part), of technical and financial cooperation (Third Part). 
Finally, the Fourth Part will consider the provisions concerning 
safeguard and derogating measures.
In the field of trade and financial cooperation, the agreement 
endorses the principle of "trade and aid" sponsored at 
international level (UNCTAD) by developing countries and adopted 
by the Community as keystone to its development cooperation 
policy14.
In the field of trade this principle means that a non­
reciprocal preferential treatment is granted by the EEC to products 
originating from developing countries.
In the Cooperation Agreement this requires the elimination of 
customs duties, quotas and measures of equivalent effect for 
industrial goods and the reduction or suspension of customs duties 
for agricultural products.
The first part of the thesis will verify, firstly, the 
interpretation of provisions regulating trade in industrial goods, 
taking as its reference point the relevant Community case-law, and 
secondly, it will discuss the provisions applying to agricultural 
trade in order to ascertain the role of the common agricultural 
policy.
The trade regime will be finally analyzed in relation to the 
rules governing the origin of products, that is the access to the 
preferential treatment.
The provisions of the Cooperation Agreement and the Financial 
and Technical Protocols regulate questions concerning for example 
the choice of beneficiaries, sectors of application and the 
preparation of projects. This part of the thesis will also discuss
14 14 See for exemple the system of generalized preferences
and the financial aid to non-associated developing countries of 
Asia and Latin America.
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problems related to the sources of financing, i.e. the Community 
budget and the European Investment Bank. A study of the rules on 
the management of aid will offer the opportunity of drawing some 
conclusions on the roles of the two institutions in the field of 
development cooperation policy.
The Cooperation Agreements with Maghreb countries also contain 
provisions in the field of labor, whereby workers of the 
Contracting Parties are granted non-discriminatory treatment as 
regards pay, working conditions and social security.
The questions examined in this part of the thesis mainly 
concern the range of application of the non discrimination 
principle and the conditions of maghreb workers in relation to 
workers of other third countries in the Community.
The fourth part of the thesis will discuss the possibility of 
deviating from the provisions of the agreement by means of 
safeguard and derogating rules.
27 
PART I

A) THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF THE COOPERATION AGREEMENTS.
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1) Title of the Agreements.
The agreements concluded between the Community and the Maghreb 
and Mashrsric countries are entitled "Cooperation Agreements". 
rhe term "cooperation" has been used very commonly and extensively 
by the Community in its treaty relationships with third countries, 
in particular after 197215.
Are cooperation agreements a new type of agreement16?
Practice17 clearly shows that the term cooperation is not used 
to describe a specific type of relationship: in fact the features
1 From an examination of Community practice from 1957 to 1972 
it emerges that the term cooperation does not appear in the title 
of any agreement with the exception of that with Lebanon of 1968 
(Agreement on Trade and Technical Cooperation) O.J. L 244 1973 
(legal basis 113,114).
16 In the field of external relations the term cooperation is 
used in two Articles of the Treaty: Articles 230 and 231 providing 
for the establishment of cooperation between the Community and, 
respectively, the Council of Europe and the Organization for 
European Economic Cooperation. One can note that the French and 
Italian text of Article 231 use the term "collaboration", 
"collaborazione" as opposed to cooperation. This suggests that the 
term cooperation has a very general meaning. In practice 
cooperation with those Organisations has taken the form of the 
exchange of information, establishment of contacts and the creation 
of permanent delegations of the EEC to these organisations.
17 One can mention the Cooperation Agreement with the member
States of the Cartagena agreement (113-235) and with the countries 
party to the General Treaty on Central Economic Integration and 
Panama (see O.J. L 153 1984 and O.J. L 172 1986) . Other agreements 
contain the term cooperation in the title: the Agreement concluded 
with Poland on Exchanges and Commercial and Economic Cooperation, 
the Framework Agreement for Cooperation with Brazil (113-235) , the 
Agreement for Commercial and Economic Cooperation with India (113- 
235) (see J. L 339 1989, O.J. L 281 1982 and O.J. L 328 1981); the 
Commercial Cooperation Agreement with Bangladesh (113) and Sri 
Lanka (113) (O.J. L 319 1976 and O.J. L 247 1975); the Freunework
Agreement for Commercial and Economic Cooperation with Canada (see
O.J. L 260 1976.
of these agreements vary, some are merely trade agreements, whereas 
others provide for the establishment of relations in other economic 
fields or in the framework of development cooperation. It is clear, 
therefore, that a classification of the agreements concluded by the 
Community with third countries cannot be based on a formal 
criterion (the title of the agreement), but must take account of 
more substantive criteria such as the objectives and the content 
of the agreementl*.
Although the Treaty does not require a formal classification 
of agreements19 and since the same term is used to describe 
different types of relations, it should, however, be asked whether 
the term cooperation has any specific meaning, and why it is so 
commonly used.
In particular, some doubts may be expressed about the 
irrelevance of the title used for agreements concluded under 
Article 238. Here the terminology may be in fact more relevant. As 
will be seen later, Article 238 does not define the field of action 
of the Community while it provides for a type of agreement having 
certain characteristics, it is silent about its content.
In other words, one should consider whether the cooperation 
agreement is to all intents and purposes an association agreement 
under a different name or whether changing the "description" also
20
u The qualification of an act according to its content and the 
irrelevance of how it is formally defined are general principles 
applied by the Court of Justice of the EEC for Community acts (See 
joined cases 16, 17/62 Confédération national producteurs fruits 
et léoumes v. Council 14.12.1962 (1962) ECR p. 471, the same could 
be applied to international agreements concluded by the Community.
19 See Written Questions 731/77 and 732/77 O.J. C 88 1978 p.2-
4. Article 113 lays down the Community's competence in the field 
of commercial policy. Once it is established that the Community can 
conclude commercial agreements it is of little relevance from a 
legal point of view whether the agreement is qualified as £rade 
cooperation or as only a commercial agreement. Agreements concluded 
with third countries can also be based on Article 235 and on the 
internal competence of the Community (see infra) and in these cases 
the Community seems to enjoy the widest freedom in the appellation 
of the agreements concluded on these bases.
reflects a modification of the content of the agreement.
The practice seems oriented, also in the context of Article 
238, towards a certain flexibility in the title of the agreements 
concluded under Article 238, for instance in the most recent 
agreements concluded with some East European Countries called 
"Europe Agreements"20.
It should be noted that the description of the agreement is 
often the result of a request by the partners of the Community. 
This is the case of Maghreb agreements, where the use of the term 
cooperation is due to a precise request by the Community partners 
who wished to underline their complete equality with the Community 
and to mark the refusal of the colonialist implication contained 
in this term due to the "precedent" of the association based on 
Part IV of the Treaty and on the Declaration of Association annexed 
to the Treaty regarding Morocco and Tunisia21.
We can presume that, with the term cooperation, the 
Contracting Parties wished also to underline the different type of 
relations established with these agreements as compared with those 
concluded in 1969 , which were also Jbased on Article 238.
When the "precedent" of association under Part IV of the 
Treaty does not exist, association may be opposed to the term 
cooperation to indicate a closer form of relationship22. This is the»
20 The title "marks the importance of the political initiative
they represent". Communication of the Commission to Council and 
Parliament Association Agreements with the Countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe: a General Outline Europe Documents, 1646/47
7.09.1990 p.2
21 See European Parliament debates, session 77/78 O.J. 224 1977 
p.208 and in particular the intervention of Cheysson (Commission) 
p.211.
22 Such a differentiation was made in the doctrine of the early 
seventies. It was suggested to title as association agreements only 
those agreements which established complex legal engagements 
(future accession, customs union, complex institutional structure) . 
In the other cases the use of the term cooperation was suggested. 
See PESCATORE,P. Contribution to the discussion TIMMERMANS, VOLKER 
(eds) Divisions of Powers between the Community .and— its— ffeffifrgJT
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meaning that is ascribed to the association established between the 
Community and some Central and Eastern European Countries (Poland, 
Hungary and Czechoslovakia)23.
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2) The Legal Basis.
2 .a) The Meaning of Legal Basis for Action and in the Field of 
External Relations.
All the acts adopted by the Council or the Commission must 
indicate their legal basis, i.e.the Article(s) of the EEC Treaty 
on which the Community authority to act is founded. This is laid 
down in Article 190 of the EEC Treaty which requires that 
"regulations, directives and decisions of the Council and of the 
Commission shall state the reasons on which they are based.."
Although the above-mentioned provision does not expressly 
refer to the legal basis, the Court has clearly ruled that this 
forms an "integral part of the statement of reason which shall 
indicate the element of facts and of law on which an act is 
founded"24. The acts through which the Community approves the
states~p.71. TUKRELL1. L'Association avec la Grèce L'Association 
à la Cee Ed. Université de Bruxelles, Bruxelles 1970 p.29. Moro 
Report European Peurliament Document n.134 28.11.1966 cited in
footnote (37) COSTONIS, The Association with Nigeria Ibidem p.237.
23 In the preamble to these agreements the Contracting Piurties 
proclaim their wish to strengthen and widen "the relations 
established in the past notably by the Agreement on Trade and 
Commercial and Economic Cooperation..".*
24 See case 24/62 Germany v. Commission 4.7.1963 (1963) £££
p. 63. HEN, La motivation des actes des institutions 
communautaires CPE 1977 pp.49-91; TIZZANO, La Corte di Giustizia 
del le Comuni tÂ Euro pee Jovene. Napoli 1967 pp. 336-341. The absence 
of legal basis however, can be corrected by the elements of the 
whereas when the illustration of the facts and aims can clearly 
indicate the legal basis. See case 112/80 Dinbeck v. Hauptzollamt 
Frankfurt 5.5.1981 (1981) ESB. p.1095, grounds 19 and 20. The
essence or the wrong indication of the legal basis are grounds for 
eumulment of Community acts under Article 173 as an infringement
agreement concluded25 with third countries make no exception.
The technical-legal rationale of the obligation to indicate 
the legal basis is derived from the fact that the Community enjoys 
only a "compétence d'attribution" whereby it can act within the 
limits of the powers and competencies established in the Treaty.
The Community can therefore act in a specific area only if it 
is possible to find an Article in the Treaty which confers such 
an authority to the Community.
It shall, however, be considered that the sphere of the 
Community competencies and powers is not clearly defined in the
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of essential procedural requirements. The Court has, however, 
declared an act void only when the legal basis which has been 
incorrectly referred to modifies the voting procedures. Thus 
decision 87/369 whereby the Council concluded the International 
Convention for the Harmonized System of Nomenclature of Goods based 
on Articles 28, 113 and 235 was not quashed because both provisions 
required unanimity in the Council (the decision was adopted before 
the entry into force of the SEA which has modified the voting 
procedure of Article 28). On the contrary Regulation 2096/87, on 
the temporary admission of containers, founded on Articles 28 and 
235, and adopted after the entry into force of the SEA, was 
declared void because Article 235 requires a different voting 
procedure than Article 28. See cases 165/87 Commission v . Council 
27.09.1988 (1988) ECR p.5545, 275/87 Commission v. Council
2.02.1989 (1989) p. 259.
25 In Community law the term used is "conclusion" of agreement. 
Since the entry into force of these acts (usually a regulation or 
a decision) the agreement becomes integral part of the community 
legal order. There is not need of an incorporation of agreements 
into a Community Act. See case 181/73 Haegemann v. Belgium 
30.4.1974 (1974) ECR p. 449. TIZZANO,A. Nota alla causa 181/73 Foro 
it. 1974 p.311. See PESCATORE,P. L'application judiciaire des 
traités internationaux dans la Communauté Européenne et dans les 
Etats Membres Mélanges Teitcren Pedone, Paris, 1984, pp.391-409, p. 
394
Treaty26 and, moreover, this has been enlarged by the doctrine of 
implied powers and through the application of Article 23527. It 
shall be remembered that the Treaty expressly gives treaty-making 
power to the Community in Articles 1132*, 238 and, since after the 
entry into force of the Single European Act agreements can be 
concluded in the field of research and technology (Article 13ON)
24
"..the sphere of Community competence is defined by 
reference to a combination of elements to be assessed; it is based 
on the subject dealt with as well as on the action the Community 
may undertake and the powers which have been conferred upon it for 
that purpose" TIZZANO,A. The Powers of the Community Commission of 
the European Communities Thirty Years of Community Law European 
Perspectives, Luxembourg 1981 pp.43-67 p. 43.
27 See TIZZANO, A. Lo sviluppo delle competenze materiali delle 
comunitâ europee RDE 1981 pp. 139-210.
28 The extent of the Community competence to enter into
agreements with third countries on the basis of this Article 
depends upon the interpretation given to the notion of commercial 
policy. The Court has so fear adopted an extensive interpretation 
of this notion. See opinion 1/75 11.11.1975 ECR (1975) p. 1355; 
1/78 4.10.1979 (1979) ECR p. 2871. The extensive interpretation has 
been confirmed more recently in case 45/86 26.03.1987 Commission 
v. Council (1987)ECR p.1493, case 275/87 op.cit. (containers), 
Greece v. Council 62/88, op.cit. The exclusive competence of the 
Community in the field of commercial policy, based on joined cases 
37,38/73 13.12.1973 (1973)ECR p.1609 and on opinion 1/75, op.cit. 
was put into question by case 174/86 Bulk Oil v. Sun International 
18.02.1086 (1986) ECR. p. 559. The Court afterwards re-confirmed, 
although in an obiter dictum, the exclusivity of the commercial 
policy (case 127/87 Commission v. Greece 21.06.1988 (1988)
p.3333. See for criticisms of the extensive interpretation of the 
commercial policy GILSDORF, Portée et délimitation des compétences 
communautaires en matière de politique commerciale RMC 1989 pp. 195, 
DEMARET,P. La politique commerciale:perspectives d'évolution et 
faiblesses présentes SCHWARZE, SCHERMERS (eds.) Structure and 
Dimensions of European Community Policy Nomos, Baden-Baden 1987 
p.83 where the author underlines the necessity of defining the 
respective fields of action of Member States and the Community and 
finds in the "evolutionary" character of commercial policy an 
obstacle to this operation.
and of the environment (Article 130R19) . The Community's power to 
conclude agreements with third countries also derives30 from the 
competence to adopt internal rules (theory of the parallelism 
between internal and external competence3l) . Article 235 is also,
25
29 See on the specific subject CONSTANTINESCO,V. Les 
compétences de la CEE et de ses Etats Membres à travers l'Acte
Unique PEHARET.Pt (?$)__Rélations Extérieures de la Communauté
Européenne et marché intérieur: aspects juridiques et fonctionnels 
Story-Scientia, Bruxelles 1987 pp. 65-90, p. 69 ff. and 
EHLERMANN,C.D. L'Acte unique et les compétences externes de la 
Communauté: un progrès? Ibidem pp. 79-90. Both the authors discuss 
the question of whether, on the basis of the theory of parallelism, 
Article 100A can be used as legal basis agreements with third 
countries concluded by the Community. See CONSTANTINESCO p. 68 and 
EHLERMANN p.88. Agreements for scientific cooperation were, 
however, concluded on the basis of Article 235 even after the entry 
into force of the Single European Act. See the Cooperation 
Agreement with Austria on research related to advanced materials 
in O.J. L 276 1988. This reference seems contrary to the holding 
of the Court in case 45/86, op.cit.
30 See case 22/70 Commission v. Council 31.03.1971 ECR (1971) 
p.263; joined cases 3,4,6,/76 Kramer and others. 14.07.1976 (1976) 
ECR p.1308, opinion 1-76 26.04.1977, ECR (1977) p. 754. There is 
a vast literature on the subject which is impossible to cite here. 
See BOULOIS,J. La jurisprudence de la Cour de Justice dans les 
rélations extérieures RCADI 1978 (II) PESCATORE,P. External 
Relations in the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities CMLRev 1979 pp. 615-645 KOVAR,R. Les compétences 
implicites: jurisprudence de la Cour et pratique communautaire 
DEMARET,P.(ed) Rélations Extérieures o p.cit. pp. 15-36. A closely 
related question is that of the division of treaty-making power 
between the Community and the Member States. The question will be 
analyzed more extensively later.
31 The doctrine does not use uniform terminology. For instance 
competence and power are often used as synonyms. I consider that 
is better to distinguish the two as follows: competence refers to 
the authority of an entity (Community or Member State) to act in 
a certain subject matter, whereas capacity is the power or the 
authority to use a certain instrument (agreement, rules applicable 
internally) through which the entity exercises its competence. Thus 
the Community may have the authority to act in a specific area 
only through the adoption of internal rules ("internal" 
competence) but not the power to conclude agreements with third 
countries on the same matter ("external competence). Therefore it 
is more correct to say that the Court of Justice has extended the
as mentioned above, a possible legal basis for Community 
agreements22.
There is also a political-institutional consideration which 
should be considered. The choice of legal basis determines the 
instruments available to the Community (regulations, directives, 
programmatic acts, consultation, agreements with third countries) 
and the procedures which must be followed (voting majority in the 
Council, consultation of other institutions).
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power of the Community (from internal noirm-setting power to treaty- 
making power) more than its competence. See WEILER,J.H. The 
Transformation of Europe Yale L.J 1991,pp. 2403-2482, p.2416. For 
a distinction between competence and power see CONSTANTINESCO,V. 
Compétences et pouvoirs de la CEE ..., NEUWALL, N . Joint 
Participation in International Treaties and the Exercise of Power 
by the EEC and its Member States: Mixed Agreements CMLRev 1991, pp. 
717-740, p. 718. For a distinction between capacity and competence 
see LACHMANN,P. International Legal Personality of the EC: Capacity 
and Competence LIEI 1984, pp.3-21; BIEBER,R. seems to use the term 
power as synonym of competence On the Mutual Completion of 
Overlapping Legal System: the Case of the EC and the National Legal 
Orders ELRev 1988, pp.147-158.
32 The possibility to refer to Article 235 as a legal basis
for Community agreements with third countries was sanctioned by the 
Court in the ERTA case, op.cit. The difference between the theory 
of parallel powers and application of Article 235 is that in the 
former case the Community already has competence to act, although 
only internally, in a certain field, in the latter case the 
Community competence is extended to a new field of action. Article 
235 has been used together with Article 113 in the case of 
agreements of cooperation with some countries in Latin America, 
Asia and more recently in Eastern Europe and the States of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council.FERNANDEZ SOLA,N. Relations avec les Pays de 
l'AELE et de l'Est, aspects Juridiques RMC 1990, pp.208-216; 
LüCRON,C.P. Communauté Européenne et pays du Golfe RMC 1989, 
pp.527-535. MARESCAD,M. A general survey of the current legal 
framework of trade relations between the European Community and 
Eastern Europe MARESCAD,M (ed.) The Political and Legal Framework 
of Trade relations between the European Community and Eastern 
Europe Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1989, pp.3-20
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Disputes between the Community and its member States and 
amongst the Community institutions themselves, therefore arise33 in 
relation to the choice of legal basis, particularly since the entry 
into force of the Single European Act34.
The cases before the Court concerning the question of the 
legal basis can be distinguished between 1) claims of the 
Commission versus the Council where the former contested the choice 
of legal basis requiring unanimity in the Council and 2) appeals 
of Member States contesting the legal basis requiring the majority 
in the Council because the Article of the Treaty on which the act 
was founded was insufficient. When a specific legal basis is not 
sufficient a second provision may be referred to enlarge the 
Community authority to act. The second legal basis suggested by the 
Council or the Member States in the cases cited above are Article 
235 or 100 or, Article 130S. It is not by chance that these 
articles provide for a voting procedure by unanimity in the 
Council. For cases of the Commission versus the Council see 165/87, 
(tariff nomenclature) op.cit./ 275/87, (containers), op.cit.. 
242/87 30.05.1989 (1989) ECR p.1425 (Erasmus)/ case 131/87
16.01.1989 (1989) p. 3743 (100/43 trade in animal glands);
300/89 11.06.1991 (1991) nyr (choice between Articles 100A and
130S) . See also, as regards inter-institutional disputes over legal 
basis case 70/88 European Parliament v. Council. 22.05.1990 (1990) 
ECR p. 2041. For the claims of the Member States see 131/86 UK v. 
Council. 23.02.1988 (1988) ECR p. 905 (hens kept in battery cages), 
68/86 UK v. Council 23.02.1988 (1988) ECR p.855 (hormones), joined 
cases 51/89,90/89,94/89 UK.France and Germany v. Council 11.06.1991 
nyr (Cornett II/ Article 128 no sufficient legal basis). In Greece 
v. Council. Greece required the annulment of regulation 3955/87 
concerning the import regime of agricultural products from third 
countries after the Chernobyl accident because Article 113 did not 
constitute a sufficient legal basis because the act pursued aims 
of protection of health which could not be covered by Article 113 
alone. See ROBERTI,M. La giurisprudenza della Corte di giustizia 
sulla "base giuridica" degli atti comunitari Foro It 1991, Parte 
IV pp.99-120. ROSSI,L. L'armonizzazione fiscale dopo l'Atto Unico: 
problemi di base giuridica DCSI 1989, 247-251. PILLITU,A.P. Sulla 
"base giuridica" degli atti comuniteuri in materia ambientale Foro 
1991, Parte IV, pp.370-383.
34 The large number of cases decided by the Court after the 
Single European Act can be explained by the fact that the SEA not 
only introduced a number of significant amendments concerning 
majority voting (since before the SEA the practice was to reach an 
agreement by consensus even when the Treaty requires majority 
voting) in the Council but modified the approach to voting. 
Majority voting was not an aim per se but was conceived of as 
functional to the construction of the internal market. See
Let us illustrate this with an example. Article 113, one of 
the most discussed provisions of the EEC Treaty, lays down the 
Community (exclusive) competence to act in the field of commercial 
policy. However, this notion is not defined in the Treaty. This 
means that a broad interpretation of this notion will narrow down 
the scope of action left to the Member States.
Moreover, the reference to Article 113 means that the Council 
will vote by qualified majority, depriving a Member State of the 
possibility of vetoing a measure contrary to its national 
interests.
Finally, in the field of external relations, there is another 
consequence ensuing from the choice of the legal basis.
The choice may also have a symbolic significance. The case of 
Yugoslavia can provide an illustration. A five year non- 
preferential trade agreement was concluded for a duration of three 
years in 1973 with Yugoslavia35 on the basis of Articles 113 and 
114, it was then renewed in 1975 for a period of five years. In 
1980 a new agreement was concluded on the model of the other 
Cooperation Agreements with the Mediterranean countries. This 
agreement went even further, since it included provisions on 
cooperation in the field of environment and fishery policy. The 
adoption of measures for the protection of investments was also 
envisaged36. A main difference concerned technical cooperation 
financed only with loans from the European Investment Bank. When 
the Community concluded the agreement, it drew its legal basis from
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DEHOUSSE, R. 1992 and Beyond: the Institutional Dimension of the 
Internal Market Programme LIEI 1989 pp. 109-136. See also 
WEILER,J.H. The Transformation of Europe Yale L.J. 1991, pp. 2403- 
2483 p. 2461 where the author notes "today, an actual vote by the 
majority remains the exception. Most decisions are reached by 
consensus. But reaching consensus under the shadow of the vote is 
altogether different from reaching it under the shadow of the 
veto".
35 O.J. L 224 1973.
36 See Articles 4 and 5.
the EEC Treaty37 as its legal basis. The reasons for this choice 
can be found in the fact that Yugoslavia, in view of its status as 
a non-aligned country, did not want to be included, formally at any 
rate, within the framework of Mediterranean policy. Alternatively, 
the reference to Article 238 could have suggested a choice in this 
direction38. It is interesting to note that the interim agreements 
which provided for the application of trade relations and financial 
cooperation pending the entry into force of the Cooperation 
Agreement (which, being mixed, required the ratification by the 
Member States' national Parliaments) were founded on Article 113 
and Article 23539, respectively, which confirms the option to avoid 
Article 238.
The development of the relationships with the Community and 
its Member States and a change in the political climate contributed 
to the removal of the symbolic obstacle presented by Article 238. 
In 1987 the second Financial Protocol was concluded on the basis 
of Article 23840.
Another case related to the symbolic value of the legal basis
is the agreement of 197S with Israel based on Article 113 even if
it is not merely restricted to trade relationships.
Presumedly, this can be due to the reticence of the Council
to conclude an association agreement with Israel as suggested by
29
37 O.J. L 41 1983.
31 It should be taken into account that a high number of joint- 
ventures contracts linked European and Yugoslavian firms and that 
Yugoslavian economy was organized as a market economy where the 
State did not exert direct control over enterprises. See 
GOLDSTAIN, A . The Relations of Yugoslavia and the EEC CMLRev 1981 
pp. 569-587.
39 See O.J. L 130 1980.
40 See O.J. L 389 1987. Following the recent events in
Yugoslavia the agreement was suspended by a decision of the Council 
and the representatives of Member States meeting within the 
Council, see O.J. L 315 1991.
the Commission and the Parliament41.
The conclusion of an agreement which extended trade 
cooperation to include provisions on investment and transfer of 
technology can be seen as a compromise between the different points 
of view among the Community institutions.
The adoption of the Financial and Technical Protocol in 
1978,42 on the basis of Article 238, marked the definitive alignment 
of the relationships with Israel to the Mediterranean global 
policy. This also implies that the renewal of the financial and 
technical cooperation is submitted, after the amendments of the 
Single European Act, to the new procedural requirements laid down 
in Article 238. Consequently, as will be discussed later, the 
adoption of the third financial Protocol was deferred by the 
European Parliament*s refusal to give its assent.
Further examples of the political and symbolic meaning of 
Article 238 can be found in the agreements concluded with Poland, 
Czechoslovakia and Hungary, replacing (and improving) the previous 
agreements based on Articles 113 and 235.
As will be argued later, the modification of the legal basis 
of the Agreements with Europeetn countries, seems more an indication 
of the different type of relations than a requirement due to the 
subjects matters covered.
2 .b) Article 238.
Article 238 lays down the legal basis for the conclusion of 
association agreements between the Community and a third State, a 
union of States or an international organization. The association 
agreement is not defined in the above mentioned provision which 
simply states that such agreements involve "reciprocal rights and
30
41 See VITTA L'accordo tra la Comunità europea e lo Stato di 
Israele TIZZANO,A. La politica Mediterranea della Cee Napoli, ed. 
Scientifica 1981, p. 76-77.
42 O.J. L 270 1978.
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obligations, common action and special procedures."
Let us examine the above mentioned attributes indicated in 
Article 238 to qualify association agreements.
Reciprocal rights and obligations. This seems to be a feature 
characteristic of all international agreements. The question 
arising in this context is whether the preferential treatment 
granted only by one Contracting Party contradicts the letter of 
Article 238.
In the case of the agreements which are the objects of this 
study, for example, as will later be discussed in more details, 
only industrial and agricultural products imported into the 
Community from Maghreb countries are granted the abolition of 
customs duties, charges of equivalent effect, quotas and measures 
of equivalent effect. This does not mean that no obligations placed 
upon the Maghreb countries as regards the importation of products 
from the Community. Maghreb countries are in fact obliged to apply 
"the most-favored nation clause" to the Community in the field of 
trade. Other duties imposed on the Community partners concern the 
consultation or notification obligations laid down in certain 
provisions, as in the case of a derogation from the most-favored 
nation clause. Corresponding rights and duties are established for 
some of the provisions on social cooperation or in those 
establishing common institutions.
Practice reveals that Article 238 covers preferential 
agreements (in the framework of the development cooperation policy 
of the Community) and non preferential agreements with European 
countries (Agreements with EFTA countries, while not yet in force 
still presumably founded on Article 328).
Common action. This is often connected with the power of 
adopting recommendations or decisions by the common institutions 
created by the agreement. This very general term also suggests43 
cooperation between the parties, although this leaves room for very
43 CAPOTORTI, F . Relazione introduttiva La oolitica
Mediterranea.. çp.çi£.
wide interpretation. For instance, in the case of the EEA Agreement 
the Contracting Parties contracted to strengthen cooperation, inter 
alia, in fields such as research and technological development, the 
environment, social policy and consumer protection. This 
Cooperation might take different forms such as the participation 
of EFTA states in Community framework programmes, or the 
establishment of joint activities in specific areas (see Article 
78-88) .
Special procedures. This expression does not refer to the 
procedures of negotiation which are indicated in another Treaty 
Article (228) . There is common agreement in legal doctrine that 
this term is intended to mean the establishment of common 
institutions. Common institutions have also been established in 
commercial agreements. If, therefore, institutionalization per se 
does not characterize association agreements, it can be argued that 
a more complex institutional structure may, on the contrary, 
distinguish association agreements from other agreements based on 
a different legal basis.
This observation is founded on the examination of actual 
practice, which shows that association agreements usually set up 
an Association or Cooperation Council composed of members of the 
EEC Council or of representatives of Member States, members of the 
Commission and members of the government of the other contracting 
party, a Committee, and in some cases, a Parliamentary Assembly 
composed of representatives of the European Parliament and the 
Parliament of the other contracting party.
The establishment of this institutional structure is the 
consequence of other characteristics of the association agreements, 
such as its indefinite duration and the framework character of such 
agreements, which require "adjustments" to changing circumstances 
and the adoption of decisions or other acts for the administration
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of the agreement44 (see Article 5 of the Cooperation Agreement with 
Morocco which provides that the Cooperation Council periodically 
defines the guidelines of cooperation and Article 32 concerning 
the adaptation of the tariff nomenclature).
Thus it is clear from what has been observed above that none 
of these terms can really clarify the content of the term 
association45.
It is in fact commonly agreed in the literature that these 
features are not capable per se to provide a basis for 
distinguishing association agreements from other agreements founded 
on a different legal basis. As mentioned above, while in other 
cases the legal basis identifies the field of action which is the 
object of the agreement46 there is nothing in Article 238 which 
indicates the possible content of association agreements.
Article 238 does not lay down a competence for the Community 
to act in a specific area but only indicates a category of 
agreements41.
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44 BISCOTTINI,G . Considerazioni sugli accordi di associazione 
alla Cee BISCOTTINI, G.(ed.) Tavole rotonde di diritto Comunitario 
Vol.I (1967-1977) Vita e Pensiero, Milano 1980, pp. 90-106. COLOMBO 
E.M. La nature juridique de l'association à la Communauté 
Economique Européenne L'association à la CEE. Aspects Juridiques. 
Ed. Université libre de Bruxelles, Bruxelles 1970 pp.1-14
45 See FOIS, Articolo 238 PENNACCHINI, MONACO, FERRRARI BRAVO 
(eds) Commentario CEE pp. 1726-1736, DE NOVA R. Gli accordi di 
associazione alla Cee. Rilievi comparativi. BISCOTTINI Tavole 
rotonde .. op.cit. pp.107-115.
46 Under Artide 113 or in another area where the Community 
has competence where the external competence is based on the 
internal one (ERTA doctrine). Article 235 enlarges the field of 
action of the Community in external relations as well. The content 
of agreements based on this provision is not defined and encounters 
the only limit laid down in this provision.
47 According to FLAESCH-MOUGIN, C. the association is a "frame" 
that can have a different content according to the Community's 
partner(s). Les accords externes de la CEE. Essai d'une typologie, 
Ed. Université de Bruxelles, Bruxelles 1979 pp.33-41, DE NOVA
It is therefore significemt that the interpretations of 
Article 238 proposed by the various commentators are based and 
inspired by a study of actual practice. At the beginning of the 
seventies a distinction was made between association and adhesion 
emd was clearly influenced by the association agreement with Greece 
and Turkey4*. Attempts have also been made, on the basis of actual 
practice, to create a "typology" of association agreements. 
Verloren Van Theemat distinguishes between: a) association as a 
substitute for membership, b) association as a special form of 
development assistance and c) association as a precondition for 
membership49. Capotorti refers to association of a first and second 
generation (respectively the agreement with Greece, Turkey and with 
Malta and Cyprus) and cooperation with Maghreb countries. For this 
author, in the Mediterranean in practice one model of agreement has 
developed with some variations50. The EEC Commission seems to 
distinguish between association for the purpose of development and 
association prior to accession, which does not exclude the 
possibility of a "combination" of these two types51.
Since neither the wording of this provision nor the practice 
of application seems to clarify the notion of association it should 
be asked whether Article 238 furnishes a correct legal basis for 
relationships with Maghreb countries or whether it would be 
possible to use any alternative provisions in the Treaty.
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** See PESCATORE,P. Les relations externes de la CEE RCADI 
19.. pp.139 ff. IAJCHAIRE,F. Les Associations è la CEE RCADI 1975,
I, pp.245-308. See BISCOTTINI OD.cit. #
49 See KAPTEYN,P.J.G. VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT Introduction to the 
Law of the EC Kluwer, Deventer, Boston 1989 p.828.
50 See also POCAR,F.Caratteri ed evoluzione degli accordi 
internazionali stipulati dalla CEE BISCOTTINI,G.(ed) I trattati
internazionali_stipulati dalla CEE Tavole rotonde di diritto
comunitario 1980, Vita e Pensiero, Milano 1983 pp.86-99.
51 See case 12/86 Demirei v. Stadt Schwäbisch Gmünd 30.09.1987 
ECR (1987) p. 3719, report for the hearing p. x3730
Article 113 can be excluded because the notion of commercial 
policy cannot cover technical and finemcial cooperation as laid 
down in the Cooperation Agreements, even if one adopts a broad 
notion of commercial policy52. These difficulties could have been 
partially overcome with the participation of Member States in the 
negotiation and conclusion of the Cooperation Agreements. However, 
it is questionable whether the role of the EIB in the financing of 
cooperation could be covered by Article 11353. Moreover, a 
"deterrent" against the use of Article 113 lies in the exclusivity 
of common commercial policy54 which would have precluded the 
conclusion of similar agreements by Member States.
A possible solution to the absence of a Community competence 
in the field of technical and financial cooperation would have been 
to add Article 235 to Article 113. From a legal point of view the 
conditions of application of Article 235 would have been satisfied 
if one considers that i) the aim of association is inscribed in the 
EEC Treaty, Article 3.k and that ii) the Community did not posses 
the necessary powers to make such far reaching agreements, since, 
it could have been argued, Azrticle 238 provides for reciprocity of 
rights and duties and could not be applied to a non-preferential
35
52 Financial and technical cooperation, as conceived in the 
Cooperation Agreements, cannot be considered as "individual clauses 
of an altogether subsidiary or ancillary nature" in relation to 
trade cooperation which, although a fundamental pillar of the 
Agreements is not the essential objective of the relationships 
established by them. See Opinion 1/78 op.cit. para. 56. At the time 
of negotiations and conclusion of these agreements the Court of 
Justice had not yet full developed its case law on common 
commercial policy.
53 See the case of the Financial Cooperation with Yugoslavia 
which was financed by loans of the Bank and for whose conclusion 
the Community applied Article 235.
54 See opinion 1/75 op.cit. p. 1363.
agreement55.
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Why was Article 238 chosen? Perhaps a more technical legal 
reason is to be found in the very character of Article 238 as an 
"elastic" construction. "The essential quality of this regime is 
its great flexibility; on the one hand, it permits both bilateral 
and multilateral associations. On the other, it authorizes all 
forms of scheme, those which borrow only a few provisions from the 
Treaty of Rome and those which entail virtually its total 
adoption."56 This therefore means that the subject matters that can 
be covered by the Agreements are not defined a priori. The 
flexibility of Article 238 seems to be confirmed by the conclusion 
of new types of agreements (for the extension of areas covered and 
for the scope pursued) based on this provision between the 
Community and its Member States with the EFTA member States and 
Liechtenstein (EEA Agreement) and with Poland, Czechoslovakia and
55 The reference to Article 235 alone would not be correct
since a important part of the Agreement concern trade. The use of 
Article 235 when an alternative basis exists in the Treaty was 
sanctioned by the Court only in 1987 in case 45/86 (system of 
Generalized Preferences) . See for comparison case 8/73 Hauptzollamt 
Brenerhaven v. Massev Ferouson 12.7.1973 (1973) £££ p. 897.
Although in a previous case the Court ruled on the 
"complementarity" of Article 235 (joined cases 73-74/64 (1964) ECR 
p. 23, in Massey-Ferouson recourse to Article 235 was not censured 
by the Court, notwithstanding the presence in the Treaty of 
specific provisions, that is Articles 9,27,28 11 and 113, which, 
by admission of the Court itself, could have provided the necessary 
authority for the Community to adopt regulation 803/68 on the 
determination of value of goods for customs purposes. This case- 
law was modified in case 45/86. The concern of the Court in this 
latter case, that the use of Article 235 as alternative to Article 
113 would have modified the voting procedure within the Council, 
would not have raised in the case of the alternative with Article 
238 since both the provisions establish for the consultation of the 
Parliament and for the voting by unanimity in the Council.
56 First Memorandum from the Commission to the Council 
Bruxelles, Feb., 26 1959. Cited by COSTONIS Treaty -Making Power 
of the European Communities: the Perspectives of Decade CMLRev. 
1967 pp.421-457 footnote n. 95 p. 448.
Hungary (Europe Agreements)57.
Second, the term association recalls that used in the 
Declaration of Intent for Morocco and Tunisia and Article 238 
acquired that symbolic meaning which has been discussed above. 
Finally, Article 238 requires unanimity in the Council.
It seems that the choice of Article 238 as legal basis for the 
Cooperation Agreements with Maghreb countries can be justified for 
two reasons:
- It allows the conclusion of agreements covering a large number 
of subject matters. The question of the subjects which can be 
covered by the association agreements is particularly relevant if 
one considers that all the agreements concluded on the basis of 
Article 238 are mixed**, that is concluded by the Community and by 
the Member States. The few exceptions are limited to the first
37
57 The EE A Agreement should create a homogeneous European 
Economic Area which means the free circulation of persons, 
services, goods and capital and the application of uniform rules 
of competition in the whole Area. In the words of the Commission 
the aim of the agreement is that of creating an homogeneous 
economic area where a law which is substantially identical to that 
in force within the Community should apply as uniformly as 
possible. In opinion 1/91 rendered on the basis of Article 228 the 
14.12.1991 (nyr) the Court of Justice ruled on the incompatibility 
of this agreement with the EEC Treaty. The Agreement was modified. 
A second opinion (1/92), required by the European Parliament, was 
rendered the 10.04.1992. In this case the Court found the emended 
agreement compatible with the Treaty as far as the questions 
submitted by the Peurliament were concerned. The Europe Agreements 
have the scope of establishing a cooperation in various fields 
between the Community and some Eastern European countries with the 
scope of helping them towards market economy and with the ultimate 
aim of integrating these countries in the process of Europe an 
integration. The agreements ested>lish a political dialogue between 
the peurties (on the Community side using the mechanisms of the 
Europeeui Political Cooperation), a free trade area (to be reached 
at the end of a transitional period) for industrial products and 
cooperation in fields such as energy, environment, transport, 
tourism, culture, telecommunication.., temporal financial 
assistance is also provided for.
M The literature on the subject is vast, see, inter alia. 
O'KEEFFE, SCHERMERS (eds.) Mixed Agreements. Kluwer, Deventer 1983.
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associations agreements (Morocco and Tunisia). The correlated 
problem is therefore whether the Community could conclude the 
Cooperation Agreements with Maghreb countries alone, or if the 
ratification by Member States was necessary. Mixity is justified 
for reasons not solely relating to the absence of community 
competencies to avoid pre-emption. This will be discussed in the 
following section (c).
- Article 238 symbolized, the provision founding the treaty 
relationships with "privileged" developing countries. This will be 
discussed in section (d).
2.c) The Subject Matters of Agreements of Association.
As regards the areas covered by a "pure" Agreement 238, some 
indications have been inferred by the legal doctrine from the 
position of Article 238 (Article 238 is contained in Part Six of 
the Treaty, General and Final Provisions in the Treaty) and from 
the rules of procedure estedzlished therein59.
See LOUIS, ,J.v., BRUCKNER, P. Relations__Extérieures
MEGRET,J. Le Droit de la CEE Vol. 12, pp.84-93. The interpretation 
of Article 238 as covering all the subjects of competence of the 
Community see also COLOMBO, La natura.. op.cit. p.6, DEWOST, Les 
compétences explicites: délimitation et mise en oeuvre
DEMARET,P. (ed) Rélations__ extérieures op.cit. pp. 1-14. See
observation of the Commission in case 12/86 Mevrem Demire 1 v. Stadt 
Schwabisch Gmund 30.9.1987 (1987) ECR p.3731 where it refers to the 
position of Article 238 showing the Community general power to
conclude agreements, which also explains the heavy procedural
requirements: unanimity in the Council and assent of the European 
Parliament. Should the association agreement require amendment to 
the Treaty, these are adopted according to the procedure of 
Article 236. According to RAWLINSON,W., An Overview of EEC Trade 
with Non-Community Countries and the Law Governing these External 
Agreements Fordham International Law Journal 13, 1989-1990, pp.205- 
233. Article 238 envisages agreement falling outside the scope of 
the Treaty. "This is evident from the reference in Article 238 to 
Article 236, which set out procedures for amending the EEC Treaty". 
It seems to me that this proves the contrary. If an agreement
concluded on the basis of Article 238 covers areas outside those
covered by the Treaty, amendments are required.
The Court has never specified which areas can be included in 
an agreement based on Article 238. In Haeaeman60 the Court ruled 
that agreements concluded under Articles 228 and 238 are acts of 
the Community institutions within the meaning of Article 177.l.b 
and therefore the Court has jurisdiction to give a preliminary 
ruling on the interpretation of these agreements.
However, in the case of mixed agreements it is not clear 
whether the Court's interpretation extends to all the provisions 
of such agreements, i.e. even those falling within the Member 
States' exclusive competence. The technique of mixed agreements 
is based by the division of competencies between the Community and 
the Member States61, whereby the Community has competence over 
certain areas and the Member States over others. In the majority 
of mixed agreements, the division of competence, i.e. which part 
of the subjects covered by the agreement, are under the exclusive 
or concurrent competence of the Community and which are outside is
39
60 Case 181/73 R & U Haeaeman v. Belgium 30.04.1974, (1974)
ECR. 459. The agreement in question was the association agreement 
concluded with Greece. For the question of the competence of the 
Court to give a prelimimtry ruling on the interpretation of 
agreements see ADAM for whom the object of the preliminary ruling 
of the Court ex Ajrticle 177 cannot be other than the acts adopted 
by the Community to conclude or implement the agreement, and not 
the agreement itself. ADAM,R. Corte comunitaria ed interpretazione 
degli accordi di associazione RDI 1975 pp. 584-589. See the 
observations of Advocate General Warner favorable to an analogous 
restrictive interpretation acknowledging the competence of the 
Court to interpret the agreement as a parameter to judge the 
validity or interpretation of a Community act adopted to enforce 
the agreement. See KCVAR,R. Note on Haegeman Journ .Dr. Int. 1976, 
pp. 193-195.
61 See NEUWALL, N. Joint Participation in International 
Treaties and the Exercise of Power by the EEC and its Member 
States: Mixed Agreements CMLRev 1991, pp. 717-740, according to 
this author mixity is not always imposed by the question of the 
division of powers between Member States and the Community, see p. 
717 and footnote (3).
unclear62.
Therefore, Haecremann can be interpreted in two different ways.
On the one hand, it can be argued that the Court interprets 
only the provisions for which the Community has competence, 
otherwise the Court would act ultra vires. Thus, since the Court 
has interpreted provisions concerning freedom of establishment and 
social security for third countries' migrant workers, these are 
areas within the Community's competence and can be included in an 
association agreement. In the cases Razanatsimba63 and Kziber the 
Court interpreted provisions concerning, respectively, the freedom 
of establishment euid the social security treatment of third 
countries' migrant workers. It is interesting to note that in none 
of these cases was the competence of the Court to interpret the 
relevant provisions contested on the basis of the lack of 
competence of the Community to act in that area (both the 
agreements concerned are mixed).
On the other hand, the Court can interpret all the provisions 
of an agreement even those within the competence of the Member 
States64, and consequently the interpretation by the Court of these 
areas has no consequence on the division of competence between the 
Community and Member States. The rationale of the latter 
interpretation is that Member States in concluding such agreements 
undertake an obligation to fulfill the duties deriving from the 
agreement as regards the Community, which is therefore authorized 
to determine the extent of those obligations (Kupferbera). The 
argument that interpretation by the Court would assure uniform 
interpretation across the whole Community territory, even of the
40
62 On the difficulties linked to a declaration of competence 
see TEMPLE LANG,J. The Ozone Layer Convention: a New Solution to 
the Question of Community Peurticipation in "Mixed" International 
Agreements CMLRev 1986, pp.157-176.
63 Case 65/77 Razanatsimba 24.11.1977 (1977) £Cg p. 2229.
64 See GAJA,G. Sull'interpretazione di accordi misti da parte 
della Corte di Giustizia RDI 1988, pp. 605-606.
provisions outside the Community's competence65 is more convincing.
The question of the jurisdiction of the Court to interpret 
provisions which are in principle outside the Community external 
relation power was not dealt with expressly in Razanatsimba and 
Kziber cases. This was done in Demirel. Germany and the United 
Kingdom considered in fact that the Community could interpret only 
those provisions falling within its exclusive competence, which 
excluded the Articles on the free movement of Turkish migrant 
workers. Germany and the U.K. asked therefore whether the Court is 
competent to rule on a matter outside the Community's competence.
The Court dismissed the questionaffirming that the area 
fell within the Community's competence and thus the Court had 
jurisdiction to interpret the relevant provisions. According to the 
Court, in fact. Article 238 empowers the Community to undertake 
commitments as regards third countries in all the fields covered 
by the Treaty. Since the free movement of workers is one of them 
"it follows that commitments regeurding freedom of movement fall 
within the power conferred on the Community by Article 238". This 
case leaves some questions open. First, it should be noted that the 
Court does not seem to give a general ruling on Article 238, but 
to reason on the specific case. The Court in fact maintains that 
"the agreement in question67 is an association agreement creating 
special, privileged links with a non-member country which must, at
41
65 See NEUWALL Joint Declaration op.cit.
66 Weiler points out the fact that the Court restates the 
points made by the UK and German governments and refers to the 
submission of the two governments as challenging the Court's 
competence to interpret provisions of agreements on the basis of 
the fact that these fall within the power of the Member States. If 
the Court had simply ruled that the Community had competence in the 
field of free movement of workers this could have been interpreted 
as meaning that this was an area of concurrent competence. See 
WEILER,J.H. Thou Shalt Not Oppress a Stranger: On the Judicial 
Protection of the Human Rights of Non EC Nationals - A Critique. 
EJIL 1992, pp. 65-91.
67 Emphasis supplied.
least to a certain extent, take part in the Community system. 
Article 238 must necessarily empower the Community to guarantee 
commitments towards third countries in all the fields covered by 
the Treaty.
In other words it should be asked (i) whether the extensive 
interpretation given to Article 238 only applies to pre-accession 
agreements, which justify the participation of third countries to 
the Community system69.
A second question concerns (ii) the interpretation of the 
terms "fields covered by the Treaty", while a third problem arises 
in relation to (Hi) the connection between external competence and 
internal power. It is in fact true that the Community has 
competence in the field of free movement of workers but only as 
insofar as workers of Community Member States are concerned. As 
regards third country workers the commitments deriving from the 
agreement are to be implemented by Member States. As the Court 
specifies: "it is for Member States to lay down the rules which are 
necessary to give effect in their territory to the provisions of 
the agreement"70. This seems to indicate that external competence 
can exist without an internal power to enact common rules.
Let us now examine these questions more closely, (i) The pre­
accession model seems to create a privileged type of relationship. 
However, it does not seem correct to make a distinction between 
pre-accession association and other association agreements to found 
a different Community competence as regards the fields covered by
42
M Para 9.
69 See observations of Advocate General Darmon "when such a 
convention looks towards further accession, the Community must of 
necessity hold the most extensive powers to conclude agreements 
with non-member countries in order to cover all the fields of 
activity contemplated by the EEC Treaty" p. 3741 and Commission's 
submission according to which agreements preparing an accession 
must be capable of dealing with matters covered by a future 
accession Treaty p.3731.
70 Demirel op.cit. para. 10.
Article 238. To admit such a possibility would also require a 
definition of a pre-accession—model which is far from being clear. 
There are examples, such as the Agreements with Malta or Cyprus 
which can be considered to fall into a "grey area" between the two 
categories. It could moreover be questioned whether accession must 
be expressly provided for or if the possibility of future accession 
is enough.
It is thus submitted that once it is este&lished that 
Article 238 covers all the fields included by the Treaty this 
applies to all association agreements.
(ii) The reference to the "fields covered by Treaty" is a very 
general expression. It can be argued that the competence is not 
limited to the four freedoms but may also include subject matters 
like agriculture or competition. But cruid juris in the case of 
areas for which there is no Community norm-setting power?
Let us take the case of social policy, for which the Treaty 
provides the Community (the Commission) with a power to coordinate 
the actions of the Member States (Article 118) . Could the Community 
alone conclude an agreement of association containing provisions 
on social security?
The Cooperation Agreements with Maghreb countries contain 
provisions on this area. In light of the Demirel case is it 
possible to submit that this field, which is covered by the Treaty, 
can be the object of a provision in an association agreement where 
Member States have not participated? A negative answer would be 
based on the consideration that Member States would lose, albeit 
in the limited fields of Maghreb migrant workers, the competence 
to regulate social security. It could on the contrary be argued 
that the Agreement only establishes the obligation of non­
discrimination on the basis of nationality; there is a Community 
competence to act albeit not a norm-setting power. Article 238 
could not be the basis for a Community internal power to adopt 
binding rules, and it should therefore be based on another Treaty
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provision such as Article 23571.
Some of the instruments provided for in these agreements, like 
the mechanisms of import-earning stabilization (Stabex in Lomé) or 
financial and technical cooperation, have also been used by the 
Community to pursue development cooperation aims in relation to 
other developing countries in the framework of Community unilateral 
actions.
As seen above, both comprex and financial aid to non­
associated countries are based on Article 235. The fact that the 
same instruments for which the Community is required to refer to 
Article 235 are used in an agreement based on Article 238 can lead 
to two conclusions : either Article 238 confers on the Community the 
competence to act in fields where it has no express competence in 
the Treaty or ¿mother basis must be found. It is argued that, since 
there is nothing in Article 238 which justifies Community 
competence to conclude development cooperation agreements, the 
application of financial and technical cooperation is only possible 
because of the mixed conclusion of these agreements72.
In fact, the participation of Member States in the conclusion 
of the Cooperation Agreements has always been explained by the fact 
that cooperation was finemced through contributions from Member 
States. This interpretation seems consistent with the fact that 
subsequent to the entry in the EEC budget of funds to finance 
cooperation with Mediterranean countries, the protocols have been 
concluded by the Community alone. It can, however, be submitted 
that financial Protocols do not need to be mixed because they are 
the application of the general principles laid down in the 
Cooperation Agreements and are closely connected to them.
The participation of Member States allows the Agreement to
44
71 See WEILER,J.H. The Transformation. .op.cit. p. 2448.
72 The same applies to the Financial Protocols which were 
concluded with Malta, Cyprus and Israel to adjust the relationships 
with these countries (based on commercial agreements) to the new 
global policy.
establish cooperation with third countries in fields which are not 
within the competence of the Community. This interpretation seems 
also to explain the fact that the Protocols with Israel are mixed 
although the source of financing is not the Member States but 
rather the Community budget.
The assertion that the participation of Member States in the 
Agreement is justified by the fact that they finance cooperation 
is not convincing since it seems that financing derives from a 
competence in the field of technical cooperation73 and not the 
reverse.
In other words if the Community could undertake obligations 
vis-à-vis third countries on the basis of Article 235, could it do 
the same on the basis of Article 238? Article 238 gives the 
Community the power to act externally in the fields covered by the 
Treaty, that is where the Community has competence regardless of 
the question whether it has a norm-setting power. If the Community 
had to adopt common rules internally or to conclude an agreement 
with a third country outside the association, recourse to Article 
235 would be required (giving norm-setting power to the Community), 
but in the framework of the association Article 238 is a sufficient 
legal basis.
(iii) Finally, what about the power to implement the agreement 
within the Community?
As already mentioned above, the solution to this problem seems 
to be indicated in the Demirel where the Court held that "in the 
field of freedom of movement for workers, as Community law now 
stands, it is for the Member States to lay down the rules which are 
necessary to give effect in their territory to the provisions of 
the Agreement.." (ground 10). In practice, the Community would have 
treaty-making power but not the power to enact internal rules. This 
can be considered as inconsistent with the construction of the
45
73 For the questions of agreements concluded by the Community 
alone and containing provisions on technical cooperation (see 
infra).
external competence of the Community, which has been based on its 
internal competence. However, one should consider that in Demire1 
the Court did not apply the theory of parallel powers to Article 
23874. Therefore the presence of Member States in an association 
agreement limited to subject matters within the competence of the 
Community would not be required even if the power to enact internal 
rules remain in the hands of the States. It is well-established in 
fact that Member States are required within the Community system 
to assure the respect of commitments undertaken by the Community 
in an agreement concluded with third countries75.
A different conclusion should be drawn in the case of an 
association agreement containing provisions on a subject matter 
not covered by the Treaty such as, for example, the protection of 
environment before the entry into force of the Single European Act. 
This is the case, for example, of the Cooperation Agreements with 
Maghreb countries providing for a technical cooperation in the 
fields of science, technology and environment. It shall be noted 
that the Decleuration by the Contracting Parties on the 
interpretation of the term "Contracting parties" as used in the 
Agreement does not clarify, as it is usually the case in 
Declarations of this type, which are the subject matters for which 
the Community and its Member States are, respectively, competent. 
The decleuration merely specifies: "the expression Contracting
Parties. .means on the one hand the Community and the Member States, 
or either the Member States or the Community alone, and on the 
other hemd the Kingdom of Morocco. The meaning to be attributed to 
this expression in each case is to be deduced from the provisions 
in question of the Agreement emd from the corresponding provisions
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74 It is therefore possible to understand that the Community 
can have competence to conclude an agreement on the free movement 
of Turkish workers while its internal competence only concerns 
workers of Member States. See also Commission in Demirel p.3731
75 Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v. Kupferberg 26.10.1982 
(1982) ESR p. 3641.
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of the Treaty establishing the Community."16
In the specific case of the Cooperation Agreements with 
Maghreb countries mixity was justified by the fact that aid was 
financed by contributions from Member States. Funds from the 
Community budget replaced Member States financing in the second 
Financial Protocol which, in fact is concluded by the Community 
alone.
By way of summary, Article 238 lays down the Community treaty- 
making power in the fields where there is Community competence, but 
it does not extend the Community's competence beyond the limits of 
the Treaty. When an association agreement includes subject matters 
outside the Community competence three possible solutions are open: 
mixity, recourse to Article 235 or an amendment to the Treaty ex 
Article 236.
What are the reasons indicating that there is a clear 
preference on the part of Member States to conclude mixed 
association agreements ? The following emswers may be suggested.
The consideration of the areas to be included in the 
agreement, in particular in the case of association, also depends 
on the Community's partners and is a question which is therefore 
difficult to know in advance. If this was the case, Member States 
would consequently demand peurticipation in the negotiating phase, 
which, as one can imagine, would lead to their concluding the 
agreement, especially if one considers that it is not clear, as 
discussed etbove, which areas can be covered by Article 238.
The fact that almost all the agreements based on Article 238 
are mixed can be explained as a way of avoiding pre-emption. In the 
field of concurrent powers, once the Community has exercised its 
competence (either internally or with the conclusion of 
international agreements), Member States are not allowed to act in
16 Declaration annexed to the Cooperation Agreement q p T<74tr • P*
109.
the same subject matter77. The conclusion by the Community alone of 
an association agreement covering several fields of action would 
imply, if this doctrine is applied, that Member States would be 
prevented to conclude agreements with third countries in these 
areas.
This incidentally leaves two questions unresolved. To what 
extent are national measures still allowed once the Community has 
adopted common rules? Does preemption mean that Member States are 
not allowed to adopt any act or does the prohibition only cover 
those acts which negatively affect the common rules adopted by the 
Community? To what extent is an area preempted? In other words do 
Member States lose their power to act for the whole area or only 
to the extent of the Community intervention? These two questions 
seem closely connected. A strict interpretation of preemption - 
banning any action by Member States unless authorized by the 
Community - could be accepted only if a very strict interpretation 
of the area preempted is also applied. For example, in the field 
of common agricultural policy, the adoption of a Regulation 
establishing a common market organization for certain products does 
not preclude the Member States from adopting any acts in the same 
field. Such a Regulation enacted by the Community of wholesale 
prices does not mean that the member States cannot regulate prices 
at the retail and consumption stages, while any national regulation
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77 I follow here the distinction made by some authors between 
exclusivity and pre-emption. The first refers to the area for which 
the Community has been conceded a power to act in the Treaty which 
excludes any action of the Member States, as in the case of common 
commercial policy; the latter indicates those fields where a 
concurrent competence of the Member States exists and where the 
action of the Community deprives the Member States of the power to 
act in the same field. See LENAERTS,K . Les répercussions des 
compétences de la Communauté européenne sur les compétences 
externes des Etats membres et la question de la "preemption" 
DEMARET,P . (ed) Rélations extérieures., o p .cit. pp.37-62. NEUWALL 
Joint Participation op.cit. p.720. For the case-law on preemption 
see case 22/70 AETR, peuras. 17 and 22.
which can affect the wholesale prices is prohibited78.
If the theory - whereby the Member States are free to act 
in the external sphere until the Community has concluded an 
association agreement in relation to areas of shared competence 
between the Community and Member States - is applied to Article 
238, then, once the Community had concluded an association 
agreement in all the fields covered by the agreement, Member States 
would be precluded from concluding agreements in the same field
with the third country party to the Agreement.
It is however necesseury to consider that until very recently 
association agreements have been concluded with developing 
countries. Leaving aside the provisions on trade, for which there
is exclusive Community competence to act both internally and
externally, the other fields of action concern financial and 
technical cooperation where the relationship between the Community 
and the Member States' action is to be conceived as complementary 
more than concurrent79. It is in fact clear that in terms of 
fimuicial aid or technical assistance it would be senseless to 
consider that the intervention of the Community would prevent the 
Member States from financing or assisting the development of these 
same developing countries.
The question, however, remains open for other areas that could 
be covered by an agreement based on Article 238.
Would it be possible to avoid, in the case of an association
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78 See case 216/86 Antonini v. Prefetto di Milano 1.07.1987 
(1987) ECR p. 2519. See WAELBROECK,M. The Emergent Doctrine of 
Community Pre-emption: Consent and Redelegation SANDALOW, STEIN 
Courts and Free Markets: Perspectives for the United States aas 
Europe Vol. II, Clarendon Press, Oxford pp.548-580.
79 See MORVIDUCCI, C. La cooperazione italiana alio sviluppo e 
la CEE Riv.lt.Dir.Pubb.Com. 1991 pp.371-389 p.388. See also the 
draft treaty on Political Union signed in Maastricht on 19 December 
1991, Title XVII on development cooperation. The new competence of 
the Community is conceived as concurrent to that of Member States. 
See Europe Documents 7.02.1992 n.1759/60
agreement which only concerns the fields covered by the Treaty,
* SOpre-emption without recourse to mixity ?
It can be useful to draw a parallel with other agreements 
concluded by the Community and covering a large number of fields. 
These are the agreements with developing countries in Asia and 
Latin America81 which regulate trade, economic and development 
cooperation. The legal basis of these agreements are Article 113 
and Article 235. Article 235 is required by the absence of 
Community competence to act in some of these areas.
All these agreements include the so-called Canada clauseK, 
whereby the Member States are free to conclude with third countries 
agreements in the same fields as those covered by the agreements. 
This clause seems to avoid pre-emption.
A feature common to both these types of agreements is that 
some of their provisions (in particular economic and development 
cooperation) are drafted in very general terms, indicating the 
sectors where the Community can act rather than specifying action 
to be taken. It can be submitted that pre-emption should apply only 
in the cases where the Community has acted concretely and not as 
a mere consequence of the conclusion of the agreement. This 
interpretation would make the inclusion of the Canada clause 
superfluous in cooperation agreements based on Articles 113 and 
235.
Analogously, the participation of Member States in the 
association agreements covering only the fields included in the 
Treaty would not be considered necessary if the theory of pre­
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80 I refer to the case where mixity is not justified, my 
observations are not dictated by a negative judgment of mixed 
agreements per se.
81 The first "framework cooperation agreement" on the double 
basis of Articles 113 and 235 was, however, not concluded with a 
developing country but with Canada O.J. L 260 1976.
82 From the first agreement containing such clause, see 
footnote supra.
emption was applied as it is applied within the Community: it is 
the concrete exercise of a competence (and therefore not the 
conclusion of a framework agreement) which pre-empts Member States' 
treaty-making power.
2 .d) Article 238 and "Preferential" Agreements.
The EEC Treaty does not confer on the Community a
competence in the field of development cooperation83. This can
easily be explained if one considers that the Community's
competence in the field of external relations was originally
limited and conceived of as functional to the common market.
The first developing countries to enter into agreements with 
the community were those issued from the process of decolonization 
which had formerly been associated to the Community on the basis 
of Articles 131-136. These provided for the association with non- 
European countries and territories which maintained "special 
relations" with some of the Member States , an elegant euphemism 
to indicate a colonial relationship. The alleged scope of the 
association was to promote the economic and social development of 
these countries, although the association was a formula which 
allowed the Member States concerned (France in particular) to 
maintain close economic relations with these countries and 
territories*4.
Likewise, the very close relationships of Morocco and Tunisia 
with France, their former "mother country", explains the 
Declaration of Intent annexed to the EEC Treaty, where the 
Contracting Parties declare "their readiness, as soon as the Treaty 
enters into force, to propose to these countries the opening of
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13 See the Maastricht Union Treaty which includes a Community 
competence to act in the field of development cooperation. Article 
130W..
14 See IACCARINO Articles 131-136 QUADRI, R., MONACO,R, 
TRABUCCHI,A. Commentario Cee Giuffré, Milano 1965 pp.1025-1046
negotiations with a view to concluding conventions for economic 
association with the Community."
The evolution of the association relations is well known. Once 
the countries which were associated with the Community became 
independent, the association Convention was first "transformed" in 
the Yaundé Conventions and finally, in 1975 in the first Lomé 
Convention.
The legal basis of Lome' Conventions85 and of the first 
association agreements with Morocco and Tunisia was Article 238.
Despite the original limits, development cooperation has 
become a very important policy of the Community which has developed 
in this framework unilateral instruments and a network of 
agreements with other developing countries in Asia and Latin 
America. The legal basis had been Article 113 and of Article 235.
Article 113 has been used as a legal basis for instruments 
such as the system of generalized preferences whereby the Community 
grants preferential access (reduction or abolition of customs 
duties) to industrial and some agricultural products originating 
in developing countries. The reference to Article 113 to base the 
competence of the Community to act in the above-mentioned field has 
been made possible also by the extensive interpretation of the 
notion of commercial policy by the Court of Justice*6. Article 235
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85 The fourth Lomé Convention was concluded in 1990 (O.J. L 
229 1991) for a period of application of ten years (the first three 
Conventions were concluded for 5 years each). The agreement not 
only provides for the preferential entry of ACP industrial products 
in the Community and for financial and technical cooperation, but 
estetàlishes a global relationship covering the fields of 
environment, agriculture, food security, rural development, energy, 
services, mining, industrial, cultural, social and regional 
cooperation. Instruments used are commercial preferences, Stabex 
and Sysmin and financial aid.
86 The landmark decision is certainly Opinion 1/78 4.10.1979,
(1979) ECR p. 2871 para.45 and 46. More recently in case 45/86, 
Commission v. Council 26.03.1987, (1987) ECR p.1493 the Court was
required to rule on the question of the correct legal basis of the 
regulations for the application of the SGP for 1986, stated that 
the link with development problems "does not cause a measure to be
has been used for unilateral Community actions like the comprex, 
a system of import earning stabilization for countries outside the 
ACP Convention , financial and technical cooperation for non— 
associated developing countriesM and food aid89.
The agreements concluded with Latin America and Asian 
countries, which can be included in the framework of the 
development cooperation policy of the Community are based on 
Articles 113 and 235. The main features of these agreements it that 
they do not provide for a preferential customs duties treatment for 
their exports to the Community and do not include financial aid.
As seen above Article 235 has been referred to, together with 
Article 113, as the foundation for cooperation agreements with some
S3
excluded from the sphere of the common commercial policy as defined 
by the Treaty». See AUVRET-FINCK J. Note à l'affaire 45/86 RTDE 
1988 pp.162-182sp.p.172 ff. Article 113 has been the legal basis 
for the conclusion of commodities agreements negotiated under the 
aegis of UNCTAD. See Opinion 1/78 and MUREAU, F . L f Europe 
communautaire dans la néaotiation Nord-Sud Paris, Puf, 1984, p. 92 
ÎÎ •
87 See regulation 428/87 O.J. L 43 1987 and comments of
LEBULLANGER.J. La politique communautaire de coopération au 
développement RTDE 1988, pp.123-157
88 See Regulation 442/81 O.J.L 48 1981. See CRETIEN, Y L'aide 
financière et technique aux pays en voie de développement non 
associés MEGRET,J (ed) Le droit de la CEE. Vol.14 pp.114-127, 
NTUMBA,L. L'aide financière et technique de la CEE aux pays en voie 
de développement d'Asie et d'Amérique Latine RMC 1989 pp.336-346
89 Regulation 3972/86. To note that before 1982 when Regulation 
3331/82 was adopted. Community food aid intervention was based on 
Articles 113 and 43. The evolution of food aid from an instrument 
of commercial policy to an instrument of development cooperation, 
which steurted with Regulation 3331/82, adopted on the basis of 
Articles 113 and 235 has been completed with the adoption of 
Regulation 3972/86 which replaces the former and is based only on 
Article 235. See SNYDER,F . The European Community's New Food Aid 
and Legislation, Towards a Development Policy? SNYDER,F., SLINN, 
P.(eds.) International Law of Development Milton, Abingdon, 1987, 
pp.271-305.
• • Q ALatin American and Asian countries .
The contractual-based relationships of the Community with 
developing countries are thus distinguished in two areas, the "area 
238" and the "area 113-235". The different choice of the legal 
basis are more the symbol of the different type of the 
relationships than they are due to the different content of the 
agreements (see observations made in section (c)).
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2 .e) Article 238 and its Application in the Convention Based 
Relationships Between the Community and Maghreb Countries.
2 .e.i) Interim Agreements.
Prior to the conclusion of the Cooperation Agreements 
currently in force, the Community entered into agreements with 
Morocco and Tunisia which were concluded by the Community on the 
basis of Article 23891. The agreements provided for the 
establishment of ail association between the Community, Morocco and 
Algeria.
If an agreement, like any other act of the Community, must be 
determined on the basis of its content, than one wonders why these 
were labelled as association agreements and were based on Article 
238. Both the agreements in fact only regulate trade relationships
90 See the agreements concluded with ASEAN countries O.J. L 
144 1980 in particular Article 4, with the member countries of the 
Cartagena Agreement, O.J. L 153 1984 Article 2 and with the member 
countries of the General Treaty on Central American Economic 
Integration O.J. L 172 1986 Article 6. The development cooperation 
policy of the Community towards Asia and Latin America is carried 
out more through unilateral actions, like the SGP, the Comprex or 
financial emd technical aid than through the agreements. The 
provisions on development cooperation are laid down in very general 
terms.
91 Association agreement with Morocco 31.03.1969 O.J. L 197
1969. English Version L 239 1973. Association agreement with
Algeria 28.03.1969 O.J. L 198 8.08.1969, English Version L 239 
1973.
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between the contracting parties and, it is submitted, could have 
been based on Article 11192. The choice of Article 238 and a 
different title (for instance association instead of trade) can be 
explained by the provisions contained in the Treaty relating to 
association of these countries to the Community, which were 
discussed in the previous section, and by the fact that these two 
countries belonged to the "Franc Area" and had very close 
relationships with their former "mother country", France. This also 
explains the Decleuration of Intent annexed to the EEC Treaty, where 
the Contracting Parties declare "their readiness, as soon as the 
Treaty enters into force, to propose to these countries (Morocco 
and Tunisia) the opening of negotiations with a view to concluding 
conventions for economic association with the Community."
It is interesting to compare the agreement with Israel93 which 
was concluded a few years later by the Community in the same area. 
This agreement (not defined) found its legal basis in Article 113. 
However, it does not contain only provisions on trade but also one. 
Article Art.18 on technical and economic cooperation. Although 
cooperation is perceived as being complementary to trade and could 
have been considered as being "absorbed" by trade cooperation, it 
is interesting to note that very similar agreements were concluded 
on a different legal basis, perhaps more on the basis of political 
considerations than on legal consistency.
The ratification procedures of the Cooperation Agreement, 
requiring approval by national Parliaments, delayed their entry 
into force. It was therefore decided to conclude interim agreements 
with the Mediterraneem partners for the application of the rules
92 At the time of negotiations and the conclusion of the 
agreement Article 112 applied (the transitional period expired on 
the 31 December 1969) . The question of the voting procedures in the 
Council was, therefore irrelevant since Article 111 provides for 
unanimity.
93 O.J. L 136 1975.
governing agricultural and industrial trade94. These agreements 
were based on Article 113 of the EEC Treaty. This can be considered 
a proper legal foundation since the content of the interim 
agreement is limited to trade relations. The reference to this 
Article was, however, criticized because it excluded the 
participation of the European Parliarent whose consultation was 
considered necesseury, since the modification of customs duties and 
levies, being a source of Community financing, entered into the 
competence of the European Parliament95. One cannot but agree with 
this very pertinent comment, but it could be observed that Raux's 
remeurk does not apply only to the agreement with Maghreb countries, 
but is on the contrary a general limitation of Article 113 and one 
which has only peurtially been overcome by the (informal) 
consultation procedure with the European Parliament. On the other 
hand, it can be considered that in the case of the Interim 
Agreements with Maghreb and Mashrak, these were by definition to 
be applied only for a limited period, i.e. until the entry into 
force of the Cooperation Agreements based on Article 238.
2 .e.ii) Additional Protocols.
The content of these agreements will be discussed in the 
second part of this thesis when examining the trade regime 
applice&le to agricultural products imported from Maghreb countries 
to the Community.
Additional Protocols were negotiated between the Community and 
Maghreb countries in order to take into account the accession of 
Spain and Portugal to the Community96. One should in particuleur 
take into account that the application of the common agricultural
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94 O.J. L 141 1976 pg. 97
95 RAUX,J. Chronique RTDE 1977 pg. 458
96 The 1st of January 1986.
policy, as a consequence of the accession, to the competitive 
agricultural products of the two new Member States could lead to 
a deterioration of the terms of exchange between the Community and 
its Mediterranean partners.
The Protocols lay down rules concerning exclusively trade in 
agricultural goods. The legal basis of the decision for the 
conclusion of these agreements is Article 23 891.
If one considers the content of the agreements, it may be 
submitted that Article 113 could have provided a sufficient legal 
basis. Since, as has already been noted, the agreements regulate 
the phasing out of customs duties, and the conditions of 
application for certain products of tariff quotas and reference 
prices, the subject matter is concerned with trade and the 
competence of the Community to enter into agreements with third 
countries in this field finds its basis in Article 113 of the 
Treaty.
However, there are two considerations that could justify 
recourse to Article 238. First, the Additional Protocols are 
without any doubt linked to the Cooperation Agreements. This 
clearly emerges from the title of these agreements, which are 
defined as Protocols Additional to the Cooperation Agreements and 
from the preamble of the Protocols where it is emphasised that the 
rules laid down have the scope of maintaining the traditional 
export trade of the Mediterranean partners with the Community. In 
other words the Protocols establish the rules necessary for 
adaption to the regime laid down in the Agreement to avoid any 
undermining of the scope of the Cooperation Agreement and of the 
cooperation thereby established by the enlargement of the 
Community.
The choice of Article 238 can therefore be considered as the 
application of a principle of peurallelism between the Cooperation
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91 See for Morocco Q.J. L 224 1988, for Algeria O.J. L 297 1987
Agreement and the other co-related contractual instruments9*.
A second reason can be cited in justification of statement made 
above: The Single European Act has modified, inter alia, the
procedure laid down in Article 238 requiring the assent of the 
European Parliament for the conclusion of association agreements.
The first opportunity for applying the new procedure occurred 
in the context of Additional protocols and the Financial and 
Technical Protocols with Maghreb and Mashrak countries. It could 
be considered that the choice showed a lack of respect to say the 
least for the new power of the Parliament allowing recourse to a 
different legal basis such as Article 113 which, as is well-known, 
does not require the intervention of the Parliament, not even for 
consul tation99.
The assent of the Parliament seems moreover peurticularly timely if 
one considers the implication for the common agricultural policy 
of the regime introduced by the Additional Protocols100.
2.e.iii) Decisions of the Cooperation Council.
The Cooperation Councils created under each of the Cooperation 
Agreements have the power to adopt binding decisions.
As regards the Community legal order, these acts do not have 
to be transposed into Community law since they sure an integral part
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98 See FLAESCH-MOUGIN,C. Les accords externes de la CEE.
Chronique 1 juillet 1986/31 octobre 1989) RTDE 1990, pp.85-124, 
p.89
99 It shall be remembered that the Luns procedure, discussed
below, is a development of the practice.
100 This is an observation made by RAUX in relation to the
interim agreement (see supra). The doubts expressed above in 
relation to the interim agreement were founded on the idea that 
Raux's criticisms could apply in general to Article 113 and not 
only to the interim agreement. In the case of the Additional 
Protocols the choice between Articles 113 and 238 seems more
relevant than in the case of the interim agreement because of the 
amendments brought about by the Single European Act.
of the Community legal order101 from the date of their entry into 
force. The adoption of a Community act is necessary only when 
supplementary Community measures are required for the 
implementation of the rules set up in the Decision.
In this case on which basis is the internal act founded?
The choice of the legal basis of a Community internal act will 
depend on the subject matter of the Cooperation Council's Decision. 
Thus if the provision concerns trade (as is often the case) Article 
113 should be applied.
Would it be possible to base the competence of the Community 
to adopt an internal act for the implementation of a Decision of 
the Cooperation Council on Article 238? It has been suggested that 
the case-law of the Court on the parallelism between internal and 
external competence could be applied in this case. This would mean 
the application of the theory by inverting the terms on which it 
is founded. The theory would not be used to expand the treaty- 
making power of the Community but to enlarge the internal norm- 
setting power. The theory of parallelism has been seldom used102 
because of its pre-emption effect. A similar resistance on the part 
of Member States would probably derive from the "inverted" paurallel 
power theory. The application of the theory in this sense would 
mean that in the case of an extension of treaty-making power the 
Community has, in the internal dimension, the power to lay down 
binding rules. What should be noted is that the extension of 
internal power would be based on a provision. Article 238, which 
does not clearly define the areas which the Community has treaty- 
making power.
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101 Case 30/88 Greece v. Commission 14.11.1989 (1989) £C£ p. 
3711 and case 192/89 Sevince v. Staatssecretttiat van Justitie. 
20.09.1990 (1990) £££ p.3461.
An application can be found in the sector of fishing See 
the agreements with Sweden and Norway in O.J« L 226 1981 (based on 
Article 43)
The Commission seems to have adopted this theory when it 
proposed a regulation to the Council for the implementation of a 
Decision of the Association Council established by the Association 
Agreement with Turkey concerning the application of social security 
schemes of the Member States to Turkish workers and the members of 
their families which was based on Article 238m . Such a choice 
would at present require the European Parliament to give its assent 
according to the new procedure laid down in Article 238 (infra) . 
Recourse to Article 238 is more valuable for the Parliament than 
the other possible legal bases (Article 235) under which the 
Parliament is only granted a mere consultative power. The 
intervention of the Parliament would be inconsistent with the more 
limited role that is conceded to it as far as the adoption of 
internal legislation is concerned. In support of the intervention 
of the Parliament and of the application of Article 238, it could 
be argued that the Peurliament's assent would be limited to the 
implementation of the agreement to whose adoption it had already 
participated.
3) The Procedure for Concluding Agreements.
3.a) Article 228.
Article 238, as eunended by Article 9 of the Single European 
Act, provides that agreements shall be concluded by the Council 
acting unemimously and after receiving the assent of the European 
Parliament acting by an absolute majority of its component members. 
This provision shall be supplemented by Article 228 which 
establishes the procedures104 that have to be followed by the
60
103 Proposal for a Regulation submitted to the Council on the 
8th of February 1983, O.J. C 110 1983.
104 see LOUIS,j .v ., b rOckner p . aligns M ftgrigm reg meg ret,j . 
(Ed.) Le droit de la CEE Vol. 12, pp.25-63.
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Community when it concludes agreements with third countries,os. 
Agreements are negotiated by the Commission and concluded by the 
Council. Consultation with the European Parliament is provided for 
only when required by the Treaty (that is only by Article 238 
according to the original version of the Treaty before amendments 
by the SEA) . It shall be noted that Article 228 does not indicate 
the voting majority in the Council which is established by the 
relevant agreements (majority according to Article 113, unanimity 
according to Article 238).
In practice, the procedure followed by Community institutions 
is more complex106 than it appeeurs from the wording of Article 228.
105 More precisely, the first words of Article 228 read: "where
this Treaty provides for the conclusion of agreements between the 
Community and one or more Member States or an international 
orgemization..". This has been interpreted as an indication that 
the external powers of the Community were restricted to the 
specific cases where the Treaty expressly confers the power to 
enter into agreements with third countries, that is Articles 111, 
113, 238. It is well-known that this interpretation was rejected 
by the Court in case 22/70 Commission v. Council 31.03.1971 (ERTA) 
(1971) ECR p. 263. It is interesting to note that while in the 
draft Treaty on Political Onion adopted by the Maastricht European 
Council the initial wording of Article 228 was not modified; in the 
version submitted by the Luxembourg Presidency to the European 
Council on June 1991 Article 228 opened as follows: "Where
agreements with one or more States or international organizations 
in fields covered by this Treaty need to be negotiated..". The 
adoption of such a version would equate to the express 
acknowledgment of the Community power to conclude agreements in all 
the areas of the Treaty. It should be noted that it was not 
specified whether the parallelism between internal and external 
competence was limited to the fields where the Community has 
internal norm-setting power. The use of the terms seejns to 
indicate a general Community external competence. For the text see 
Agence Europe Documents n.1722/1723 5.07.1991. The text was then 
revised to take account of the observations of the 
Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union. See for the 
amended version of Article 228 the working document prepared for 
the Foreign Ministry session of 12/13 November 1991. gufope 
Documents 1746/1747 20.11.1991.
106 BOT,B.R. Negotiating Community Agreements;procedure and
practice 1970 pp. 286—310. QUINTIN,H. Participation de
1 'Assemblée parlamentaire européenne aux déroulement de la 
procédure de négotiation des accords commerciaux ET PS 1975 pp. 211-
Moreover there is a tendency towards uniformity of the procedures 
for all types of agreements107. Since the questions which regard 
negotiations and the conclusions are common to all Community 
agreements10* it is sufficient to mention the more relevant ones 
with reference to the agreements which are the object of this 
study.
Negotiations are carried out by the officials of the relevant 
Directorate General of the EC Commission. In the case of 
association agreements, which cover more than one area and which 
may have important repercussions on internal Community policies, 
the presence of all the Directorate Generals involved is required. 
In the case of Cooperation Agreements with Maghreb Development 
Cooperation (DG VIII), (Agriculture?..). Procedural requirements 
provided for in Article 113 have been extended to all the 
agreements concluded by the Community. According to this Article 
the Council authorizes the Commission to open negotiations which 
will be ceurried out on the basis of directives of negotiations 
issued by the Council. A Committee (called Committee 113) is 
created which ensures control on the part of the Council over the 
progress of negotiations carried out by the Commission.
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107 See for a study and a comment of the actual practice as it 
developed from the very beginning COSTONIS,J. The Treaty-Making 
Power of the European Economic Community: the Perspectives of a 
Decade CMLRev 1967/78 pp.421-457.
101 It also clear that the rules of international law on the 
law of the treaties apply to the Community. The matter is regulated 
by the Vienna Convention on the law of treaties between States and 
International Organizations and between International Organizations 
concluded on the 21st March 1986 in Vienna and which is a duplicate 
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties of 1969 
applying to States. See Riv.dir.Int. 1986 p.198
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The acts whereby the agreement is "concluded" do not
109transform the agreement in Community law110. Thus, the power 
vested by the Treaty in the Council111 is that of adopting an act, 
a regulation or a decision, by which it declares the Community's 
consent to be bound by the agreement112. The date of the entry into 
force of the agreement is indicated in the agreement. In the case 
of the Cooperation Agreements with Maghreb the date was the first 
day of the second month following notification that the procedures, 
by which the agreement was approved by each contracting party, were 
(Article 60 Cooperation Agreement with Morocco). The negotiations 
and conclusion of the Cooperation Agreements with Maghreb countries 
have some points in common with all other (bilateral) mixed 
agreements concluded by the Community and its Member States. In the
109 For an exeunination of the different opinion in legal 
doctrine see JACOT-GUILLARMOD,O. Droit Communautaire et Droit 
International Public. Genève, Librairie de l'Université Georg & c., 
1979, pp. 104-105 and footnotes, the author espouses the monist 
approach. See also PESCATORE,P. Ordre Juridique des CEE Presse 
Universitaire de Liège, Liège p. 151 for an illustration of the 
application of the monist theory to Community law.
110 International law distinguishes three moments: 
(i) signature of the agreement, which has the consequence of 
authenticating the text which has been negotiated; (ii) approval 
by national Parliaments when required by the national legal order 
and (iii) ratification by which the competent national organs 
declare the State to be bound by the agreement. The entry into 
force is often subject to the exchange of the ratification 
instruments. The signature of the agreement is considered as part 
of the procedure of the conclusion and is therefore part of the 
competence of the Council. Initialling on the contrary is within 
the competence of the Commission, since it is considered that this 
constitutes the final phase of negotiation. See BRUCKNER, LOUIS 
QD.cit. p.34.
1,1 The Council's power has been defined as the power of "prior 
authorization, concurrent control and final approbation" see BOT 
Negotiating..op.cit. p. 289.
112 See GAJA,G. Fonti comunitarie Digesto utet, Torino, Vol. VI 
pp.433-453, p.450. In the Community the so-called simplified 
procedure is also applied whereby the Community is bound by the 
signature of the agreement.
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case of the Cooperation Agreements with Maghreb and Mashrak 
countries the Commission negotiated on the basis of the 
authorization by the Council and of a mandate by Member States113.
3.b) The Role of the European Peurliament Under Article 238.
A final question needs to be discussed more thoroughly 
considering its the particular relevance in relation to agreements 
concluded under Article 238.
The original version of Article 238 required the opinion of 
the Europeem Pariiament for the conclusion of the association 
agreements. Although it was mandatory for the Council to require 
and obtain the opinion of the Parliament, this was recognized only 
as a consultative power similar to that provided for in other 
Articles of the Treaty. The amendment to Article 238 introduced by 
the SEA, which requires the assent of the Parliament, has modified, 
at least apparently, the power of this institution in the procedure 
of adoption of agreements under 238 but at the same time gives rise 
to a number of questions.
The difference between the procedure applied before the SEA 
and the one in force at present is clear. In the first case the 
Council could disregard the negative opinion of the Parliament, but 
according to the new version the Parliament has in practice a veto 
power: its assent is in fact a conditio sine crua non for the 
conclusion of the agreement by the Community.
The debate concerning the power of the Parliament has for a 
long time focused on the question of the timing of its 
consultation114. It was held that the opinion of the Parlieunent
113 LOUIS, BRUCKNER QD . OD.cit. p. 50
1,4 The "ambiguity" of the term conclusion was also responsible 
for the controversy and was used by both the Council and the 
Parliament to support their respective arguments. For the 
Parliament "conclusion" means signature, therefore a literal 
interpretation required the opinion of the Parliament before 
signature. For the Council conclusion meant ratification whereby
should he requested before the signature, while the practice of 
requesting the opinion between the signature and the conclusion 
rendered the intervention meaningless and the possible observations 
of the Parliament without any practical significance115. It does not 
appear whether the opinion of the Parliament could be given before 
or after the signature changes the issue. Firstly, the Council was 
not obliged to follow Parliament's opinion, secondly, even if not 
signed the text of an agreement at the end of negotiations is 
usually complete and is often the result of delicate equilibria: 
it is difficult therefore to accept or even to propose 
modifications at that stage. The creation of a permanent link 
between the Parliament and the Commission and the Council was set 
up by the Luns procedures1,6. It provides for consultation between 
the Parliament and the Council in three phases: debate before the 
Parliament preceding the opening of negotiations, consultation 
between the Commission and the competent Committees of the European 
Parliament and confidential communication by the Council before 
the ending of negotiation111.
The limited participation of Parliament in the field of 
external relations is consistent with its role in the legislative 
process. As a consequence, the "new" role of Peurliament, as regards
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the practice of consulting the Parliament after the signature was 
correct. See COSTONIS The Treaty-Making. .o p .cit. pp. 442-443.
115 WEILER,H.J. The European Parliament and its Foreign Affairs 
Committees CASSESE,A. (ed.) Control of Foreign Policy in Western 
Democracies Cedam, Padova, Oceana, New York 1982, Vol.II, p.90,
,,é Luns I for association agreement emd Luns II (or 
Westerterp) for commercial agreements.
117 See WEILER,H.J. The Transnational Setting.— Th$ Evr<?pe$n 
Parliament and its Foreign Affairs— Comnuttççs CASSESE,A. (ed.) 
Control ot Foreign Policy in Western Ceda®, Zce*n,°’
Padova, New York 1982, Vol.II, sp. pp.89-98. NICOLL,W. Les 
procédures Luns/Westerterp pour l'information du Parlement Européen 
RMC 1986, pp.475-476.
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external relations118 with the amendments of the SEA, is to be 
connected to the other amendments of the Treaty introduced with the 
SEA and moreover which have, to a limited extent, enhanced the role 
of the Parliament in the adoption of Community legislation119.
In this respect it can be observed that the Parliament has been 
recognized a "power of co-decision"120 in the adoption of Community 
binding acts only in the field of external relations. This power 
is however limited. First, it only concerns Article 238, while the 
SEA has not amended Article 113. It is well known that this 
provision does not even require the opinion of Parliament. The 
objection that in practice the Parlieunent is consulted also in the 
case of commercial agreements does not seem convincing because this 
procedure is not based on a binding provisions, therefore the 
Council could suspend this practice without any legal 
consequence121. The absence of the requirement for Parliament's
1.8 The assent of Parliament is also required by Article 237 
as amended by Article 8 of the Single European Act for the 
conclusion of agreements for the accession of new members in the 
Community. This, however, could hardly be considered a subject 
matter related to external relations.
1.9 See the cooperation procedure introduced by Article 7 of 
the SEA (see Article 149 EEC Treaty) The picture will be more 
complete if one considers the Parliament's power as regards the 
budget (see reference above, in the chapter on finemcial 
cooperation) and the role that the Court of Justice has recognized 
to the Peurliament under Article 173. See case 294/83 23.04.1986 
Parti Ecologiste "Les Verts" v. European Parliament (1986) E£E 
p.1339 (where the Court ruled that Article 173 covers the acts of 
Parliament), case 70/88 European Parliament v. Council 22.05.1990 
(1990) ECR 1-2041. For the locus standi ex Article 175 (failure to 
act) see case 13/83 European Parliament v. Council 22.05.1985 
(1985) E£R P* 1513. See GOILLERMIN,G. Le principe de l'équilibre 
institutionnel dans la jurisprudence de la Cour de Justice des Cee 
J.Droit.Int. 1992, pp. 319-345.
120 So defined by the Court in case 302/87 European Parliament 
v. Council 27.09.1988 (1988) ECR p. 5615 para. 26.
121 When, on the contrary, the Treaty requires the opinion of 
the Parlieunent, an act adopted without this opinion can be declared 
void for infringement of an essential procedural requirement. The 
Court has also ruled that it is not sufficient for the Council to
opinion under Article 113 is a lacuna which should be tackled if 
one considers the relevant number of agreements concluded on this 
basis. The second limit of the co—decision procedure is the 
"negative power"m , in fact in practice the Parliament can only 
make the adoption of the act more difficult but is not involved in 
the negotiations. However, the possibility of a veto from the 
Parliament should at least theoretically require closer cooperation 
between the Parliament, the Council emd the Commission123.
"So it is not just the Council which may influence the 
negotiations, Peurliament may also do so during the negotiating 
process in the certainty that its views will be taken into account 
in the agreement.."124. It is not by chance that the Parliament's 
rules of procedures were modified after the entry into force of the 
SEA to include for both the association and trade agreements the 
so-called Luns-Westerterp procedures (Articles 33 and 35) 125. For 
the Parliament there are other agreements which are politically as 
important as the agreements concluded under Article 238. Article 
34 of the rules of procedure of the European Peurliament extends the 
Luns procedure and the requirement of Parliament's assent to those 
agreements, which are defined as "significant international
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ask for the Parliament's opinion, the requirement implies that the 
Parliament actually expresses its opinion. See case 138/79 
Roouette v. Council 29.10.1980 (1980) £CR p.3333.
122 BIEBER, R ., PANTALIS, J ., SCHOO J. Implications of the Single 
Act for the European Parliament CMLRev 1986 pp.767-792 p.779.
123 Although, as the case of the Protocols with Israel shows, 
the rejection of the agreement by the Parliament in plenary session 
cannot be avoided even if the assent is reached within the 
competent Parliament Committee. See ADAM,R. I protocolli Cee— 
Israele davanti al Parlamento Europeo RDI 1988 601-605.
124 see Report on the Role of the European Parliament in the 
Field of Foreign Policy in the Context Qt the Single EurQPeM M t  
Rapporteur Puchades, PE DOC A 2-86/88 26.05.1988.
125 The revision and improvement of the procedures was 
considered a necessity by the Parliament after the amendment of the
s e a. ibidem p.n.
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agreements" ("significant within the terms of the solemn 
declaration on the European Union"126) . From a legal point of view, 
the provision of the rules of procedure cannot modify the rule 
contained in the Treaty. It is clear that it is possible for the 
Council to extend the Luns procedure to all types of agreements 
(the procedure is a development of the actual practice and it is 
not contained in any provision of the Treaty or in any secondary 
legislation). Simileurly, the optional consultation of the 
Parliament is always possible. However, in the event of 
Parliament's rejection of agreements concluded on a different legal 
basis than Article 238, the Council could adopt these agreements 
without legal consequences.
What happens if Parliament does not deliver its opinion? This 
hypothesis is different from the case of a negative opinion since 
in this latter case the opinion is delivered, while in the fozrmer 
case Parliament does not act. Before the requirement of assent for 
association agreements, the possibility of delaying the delivering 
of its opinion was a more pertinent problem. At present the 
Parliament has a more important instrument for blocking the 
conclusion of the agreement which it does by refusing to give its 
assent. In fact, before the adoption of the Single European Act, 
its negative opinion could be ignored by the Council. The only way 
therefore of increasing de facto its power was by refusing to 
deliver its opinion, i.e. meriting use of the Roquette decision 
whereby the Parliament must express its opinion. It seems however, 
that Roquette does not allow the Parliament to use its consultative 
power in such a way127. In the case described above, the Council had 
not exhausted all the possibilities of obtaining the Parliament's
126 Parliament claimed the right to decide which agreements 
are significant. See FLAESCH-MOUGIN Chronique 1990 op.cit. p. 94. 
Doc. A2-131/86.
127 The Court did not examine the issue of whether the 
Parliament could use the consultative competence to hold up 
legislation indefinitely just by refusing to give an opinion.
opinion on the regulations in question, and for this reason the 
Court declared them void for infringement of an essential 
procedural requirement. The use of the right to express its opinion 
to block the adoption of an act seems to go beyond the scope of the 
power which is recognized to the Parliament. The Parliament must 
give its opinion within a reasonable time limit, the length of 
which may depend on the circumstances and on the urgency for the 
adoption of the act. What can be inferred by the ruling of the 
Court is that where the Council has exhausted all the possibilities 
to obtain the opinion of the Parliament, it could adopt the act 
without the Parliament's opinionm .
Parliament's role in the field of external relations, where 
the Community has express external power to conclude agreements 
with third countries, may be summed up as following:
- agreements concluded under Article 113: Parliament's opinion is 
not requested. The Luns-Westerterp procedure can be applied but 
there is no obligation on the part of the Council to do so;
- agreements concluded under the double basis of Articles 235 and 
113. Article 235 requires the opinion of the Parliament, which, 
however, is not binding on the Council;
- agreements concluded under Article 238: the assent of the
Peurliament is required;
- agreements in the field of research and technological development 
and of the environment (see Articles 130f-130q and 130r-130t 
respectively) . In the first case the cooperation procedure applies. 
Article 13OQ in fact establishes that the Council in adopting, 
inter alia, the provisions referred to in Article 13On (cooperation 
with third countries) acts in cooperation with the European 
Parliament. This technique does not seem the most appropriate way
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m  See JOLY,G . Observations sur l'arrêt isoglucose ££>£ 1983, 
pp.66-88, JACOBS,F Isoglucose resurgent: two Powers of the European 
Parliamnet Upheld by the Court CMLRev 1981, pp.219-226, HARTLEY.T. 
Consulting the European Parliament ELRev 1981 pp.181-185.
* 129to associate the Parliament with the conclusion of an agreement 
For agreements in the field of the environment Parliament is 
consulted (see Article 130s);
- agreements founded on an other legal basis (theory of parallelism 
between internal and external competence); Parliament's position 
as regards the agreement depends on its power as regards the 
adoption of internal legislation.
Some of the comments on the new procedure of Article 238 
emphasize that this could lead to an inter-institutional dispute 
on the choice of the legal basis of agreements, made worse by the 
problem of defining the notion of association and of trade 
policy130.
In practice, regarding the most significant agreements 
concluded by the Community after the entry into force of the SEA, 
this seems not to be the case. Article 238 was in fact referred to 
as the legal basis for the fourth Lomé Convention (traditionally 
based on this Treaty provision), for the third financial Protocols 
with Mediterranean countries, and presumably the fourth131 
Protocols, for the so-called new "European agreements" with some 
Eastern European countries and with EFTA countries. Articles 113 
and 235 have been the legal foundation of agreements with the 
member countries of the Cooperation Council of the Gulf. This last 
case gave raise to some doubts as regards the possible use of 
Article 238, especially if one considers that Article 238 was used 
as legal basis for the Cooperation Agreement with Jordan which 
could hardly be defined as a Mediterranean country, although it is
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129 EHLERMANN,C.D. L'Acte unique et les compétences externes 
de la Communauté: un progrès? Rélations Extérieures... op.cit. 
p.79-90.
130 Ibidem, p. 89. FLAESCH-MOUGIN,C. speaks of a "tentation de 
1 'article 238" for Parliament, see Les accords externes. 
Chronique., op.cit. p.90.
131 Only the Protocol with Tunisia has entered into force, 
those with Morocco and Algeria are waiting the assent of 
Parliament.
clear that this was a political choice132.
The assent of the European Parliament was refused to the 
financial Protocols of the agreement with Israel, Syria and 
Morocco.
It is interesting to note that in the case of Israel, the 
relevant Commission of the Parliament was in favor of giving its 
assent to the conclusion, but Parliament refused to it. It has 
rightly been observed that this seems to contradict the assumption 
that the consultation between the Parliament Committees and the 
Council during the negotiations could avoid the risk of a refusal 
of assent from Parliament133. This is related to the question of 
the object of the assent of the Parliament. Does the Parliament 
take into account the content of the agreement or can the assent 
be given or refused on the basis of more general political 
consideration related to the Community partner? The refusal of 
assent in the case of the financial protocols with Israel (and with 
Morocco on the basis of alleged violations of human rights) seems 
to indicate that an examination by the Parliament is not limited 
to the content of the agreement itself. It seems clear, therefore, 
that consultation between the Parliament and the Council during the 
negotiating stage can only concern the content of the agreement 
which is being negotiated. This means in other words that the 
improvement of the phase of consultation can be useful only as far 
as the technical aspects of the agreement are concerned, but this 
is useless if political considerations are at the heart of 
Parliament's refusal to give assent. On the other hand it should
7 2
132 See the Resolution of the European Parliament which
indicated Articles 238, 113 and 235 as a basis for the agreement 
with the Gulf countries. O.J. C 12 1989 p.80. See also Resolution 
on the significance of the free trade agreement to be concluded 
between the EEC and the Gulf Cooperation Council where the 
parliament strongly criticizes the lack of consultation on the 
mandate to the Commission for the negotiation of the agreement see 
points 15 to 18 O.J, c 231 1990 p. 216.
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also be considered that political evaluations have been the basis 
of the freezing of trade and association agreements between the 
Community and Spain, Greece and Turkey. I do not see why the same 
type of consideration should not be applied by the Parliament, a 
highly political institution, when requested to pronounce on 
agreements concluded by the Community134.
3.c) The Amendments of the Procedure for Adoption of Agreements as 
Contained in the Maastricht Treaty on European Onion.
The provisions which have been discussed in this section are 
the object of significant emendments contained in the Treaty on 
European Onion signed in Maastricht on the 11th of December 1991 
amending the Communities Treaties in force.
The entry into force of the Treaty is foreseen for January 
1993 although the process leading to ratification by national 
Parliaments is proving long and complicated.
Article 228, as amended by the Onion Treaty (I will refer to 
it as Onion 228 while I will refer to the version at present in 
force as EEC 228), becomes a more complete provision codifying the 
actual practice, absorbing some of the procedural requirements 
contained in other Treaty Articles and introducing important 
modifications in particular with regard to the power of the 
European Peurl i ament135.
While the amendments seem to provide answer to some of the 
criticisms and doubts expressed above, over the procedure at 
present in force, they give rise to other questions which could 
probably be cleurified by future practice.
In the new version of Article 228, the initiative for the
134 In the case of Israel, assent was refused because of the 
political situation in the occupied territories, although assent 
was later given. See SILVESTRO,M.Les protocoles., op.cit. p. 462.
135 REICH,C. Le traité sur 1'Onion Européenne et le Parlement
Européen 1992,pp.287-292.
conclusion of agreements with third countries comes from the 
Commission which makes a recommendation to the Council. The latter 
authorizes the Commission to open negotiations issuing directives 
followed by the Commission during negotiations. The Commission is 
assisted by a special committee appointed by the Council.
This provision extends the procedure provided for in Article
113 (common commercial policy) to all the agreements of the
Community codifying a common practice of the Community (see supra).
As regards the opening words of Article 228 Union it should 
be remarked that they do not modify Article 228 EEC. It is however, 
interesting to note that, in an early version of the draft Treaty 
on the Union Article 228, reads as follows: "Where agreements with 
one or more States or with an international organization in fields 
covered bv this Treaty need to be negotiated... "l36. The adoption 
of this version would have meant an express acknowledgment of the 
parallelism between internal and external competence, that is that 
the Community could conclude agreements with third countries in all 
the areas where competence has been given to the Community.
Article 228 Union specifies that the voting procedures in the 
Council are, both as regards the phase preceding the conclusion137 
and the conclusion itself, by qualified majority or by unanimity. 
Qualified majority applies in general, while unemimity is applied 
in the case of agreements under Article 238 Union or when the 
agreement covers a field for which unanimity is required for the
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136 See Non-Paper submitted by the presidency of the
Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union reported in Europe 
Documents n.1709/1710 3.05.1991 and the Draft Treaty submitted by 
the Luxembourg Presidency on 20.06.1991 Europe Documents n. 
1722/1723 5.07.1991. The Draft Treaty presented by the Dutch
Presidency in November contain a version of Article 228 which is 
closer to the one adopted see Europe Documents n.1746/1747 
20.11.1991.
137 That is the authorization to open negotiations to the 
Commission and to adopt directives for negotiation.
adoption of Community legislation.
This requires a "cross reading" of the Treaty provisions, 
which makes the choice of the voting procedure quite complicated, 
in peurticular if one considers that in many cases the provisions 
of the Treaty refer to procedures contained in other Treaty 
Articles.
Article 130M Onion (research and technological development) 
makes reference to Article 228 Onion. What is the voting procedure 
to be followed by the Council in this case? Reference should be 
made, according to Article 228, to the voting procedures followed 
in the Council for the adoption of Community acts in the same 
field. The Community rules in this field are contained in the 
multiannual framework programme implemented by specific programmes 
which include cooperation with third countries. The specific 
progremmes are adopted by the Council voting by qualified majority 
(Article 1301.4).
In the case of the environment Community legislation is 
adopted following the procedure laid down in Article 189C Onion. 
The general rule in this case is majority but when the Parliament 
rejects the common position at the second reading the Council votes 
by unanimity.
Which then will be the procedure to be followed for the 
conclusion of agreements in the field of environment? In Article 
228 Union the word "field" is used. It is not clear if it can also 
refer to a specific area or sector of activities. In this case the 
voting procedure to be followed for the conclusion of the agreement 
could be the same as the one applied for the adoption of the basic 
Community legislation in the area concerned.
The same reasoning could apply in the field of development 
cooperation. According to Article 13OW Onion the measures taken by 
the Council to further the objectives laid down in Article 13ON 
Union are adopted under the procedure of Article 189C Union.
Article 228 Onion fixes the rules concerning the consultation 
of the European Parliament. The general rule is consultation, which
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applies when agreements are concluded in a field requiring the 
procedures established in Article 189B or 189C Union for the 
adoption of Community legislation.
The Council may fix a time-limit within which Parliament 
delivers its opinion. In the absence of this opinion the Council 
may act. It is regrettable that the opinion of the Parliament is 
explicitly excluded in the case of trade agreements.
The assent of the Parliament is required in some cases by way 
of derogation from the general rule, it is not only required for 
association agreements but is extended to (i) "other agreements 
establishing a specific institutional framework by organizing 
cooperation procedures, (ii) agreements having important budgetary 
implications for the Community and (iii) agreements entailing 
amendment of an act adopted under the procedure referred to in 
Article 189b". It can be submitted that these new categories of 
agreements have been introduced to answer Parliament's request, 
proposed in its rules of procedures, to extend the assent to other 
significant agreements.
As for agreements under (i), it can be observed that the 
definition given in Article 228 Union could apply to framework 
cooperation agreements concluded with developing countries in Asia 
and Latin America (see supra) and based on Article 113 and Article 
235 EEC. The extension of the Parliament's assent to these 
agreements should avoid the potential competition between, on the 
one hand, Article 238 Union, and on the other Articles 113 and 235 
because Parliament would arguably support the choice of Article 238 
instead of Articles 113 and 235. It is also possible to apply this 
definition to other agreements based on Article 113 alone, where 
these create common institution with a view to adopting common 
provisions in the field of trade.
The definition of agreements under (ii) leave scope for 
different interpretation if one considers, for instance, that 
preferential trade agreements diminish the financing of the 
Community since one of the sources of revenue are customs duties.
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As for agreements under (iii), the rationale behind the 
provision seems consistent with the principle of the institutional 
balemce. When Parliament has been granted a power of co-decision 
for the adoption of internal rules, a corresponding power is also 
granted in the same areas when the Community concludes agreements 
with third countries. This meems in practice that the assent of 
Parliament will be required for agreements in the fields of 
development cooperation (Article 130W Union provides for 
application of Article 189C Union), research and development 
(Article 1301 requires application of Article 189C Union) and the 
environment (Article 130S refers also to Article 189C Union).
In the case of assent the Council can fix a deadline for the 
Parliament only in an urgent situation.
Article 228 Union recognizes the power of the Commission to 
approve modifications to agreements in two cases: when the
agreements allow modifications to be adopted with a simplified 
procedure
or when the agreement establishes that amendments can be adopted 
by the bodies created by the agreement (case of modification of the 
rules of origin protocol in Maghreb..).
As for Article 238 Union, the rules of procedure and the rule 
whereby amendments of the Treaty required by the association 
agreement are adopted according to Article 236 Union, are included 
in Article 228 Union. Article 238 Union is the equivalent of the 
first para, of Article 238 EEC. The only modification in the text 
relates to the possibility of concluding association agreements 
with one or more international organizations. The extension of "an 
international organization" to " one or more ..international 
organizations" can be interpreted as laying down the possibility 
of concluding an agreement involving more them one orgemization at 
one time, which however could not be excluded by the version of 
Article 238 of the EEC Treaty.
B) THE "INSTITUZIONALIZATION" OF THE COOPERATION AGREEMENTS.
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1) The Creation of Common Institutions in the Field of External 
Relations.
The "institutionalization" of agreements, that is the creation 
of institutions composed of representatives of the Contracting 
Parties is a common feature of many agreements concluded by the 
Community with third countries.
The number of organs, their composition, task and competence 
depends on the content, scope and degree of integration aimed at 
in the various agreements.
Generally speaking, these organs provide the Contracting 
Parties a forum for consultation through which the agreement can 
be monitored although the solutions depend again on the purpose of 
the agreements and its characteristics.
Thus, for instance, trade agreements with a limited scope, 
may create consultative bodies for the examination of the trend in 
the marketing of the products concerned138. other trade agreements 
which are more embitious in scope, such as the free trade 
agreements with EFTA, creating a free trade areas concerning all 
industrial products, establish common institutions (joint 
committees) which in addition to implementing and administering the
* • • • 139agreements, are also empowered to take binding decisions .
In the case of Framework Agreements, the task of the 
institutions is that of identifying areas of cooperation and 
suggesting practical measures to be taken by the Contracting Party 
in the fields covered by the agreement140. In other cases, a even
138 See for instance the Consultative Committee in the 
voluntary restraint agreement with Argentina O.J. L 275 1980.
139 See for example the trade agreement concluded with Finland 
in O.J. L 328 1973
140 See the Agreement for commercial and economic cooperation 
between the EEC and India O.J. L 328 1981 Article 10 creating a 
Joint Commission. The framework on scientific and technical 
cooperation with Austria in O.J. L 216 1986 creating a Joint
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more general task of the Joint Committee is to "promote and keep 
under review the various cooperation activities envisaged between 
the Parties in the framework of the Agreement"141.
The agreements with the highest level of institutionalization 
are the Association Agreements concluded with Greece and Turkey, 
the Lomé Conventions, the Agreement concluded with the EFTA 
countries creating an European Economic Area (hereafter EEA 
Agreement) and the Agreements concluded with some Eastern European 
countries (Europe Agreements). For the Association Agreements 
concluded with Turkey and Greece, the bodies created by these 
agreements are designed on the model of the Community institutions, 
which can be explained by the fact that these were conceived as 
pre-adhesion agreements. For the Lomé Convention142, the degree of 
institutionalization, can be explained by the objective 
difficulties which arise in administering an agreement with a high 
number of Contracting Parties and involving a wide range of 
activities. In the EEA Agreement, the Joint Committee has important 
competencies in ensuring the uniform interpretation of the 
Agreement and of its provisions reproducing those contained in the 
EEC Treaty143. In the Europe Agreements, the Association Council,
Committee and the COST agreement creating a concertation committee,
O.J. L 388 1981.
141 See the Cooperation Agreement between the EEC and the 
member countries of ASEAN O.J. L 144 1980 Article 5 instituting a 
Joint Cooperation Committee, the Cooperation Agreement concluded 
with the General Treaty on Central American Economic Integration 
and Panema O.J. L 172 1986 Article 7 (power or recommend solution 
to differences that may arise on interpretation of agreement). See 
Framework Agreement for cooperation between EEC and Brazil O.J. L 
281 1982, Article 4.
142 The Convention sets up of a Council of Ministers, a 
Council of Ambassadors (executive tasks), a Committee and groups 
of work and a Parliamentary Assembly.
143 The Joint Committee has the general competence of ensuring 
effective implementation of the Agreement and in the field of the 
settlement of disputes and safeguard measures. Other institutions
the main organ of the Agreement, with the power of supervision, 
settlement of disputes and of adopting binding decisions, is 
assisted by an Association Committee. The Association Parliamentary 
Committee is a forum for exchange of views between the Contracting 
Parties.
2) Composition and Procedures Followed by the Common 
Institutions.
Article 44 of the Agreement with Morocco (Title IV »General 
and Final Provisions") establishes a Cooperation Council which, 
with regard to its competence and composition is the primary organ 
of the agreement. Other organs include a Cooperation Committee 
(article 47.1) and other committees which may be created by the 
Cooperation Council itself to assist it in the performance of its 
duties (Article 47.2) . The Protocol on the Rules of Origin creates, 
in Article 29, a Customs Cooperation Committee. It is composed of 
customs experts of Member States and of competent officials of the 
EEC Commission. This Committee applies the same rules of procedure 
of the Cooperation Council.
This original institutional structure has been supplemented 
by other bodies created by the Additional Protocol (whose content 
on agricultural trade has been studied above in Chapter I, section 
B. More precisely, a Trade and Economic Cooperation Committee and 
an advisory working party were created, respectively, by Article 
5 of the Protocol and by the Joint Declaration in annex on new 
potatoes (it shall be remembered that the Additional Protocols are 
an integral part to the Cooperation Agreements) . One should also
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created by the Agreement are the EEA Council, the political body 
responsible of giving political impetus to the implementation of 
the Agreement and which takes the political decision for 
amendments, a Joint Parliamentary Committee and a EEA Consultative 
Committee composed of representatives of the EEC Economic and 
Social Committee and of the analogous EFT A Committee with 
consultative competencies.
note that Article 47.2 of the Cooperation Agreement provides that 
the Cooperation Council may set up other committees to assist in 
the performance of its duties. The two above-mentioned organs, 
however, were created by agreement of the Contracting Parties and 
not by the Cooperation Council; they are part of the institutional 
mechanisms of the Agreement (see Article 5 of the Additional 
Protocol).
The Cooperation Agreement specifies in Article 45 that members 
of the Cooperation Council are on one hand members of the Council 
and of the Commission of the Community and, on the other, members 
of the Government of Morocco. The rules of procedures do not give 
any clarification on the constitution of the Council, it is only 
stated that representatives of the European Investment Bank are 
admitted as observers, when relevant questions involving the 
actions of this institution (in the field of financial 
cooperation), are included in the minutes (Article 3 of the rules 
of procedure).
Member States of the Community, which are contracting parties 
of the agreement, are not members of the Cooperation Council. It 
should, on the contrary, be noted that the Cooperation Agreement 
establishes in Article 47 that the Cooperation Committee is 
composed by one representative of each Member State and one 
representative of the Commission and of representatives from 
Morocco. One can submit that the varied composition is due to the 
different tasks of these two organs. The Cooperation Council as we 
will discuss in more details later, has the task of supervising the 
functioning of the Agreement and has the power of taking binding 
acts, whereas the Cooperation Committee has the responsibility of 
preparing the work of the Cooperation Council. The number of 
Community representatives is unclear: according to the terms of 
Article 45 it seems that all the members of the Council are 
represented in the Cooperation Council while for the Commission the 
number of officials may vary.
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The Cooperation Council is chaired, alternatively every six 
months (April-September and October-March) by a member of the 
Council and a member of the Government of Morocco. The Cooperation 
Council shall meet once a year unless additional reunions are 
necessary at the request of either Contracting Party. Article 15 
of the rules of procedure specifies that the secretary is provided 
by a member of the General Secretary of the Council and by a member 
of the government of the other Contracting Party•
The Cooperation Agreement does not provide, as in the case in 
Lomé, for the establishment of an institution composed of 
representatives of the members of the Parliament of the Community 
(MS) and Morocco. Article 48, however, establishes that the
Cooperation Council shall take any measures to facilitate contacts 
between the European Parliament and the Chamber of Representatives
144of Morocco .
The composition of and procedure followed by the Trade and 
Economic Cooperation Committee set up by the Additional Protocol 
(Article 5) shall be decided by the Cooperation Council. According 
to the Joint Declaration the members of the "advisory working 
party" (Joint Declaration, on new potatoes annexed to the
Additional Protocol) are designated by the governments of the 
Mediterranean exporting and Community importing countries. In other 
words it seems that this is an institution common to all those 
concerned Mediterranean countries (see other Joint Declaration). 
This seems to be a positive development for the coordination and
integration of the markets (see tasks of the advisory working
party) .
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144 ..disposition sans grande portée pratique, les parlements 
étant suffisamment souverains pour établir d'eux-mêmes de tels 
contacts" BRODIN La politique d'approche globale méditerranéene de 
la Communauté MEGRET,J. Le Droit des Communautés Economiques 
Euro péennes Vol. XIV, pp. 197-298, p. 254. In the practice 
delegations of representatives of the European Parliament and of 
the Parliaments of the Mediterranean countries meet 
periodically. (Intergroup) They, however, remain outside the 
structure of the agreement.
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In principle the Cooperation Council should meet once a year, 
but additional meetings are also possible. The Agreement does not 
specify how often the other bodies shall meet. According to the 
rules of procedures, the Contracting Parties can request 
consultation with the other Party at any moment. Such meeting take 
place within twenty-one days from the date of the request. The 
questions discussed are listed in the minutes. A provisional minute 
is prepared by the President and the formal minute is approved by
the Cooperation Council at the beginning of each session (Article
8) .
3) Competencies of the institutions.
The competence of the Cooperation Council may be summed up as
followed.
(i) It provides for a forum for consultation of the Contracting 
Parties, This consultation takes place in the case of unilateral 
revision of the agreements. The consultation is mandatory, when the 
arrangements applicable to petroleum products are modified by the 
Community (article 13), whilst in the case of modification of the 
provisions of agricultural trade (eurticle 25) and introduction of 
new customs duties by Morocco (Article 28), the consultation takes 
place only at the request of the other contracting party.
Consultation is held within the Cooperation Council in crisis 
situations as in the case of adoption of safeguard measures 
(Article 38 and 39) or when the advantages granted to Morocco, as 
regards agricultural products, are jeopardized by abnormal 
conditions of competition (Joint Declaration annexed to the 
Cooperation Agreement) . Finally,y consultations are ceurried out in 
the event of the conclusion of Association Agreements or trade 
agreements which have a particular incidence in the functioning of 
the Cooperation Agreement at the request of one of the Contracting 
Parties. Consultation has the general aim of watering down the 
unilateral character of the decisions even if in these cases the
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final decision is the competence of one of the parties;
(ii) The Cooperation Council has a specific task in the settlement 
of disputes that might arise between the Contracting Parties.
When one party considers that the other has not fulfilled its 
obligations under the Agreement it may take "appropriate measures". 
However, before doing this, it is obliged to inform the Cooperation 
Council which shall examine the situation in search of a solution. 
According to Article 52, the Cooperation Council is competent to 
examine disputes which may arise between the Contracting Parties 
on any questions of interpretation of the Agreement. If the dispute 
is not settled at the Cooperation Council meeting an arbitration 
procedure takes place. Each Contracting Party (the Community and 
the Member States are considered one party) appoints an arbitrator 
and a third one is appointed by the Cooperation Council.
(iii) The Cooperation Council may modify the Agreement and enact 
binding rules for its implementation'45.
In the case of a modification of the tariff nomenclature the 
task of the Cooperation Council is to adapt the nomenclature used 
in the Agreement (article 32). In the case of social cooperation 
the task of the Cooperation Council is to implement, trough the 
adoption of binding rules, the principles set up in Article 41 
regarding the abolition of discrimination in the treatment of 
migrant workers and of the members of their families (see for the 
details the chapter on social cooperation).
Article 28 of the Protocol on rules of origin, empowers the 
Cooperation Council to make changes on the provisions of the 
protocol. An annual examination is carried out for this purpose.
(iv) The Cooperation Council sets up guidelines of cooperation. 
The rules on fineuicial cooperation are conceived as framework
145 For a distinction between "implementing" and "legislative" 
power delegated to international bodies and the consequence for the 
Community institutional balance see LENAERTS,K. Regulating the 
Regulatory Process: Delegation of Powers in the European Community 
Paper presented at a Workshop organized by the European University 
Institute, Florence on 16 June 1992.
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provisions, in this context the role of the Cooperation Council is, 
at least in theory, relevant. In fact, although its role is not 
very precisely defined, it is empowered to take binding decisions 
to implement the cooperation.
The competence of the Cooperation Committee is not defined in 
the Agreement. Article 47 only indicates as the task of this body 
that of assisting the Cooperation Council in the performance of its 
duties. According to the rules of procedures (Article 14) its 
duties are not much more specified: it prepares the resolutions of 
the Council, examines questions referred to by the Cooperation 
Council and it assures the continuation of the cooperation.
The task of the Economic Cooperation Committee (Additional 
Protocol concluded in 1987, Article 5) is that of assuring a 
regular exchange of information on trade, production data and 
forecast. The duty of the "potatoes working party" (1987 Additional 
Protocol Joint Declaration) is more specifically that of setting 
up timetables for export of potatoes to avoid the concentration od 
deliveries on sensitive periods for the Community market.
The Customs Cooperation Committee guarantees the 
administrative cooperation for the correct application of the 
customs provisions of the Agreement and carry out the specific 
executive tasks conferred by the Cooperation Council. It has not 
autonomous power of decision and it is provided for that it has to 
refer to the Cooperation Council whenever a question concerning 
the application of the Agreement arises.
4) Acts Enacted by the Common Institutions.
The Cooperation Council can enact decisions, which are binding 
on the Contracting Parties and recommendations, opinions and 
resolutions. Decisions are enacted only where expressly provided 
for in the Agreement, whereas the other instruments, which are not 
binding, can be adopted whenever it is considered desirable by the 
Cooperation Council.
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The technical bodies created by the Agreements and Additional 
Protocols are empowered to adopt only specific acts which are 
related to their duties, as is the case with the reports that the 
Trade and Economic Cooperation Committee may submit to the 
Cooperation Council, upon request of this latter and the export 
timetables of the "potatoes working party" (see supra).
The Cooperation Agreement merely specifies that the decisions 
"shall be binding on the Contracting Parties, which shall take such 
measures as are required to implement them."
The legal value of the binding decisions of the Cooperation 
Council within the Community legal order will be discussed in the 
following section.
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C) The Direct Effect of the Cooperation Agreements and of the 
Decisions Enacted by the Cooperation Council.
The scope of this section is to examine whether the
Cooperation Agreements concluded with Maghreb countries and the
decisions adopted by the Cooperation Council created by the 
Agreements can, according to the case-law of the Court of Justice 
in this matter, have direct effect in the Community legal order.
The direct effect of a provision is a question of
interpretation of the agreement which, in the Community legal 
order, is a task of the Court of Justice146.
The question of direct effect of provisions of the agreement 
concluded by the Community with a third State can be decided in a 
different manner by the Court of this State147.
The question of acknowledgment of direct effect is less 
relevant from a perspective of balanced enforcement148 of the
146 See Haeaemann, infra.
147 See the case of the agreement concluded with Austria and 
Switzerland which were denied direct effect by the Tribunals of 
these countries. See IMBRECHTS, L. Les effet internes des accords 
internationaux des Communauté Européenne Rev.DfInt.Europ. 
1986/1987, pp.59-77, p. 65 footnote 19. The decisions of these 
Courts have not prejudiced the EEC Court of Justice ruling on the 
same matter. According to the Court of Justice the judgments of 
these Courts does not violate the reciprocity required by the 
agreements. See Kupferbera op.cit. para 18. According to JACOT- 
GUILLARMOD,O., the Court of Justice in Kupferbera sent an indirect 
but clear message to the EFTA Courts to follow its position as 
regards the question of direct effect. The author also underlines 
that the consequences of the different case-law on the matter are 
the unbalanced position of EFTA and EC enterprises in the market 
of the other Contracting Parties. For reference of EFTA Case-law 
see this author's article: Le protectionnisme judiciaire: faculté 
juridique ou défi politique pour le libre-échange en Europe EFTA 
Bull. 1985, pp. 8-12.
148 See BOURGEOIS, J.H.J., Effect of International Agreements 
in European Community Law: Are the Dice Cast? Mich.L.R. 1984 pp. 
1250-1273.
agreement In the case of the Cooperation Agreement with Maghreb 
countries. As it will be discussed in detail in the following 
chapters, the majority of obligations are laid down for the 
Community and the number of obligations for Maghreb countries are 
very limited.
An example of a provision laying down a certain and 
unconditioned obligation for Morocco and which could, therefore, 
be invoked before a national Court, is contained in Article 33 
establishing that "The Contracting Party shall refrain from any 
measure or practice of an internal fiscal nature establishing, 
whether directly or indirectly, discrimination between the products 
originating in the territory of the other Contracting Party".
A provision contained in an international agreement has 
direct effect149 when it creates rights upon individuals which do 
not require the adoption of further acts by the contracting parties 
of the agreement for their implementation. As a consequence, the 
rights can be invoked by the individuals before their national 
Courts if the State of the individual does not apply this right or 
violates it. In other words, when a Court is required to enforce 
a rule contained in a provision of an international agreement, it 
will verify if this provision meet a number of requirements whereby 
it directly creates subjective rights or if the action of the 
legislative organs is necessary150.
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149 This expression is employed in Community law in relation 
not only to agreements concluded with third countries but also, 
and especially, in connection with Articles of the EEC Treaty and 
acts of derived Community legislation. See PESCATORE,P. The Direct 
effect of Community Legislation: an Infant Disease of Community Law 
ELRev. 1983, pp. 155-177. In international law the terms self- 
executing norms are more often used. For a distinction between 
direct applicedoility and direct effect in Community law see GAJA,G. 
Fonti..op.cit.
150 When the possibility of invoking of an international 
agreement provisions is raised before a Court the questions 
examined concern, firstly, the possibility of enforcement and then 
their merit, that is the interpretation of the rights invoked. As
According to the well-established case-law of the EEC Court 
of Justice a provision contained in an agreement concluded with a 
third country has direct effect151 when two criteria have been 
satisfied.
One is the so-called "preliminary question"151, that is the 
capacity of the agreement to have direct effect. To ascertain this 
the Court examines the "nature" and the "purpose" of the 
agreement153.
The second criterion concerns the wording of the provision 
itself, which must contain an obligation "clear, precise and 
unconditional" not requiring, for its application, the intervention 
of any further act154.
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discussed later, in Polydor the Court first gave an interpretation 
of the provision of the agreement with Portugal to avoid to rule 
on the Agreement direct effect. Case 270/80 Polvdor Limited and RSO 
Records Inc. v. Harlequin Record Shops and Simon Records 9.02.1982 
(1982) ESR P- 329.
151 See joined cases 21-24/72 International Fruit Company v.
Produktschap voor Groenten_en_Fruit. 12.12.1972, (1972) ECR
p.1219, (GATT); case 87/75 Bresciani v. Amministrazione italiana 
del le Finanze. 5.02.1976, (1976) ECR p.129 (Yaoundé Convention);
case 17/81 Pabst & Richarz v. Hauptzollamt Oldenburg. 29.04.1982, 
(1982) ECR p. 1331, (Association Agreement with Greece); case 104/81 
Hauptzollamt Mainz v. Kupferberg 16.10.1982, (1982) £££ p.3641,
(Free trade agreement with Portugal); case 12/86 Demirel, op.cit,; 
case 192/89 Sevince v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie. 20.09.1990 
(1990) E££ p.3461.
152 See TAGARAS,H.N. "L'effet direct des accords internationaux 
de la Communauté" ÇQ£ 1984 pp.15-53, p. 29 ff, IMBRECHTS,L . "Les 
effets internes op.cit. p.65, MARCH-HUNNINGS, N. "Enforceability 
of EEC-EFTA Free Trade Agreements" E.L.Rev. 1973, p.183.
153 In case 87/75, Bresciani. the Court speaks of the "spirit", 
the "structure" and of the "wording" of the Convention and of the 
Article (para. 16), in case 17/81, Pabst. the terms used are 
"object" and "nature" of the agreement (para. 27) .
154 The fact that one provision of an agreement has not direct 
effect does not imply that other provisions cannot create rights 
upon individuals which are directly enforceable.
1) The Cooperation Agreements.
90
The direct effect of a provision contained in the Cooperation 
Agreement with one of the Maghreb countries was examined by the 
Court of Justice in case 18/90 Kziber. As it will be discussed in 
another part of the thesis (see Part III, second chapter), this 
concerned the daughter of a Moroccan workers established in Belgium 
who was refused the grant of unemployment benefits paid to Belgium 
nationals because of her Moroccan nationality. Ms. Kziber invoked 
the principle of non-discrimination established by Article 41 of 
the Cooperation Agreement to be admitted to the above mentioned 
benefits. The Court of Justice was therefore required to rule on 
the direct effect of Article 41 and on the interpretation of the 
principle of non-discrimination. It would have seemed logical for 
the Court to first examine whether the Cooperation Agreement with 
Morocco had the capacity of having direct effect and, secondly, 
whether Ms. Kziber could rightly invoke Article 41. Instead, the 
Court examined the nature and the purpose of the Agreement only 
after having positively solved the question of direct effect of 
Article 41.1155. I will then begin by examining the capacity of the 
Agreement to have direct effect.
The object and the nature of the agreement are taken into 
account by the Court to establish the possibility of its having 
direct effect: "the direct effect is not contradicted by the
examination of the nature and the object of the Agreement .." The
155 An analogous form of reasoning was followed by the Court in 
case 192/89 Sevince. op.cit.„ where one of the question addressed 
to the Court concerned the direct effect of two decisions adopted 
by the Association Council created by the Association Agreement 
with Turkey. The Court, after having examined the wording of these 
decisions, declared that it had direct effect having regard to the 
object and the nature of these decisions and of the Agreement to 
which these are linked. For comparison, see joined cases 21-24/72 
International Fruit Company 12.12.1972 (1972) ECR p.1219, para.27, 
Kupferbercr oo.cit.. para.22.
Court affirmed that the objective of the Agreement156 was to promote 
global cooperation between the contracting parties, in particular, 
with regard to the labor force. The fact that the Agreement aims 
essentially at the economic development of Morocco and is limited 
to establishing a cooperation among the parties, without pursuing 
a future membership of Morocco in the Community, does not prevent 
the direct applicability of some of its provisions" (para 21). 
Kziber seems consistent with the case-law, cited above, as regards 
the criteria laid down by the Court15’1. One question is worth 
mentioning, however, as it is related to what it has been discussed 
in other part of this thesis concerning the links which are 
established by the Cooperation Agreement. Even if in Kupferbera158 
the Court seemed to have abandoned the thesis that only the 
agreements establishing peurticular links between the parties may 
have direct effect, it is also true that the fact that the Court 
has never explicitly pronounced on this matter, imposes "une 
certaine prudence quant aux conclusions à tirer de 1 'arrêt 
Ku pferberg"159.
The reference made by the Court to the "global cooperation"
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156 The aim and the nature of the Agreement are analyzed at the 
very beginning of the Court's Decision, but with the purpose of 
making the object of the preliminary question submitted to the 
Court more precise (see paras. 8 and 9) .
157 The Advocate General, Van Gerven, gave a very detailed 
analysis of the Cooperation Agreement in the light of the Court's 
case law to demonstrate the capacity of the agreement to have 
direct effect.
158 Case 104/81, Kupferbera. on the agreement concluded with 
Portugal (legal basis Article 113 EEC Treaty) establishing a free 
trade area between the contracting parties.
159 See TAGARAS "L'effet direct des accords.." 1984 op.cit, 
p.47. For other authors the Kupferbera decision marks in this sense 
a "revirement" of the Court case-law. See BEBR,G. "Agreements 
Concluded by the Community and their Possible Direct Effect: from 
International Fruit Company to Kupferberg" CMLRev 1983 pp.35-73, 
p. 63, IMBRECHTS,L. "Les effets internes des accords.." 1986, 
op.cit. p.69.
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between the parties as the main aim of the agreement seems to 
indicate that the tightness of the links is a relevant criterion 
in judging whether an agreement has direct effect.
As regards the capacity of Article 41.1 for having direct 
effect, the Court recognized that its wording was "clear, precise 
and unconditional" (ground 17) . In this respect, two issues are 
discussed by the Court. The first is related to the formulation of 
Article 41.1., which reads: "Subject to the provisions of the
following paragraphs, workers of Moroccan nationality and any 
members of their families living with them shall enjoy, in the 
field of social security, treatment free from any discrimination 
based on nationality in relation to nationals of the Member States 
in which they are employed"(emphasis added).
According to the Court, the reservation contained in this 
Article means that for family allowances, the addition of insurance 
periods, the transfer of pensions and annuities to Morocco, the 
principle of non-discrimination shall be regulated within the
limits established in paragraphs 2,3 and 4 of this same Article
160 , , ,41 . For the remaining questions of social security, the non­
discrimination principle remains unconditional (para. 18).
The second point examined by the Court was whether the 
application of Article 41 was subordinate to the intervention of 
the Cooperation Council as provided for by Article 42, which reads: 
"Before the end of the first year following entry into force of 
this Agreement, the Cooperation Council shall adopt provisions to 
implement the principles set out in Article 41"(emphasis added).
This argument, submitted by France and the Commission, was 
rejected by the Court. It held that the task of the Cooperation 
Council according to Article 42 is to promote the principle of non­
discrimination, and that the intervention of the Cooperation 
Council was conceived for the application of the principle to 
aggregation of insurance periods, but it could not be considered
160 For an analysis of these rules see infra.
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as a condition of application of the non-discrimination pri nc&piJ.
Finally, the Court specified that Article 40 and 41,161 acPWSt 
have a programmatic character. This decision by the Court recalls 
a previous decision, case 12/86, Demirel. where a provision of the 
Association Agreement with Turkey, and of the Additional Protocol 
of 1970 were denied direct effect on the ground, inter alia. that 
they had a programmatic character162.
The importance of this case is that it is the first time that 
the Court exeunines the direct applicability of a Cooperation
Agreement concluded with one of the southern Mediterranean
countries. Although in other cases the Court has examined
agreements concluded on the basis of Article 238
2) The Decisions of the Cooperation Council.
The Cooperation Council, the main institution common to every 
Cooperation Agreementm , has amongst others, the power to enact 
binding acts (decisions). Article 44 of the Cooperation Agreement 
with Morocco merely specifies that the decisions "shall be binding 
on the Contracting Parties, which shall take such measures as are 
required to implement them."
Which is the value of the decisions taken by the Association
Council ? Are they part of the Community legal order ?
In two judgments the Court of Justice examined the questions 
of the binding acts enacted by an institution created by an
161 The Court also mentioned that Article 40 has direct effect,
although the question of the direct applicability of this provision 
had not been raised. It can be affirmed thus that the direct effect 
of Article 40 cannot be contested. See RAUX,J. "La mobilité des 
personnes et des entreprises dans le cadre des accords externes de 
la CEE RTDE 1979, 466-478, p.474, NADIFI,A.. "Le statut
juridique.... op.cit.. RMC 1989, pp.289-295, p.291.
162 Case 12/86, Demirel o p .cit.. ground 23.
163 See supra when the provisions concerning the organs of the 
Agreement have been discussed.
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association agreement. Although the Cooperation Agreements with 
Maghreb countries differ from the Association Agreements with 
Greece and Turkey, in peurticular as regards the different 
objectives they pursue, the question of the legal effect of the 
decisions adopted by the Association Council created by these 
agreements is the same for the two types of agreements.
164In case 30/88, Greece brought an annulment action before 
the Court against two Commission decisions approving the financing 
of certain projects for Turkey. Greece claimed, inter alia, that 
the Association Council's decision 2/80 did not constitute a 
sufficient legal basis for the implementation of payments, but 
that an act of the Council was required to transpose the decision 
of the Association Council in the Community legal order. Greece 
invoked Article 2(1) of the Intergovernmental Agreement laying down 
the rules for the procedures to be followed in the implementation 
of the Association Agreement with Turkey165. This provides that the 
decisions of the Association Council "shall, for the purposes of 
their implementation, be the subject of acts adopted by the Council 
acting unanimously after the Commission has been consulted".
According to the Commission, the words "for the purpose of 
their implementation" do not mean that any Association Council 's 
decision should be transposed, but that the adoption of Community 
acts is necessary only when the rules contained in the decisions 
require, for example, the amendment of internal legislation.
The Council practice conflicts with this interpretation. In 
several cases, in fact, the Council adopted regulations 
implementing decisions adopted by the Cooperation Councils under 
Mediterremean agreements166 even where this was not required, by the
164 Case 30/88 Hellenic Republic v. Commission 14.11.1989 
(1989) E£R p.3711.
165 O.J. L 217 1964.
166 See Regulation 561/79 implementing decision 3/78 of the 
Cooperation Council EC-Tunisia and Regulation 3252/80 for 
regulation 1/80 Morocco-EEC Cooperation Council O.J. L 342 1980.
decision according to what has been specified above.
Such a Decision was Decision 2/80, which determined the amount 
of aid and the procedures to be followed by Turkey when submitting 
projects to be financed to the Commission. Both the institutions, 
supported by Advocate General, rightly considered therefore that 
the implementation of this decision did not require transposition.
The Court accepted this interpretation on the basis of the 
following reasoning. After having recalled its previous judgment 
in case 12/86 (Demirel), where it ruled that the agreements 
concluded under Articles 238 and 228 are, from their entry into 
force in the Community, an integral part of the Community legal 
system, the Court held that, since the decisions taken by the 
Association Council are directly connected with the Association 
Agreement, they form an integral part of the Community legal 
system.
On the basis of the examination of its content, Decision 2/80 
does not require the adoption of supplementary measures for its 
implementation.
Case 192/89xtn concerned the interpretation of certain 
provisions of two decisions taken by the Association Council in the 
framework of the Association Agreement with Turkey. These 
provisions were invoked by M. Sevince, a Turkish national, to 
support his application for a residence permit. The Court was 
requested by the Raad van State of the Netherlands to give a 
preliminary ruling determining whether, inter alia, the decisions 
referred to above fell within the scope of Article 177 and whether 
certain provisions of these decisions had direct effect.
It should be remembered that the Court held in Haeaemeann. 
that agreements concluded with third countries are acts of 
institutions of the Community and are therefore covered by Article
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See for other Agreements with third countries practice cited by 
GILSDORF,P. Les organes institués par des accords communautaires: 
effets juridiques de leur décisions RMC 1992 pp.328—338.
167 Case 192/89 Sevince o p .cit.
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177. The Court recognizes its competence to interpret the decisions 
taken on the basis of the Association Agreements under Article 
177i6s Ught of its competence to interpret the provisions of
the Agreement. In other words, it is the link between the agreement 
and the act of the Association Council which is relevant for the 
Court169. The decisions of the Association Counâil can be 
considered, as has been done by the Commission, as international 
agreements which are binding on the Community, which is expressly 
stated in the Association Agreement itself. The binding effect of 
the decisions enacted by the Cooperation Council is the product of 
the agreement between the Contracting Parties of the Cooperation 
Agreement.
To recapitulate: the decisions of the Cooperation Council are 
always part of the legal order of the Community as Contracting 
Parties of the Agreement; this is more evident when the decisions 
are "transposed" in the Community legal order by an act of the EEC
168 Article 177 does not apply to the agreement but to the act 
of conclusion of the agreement. The agreement is a parameter for 
the validity of internal act (violation of the agreement is 
violation of the Treaty (ewticle 228) . The competence of the Court 
to interpret the agreement exists when its interpretation is 
required to establish the validity of an act of the EEC or for its 
interpretation. ADAM,R. Corte comunitaria e interpretazione in via 
pregiudiziale degli accordi di associazione RDI 1975, pp.584-589. 
WAELBROECK,M. Enforceability of EEC-Efta Free Trade Agreements: a 
Reply ELRev. 1978, pp.27-31. The agreements are bilateral and
multilateral acts and cannot be identified with unilateral acts 
whereby the Community gives its assent to the Agreement (the 
decision or regulation which concludes the agreement). See 
HARTLEY,T.C.. The Foundations of European Community Law Clarendon 
Press, Oxford 1988 p.251-254. See BEBR,G.Agreements Concluded... 
op.cit.
169 "..why would the acts of the organs of an international 
body set up by such agreement and which have come into being 
through the participation of the Community..not be attributable to 
the institutions of the Community representing the latter in the 
decision making organs of the international body and therefore 
qualify for judicial review under Article 177(b) of the EEC 
Treaty?" LENAERTS Regulating., op.cit. p. 20.
Council but this applies to the other decisions, also those which 
are not published.
Ultimately, the fact that the decisions are part of the 
Community legal order is relevant for the question of direct 
effect. The direct effect of the provisions contained in the 
Association Council decision was in fact opposed by Germany on the 
grounds that the contested decision was not part of the Community 
legal order. However, once it has been established that the 
decisions of the Association Council are sources of law for the 
EEC, the direct applicability of those provisions cannot be 
excluded in principle (see Advocate General Darmon in Sevince para.
11) .
It should be noted that the direct effect of a provision does 
not result from the fact that this is part of the Community legal 
order but it is clear that if the rule is not part of it cannot 
have direct effect in the Community. Thus, the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade although part of the Community legal order 
does not have direct effect therein.
The Court's ruling on the direct effect of Decisions of the 
Association Council reaffirms the well established case-law on the 
subject. Account is taken of the object and the nature of the 
Decisions of the Association Agreement and of the features of the 
obligation which must be clear, precise and not subordinated to any 
further act.
The programmatic character of the Articles of the Association 
Agreement on which the Decisions are based (Article 12 and 36 of 
the Additional Protocol) is not em obstacle to their direct 
applicability. Although the Decisions of the Association Council 
provide for the adoption of national measures which should fix the 
modalities of application, the national authorities do not have 
any discretionary powers. The non-publication of Association 
Council Decisions is irrelevant to the question of its having 
direct effect.
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The specification contained in Article 44.1 second paragraph 
of Cooperation Agreement with Morocco whereby the Contracting 
Parties "..shall take such measures as are required to implement 
them" does not require Contracting Parties to adopt implementing 
acts for every Decision of the Cooperation Council but lays down 
the principle that it must executed in good faith170.
In Sevince, the Court gave a preliminary ruling concerning the 
interpretation of the decision of the Cooperation Council, but it 
seems clear that, since the Court's jurisdiction under Article 177 
extends to the validity of "acts of the institutions", a ruling of 
the Court on the validity of the Cooperation Council decisions 
would be legitimate171. In the event that the Court annuls such 
decisions, its ruling would obviously apply only within the 
Community legal order and problems of international responsibility 
would eurise, since the Community would be bound vis-à-vis the other 
contracting party (ies) to implement the decisions of the 
Cooperation Council.
There is a final question which needs to be examined with 
regard to the status of Cooperation Agreements and of the decisions 
of the Cooperation Council within the legal order of the Community 
and of the Member States. What happens if a provision contained in 
an act of the Community or of the Member States conflicts with the 
Cooperation Agreement or with a decision of the Cooperation 
Council?
The direct effect and the status of an agreement are two 
separate questions. A provision contained in the Cooperation 
Agreement can have direct effect without at the same time taking 
priority over a provision enacted subsequently. The cases examined 
by the Court on the direct effect of provisions of Community
170 See Sevince para 23.
171 See HARTLEY,T.C. European Community... op.cit. p. 253, see 
also LENAERTS Regulating... op.cit.. p. 20 footnote (57).
agreements concerned the relationship between provisions of the 
agreement and Member States' legislation enacted before the entry 
into force of the agreement.
It is also clear that there is a difference between the 
principles of supremacy and direct effect as applied in the 
relationships between Community and Member States law and in the 
relationship between international and Community law172.
Article 226.2 establishes the rule that an Agreement 
concluded according tOfthe procedures laid down in the paragraph 
1 is binding for the Community institutions and for the Member
173States . As has already been mentioned, the "conclusion" is the 
process whereby the Community approves the agreement and express 
its consent to be bound. As clarified by the Court in Haeaemann. 
the agreement becomes part of Community law as soon as it enters 
into force. Transformation, that is the incorporation of an 
agreement in Community law, is required only when the provisions 
of the agreements require to be integrated by internal rules for 
their application114. Agreements concluded with third states become 
sources of law for the Community and their Member States and have 
the status of Community law within the Member States legal order.
These provisions take priority over "derivative" community 
legislation175 but have the same status as the EEC Treaty. This 
means that the Community institutions are obliged not only to adopt
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172 See BOURGEOIS, J.H.J. The Tokyo Round Agreement and 
Technical Barriers and Government Procurement in International and 
Community Perspectives CMLRev. 1982, pp. 5-33, p. 25.
173 This distinguishes the Community from other international 
organizations, the general rule is in fact that the agreements 
concluded by an organization do not bind its Member States.
174 See BOURGEOIS, Effect of International., op.cit. p. 1257.
175 See MEGRET,J. Conclusion, formes et effets des accords 
internationaux passés par la CEE RMC 1965, 19-27, p. 25; IMBRECHTS 
Les Effects internes., op.cit. p. 77.
<s>
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legbnting measures, when this is required by the agreement, but 
to refrain from adopting any act which is contrary to the 
agreement (emd which could be annulled by the Court under Article 
173) .
The agreement takes priority, as an act of Community law, over 
Member States' legislation, regardless of the relations which the 
national legal orders esteUolish between national and international 
law. The infringement by a Member State of the agreement concluded 
by the Community can be censured by the Court under Article 169.
This also should apply in the case• of infringement of an 
obligation undertaken by the Member State in a mixed agreement and 
falling within its sphere of competence (Camber States undertake 
an obligation as regards the Communityl7t to fulfill all the 
provisions of a mixed agreement).
In theory, the status of a mixed agreement, for the subject 
matters which fall within Member States' competence, should be the 
status that international agreements have in each member States177. 
However, this is possible only when the division of competencies 
between Member States and the Community are clearly established. 
When this is not the case and when the obligations of Member States 
and the Community are closely related the agreement should have in 
the member States' legal order the same rank as Community 
legislation.
Agreements concluded by the Community cannot prevail over the 
rules contained in the Treaty. This can be inferred from Article
228.1 which establishes that if the Court finds the agreement 
incompatible with provisions of the Treaty, the agreement may enter 
into force only after amendment of the Treaty. In practice an 
incompatibility between the Treaty and an agreement has to be
176 Article 5 of the EEC Treaty.
177 See PESCATORE Melanges offerts & P.H. Teitaen; 
SCHERMERS,H.G. Internal Effect of Community Treaty-Making O'KEEFFE, 
SCHERMERS,H.G. Essavs on European law and Integration Kluwer, 
Deventer, 1982, pp. 167-178.
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resolved prior to the agreement insertion in the legal order of the 
Community, either through a Treaty amendment or an amendment to 
the provisions of the agreement which are incompatible179.
The observations made above as regards the rank of 
international agreements concluded by the Community should also 
apply to the decisions of the Cooperation Council. These, as rules 
of international law, (agreements of simplified forms) prevail over 
"derivative" community law, they do not prevail over the agreement 
and over the Treaty.
171 This latter solution requires the agreement to be re­
negotiated with the Community partners as it was the case with the 
EE A Agreement.
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PART II

A) TRADE COOPERATION.
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1) The Objectives of Trade Cooperation. 
l.a) The Elimination of Obstacles to Trade.
The objective of the trade cooperation established between the 
Community and Morocco is that of promoting trade between the 
Contracting Parties with a view to increasing the rate of Morocco's 
trade and improving the condition of access of its products to the 
Community market (article 8 Cooperation Agreement with Morocco). 
This means that at least some of the obstacles to imports of 
Moroccan products to the Community shall be eliminated.
Generally speaking, barriers to trade can be distinguished by 
tariffs, that is customs duties and levies179 (which are peculiar to 
the common agricultural policy of the Community and will be 
discussed more thoroughly in the second chapter of part two) and 
non-tariff barriers.
Customs duties are charges imposed on goods at the moment of 
their importation. Customs duties are (i) "ad valorem" duties, when 
they are calculated as a percentage of the good value (price)190 at 
the moment of the customs declaration and (ii) "specific" duties
179 Although the importance of customs duties as a source of 
revenue has decreased noticeably for industrial countries, customs 
duties are, together with agricultural levies and a percentage of 
value added tax, a source of Community finance. See USHER,J.A. The 
Financing of the Community Thirty Years of Community Law European 
Perspectives, Bruxelles, 1981, pp. 195-217. The system of self- 
financing was adopted with Decision 70/423 O.J. L 94 1970 ex 
Article 201 of the EEC Treaty.
1,0 By regulation 1224/80, O.J. L 134 31.05.1980, the Community 
replaced the criterion of the "normal price" as an element to be 
taken into account for the calculation of customs duties 
established by regulation 803/68 with that of the "transaction 
price", i.e. the price actually paid or payable for the goods when 
sold for export on the customs territories of the third country. 
The main difference with the former system is that even a symbolic 
payment may be considered as the basis for the calculation (the 
price declared may be inferior to the market price) . For the 
conditions of application see Article 3 of regulation 1224/80.
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when they are calculated per unit or quantity of the good, thus 
they do not vary with the price of the goods181.
Although customs duties have lost most of their relevance as 
obstacles to trade, the general economic function of the customs 
tariffs is the protection of the internal market against imports 
from third countries.
Customs duties are indicated in the Community common customs 
tariff182. The CCT is a constituent element of the customs union and 
the main instrument of trade policy for the European Community. It 
is made up of two elements: a) a nomenclature, i.e. a description 
of the goods subject to the dutym  and b) the rate which is applied
181 See DECHELOTTE Les Droits des Douanes sont-ils encore un 
element efficace de protection? RMC 1982 pp. 544-551.
182 The common customs tariff came into force in the Community 
in July 1968, eighteen months before the deadline for its scheduled 
implementation steüjlished by the Treaty, that is at the end of the 
transitional period fixed as 1st January 1970. See J.O. L 172 1968 
p.l, for the English version see Special Edition 1968 p. 275. 
MATTERA RICIGLIANO, A. Unione doganale nella CEE Appendice al 
movissimo Diaesto p p . 982-992. VAULONT,N. The Customs Union of the 
European Community European Perspectives, Brussels, 1985.
183 The nomenclature is not only an element of the customs 
tariff but is also used by the Community to identify the products 
covered by the common market organizations and those listed in 
Annex II to the Treaty. The change of tariff heading is an 
important criterion which is taken into account for the application 
of the rules of origin. The application of non-tariff measures, 
such as safeguard provisions and surveillance measures also refer 
to the nomenclature. The Customs nomenclature originally adopted 
by the Community was the Brussels Nomenclature for the 
Classification of Goods and Customs Tariffs, which has recently 
been replaced by the Harmonized System of Customs Classification. 
See Decision 87/369 O.J. L 198 1987 and OLIVIER, P., YATAGAN AS A, X . 
The Harmonized System of Customs Classification YbEur.Law 1987 
pp.113-129. The modification of the Customs Nomenclature implies, 
at least in theory, a corresponding adaptation of the instruments 
referring to it. In the case of agreements, it is clear that any 
adaptation shall be decided jointly by the parties and not 
unilaterally by the Community, as a results of Art. 15 of 
regulation 2658/87 (O.J. L 256 1987 and O.J. L 341 1987) where the 
Commission's competence to amend legislation in relation to the 
introduction of the new nomenclature excludes international
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to the goods.
Customs duties may be subject to variations only as a 
consequence of an agreement providing for a reduction for the 
benefit of imports from a third country (the agreements with 
Maghreb countries subject of the present reseeurch) , of a unilateral 
measure adopted to respond to a particular aim (the system of 
generalized preferences) or of multilateral negotiation (the tariff 
rounds under the aegis of GATT). The exclusive competence to modify 
customs duties belongs to the Community since the adoption of a 
Common Customs Tariff substitutes the customs tariffs applied at 
frontiers by member States.
Non-tariff barriers may be defined as "any law, regulation, 
policy or practice other than import duty that has a restrictive 
effect on international trade"1*4. This is a very extensive notion 
which covers many practices, like, besides quantitative 
restrictions, subsidies, state monopolies, anti-dumping duties,
agreements concluded before the entry into force of the said 
regulation. In the cooperation agreement with Maghreb countries, 
it is specifically provided that in case "of a modification to the 
nomenclature of the customs tariffs of the Contracting Parties 
affecting products referred to in the Agreement the Cooperation 
Council may adapt the tariff nomenclature of these products to 
conform with such modification, subject to the maintenance of the 
real advantages resulting from this Agreement". However, the 
provision of the Additional Protocols concluded with Maghreb 
countries still refer to the Brussels Nomenclature. This can be 
explained by the fact that only a short period of time has elapsed 
between the entry into force of the Harmonized System for the 
Community and the conclusion of the said Protocols; besides the 
Protocols explicitly refer to the provision of the Cooperation 
Agreement and, therefore, the two treaties had to use the same 
nomenclature; finally, such an adaptation gives rise to complex and 
technical problems requiring a longer period of time for their 
resolution.
184 SLOT, P.J. Technical and Administrative Obstacles to trade 
in the EEC Sijthoff, Leyden, 1975, p.9.
restrictive administrative and technical regulations185 and 
voluntary restraint agreements.
Quantitative restrictions or quotas are measures which limit, 
in part or totally, the quemtity ot goods that can be imported into 
a country1*6.
A comparison with other international trade agreements such 
as EFTA and GATT clearly suggests that the elimination (or 
reduction) of customs duties and quotas is not sufficient. In fact 
the rules concerning customs duties and quotas also refer to 
"other" charges and measures. These are differently defined: in
EFTA an expression identical to that used in the EEC Treaty is 
utilized1*1. Article 3 of EFTA provides for the elimination of
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185 On the question of the definition of non-tariff barriers 
see DAM,K.W. The Gatt: Law and International Economic Organization 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, London 1977, p.19. See also 
JACKSON, J.H., DAWEY w.J. Legal Problems of International Economic 
Relations West Publishing, St. Paul, 1986, p.483 ff.
m  In case 2/73 Geddo v._Ente Nazionale Risi 12.07.1973
(1973) ECR p. 865 the Court defined quantitative restrictions as 
measures which amount to a total or partial restriction on imports. 
In other words quantitative restrictions do not cover only quotas 
but also ed>solute import prohibitions. Case 34/79 Regina v. Henn 
and Derby 14.12.1979 (1979) ECR p.3795, where the Court ruled that 
quantitative restrictions also cover absolute import bans. For 
discussion of this issue, with reference to the Treaty see 
OLIVER,P. Free Movement of Goods in the EEC European Law Centre, 
London, 1988 p.62. Quotas are distinguished from tariff quots. A 
tariff quota is established when a specific quemtity of good can 
be imported in the Community at a reduced customs duty, when this 
quantity is exhausted the normal tariff is re-introduced. Tariff 
quotas are covered by the prohibition of Article 12 EEC Treaty.
187 It may be submitted that this is a "borrowing" from the EEC 
Treaty.
customs duties and "other charges having equivalent effect1**." 
Article 10 requires the Member States not to introduce or intensify 
their quantitative trade restrictions which are defined as 
"prohibitions or restrictions on imports from the territory of 
other Member States whether made effective through quotas, import 
licenses or other measures with equivalent effect, including 
administrative measures and requirements restricting imports." 
Article I of Gatt provides for the application of the MFN clause 
to customs duties and "other charges of any kind". Article II 
provides, for bound products, for the exemption from all other 
duties or charges of any kind. Article VIII refers to "fees and 
other charges of whatsoever character". In relation to quotas 
Article XI also mentions "import licenses and other measures."
The question of the definition of measures of equivalent 
effects to customs duties and to quotas will be discussed in the 
chapter concerning trade on industrial products.
l.b) Development Cooperation.
The elimination of obstacles to trade, more than a aim in 
itself, could be considered as an instrument serving a further 
objective. Article 8 in fact makes clear that the provisions
on trade have been conceived as a way of "increasing the rate of 
growth of Morocco's trade" and "to improve the conditions of access 
for its products to the Community market". Reference is also made 
in the same Article to the "different level of development" of the 
contracting parties which has to be taken into account in their 
trade relations.
This echoes the words of the preamble of the Agreement, where 
the contracting parties declare themselves resolved to promote
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m  EFTA does not contain a definition of those charges. A 
Committee established by the EFTA Council prepared in 1968 a list 
of "other border charges" which mentioned phytosanitary, 
veterinary, statistical fees and fees for licenses. Building EFTA 
Geneva, December 1968, p. 78.
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economic and trade cooperation between them having regard to their 
respective levels of development. This and perhaps even more 
clearly, the express reference to "a new model of relations" and 
to the new economic order, also contained in the preamble, express 
the will of the Community to conceive its relationship with its 
Mediterranean partners taking into account the principles developed 
within the international community and applying them in the 
economic relations between industrialized and developing 
countries189. Thus, the essence of reciprocity in the preferential 
treatment which the Community grants to its Mediterranean partners, 
the main feature of the agreement, is founded on the principle - 
championed by developing countries in UNCTAD (United Nations 
Conference for Trade and Development) - that a different level of 
economic and social development requires a different economic 
treatment of developing countries in their commercial relations 
with industrialized countries. The underlying principle is the so- 
called dualism of rules. Application of this principle is the 
system of generalized preferences. The principle has been included 
in GATT where a derogation (Part IV) was introduced to the basic 
rule of reciprocity and non-discrimination contained in Article I190 
The absence of the requirement of reciprocity distinguishes 
the Cooperation Agreement (which is the subject of discussion) from
189. The agreements with Mediterranean countries of Maghreb and 
Mashrak are considered, together with Lome' Convention, as the 
cornerstone of the Community development cooperation policy.
190 See for a critical examination of this principle BENCHIKH, 
Droit international du sous-devéloppement Berger-Levrault, Paris 
1983, pp.63-114, STERN,B. Un nouvel ordre international? Economica. 
Paris 1983, Vol.I introduction sp.p.LIV, THIERRY,H.,COMBACAD,J., 
VALLEE,S. Droit International Public. Paris 1986, pp.738-739, 
GROSS-ESPIELL,H . La clause de la nation la plus favorisée, la 
Communauté et l'aide aux pays en voie de développement RMC 1971, 
pp. 411-421.
the Association Agreement, concluded with Morocco191 in 1969, which 
required reciprocity. In the Cooperation Agreement, on the 
contrary, it is established that imports to Morocco coming from the 
Community are subject to a treatment "no less favorable than the 
most favored nation treatment". Two exceptions are established in 
the application of the clause: in the case of the creation of 
customs unions or free trade areas and in the case of measures 
aiming at the economic integration of Maghreb, or benefiting 
developing countries. The first exception can be considered a 
general rule. This is, for instance, the case in GATT, where one 
of the exceptions to the application of Article I, "the most 
favored nation clause", is contained in Art. XXIV, contemplating 
precisely the case of the creation of free trade areas or customs 
unions between contracting parties. The second exception relates 
to development cooperation considerations in so feur as it 
should favor the development of trade between developing countries, 
in particular between those belonging to the same region or sub-
• _ _  192region
2) The Products Covered.
A very important distinction is made in the Cooperation 
Agreement regeurding trade in industrial and agricultural products. 
Title II (trade cooperation) of the Agreement is in fact divided
Ill
191 For the text of the Association Agreements concluded with 
Morocco and Tunisia see O.J. English Version L 239 27.08.1973.
192 The creation of an economic integration of the Maghreb is 
no longer hypothetical since the creation of the Union of Arab 
Maghreb created on the 17th of January 1989 by Algeria, Morocco, 
Tunisia, Libia and Mauritania. The Treaty establishing the Union, 
together with cooperation in the field of security and diplomacy, 
provides for agricultural, industrial commercial and social 
development action. The long-term objective is the total 
integration of the five countries.
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into Section A (industrial trade), and Section B (agricultural 
trade).
Article 9 of the Cooperation Agreement gives a "negative" 
definition of industrial products. These are the products "which 
are not listed in Annex II to the EEC Treaty." This means that all 
goods,193 with the exception of primary agricultural products listed 
in Annex II, are included.
The general notion of industrial products includes oil 
products and processed agricultural products.
What are the products referred to as processed agricultural 
products? In the Community agricultural products are distinguished 
in basic and first-stage processed products194 listed in Annex IT195 
of the Treaty and processed agricultural products which are those 
not contained in Annex II196. The Cooperation Agreement reproduces
For the definition of goods in the EEC see case 7/68 
Commission v. Italy 10.12.1968 (1968) ECR p.423.
194 For the interpretation of this notion see case 185/73 
Hauotzollamt Bielefeld V. Offene Handelsgesellschaft 29.05.1974 
(1974) ECR p.607, p.618. A "clear economic interdependence between 
basic products and products resulting from a productive process, 
irrespective of the number of operations involved therein" must be 
established.
195 Agricultural products covered by the common agricultural 
policy sure broadly defined in Article 38 of the EEC Treaty: 
products of the soil, stock farming, fisheries and products of 
first stage processing directly related to these products. Annex 
II contain a more detailed list of products, the Council can add 
new products to it. See Regulation ..O.J. L 1961 p. 71. For the 
interpretation of Annex II recourse should be made to the 
established interpretation and method of interpretation relating 
to the Common Custom Tariff. Case 77/83 CILIFT v. Ministero della 
Sanita'.29.02.1984 (1984) ECR p. 1257, p. 1265 para. 7.
196 For a critique of the distinction between agriculture and 
industry see SNYDER,F . New Directions in European Community Law. 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London 1990, pp. 120-121. "As legally 
defined, agriculture includes both the production of raw materials 
and the products of first stage processing. The legal concept of 
agriculture...borrows selectivity from the common sense conception
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this distinction. Agricultural provisions are applied only to the 
products listed in Articles 15 and following. Processed 
agricultural products are not defined but since they are covered 
by the provisions of industrial trade, the above cited rule 
contained in Article 9 applies to them as well.
The distinction between processed and basic agricultural
products is not without relevance, since processed agricultural
products are the object of different trade rules under the
Agreement. It should be noted that wine, olive oil and fruit juices 
are considered as basic agricultural products. If they were 
classified as processed agricultural products they would have been 
entitled to a different customs regime.
Finally one should note that the distinction made in the 
Cooperation Agreements between industrial and agricultural products 
does not correspond to the distinction between basic and processed 
products, since, as has been seen above, oil products are covered 
by the Title covering industrial products, although the regime 
applied differs from that contained in Article 9-11 of the 
Cooperation Agreement.
Finally, textile products are industrial products and should, 
therefore, in principle, be covered by Article 9.
of agriculture. Though including some aspects of the common sense 
conception, it omits other elements". The author also suggests 
that in completing the internal market the Community and the Court 
of Justice should minimize the legal distinction between 
agriculture and industry as two distinct sectors, and the use of 
Article 100A instead of Article 43. See case 68/86 UK v. Council
23.02.1988 (1988) ECR p. 855 where it has been confirmed that the 
rules on agricultural policy prevail over those concerning the 
creation of the common market. See also case 131/86 UK v. Council
23.02.1988 (1988) ££g p. 905 para 15.
114
B) Trade in Industrial Products.
Industrial trade in the Cooperation Agreement is based on a 
single and apparently straightforward provision which states that 
industrial products originating in Morocco "shall be imported into 
the Community free of quantitative restrictions and measures having 
equivalent effect, and of customs duties and charges having 
equivalent effect." (Article 9.1).
Special rules are established for oil products and processed 
agricultural products.
Article 12 establishes a provisional system of tariff 
ceilings197 regarding oil products other them crude oil and natural 
gas. These tariff ceilings19* which were subject to an annual 
increase based on a fixed percentage, were abolished at the end of 
1979199 .
As for processed agricultural products. Article 14 reads "for 
goods resulting from the processing of agricultural products listed 
in Annex A, the reduction specified in Article 9 shall apply to the 
fixed component of the cheurge levied on imports of these products 
into the Community." To better understand this provision one should
197 A tariff ceiling means that a specific quantity of product 
cem be imported free of customs duties, but when this quota has 
been exhausted then the customs duties may be reintroduced.
198 The higher ceiling provided for in the Agreement with 
Algeria (1.100.000 tons) are explained by the importance of this 
product for the Algerian economy. See, by way of comparison the 
ceiling established in the Agreement with Morocco (175,000) and 
Tunisia (175,000).
199 See EL MALKI H., JAIDI,L.,KETTANI,O. Accords Cee Maroc et 
Commercialisation des Produits de Base Industriels et Agricoles 
NABLI,M.K. Cooperation CEE Maghreb Colloque, Tunis, Centre des 
Etudes de Recherche et Publication de la Faculté de Droit, Science 
Politiques et Economiques de Tunis, Tunis 1979, pp. 99-144. See for 
a survey of the energy policy of the Community MC GCftAN,F. EC 
Energy Policy EL-AGRAA A.M. The Economics of the EC St. Meurt in 
Press, New York 1990, pp.243-266.
consider that a specific trade system has been devised200 for 
processed agricultural products in the Community. The Community 
imposes a charge on imports made up of two components: a fixed one, 
which aims at the protection of the processing industry (which is 
in practice an "ad valorem" customs duty), and a variable one to 
offset the difference between world and Community prices (for the 
EEC the threshold price) of the relevant basic agricultural 
product which was used in the manufacture of the processed good (in 
practice a levy) . When processed agricultural products are imported 
from Morocco into the Community, only the variable element of the 
duty is levied. One can explain this more limited advantage with 
the different set of rules governing trade on agricultural products 
(infra) .
Article 10 specifies that "in the case of customs duties 
comprising a protective and a fiscal element. Article 9 shall apply 
only to the protective element." Customs duties of a fiscal nature 
are imposed when no domestic production exists. When the teuced 
products are also produced in the importing Member State, fiscal 
customs duties are allowed only if the conditions established in 
Article 33 of the Cooperation Agreement are fulfilled (see 
infra)201.
The EEC Treaty provides for the elimination among Member 
States of customs duties and charges having equivalent effect 
(Articles 9, 10 and 12) and of quantitative restrictions and
measures having equivalent effect (articles 30-36). These 
provisions are at the core of the system of market integration. In 
the absence of a definition - which would have hardly covered all 
the possible forms of restrictions assimilated to customs duties 
and quantitative restrictions, especially if a dyneunic
115
200 See Regulation 3033/80 O.J. L 323 1980 and SWINBANK,A., 
WILKINSON,G., HARRIS,S. The Food and Farm Policy of the European 
Community Chichester, Wiley 1983, p.243 ff.
201 See for a comparison Article 17 of the EEC Treaty.
interpretation was given to these provisions202 - the Court of 
Justice has constantly been asked to rule whether the measures 
adopted by Member States could be classified as measures of charges 
of equivalent effect and consequently whether they were covered 
by the prohibition contained in the cited Treaty Articles.
The main questions in this chapter concern the interpretation 
of the notion of charges and measures having equivalent effect, to 
custom duties and quantitative restrictions. More precisely, the 
problem analysed hereafter is whether and in case to what extent, 
the criteria este&lished by the EEC Court of Justice's case-law 
could be applied to the notions of charges and measures having 
equivalent effect contained in the Cooperation Agreement. The 
reasons why attention should be paid to such matters are that (i) 
these notions are not defined in the agreement and (ii) the extent 
of liberalization of trade that the Cooperation Agreements seek to 
attain can be evaluated only after the interpretation of these 
provisions.
Before discussing this problem, however, a preliminary 
question shall be examined. This concerns the possibility of 
transposing the interpretation of Community Treaty Articles to 
provisions contained in Agreements concluded with third countries 
which are formulated with identical wording.
1) The Interpretation of Provisions Contained in Agreements 
Concluded with Third Countries in the Case-law of the Court of 
Justice. From Bresciani to Opinion 1/92.
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202 ".. .é ragionevole immaginare che gli autori del Trattato 
vollero in tal modo ottenere che la nozione di misura di effetto 
equivalente fosse via precisata in maniera empirica e che non fosse 
quindi immutabile, ma strettamente dipendente dal grado di 
integrazione man mano raggiunto" CORTESE PINTO, E. Ostacoli non 
tariffari agli scambi nel diritto comunitario P. Angeli, Milano 
1985 p.23. The same idea is expressed by VI SCARDINI-DONA' W. Les 
mesures d'effet equivalents à des restrictions quantitatives RMC 
1973 pp. 224-233.
The Cfuestion of the interpretation of provisions of agreements 
with third countries has always arisen in connection with the 
question of their direct effect.
On the cases discussed hereafter, the Court had to resolve two 
questions: can an economic operator invoke a rule of an Agreement 
concluded with a third country against a measure adopted by a 
Member State and which he believes runs contrary to the rule 
contained in the agreement? Secondly, how should this provision be 
interpreted? It is clear that the two questions are closely 
connected and logical that the second should follow from the first. 
The interpretation of the provision of the Agreement is relevant 
only if it has been ascertained that the same rule can be invoked 
before a judge. Although in the discussion of the direct effect of 
agreements concluded with third countries, very little attention 
is usually given to the question of interpretation of the 
provision203 the implications of this question should not be under­
estimated. Once it has been verified that the provision contained 
in an Agreement can be invoked before a national jurisdiction, the 
relevance of the ruling on the direct applicability will depend on 
the interpretation given to the provision of the Agreement. Let us 
for example consider the case of an agreement requiring the 
abolition of charges of equivalent effect on customs duties, and 
let us imagine also that a Member State adopts a legislative 
measure imposing a levy for statistical analysis on imports from 
third countries. If it is established that the prohibition 
contained in the agreement can be invoked before a national Court, 
than the central issue will be whether the prohibition of the 
agreement also cover measures such as the national levy in 
question. In the case of a negative answer, the possibility of 
invoking the agreement provision is of little significance for the 
importer who has to pay the import levy for statistical reasons. 
On the contrary, if the agreement provision can be invoked this
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2(0 An exception can be found in BOURGEOIS Effects of 
International Aareements. .op.cit. p. 1268.
will enable the national measure to be quashed.
Since the rules contained in agreements with third countries 
are often similar to those contained in the Treaty it is clear that 
in cases involving agreements with third countries, reference was 
made to the Court of Justice's interpretation of EEC Treaty 
provisions corresponding to those set up in the relevant agreement.
When dealing with these cases, the Court has, except in two 
cases, first examined the question of the direct effect and then, 
in the event of a positive response, interpreted the relevant 
provision of the agreement.
The landmark decision is Polydor20*. although the Court had 
already given a ruling on the subject in Bresciani205.
In this case an importer of raw cawskin from Senegal contested 
a charge imposed on the importation of these goods levied as 
payment for health inspections, on the ground that it infringed 
Article 2(1) of the Yaounde' Convention concluded by the Community 
and Africem States and the State of Madagascar. The Court was, 
inter alia, asked to rule whether the notion of "charges of 
equivalent effect to customs duty" contained in Article 2(1) of 
the above Convention was the same as that contained in Article 
13(1) of the EEC Treaty.
The question was however, not too problematic since Article 
2(1) of the Convention made express reference to Articles 12, 13,
228
204 Case 270/80 Polvdor op.cit.
205 Case 87/75 Conceria Daniele Bresciani v. Amministrazione 
Italiana delle Finanze 05.02.1976 (1976) P • 129. The issue came 
up also in case 51/75 EMI Records Limited v. CBS United Kingdom 
Limited 15.06.1976 (1976) ECR p. 811. See also the other EMI cases 
86/75 (1976) £££ P* 671, and 96/75 (1976) ££g p. 913. The Court did 
not discuss the question at length, ruling that there is no 
obligation on the part of Member States to extend the prohibition 
of measures of equivalent effect to third countries. See Advocate 
General opinion where he points out that the same words in a 
different context must be interpreted differently.
14, 15 and 17 of the Treaty206. It vas thus easy for the Court, 
which expressly referred to the wording of the provision2***, to rule 
that the two notions had the sane meaning.
The Polvdor case arose out of a dispute between, on the one 
hand, RSO and Polydor (in the OK owner and exclusive licensee, 
respectively, of a copyright for sound recordings of the Bee Gees 
band) and, on the other hand, Harlequin and Simon, a retail record 
shop selling the recordings in the OK, and a wholesaler importing 
from Portugal copies of records produced there by Polygram and 
Phonogram, the RSO licensee in Portugal. If the same situation had 
occurred within the Community, the owner of the rights in the OK, 
RSO, would not have the right, under the "exhaustion of rights" 
doctrine208 to prevent the importation of such records in the OK.
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206 "goods originating in Associated States shall, when
imported into Member States, benefit from the progressive abolition 
of customs duties and charges having equivalent effect to such 
duties, resulting between Member States under the provisions of 
Articles 12, 13, 14, 15, and 17 of the Treaty and the decisions 
that may be adopted to accelerate the rate of achieving the aims 
of the Treaty." In paragraphs 6 to 11 the Court gives an
interpretation of Article 13(2) of the EEC Treaty.
207 The seme conclusion was reached by Advocate General
Trabucchi who noted that although "..in the Community's 
international relationships, which are the subject of the article, 
it is not possible to read into the provision all the implications 
which affect relationships within the common market and which are 
justified only on the basis of the process of integration which the 
EEC Treaty has established between Member States."
208 See case 78/70 Deutsche Gramophone v. Metro 08.10.1971
(1971) ECR p. 487 "..it would conflict with the provisions
regarding the free movement of goods in the Common Market if a 
manufacturer of recording exercised the exclusive right granted to 
him by the legislation of a member-state to market the protected 
articles in order to prohibit the marketing in the member State of 
products that had been sold by him himself or with his consent in 
another member State solely because this marketing had not occurred 
in the territory of the first member State" para. 13. See also the 
cases cited in the judgment by the plaintiffs and the Court itself.
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According to the Court, the same terminology used in Articles 
30-36 of the Treaty and in Articles 14 and 23 of the Agreement with 
Portugal is not sufficient to transpose to the latter the case-law 
developed for the Community to copyrights. Each provision must be 
interpreted in the light of the objectives and the purposes pursued 
as well as its wording.
The Court makes a clear distinction between the objectives 
of the Treaty and those of the Agreement with Portugal.
While the aim of the Agreement is the consolidation and 
extension of the economic relations existing between the Community 
and Portugal the aim of the Community is the unification of 
national markets into a single market having the characteristics 
of a domestic markets. Therefore, the doctrine developed in the 
Community as regards copyrights is justified only within the 
Community209 and cannot be applied to the relationships between 
Portugal and the Community where the prohibition of measures having 
equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions have a different 
purpose.
The Court gave a second reason why the interpretation of the 
Agreement and the Treaty must be different: the instruments at 
Community's disposal for achieving uniform application of Community 
law and the progressive abolition of legislative disparities are 
absent in the Agreement with Portugal. The reference is not clear 
although the Court probably refers to Article 100 and 101 of the 
EEC Treaty (harmonization of legislation) and to the procedure 
under Article 177 of the EEC Treaty to assure the uniform 
interpretation of the Community la^ r210.
It can be noted that in Polydor the Court reverses the 
reasoning followed in Bresciani. The first step made by the Court 
was the interpretation of the provisions contained in the
209 See UBERTAZZI, L.C. Esaurimento comunitario della 
proprietà' industriale ed importazione dai paesi terzi Foro 
Italiano 1982, pp.250-255.
2,0 BEBR,G. Agreements concluded.. .op.cit. p. 55.
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commercial agreement with Portugal. The Court examines the question 
whether the protection of industrial and commercial property 
(copyright) (article 23 of the agreement) could justify the 
prohibition on the importation of the records from Portugal into 
UK (a measure which runs counter Article 14 of the agreement laying 
down the elimination of restrictions of trade between the 
contracting parties) .
The Court then, having concluded that the national measure 
preventing the importation and selling of the records in the UK 
was justified by the protection of the copyright212, did not examine 
the direct effect of the provisions, as it considered that this was 
rendered unnecessary by the reply given to the first question.
Although it is clear that had the Court adopted a different 
interpretation the defendants would have had an interest in 
invoking the direct effect of the prohibition contained in Article 
14 of the Agreement with Portugal, it seems that it is more logical 
to interpret the provision only once it has been ascertained that 
the provision of the agreement can actually be invoked. The reason 
why the Court reverses the reasoning followed in the other cases213 
seems to be to avoid giving a ruling on the sensitive question of 
the direct effect of the agreement with Portugal.
The conclusion reached in Polydor has been confirmed by two 
subsequent judgments. In Pabst the Court acknowledged that Article 
95 of the EEC Treaty and Article 53(1) of the Association Agreement 
with Greece had the same meetning. This conclusion was drawn not
211 Articles 14 and 23 of the Agreement with Portugal 
corresponds to Article 30 and 36 of the EEC Treaty.
2.2 It has been noted that the Court "did not state whether 
or not its interpretation of Article 30 of the EEC Treaty alone,
i.e. not in connexion with Article 36, would also be relevant to 
the interpretation of Article 14 of the Agreement" BEBR Agreements 
Concluded by.. op.cit. p. 56-57
2.3 The only other case in which the Court first interprets the
provision of the agreement is case 17/81 Pabst & Richarz_v,.
Hauptzollamt Oldenburg 29.04.1982 (1982) ECR p. 1331.
only from the fact that the provisions were identically worded, a 
consideration that we have seen is not conclusive, but also from 
the objective and nature of the Association Agreement, whose 
purpose is to prepare for the entry of Greece in the Community.
The reference to the harmonization of agricultural policies 
and freedom of movement of workers214 was criticized by Demaret215 as 
having no relation to the prohibition of fiscal discrimination. It 
is however submitted that the reference made by the Court to these 
principles has the scope of proving that the Association Agreement 
with Greece pursues the same aim of integration pursued by the 
Treaty (even if at an earlier stage) and therefore that its 
provisions can be interpreted in the same way as those contained 
in the Treaty.
The conclusion of the Court therefore is that, since Article
53.1 of the Agreement fulfills the same purpose as Article 95 of 
the Treaty, they have the same meaning and can be interpreted in 
the same way.
The second ruling on the question subsequent Polvdor was 
rendered in Kupferbercr216. Under the law on the Monopoly of spirits, 
a monopoly equalization duty was levied on imports into Germany of 
spirits, amongst which port wine. If a similar product existed in 
Germemy it would have qualified for a tax reduction which was, on
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2.4 See para. 26 where the Court hold that Article 53 of the 
Association Agreement "forms part of a group of provisions the 
purpose of which was to prepare for the entry of Greece into the 
Community by the establishment of a customs union, by the 
harmonization of agricultural policies, by the introduction of 
fredom of movement for workers and by other measures for the 
gradual adjustment to the requirements of Community law".
2.5 DEMARET.P he regime des echanges.. Du Droit International 
Au Droit de L'integration 1988, p.165. In the same article Demaret 
criticizes the restrictive interpretation given by the Court of 
Justice to the agreement of free trade as contrary to Article 
XXIV.8 of GATT.
216 *Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt__Mainz__v. C.A. Kupferbera
26.10.1982 (1982) p. 3641.
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the contrary, not extended to imported spirits. This amounted to 
potential discrimination. The importer of Portuguese port wine 
claimed that the refusal to extend such a reduction to imported 
spirits was contrary to Article 21(1) of the Agreement concluded 
by the Community with Portugal. As regards the analogy of Article 
21(1) of the Agreement with Article 95 of the EEC Treaty217, the 
Court applied the same reasoning used in Polydor. The Court held 
that although Article 21 of the agreement with Portugal and Article 
95 of the EEC Treaty had the same object, the elimination of tax 
discrimination, the provisions were to be "considered and 
interpreted in their own context". Since the EEC Treaty and the 
Agreement pursue different objectives the interpretation given to 
Article 95 of the EEC Treaty could not be applied by analogy to
Article 21 of the Agreement2**.
The Court was again confronted with the question of 
interpretation of a provision of an external agreement in the 
Demirel219 Sevince220 and Kziber221 cases concerning the Association 
agreement with Turkey and the Cooperation Agreement with Morocco. 
The cases are different from those referred to above because the 
provisions under discussion did not concern trade but social 
cooperation. In Demirel and Sevince the Court had to interpret 
the notions of free movement of workers and "regularly employed" 
worker contained in the provisions of the agreement and of the
Association Council decision. In Demirel it did not examine the
2.7 it should moreover be noted that the wording of the two 
provisions is not identical.
2.8 The Court gives etn interpretation of Article 21 and of the 
notion of like product contained in that provision. See para. 47.
220 Case 192-89 Sevince v. Staats secretar is van Justitie 
op.cit..
231 Case 18/90 Bahia Kziber v. Office National De l'Emvloi 
31.01.1991 (1991) S£R p.1-199.
question because it excluded the direct applicability of the 
relevant provision. In Sevince the Court interpreted the notion of 
regular employment. Kziber concerned the interpretation of 
Article 41 of the Cooperation Agreement and the question of 
application of the case-law developed in the Community on the 
issue. The Court did not enter into this question232 , but in its 
ruling, in practice, it applied the same interpretation given in 
the framework of the free movement of workers in the Community223.
It could be concluded that the EC Court's ruling on this issue 
is that the equivalence of terminology between a provision 
contained in an Agreement concluded with a third country by the 
Community and a provision contained in the EEC Treaty is not 
sufficient to enable a conclusion to be drawn on the identity of 
the notion contained in the two articles. It is, on the contrary, 
the scope and the nature of the agreement which should be 
considered.
One exception, however, is Bresciani, where the Court did not 
make reference to the aim of the Yaounde Convention but based its 
interpretation on the will of the Contracting Parties in this case 
to interpret the provisions of this agreement in the same way as 
the corresponding Treaty Articles.
The scope of the Yaounde Convention was the continuation, on 
a different basis, of the Convention of Association provided for 
in the EEC Treaty (articles 131-136)224. Could such a link justify
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222 See Advocate General Van Gerven who discusses the question 
of interpretation at length arriving at a different solution.
223 See infra Part III, Chapter II, Social Cooperation.
224 See the preamble of Yaoundé Convention where the 
Contracting Parties express their "desire to maintain the 
association" and to "pursue their efforts together for economic, 
social and cultural progress of their countries". See also Article
I where it is specified that the object of the Agreement is "to 
provide cooperation to further economic and social development by 
increasing trade and by implementing measures of financial 
intervention and technical cooperation. See O.J. Special Edition
II Series Vol.l, p.5
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an extensive interpretation of the provisions contained in the 
Convention? It could be eurgued that the reference made in Article
2 of the Convention to Articles 12 to 15 and 17 of the EEC Treaty 
could be considered, more as the expression of the close link 
established between the Contracting Parties than the basis to 
justify the analogy of the notions contained in the said Articles 
with the corresponding Convention's provisions and that this link 
is the real justification of the equivalence of the notion of 
charges of equivalent effect.
If one pushes the bounds of this interpretation it could even 
been argued that the interpretation of the notions contained in the 
EEC Treaty could be extended to the provisions of Lomé Conventions 
which can be regarded for their part as the continuation of Yaoundé 
Conventions225. Moreover, the same link with the Treaty, and the aim 
of maintaining the special relations with the former colonial 
territories was also established with Morocco and Tunisia. In a 
Declaration annexed to the Treaty326 the Member States proposed, to 
the independent countries of the franc area227, the conclusion of 
an association convention whose aim was "to maintain and intensify 
traditional trade flows and to contribute to the economic and 
social development" of these countries. Trade Agreements (called 
Association agreements and based on Article 238 of the Treaty) were 
concluded in 1967. These were then replaced by the Cooperation 
Agreement when the "Global Policy" was launched.
225 On the various stages of association see 7WITCHETT, C.C. 
Europe and Africa"From Association to Partnership" Farnborough, 
Saxon House, 1978, pp. 147 ff.
226 The Association in Articles 131-136 concerned "countries 
and territories" which were not yet independent, and was 
unilaterally granted by the six Member States. The Declaration in 
the Annex is a proposal for the conclusion of an agreement made 
with independent countries, although they were former colonies with 
which the Community (France) had important commercial 
relationships.
227 Algeria was still a Department of France at the time of the 
conclusion of the Treaty.
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However, such an interpretation seems excluded by the fact 
that the instruments applied in the relationships between the 
Community and the A CP countries and Maghreb and Mashrak countries 
and the political and ideological background are completely 
different from the instruments used and the setting which framed 
the Association Convention and even the first 
association/cooperation agreements with these countries.
As for the scope of the agreement, the Court has considered 
justified the application of the interpretation given to Treaty
provisions to rules contained in agreement whose aim is future
membership in the Community, as seen in Pabst.
The same reasoning was not however applied to the agreement
with Portugal which was conceived primarly as a commercial 
agreement and did not envisage the future entry of this country in 
the Community.
One must therefore ask whether the provisions contained in 
the association agreement with Turkey could be interpreted as the 
corresponding EEC Treaty articles in the light of the Pabst ruling, 
which, as seen above concerned the association agreement with 
Greece, and which, like the latter, was conceived as pre-accession 
agreement.
The Court has examined the association agreement with Turkey 
in two cases. However, as seen above, Demirel and Sevince do not 
rise issues on questions of interpretation of trade provisions 
which are analogous to Treaty Articles, but concern a questions of 
social cooperation.
It seems that the application of the interpretation by analogy 
could be justified, not only in relation to the aim of the 
agreement, but also on the basis of the scope of the provision. In 
the case of the association agreement with Turkey the scope of the 
provision is much more restricted than that of the comparable 
provision of the Community free circulation of workers in the 
Community. Therefore, the final scope of the entry of Turkey in the 
Community does not seem to justify the analogy of the provisions
which, for their part, do not pursue the same objectives as the 
counterpart EEC Treaty provisions228. It should be noted, moreover, 
that there is no perfect analogy of terminology between the 
provisions of the Treaty ernd of the Agreement since Article 12 of 
the Association Agreement229 refers to Articles 48 and 50 of the EEC 
Treaty as merely providing a "guide".
Another important ruling that can be referred to in relation 
to the question of the transposition of the EEC Court's case-law 
to provisions contained in agreements with third countries is 
Opinion 1/91 rendered on the basis of Article 228 second paragraph 
of the EEC Treaty on the compatibility of the agreement on the one 
hand, between the Community and its member States and on the other 
hand, the States party of the Free Trade Association Agreement and 
Liechtenstein and the EEC Treaty130.
The Agreement, which aims at establishing an European Economic 
Area, contains a number of provisions which are identical to those 
contained in the EEC Treaty in the fields of free circulation of 
goods, services, persons, capitals and of competition. The idea is 
that of applying the Community law to the area constituted by the 
territories of EEC and EFTA countries. This objective should be 
achieved through the "duplication" in the EEA agreement of terms 
identical to those contained in EEC Treaty and through the creation 
of a particuleur jurisdictional system231. Article 6 of the EEA
228 See observations of Advocate General Darmon in Sevince cit.
229 Compare with Article 44 of the association agreement with 
Greece.
230 Opinion 1/91, 14.12.1991, nyr.
231 A Court (EEA Court) and a Court of First Instance are 
established. The EEA Court is competent for the settlement of 
disputes arising between the Contracting Parties of the EEA 
agreement, actions in the fields of surveillance procedures and as 
Court of appeals against decisions of the Surveillance authority. 
See EC-EFTA Court? Editorial Comment, CMLRev 1989 pp.341-344 where 
there was a suggestion to expand the composition of the Court of 
Justice to include EFTA judges. The Court would be competent not 
only for question of EC law but also for cases eurisen in relation
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Agreement as presented to the Court read as follows: "Without
prejudice to the future development of case law, the provisions of 
this Agreement, in so far as they are identical in substance to 
corresponding rules of the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community..and to acts in application of these two 
treaties, shall in their implementation and application be 
interpreted in conformity with the relevant rulings of the Court 
of Justice of the European Communities given prior to the date of 
signature of this agreement." As regards the question of identity 
of the terms of the provisions contained in the EEC Treaty and the 
EEA agreement the Court reaffirms its previous case-law whereby 
provisions of an international agreement shall not be interpreted 
only on the basis of its terms but also in the light of the 
objectives they pursue. The Court then examines the aims of the 
EEA agreement and of the EEC Treaty232 to conclude that the 
difference between the objectives of the two instruments prevents 
the homogenous interpretation of the provisions233 of the Agreement 
corresponding to those of the EEC Treaty. The application of the 
case-law of the Court of Justice to the interpretation of the 
provisions of the EEA agreement, established by Article 6 of the
to the application of the EEC-EFTA agreement.
232 The Court examines first the objective of the two
instruments. The EEA agreement provides for the establishment of 
a regime of free trade and of competition between the contracting 
parties, whereas in the case of the Community the free circulation 
and the competition rule are only means to reach a further 
integration (internal market and economic and monetary union) and 
as a long-term objective the European Union. It is interesting to 
note that the Court also considers the different context of the 
objectives of the two instruments. The objective of the EEA is to 
be achieved by means of an international agreement providing for 
reciprocal rights and obligations while the EEC Treaty is defined 
as the constitutional chart of the Community whose legal order is 
founded on the supremacy of the law of the Community over that of 
Member States and on the direct effect of a range of provisions.
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agreement is not sufficient to guarantee the homogeneity of 
interpretations. Not only does this provision make scant reference 
to the case-law developed by the Court before the entry into force 
of the EEA agreement but further still it fails to cover essential 
elements of this case-law like the principle of direct effect and
supremacy which are not compatible with the EEA agreement. A second• • 111 ,Opinion was rendered by the Court on the compatibility of some
of the provisions of the modified EEA Agreement with the Treaty.
The new version of the EEA Agreement maintains the principle
whereby the provisions of the Agreement have to be interpreted
according to the case-law of the Court of Justice on the
corresponding EEC Treaty provisions as developed before the
signature of the Agreement but assigns the task of ensuring the
homogeneity of the interpretation to the Joint Committee whose
decisions do not (impinge) upon the Court's case-law (Article 105
and procès-verbal) . In the case that a dispute arises on the
interpretation of the provisions of the Agreement, the Court of
Justice is competent to interpret the disputed provisions.
According to the Court this solution is compatible with the Treaty
because the relevant provisions of the Agreement and, in
particular, the "procès-verbal" between the parties guarantee the
autonomy of the Community legal system and the binding character
235of the Court's case-law (paras.17-30)
However, Opinion 1/92 does not seem to modify the previous 
case-law of the Court as regards the interpretation of expressions 
contained in agreements concluded with third countries identical
734 Opinion 1/92 10.04.1992 nyr.
235 The new competence of the Court of Justice (interpretation 
of the provisions of the Agreement) is also compatible with the 
Treaty as far as this interpretation is binding. The same applies 
to the competence of the Court of Justice to give an interpretation 
on the provisions of the Agreement at the demand of a EFTA Courts 
(para 37) . The provisions on the division of competences in the 
field of competition between the EEC Commission and the EFTA 
Surveillance Authority are also compatible with the EEC Treaty 
(paras. 38-42).
130
to those of the EEC Treaty. It should be noted that the Court rules 
on the compatibility of the above mentioned provisions of the EEA 
Agreement with the EEC Treaty on the basis of considerations on the 
autonomy of the Community legal system which was on the contrary 
not guaranteed by the system established by the first version of 
the EEA Agreement. However, it seems that the objective of 
homogenous interpretation between the corresponding provisions of 
the EEA Agreement and the EEC Treaty cannot be pursued because the 
scope of the Agreement is different from that of the EEC Treaty.
In other words, the new version of the EEA Agreement does not 
change this basic difference between the aim of the two 
instruments. It could therefore be submitted that when asked to 
interpret the provisions of the EEA Agreement which are identical 
in terminology to the rules of the EEC Treaty the Court will apply 
the principles identified in its case-law.
How cern this case-law be applied to the Cooperation Agreements 
with Maghreb countries?
The notions of charges and measures of equivalent effect 
should be interpreted in the light of the scope of the provisions 
on trade cooperation and of the general aim of the Cooperation 
Agreement.
As discussed in the introduction to this chapter, from an 
euialysis of the Preamble, Article 1 and Article 8, the aims of the 
Cooperation Agreement are the socio-economic development of 
Morocco, the strengthening of relations between the parties and the 
promotion of an overall cooperation. However, economic, financial, 
trade and social cooperation should be conceived as instruments for 
the promotion of the development of Morocco. As for the 
strengthening of relations between the Contracting Parties, this 
hardly seems a distinctive objective, but rather a consequence of 
the agreement.
When the Cooperation Agreement was presented in the General 
Agreement of tariff and trade (GATT)236, the Contracting Peurties 
defended its compatibility with the General Agreement alleging that 
the elimination on the part of the Community of trade restrictions 
met the conditions laid down in Article XXIV for the creation of 
a free trade area. The absence of a requirement of reciprocity on 
the part of Morocco was justified by the gap in the economic 
development between this country and the Community Part IV of GATT 
was invoked. It was also declared that the creation of a free trade 
area was the ultimate aim of the agreement as soon as the economic 
conditions of Morocco would have allowed it. The Agreement, 
however, does not contain any express provision for the
• 237establishment of a free trade area , not even as a long-term 
objective. Therefore, the provisions of the Agreement should be 
interpreted having regard only to the development cooperation aim.
The rationale behind the provisions on industrial trade is 
that the free access (without reciprocity) of industrial products 
to the Community market would promote industrialization in Morocco 
which would contribute to the economic growth and development of 
this country.
As it will be discussed later, the prohibitions contained in 
Articles 9-13 and 30-36 are instruments of integration. The 
principle underpinning the case-law of the Court concerning these 
provisions is that the aim of the Treaty is the creation of 
conditions as close as possible to that of an internal market, and 
the cited rules are interpreted in line with this objective.
It seems, at first sight, that the interpretation given to the
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736 See Gatt L/4560 31 October 1977. BISD 23 Supp. 88.
237 Article 3 of the Cooperation Agreement refers to the 
"strengthening of existing economic links on as broad a basis as 
possible for the mutual benefit of the parties". This reference 
provision, however, is contained in Title I, Economic, Technical 
and Financial Cooperation and could hardly be considered as an 
objective, even long term, for the establishment of reciprocity on 
trade.
provisions contained in the above cited Articles of the EEC Treaty 
cannot be transposed "in toto" to the notion of charges and
measures of equivalent effect contained in the Cooperation
Agreement. The question is, however, to what extent the
interpretation given by the Court can be extended to the agreement.
Two possible interpretations can be submitted. A transposition 
of the interpretation is admissible only when the interpretation 
of Articles 30-36, 9-12 is functional to the elimination of
protective measures.
Alternatively, it could be argued that one purpose of
development cooperation is to justify a broad interpretation of the 
prohibition of charges and measures of equivalent effect. As for 
this latter issue one should note that, in the cases discussed 
before the Court, the agreement with developing countries has only 
been examined in relation to social cooperation provisions. In 
Kziber the Court interpreted the notion of social security as 
applied to migrant workers in the same way as it applies this 
notion in the Community. The Court has held that the interpretation 
of a provision depends on the aims of the instrument in which it 
is contained, but it has never stated that the creation of the 
internal market alone justifies a broad interpretation of the 
notion of charges or measures of equivalent effect.
Finally, although the level of economic integration sought 
through the Cooperation Agreement for the economies of the 
Contracting Parties is more limited in comparison with those aimed 
at by the Treaty, closer integration seems to be established than 
in the case of GATT. It will be remembered that the aim of GATT is 
the "substantial reduction238 of tariffs and other barriers to trade 
and (••) the elimination of discriminatory treatment in 
international commerce".
It is thus suggested that GATT could be taken as a reference 
for minimum standards applying between the EEC and Morocco.
132
238 Emphasis supplied.
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2) Charges Having Equivalent Effect to Customs Duties and the 
Prohibition of Fiscal Discrimination in the EEC Treaty.
The releveuit EEC Treaty Articles discussed in this section are 
Articles 9, 12 and 95.
Article 9, first paragraph, prohibits the levying of customs 
duties and charges of equivalent effect on imports and exports 
between Member States. Article 12 specifies the obligation on 
Member States to refrain from introducing new customs duties and 
charges of equivalent effect and increasing those already in force. 
This prohibition is functional with regard to the achievement of 
the free circulation of goods within the Community.
The customs union, which plays a crucial role in the construction 
of the common market, is based on this prohibition239.
Article 95 allows Member States to impose internal taxation on 
imported goods, provided that there is no discrimination between 
imported and domestic products (see under section 2)
2.a) The Court of Justice Case-Law on Charges of Equivalent Effect.
The Court's interpretation of the EEC Treaty concerning 
charges of equivalent effect to customs duties is based on the idea 
that Article 9 is a fundamental provision of the Treaty, and 
therefore the prohibitions contained in that Article, and in 
Article 12, have an absolute character and any exception must
239 GUAZZARONI La libera circolazione delle merci motore di 
fondo dell'integrazione europea DCSI 1973, p.173. PANICO,G. Teuriffa 
doganale comune e tariffe di effetto equivalente Riv.Dir. Eur. 
1974, pp. 69-78. See WOOLDRIDGE,F . PLENDER, R. Charges having an 
Effect Equivalent to Customs Duties: a Review of the Cases ELRev. 
1978, pp. 101-115. "The principles for the realization of a unified 
market among the member states . .are laid down in the Title the 
free movement of goods, in the second part of the Treaty devoted 
to the Foundations of the Community and in Article 3 (f) of the 
Treaty..".
therefore be strictly construed240.
On the basis of the long tradition of case-law241 on charges 
the following definition of charges having equivalent effect to 
customs duties can be summarized^42: charges of equivalent effect to 
customs duties are pecuniary charges other than customs duties 
imposed unilaterally by Member States. They are levied only on 
imported products, when they cross the frontier or even afterward 
by reason of their movement across the border.
When all these conditions are fulfilled a charge falls under 
the prohibition under Article 12 regardless of its name, its 
amount eund mode of application, the aim for which is established, 
its protectionist or discriminatory effect. Some of the notions 
referred to above need to be clarified.
Unilateralitv of the imposition means that while a Member 
State is forbidden from imposing charges on imported products 
acting on the basis of its legislation, charges are admitted when 
they are levied on the basis of Community legislation or of
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240 "It follows. .from the clarity, certainty and unrestricted 
scope of Articles 9 and 12, from the general scheme of their 
provisions ernd from the Treaty as a whole, that the prohibition of 
new customs duties, linked with the principles of the free movement 
of products, constitutes an essential rule and that in consequence 
any exception, which moreover is to be narrowly interpreted, must 
be clearly stipulated". Joined case 2-3/62, Commission v. 
Luxembourg and Belgium 14.12.1962 (1962) ECR p. 425, p. 432.
241 In this paragraph only some of the most significant cases 
discussed before the Court will be referred to. For a complete list 
of cases see SMITH, H. & HERZOG P.E. The Law of the European 
Economi n Communities A Commentary of the EEC Treaty, Mat tew Brender 
New York, 1991 and references in VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, Kapteyn 
P.J.G. Introduction to the Law of the EEC Gormley, 1990, pp.359- 
375, MATTERA RICIGLIANO A. II Mercato Unico... oo.cit. pp.33-39.
242 The Court of Justice has provided several definitions of 
charges having equivalent effect to customs duties. Some of these 
definitions, although consistent, emphasize different aspects of 
the notion under consideration according to the specific problems 
that the Court was asked to resolve on the various cases.
international agreements binding all Member States243.
On the basis of this reasoning the fees demanded for these 
inspections were not considered as charges of equivalent effect: 
"they are not prescribed by each Member State in order to protect 
some interest of its own but by the Council in the general interest 
of the Community. They cannot therefore be regarded as unilateral 
measures which hinder trade but rather as operations intended to 
promote the free movement of goods.."244.
Although the charge in question in Bauhuis was a charge on 
export, it is important to understand the rationale behind the 
Court's reasoning. In the absence of a common rule, a double test 
or control would result (by the exporting and importing State) with 
the prohibition of levying charges for these inspections. On the 
other hand, if a common standard is accepted, only one test is 
carried out and the Member State responsible for it is allowed to 
receive a monetary compensation for this service. Intra-Community 
trade would therefore be facilitated. Another means to expedite 
trade would be through the mutual acceptance of control by the 
Member States. If the inspections carried out by the exporting 
Member State are recognized by the importing Member State, multiple 
control at frontier is avoided. This implies a single integrated 
market where there is mutual trust among Member Statesll.
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243 See Case 46/76 Bauhuis v. Netherlands 25.1.1977 (1977) ECR 
p. 5. This was the case of the levy of fees for veterineury 
inspections on exported goods prescribed by Council Directive 
64/432. Analogously, in case 89/96 Commission v. Netherlands
12.07.1977 (1977) ECR p. 1355, the fees charged for phytosanitary 
inspections were considered legitimate because they aimed at the 
issuing of certificates provided for by the International Plant 
Protection Convention, of which all Member States are contracting 
parties. These inspections were not considered by the Court as 
unilateral measures hindering trade, but operations designed to 
foster the free movement of goods. See peuragraphs 14 and 15. For 
comment on these cases see BARENTS,R Charges of Equivalent Effect 
to Customs Duties CMLRev 1978 pp.415-434. BURKI, S.J. L'Affaire 
Bauhuis c/Etat nérleuidais ou un nouveau problème posé par les taxes 
d'effet équivalant à des droits de douane RTDE 1977, pp.313-315.
244 See Bauhuis. o p .cit. peuras. 29 and 30.
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Scope and service rendered. The emphasis placed by the Court 
on the absolute character of the prohibition laid down by articles 
9 and 12 does not allow any distinction between charges according 
to the aims Member State pursue when applying them. Therefore, 
charges levied for sanitary inspections, statistical purposes, or 
even financing a fund providing social benefits to workers employed 
on the sector relating to the imported good, fall under the 
prohibition of article 12745.
A related question concerns the charges imposed for sanitary, 
veterinary and phytosanitary inspections, etc. which could be 
considered as fees levied in consideration of a service rendered. 
The Court has adopted a very restrictive view on the issue,246 
stating that when such activities are services rendered for the 
general interest the corresponding fees fall under the prohibition 
of Article 12, whereas they are permitted when the activities are 
services specifically rendered to the importer341. In this case,
245 See case 24/68 Commission v. Italy 18.11.1970 (1970) ECR 
p.193, case 8/70 Commission v. Italy 18.11.1970 (1970) ECR p.961; 
case 2-3/69, Social Fonds voor de Diamantarbeiders v. Sa Ch. 
Brachfeld 1.07.1969 ECR (1969) p.211. The scope of the imposition 
is irrelevant because the abolition of customs duties and charges 
of equivalent effect is not only the elimination of the protection 
among Member States but it is functional to the free movement of 
goods. See Piamantarbeiders paras. 11-14 and 15-18 pp. 221-222.
246 See case 39/73, Rewe - Zentralfinanz v. Director der 
Landwirtschaftskammer 11.10.1973 (1973) ESE p.1039. 29/72 Marimex 
v. Italian Fiscal Administration 14.12.1972 (1972) E£E 1309; case 
251/78 Firma Denkavit v. Minister fdr Ernhruna 8.11.1979 (1979) £££ 
p.3369.
241 "specific individual izable service actually rendered" 
BARENTS, R. Charges of Equivalent Effect to Customs Duties CMLRev 
1978, pp. 415-434, p. 423. See case 132/82 Commission v. Belgium 
and case 133/82 Commission v. Luxembourg 17.05.1983 (1983) ££fi p. 
1649 and 1669. In both cases the Court stated that although the 
storage of goods in a public warehouse represents a service 
rendered to the exporter, the charge imposed by the two Member 
States infringed the prohibition laid down in Articles 9 and 12 
because it was levied even if no storage was required by the 
importer completing customs formalities at the public warehouse. 
The charge would be justified if they were part of a general system
however, the charge must be proportionate to and not exceed the 
cost of the service rendered248.
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2.b) The Court Case-law on the Prohibition of Fiscal 
Discrimination.
Under Article 95.1 of the EEC Treaty Member States are allowed
• 249 »to impose internal taxes on imported products provided that these 
are not in excess of those applied to similar domestic products.
This provision is completed by the rule laid down in paragraph
2, whereby Member States are prohibited from affording, through 
internal taxation, indirect protection to imported products which, 
although not similar, are in a competitive relationship with 
domestic goods250. Based on the principle of non-discrimination on 
ground of nationality, Article 95 performs three functions in the
of internal teucation.
248 Case 158/82 Commission v. Denmark 9.11.1983 (1983) ECR
p.3573, case 32/80 Officier van Justitie (1981) E£R p. 251.
249 A compeurison between the charges imposed on domestic and
imported products requires the application of identical criteria. 
The rates, the basis of assessment and the detailed rules of 
levying the tax are taken into account. See case 148/77 Hansen v. 
Hauptzollamt Flensbura 10.10.1978 (1978) ECR p. 1787, case 74/76 
Iannelli v. Meroni 22.03.1977 (1977) p. 557.
250 In paragraph two no exact standard of reference is
established, but two requirements need to be fulfilled: une<jual 
treatment and protective effect. See observations of Advocate 
General Reischl in case 170/78 Commission v. United Kingdom
27.02.1980 (1980) ECR p. 441. See also case 27/67 Finck Frucht v. 
Hauptzollamt Munchen-Landsberaer (1968) ECR p.223, case 169/78, 
Commission v. Italy 27.02.1980 (1980) ECR p. 385; 168/78 Commission 
V. France 27.02.1980 (1980) ESR P• 347; case 171/78 Commission v. 
Denmark. 27.02.1980 (1980) ESR p. 437, 385, 447. Case 216/81,
Coais. v - Amministrazione delle finanze 15.07.1983 (1983) ECR
p.2701. See BARENTS, R. The Prohibition of Fiscal Discrimination 
in Article 95 of the EEC Treaty CMLRev 1980 pp. 437-449, p. 442.
Community system251: it prevents distortion of competition252, it
assures border tax adjustment, and it complements the prohibition 
contained in Articles 9-1325*. It is clear that the imposition of 
higher teueation on an imported good would have the same effect on 
price as the imposition of a customs duty or of a cheurge of 
equivalent effect254.
Internal taxes and charges of equivalent effect, however, must 
be distinguished. According to the Court the concepts of charges 
under Article 12 and of internal taxation under Article 95 are 
separate and their application mutually exclusive255.
As for the question of whether charges imposed on both 
imported and domestic products, but benefitting only the latter, 
should still be regarded as being covered by Article 95, or should
138
251 See EASSON,A. Fiscal Discrimination: New Perspectives on 
Article 95 of the EEC Treaty CMLRev 1981 pp. 521-551, p. 523. 
MARESCA,M. ¿e , "Jfls ,t  .  ppT p. 57 ff. Case 27/67 Finck Fruit Q}2j. 
Cit. p. 233. See also case 169/87 Commission v. Italy op.cit.
252 See case 73/79 Commission v. Italy 21.05.1980 (1980) ECR 
p. 1533 and the parallelism drawn with Articles 92 and 93 which for 
the Court indicates that these provisions pursue the same aim in 
avoiding the distortion of competition with in the internal market.
253 "Article 95 is intended to fill in any breaches which a 
fiscal measure might open up in the prohibition laid down, by 
prohibiting the imposition on imported products of internal 
taxation in excess of that imposed on domestic products" Case 24/68 
Commission v. Italy 1.07.1969 (1969) ££g p.193.
254 "Imposizioni fiscali più' onerose sulle importazioni 
violeuio le concessioni tariffarie per cui si annulla o riduce 
1 'efficacia degli accordi che avrebbero dovuto portare an 
incrementeure il commercio internazionale" STAMMATI, Articolo 95 
QUADRI,R. MONACO R., TRABUCCHI, A. Commentario CEE Vol. II, p.776.
255 Case 45/75 Rewe Landau Pfalz 17.06.1976 (1976) ££g p. 181.
case 57/65 Lùtticke v. Hauptzollamt Saarloms. 16.06.1966 (1966) EOE 
p.205; 27/74 Demact v. Finanzamt Duisbura-Sud 22.10.1974 (1974) EOE 
p. 1037, 20/76 Schott le 16.02.1977 (1977) p. 247. Therefore
when a charge falls under Artide 12 it cannot be considered an 
internal taxation.
be classified as charges of equivalent effect756, in several cases 
the Court has ruled that when the sole purpose of the charge is to 
finance activities to the exclusive advantage of the taxed internal 
product, the charge must be considered as a charge of equivalent 
effect751. In the case where only a part of the tax benefits the 
domestic products, the advantage is evaluated under Article 95.
A primary question concerning Article 95 relates to the 
interpretation of "similar products" (paragraph 1) and "other 
products" (paragraph 2) . The distinction is important since the 
fiscal treatment which Member States must apply is different in 
the two cases751.
Paragraph 1 requires that imported products are not the object 
of a higher tax treatment as compared with that imposed on similar 
domestic products759. Under the second paragraph a different form 
of taxation is allowed, provided that it does not have a protective 
effect for domestic products. In this case, if the different
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256 These are the so-called parafiscal taxes. See case 71172 
Caoolonao v. Ma va 19.06.1973 ECR (1973) 611. 7B/76 Steinike v.
Weinlia 22.03.1977 (1977) p.595 Cucchi v. Avez 25.05.1977 (1977) 
ECR p.987, case 94/74 ICAV v. Ente Nazionale per la Cellulosa 
18.06.1975 (1975) E£R p.699. Interzuccheri Spa v. Ditta Rezzano
25.05.1977 (1977) ECR p. 1029.
751 See EASSON Fiscal Piscrimination. .op.cit. p. 529. See 
PANIELE,L. Il divieto di discriminazione fiscale nella
giurisprudenza comunitaria (1980-1987) Forolt 1989 pp.202-224,sp. 
p.208, for this author the Court ruling in case 73/79, Commission
v. Italy 21.05 1980, is inconsistent with the previous case-law.
In case 73/79 in fact the Court the tax in question was to be
considered as covered by Article 95 although it went to the
exclusive advantage of domestic products, whereas according to the 
previous rulings, see case 77/76 Cucchi v. Avez 25.05.1977 (1977) 
ECR p. 987, the destination of the tax to the exclusive advantage
of the national products was considered as a tax of equivalent 
effect.
258 See TIZZANO,A. Sul divieto di discriminazioni fiscali nella 
Comunità economica europea Forolt. 1976, Part IV, pp.318-324.
759 Imported goods could be taxed at lower rate than domestic 
goods which are similar. See case 34/67 Firma Lùck v. H. Koln 
4.04.1968 (1968) ESR P* 334.
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taxation imposed on products which are in competition is justified 
(by the different procedures of manufacture260, the materials used 
or other objective criteria261) the fiscal discrimination is 
compatible with Article 95.2 unless the criteria which justify the 
different treatment are not laid down with the purpose of 
discriminating imported products262.
According to the Court, similar products are those which are 
comparable as regards the origin, the composition , the processing 
and the substemtive qualities263 and from the point of view of the 
consumer264. Both these conditions should be fulfilled because 
recourse to the criterion of consumer's preferences can be 
inaccurate since it can be the result of the difference in price 
between two products.
In order to clarify this point, reference can be made to the
260 See case 21/79 Commission v. Italy 08.01.1980 (1980) ECR 
p.l (regenerated oil), the difference in taxation was justified 
because production cost of regenerated oils are higher than those 
of fresh oil.
261 On differences between luxury goods see case 319/81
Commission v. Italy 15.03.1983 (1983) ECR p.601 and case 277/83
Commission v. Italy 11.07.1985 (1985) ECR p.2053 where the
different taxation was quashed because only imported luxury goods 
were taxed with a higher burden.
262 See case 112/84 Humblot v. Directeur des Services Fiscaux
09.05.1985 (1985) p. 1373.
263 The Court also had recourse to customs classification even 
if it also recognized that the fact that the products had the same 
customs classification, which, although an important element, could 
not be conclusive. See Fink-Frucht op.cit. and case 28/69 
commission v. Italy op.cit. Products which bear a different 
classification may be covered by the same tax and be considered 
similar for this purpose. See McGOVERN,E. International Trade 
Regulations Exeter, Globefield Press 1986 pp. 242-249.
264 See case 106/84 Commission v. Denmark 04.03.1986 (1986) ECR 
p. 867 and case 243/84 Jhon Walker v. Ministeriet for Skatter
04.03.1986 (1986) ECR p. 877 where the products in question were 
not considered simileur since their characteristics are 
substantially different (absence of the first type of criterion 
mentioned).
economic concept of cross-elasticity which indicates the variation 
of the demand of a product at the raising or lowering of the price 
of another good.
The percentage variation of demand for a product (A) is 
divided by the percentage variation of the price of the other 
product (B): the result is the cross-elasticity. A high cross
elasticity means that the difference in prices will modify the 
choice of consumers (when the price of B raises, the demand for A 
increase). Similar goods therefore have a high cross elasticity, 
and hence even a marginal difference of prices between them would 
modify the choice of the consumers: this explains why the same 
fiscal treatment is required.
Products coming under paragraph 2 have a lower cross- 
elasticity (they have different cheuracteristics but are 
competitive) . Therefore, a different tax treatment is allowed, but 
only if it is justified by such differences emd provided that the 
preferential treatment granted to domestic goods is not based on 
conditions that cannot be fulfilled by imported goods (they do not 
have to be established with a protectionist aim).
It has been argued265 that the case-law of the Court of Justice 
shows a "globalization" of article 9S266. This means that the 
distinction between "similar" and "other products" has lost part 
of its relevance. If one applies the concept of cross-elasticity, 
the "globalization" means that in a hypothetical scale of cross­
elasticity going from 1 to 10, Article 95 covers the hypothesis of 
products with a cross elasticity going from 4 to 10 (the higher 
values being those of similar goods).
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265 See EASSON Fiscal discrimination... op.cit. and DANDSSO, 
M. DENTON, R. Does the European Court of Justice Look for a 
Protectionist Motive under Article 95? LIEI 1990, pp.67-120.
266 See EASSON New perspectives. .cit. p. 535. This view is
developed by DANVSSO, M. DENTON,R. Does the European Court... 
PPtCitt p.74.
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Globalization also implies that the different fiscal treatment 
required under paragraph 1 and paragraph 2 is not differentiated 
any longer161. According to the authors who submitted the theory of 
globalization of Article 95, the Court focuses in peurticular on 
the question of protectionism269. In other words the Court considers 
the objectives of the different tax regime. If the reason is 
legitimate the difference is allowed, if the aim is protectionist, 
the national measure is quashed.
3) The Notion of Charges Having Equivalent Effect to Customs Duties 
and Fiscal Discrimination in the Cooperation Agreement.
It has already been seen that customs duties imposed on goods 
imported from third countries in the Community are indicated in the 
Common Customs Tariff and that Member States cannot impose customs 
duties unilaterally on third countries imports. This prohibition 
extends to charges of equivalent effect269 which should require a 
common notion of charges of equivalent effect. It is cleeur, in 
fact, that a charge imposed by a Member State on a good imported 
from a third country is legitimate if it is not qualified as charge
261 See DANIELE,L. Il divieto di discriminazione fiscale nella 
giurisprudenza comuni taria Forolt. 1989, Piurt IV, pp.201-223.
269 "It appears.. .that Article 95, taken as a whole, may apply 
without distinction to all the products concerned. It is sufficient 
therefore to examine whether the application of a given national 
tax system is discriminatory or, as the case may be, protective" 
case 319-81 Commission v. Italy para.13.
269 Member States will not be allowed to introduce or modify 
customs duties and charges of equivalent effect as regards third 
countries 37-38/73 Diamanterbeiders v . Indiamex 13.12.1973
(1973) p.1609. The Court has ruled that the prohibition of 
maintaining them in case 266/81 SIOT v. Ministero del le finanze
16.03.1983 (1983) E£R p.731. In case 144/77 Hansen v. Hautzollamt 
Flensbura 10.10.1978 (1978)ESE 1787 the Court ruled that, in the 
absence of agreement providing for such a rule, there is not a 
prohibition of discrimination in taxation imposed on goods imported 
from third countries.
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of equivalent effect and a different notion adopted by the various 
Member States could distort the trade flow in the Community.
The Court has expressly recognized the analogy of the notion of 
charges of equivalent effect contained in Articles 9 and 12 with 
the notion of charges of equivalent effect (as well as measures of 
equivalent effect) contained in the regulations establishing common 
market organizations. These usually contain rules concerning trade 
with third countries prohibiting the levying of customs duties and 
charges of equivalent effect270.
It should be considered that the main purpose of having a 
common customs tariff seek to secure the uniformity of treatment 
at the external borders as regards goods imported from third 
countries271. Whereas in the case of the Cooperation Agreements with 
Maghreb countries the aim of Article 9 is that of eliminating some 
of the obstacles to trade, amongst others, customs duties and 
charges of equivalent effect.
Although the ultimate aims of the EEC Treaty and of the 
Cooperation Agreement are different, it seems possible to give an 
interpretation of the notion of charges of equivalent effect 
contained in the Cooperation Agreements with Maghreb countries 
which is the same as that adopted in Community law. The two most 
relevant questions are the scope of the charge and the charges 
levied for a service rendered to the importer. It can be submitted 
that the reference to the purpose of the charge is too subjective 
and can lead to abuses. It would be relatively simple for the 
importing Member State to allege that the charge is not imposed as
270 Case 34/73 Variola v. Amministrazione delle finanze
10.10.1973 (1973) £Cfi p.981; case 43/71 Politi v. Ministero delle 
finanze 14.10.1971 (1971) P* 2039; case 84/71 Marimex v.
Ministero delle finanze 7.03.1972 (1972) £££ p.89 ; case 21/75
Firma Schroeder v. Oberstatdirektor der Stadt Koln 9.07.1975 (1975) 
ECR p. 905.
271 See observations of Advocate General Werner in Marimex cit. 
p. 916 and case 70/77 Simmenthal v. Amministarazione delle Finanze
28.06.1978 (1978) ££g p. 1453.
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a meeuis of protection but has a different purpose, such as the 
reimbursement of post steunps or expanses for statistical analysis. 
If the charge is levied for the reason that the good has moved 
across the border this should be classified as charges of 
equivalent effect and therefore prohibited. An exception exists in 
the case of a charge imposed as payment of sanitary or 
phitosanitajry inspections, or for any service
rendered to the importer. In this case the fees levied must be 
proportionate to the service rendered. An analogous interpretation 
can be found in GATT where charges and fees are allowed (Article 
VIII) if they are levied in consideration of a service rendered to 
the exporter. As in EEC law GATT requires proportionality between 
the cost and the service.
One more complex question concerns the interpretation of 
Article 33 of the Cooperation Agreement with Morocco on fiscal 
discrimination. This prohibits "any measures or practice of an 
internal fiscal nature establishing, whether directly or 
indirectly272, discrimination between the products of one 
Contracting Party and like products originating in the territory
273of the other Contracting party" .
272 The distinction between direct and indirect taxation lies 
in relation whether tax is imposed on products (indirect taxation) 
or on the producer (income tsucation, e.d. direct taxation)See in 
Community law case 45/64 Commission v. Italy 1.12.1965 (1965) ECR 
p. 857. This is a well known distinction in international trade, 
it is particularly relevant as regards border adjustment tax and 
also applies in GATT. See JACKSON J.Ü. National Treatment 
Obligations emd non-Tariff Barriers MJIL 1989 pp. 207-224.
273 Article 33 sets up the "destination principle" that is 
guaranteed in the Community by Articles 95 and 96. The function 
performed in the EEC by Article 96 is accomplished by the second 
paragraph of Article 33 which reads "products exported to the 
territory of one of the Contracting Party may not benefit from the 
repayment of internal taxation in excess of the amount of direct 
or indirect taxation imposed upon them". This means that the 
turnover tax applied by Morocco to a good which is exported to a 
Community Member States is remitted, that is the good is exported 
free of tax and the importing Member State will then apply the tax
What is the role of Article 33 in relation to the prohibition 
of customs duties and charges of equivalent effect? How should the 
term "like products" and the prohibition of discrimination be 
interpreted?
The rationale behind of the rule is that of sanctioning 
discriminatory taxation which would result, if admitted, in an 
obstacle to trade. It should however be noted that Article 33 is 
not part of the provisions contained in Title II, Trade 
Cooperation, for industrial products, but is one of the "Common 
Provision" applying to both industrial and agricultural trade.
While the prohibition of customs duties and charges of 
equivalent effect only concerns industrial trade from Morocco to 
the Community, the prohibition laid down in Article 33 also applies 
to the Community originating products imported into Morocco. 
Therefore, on the one heuid, there is non-reciprocal preferential 
treatment as regards customs and quotas, and on the other, the 
principle of non-discrimination on nationality applying both ways.
In other words, products imported from the Community to 
Maghreb countries are subject to customs duties but they must not 
be discriminated, as regards taxation, in relation with like 
domestic goods. The second aim of Article 95 of the EEC Treaty, 
which is to assure fair conditions of competition, does not seem 
to be pursued by Article 33. First, there are no other provisions 
on competition in the Cooperation Agreement (such as those on State 
aids of the EEC Treaty) and, second, there is not reference to 
"products in competition" in Article 33.
Since Article 95 of the EEC Treaty and 33 of the Cooperation 
Agreement are worded differently it seems clear that Article 33 has 
a more limited application. What is not clear is whether Article
33.1 corresponds to Article 95.1.
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which is applied on the same product. A different tax, in fact, 
would be a further obstacle to trade, if, let us suppose the tax 
imposed by Member State would be a 10%, while the Moroccan tax 
would be a 7%.
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It should in fact be noted that Article 33 establishes a 
comparison between "like" products, whereas Article 95.1 refers to 
"similar" products. In addition, Article 33.1 prohibits 
"discrimination" whereas Article 95 paragraph 1 more specifically 
prohibits the imposition of a higher tax burden on imported goods.
As far as the notion of "like products" is concerned it seems 
that the provision does not require perfect correspondence between 
the products whose tax burden is being compared. This seems to be 
excluded first by the term used (like, "simileuri"..) , but 
especially by the observation that such an interpretation would 
excessively limit the application of Article 33274. A little 
divergence would in fact be sufficient to circumnavigate the 
prohibition of discrimination.
Analogously, one can exclude the possibility of products which 
are in competition but differ for their characteristics being 
covered by Article 33. In Kupferbera the Court ruled that 
"products which differ inter se both as regards the method of their 
manufacture and their characteristics may not be regarded as like 
products"275. This case concerned the interpretation of Article 21 
of the Agreement with Portugal, which is identical to Article 33 
of Morocco Cooperation Agreement. The absence of a corresponding 
provision to Article 95.2 in the Cooperation Agreement meant that 
it was not in the intention of the contracting Parties to extend 
the prohibition of fiscal discrimination to this type of products. 
The different aims of the two international instruments should also 
confirm such an interpretation.
It could be submitted that the application of the prohibition 
of discrimination laid down in Article 33 cover only products
274 See in the EEC case 148/77 Hansen 6 Balk v. Hauptzollamt 
Flensbura 10.10.1978 (1978) £££ 1787. case 45/75 Rewe v.
Hauptzollamt Landau-Pfalz 17.02.1976 (1976) E0& p.181, case 169/78 
op.cit.
275 It was the case of wines fortified with spirits and wines 
of natural fermentation. See case 104/81 Kupferbera. op.cit. p. 
3669.
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having a high value of cross elasticity (on the scale from 1 to 10 
values comprised between 8 and 10).
As for the tax rates which are being compared, the prohibition 
contained in Article 33 concerns "measures and practice of an 
internal fiscal nature". Tax rates, based on the same assessment 
basis and concerning products at the same stage of production or 
marketing are covered.
This would be, however, a too restrictive interpretation 
covering, in practice, only foirmal discrimination. It is submitted 
that method of payment216, tax reimbursement and exemptions should 
be calculated to verify the compliance of the tax treatment imposed 
by the importing Member State with Article 33.
A different fiscal treatment between "like" products, whereby 
a State is free to decide whether to pursue economic and or social 
policy objectives, should, however, not be discriminatory211. This 
is not always easy to ascertain. It could be argued that when only 
domestic products can qualify for the preferential fiscal 
treatment, there is a presumption of discrimination21*.
216 See for Article 95 case 55/79 Commission v. Ireland
27.02.1980 (1980) ECR p.481 "..even when the rate of tax is equal 
the effect of that tax may vary according to the detailed rules for 
the basis of assessment and levying thereof applied to national 
production and imported products respectively" para. 8.
277 In a case reproducing the facts of "regenerated oil", case
21/79 Commission v.__JtaJv . p.l, where only domestic
regenerated oil was granted a preferential fiscal treatment, 
whereas imported regenerated oil was taxed like fresh oil was 
clearly discriminatory on the basis of nationality.
27t This would be the case of a situation like that examined 
in the Marsala case, case 277/83 Commission v. Italy 3.07.1985 
(1985) ECR p. 2049, where Marsala wine was taxed less heavily than 
liqueur wines, and imported liqueur wines could never be qualified 
for the preferential treatment. See also case 106/84 Commission v. 
Denmark 1986 (1986) ECR p. 833, (Danish fruit wines) where the
products object of the higher tax were only imported goods.
In support of this interpretation, it could be held that its 
application would in any case limited by the first part of the 
provision, that is by the fact that the tax only concern *like" 
products and it is not extended to products which are in 
competition. This means, in other words, that the narrower 
interpretation given to Article 33, as compared with Article 95, 
is maintained.
The prohibition of fiscal discrimination is also contained in 
Article III of GATT. This provision establishes, in general, the 
principle of national treatment between domestic and imported like 
products as regards not only fiscal discrimination but also other 
measures and regulations applying to domestic goods.
Thus, if parallelism can be drawn with EEC Treaty provisions this 
will concern Article 95 and Article 30.
The aims of Article III GATT are to remove discrimination as an 
obstacle to trade and also to assure equal conditions of 
competition279. The interpretation of like products is also 
controversial in GATT, although it seems that the compeurable use 
of the products is not sufficient to qualify them as like 
products290.
Article III is also interpreted as sanctioning all the 
measures which although not discriminatory "prima facie" 
discriminates between domestic and imported goods.
A comparison can hardly been made between Article III GATT and 
Article 33 of the Cooperation Agreement. It has been seen that the 
objective of the former provision is more extensive than that of
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See the Italian discrimination against imported 
agricultural machinery case where the Panel stated that the 
intention of the drafters was to provide equal conditions of 
competition between imported and domestic goods once they have been 
cleared through customs. See JACKSON, DAVEY op.cit. p.486 ff. spec, 
p.488 and JACKSON,J.H. National Treatment...op.cit. p.210.
280 See the milk protein case where the Panel concluded that 
although animal and vegetable and synthetic proteins were used to 
add protein to animal feed that could not be considered as like 
products. JACKSON, DAVEY Q£ cit. p.493.
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Article 33. However, we should also consider that Article 9 of the 
Cooperation Agreement prohibits the application of measures of 
equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions. The interpretation 
of this provision will be discussed in the following section.
4) Measures of Equivalent Effect to Quantitative Restrictions.
4.a) The Case-Law of the Court of Justice.
As has been seen above, besides the prohibition on applying
quantitative restrictions to imports of Moroccan industrial goods
into the Community, the Agreement also provides for the elimination 
2*i , ( # 
of measures of equivalent effect in relation to quantitative
restriction2,2.
Jn the EEC, the interpretation of this concept is of an 
extraordinary complexity and is still the subject of many cases
2,1 In the EEC Treaty a "measure" under Article 30 cannot 
concern the behavior of an undertaking but must be imputed to the 
State. It is also clear that an EEC legislation setting up a system 
of import licence for importation in the Community could not be 
applied to Moroccan imports. See Commission Directive 70/50 O.J. 
L 13 1970 defining measures for the purpose of Article 30 "laws, 
regulations, administrative provisions, administrative practices 
and all instruments issuing from a public authority, including 
recommendation" (second consideranda). "National practice" 
introduced by the government of a Member State, although not 
binding is considered a measure under Article 30. See Buy Irish 
case 249/81 Commission V. Ireland 24.11.1982 (1982) ECR p.4005.
2X2 See Article XI and Article III of GATT. The first is 
concerned with quotas and other measures which apply only to 
imported products and which are forbidden. Article III concerns 
measures such as regulations and legislation which do not make a 
distinction between imported and domestic goods. In this second 
case Article III requires that imported goods are treated no less 
favorably than domestic goods. The Community is going further 
because it considers that these measures are prohibited when they 
have a restrictive effect on trade.
brought before the Court of Justice2*3.
Before the important ruling in Dassonville2*4. part of the 
doctrine285 considered measures of equivalent effect those which 
discriminated between imported and domestic goods. According to 
other scholars, however, measures of equivalent effect were those 
which, although formally non-discriminatory, had the effect of 
restricting trade between Member States.
The Commission, in its Directive 70/50, differentiated 
between "distinctly" and "indistinctly applice&le" measures. While 
the effect of the former was considered equivalent to that of 
quotas, which were per se prohibited, the latterfs effect was 
considered "inherent" to the difference of regulations applied by 
Member States and thus in principle not covered by Article 30 
unless the restrictive effects of these measures were not 
proportional to the aims and when the same objective could be 
attained by less restrictive means286.
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2X3 On the most recent development see GORMLEY,L. Recent Case 
Law on the Free Movement of Goods: Some hot Potatoes CMLRev. 1990 
pp. 827-857. On the question of which measures are prohibited under 
Article 30 see also WHITE,E.L. In Search of Limits to Article 30 
of the EEC Treaty CMLrev 1989, pp. 235-280; MORTELMANS,K . Article 
30 of the EEC treaty and Legislation relating to Market 
Circumstances: Time to Consider a new Definition? CMLRev 1991, pp. 
115-136. STEINER,J. Drawing the Line: USes and Abuses of Article 
30 CMLRev. 1992, pp. 749-774.
244 case 8/74 Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville 11.07.1974 (1974) 
ECR p. 837.
285 See for reference OLIVER, P. Free Movement., op.cit. p. 83- 
86; GORMLEY,L. Prohibiting Restrictions on Trade within the EEC 
North-Holi and, Amsterdam, 1985 pp.8-20.
286 It is worth noting that Advocate General Capotorti in case
120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolvervaltung fur Brenntwein
20.02.1979 E£E (1979) p.649, (Cassis de Diion) qualified the
limited interpretation of measures of equivalent effect given by 
the Commission in Directive 70/50 as an expression of a "prudent 
attitude" which could be explained only if seen in the context of 
a stage of progressive abolition of quotas. The Advocate General 
considered, in other words, that the definition contained in the 
directive was insufficient to guarantee the free movement of goods
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In Dassonville the Court did not distinguish between equally 
and non-equally applicable measures, but it broadly defined 
"measures" within the meaning of Article 30, as "all trading rules 
enacted by Member States which are capable of hindering, directly 
or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade". The 
Court in this ruling made it clear that, in order to qualify as a 
measure of equivalent effect, the key criterion would be the 
restrictive effect it has on trade between Member States. In the 
Cassis de Pi ion ruling, concerning national legislation applicable 
to both domestic and imported goods, the Court confirmed that even 
equally applicable measures are covered by Article 30.
Subsequent case-law established that it is not necessary for 
a measure to advantage domestic goods to come within the scope of 
Article 30™.
A distinction can be made between those measures which concern 
the characteristics of the goods (labelling, packaging, 
composition..) and measures which regulate the circumstances on 
which goods are used or sold2**.
at a more advanced stage of integration.
287 See case 60/61-1984 Cinéthèque v. Fédération National des 
Cinemas Français 11.07.1985 (1985) ECR p.2605. See WHITE op.cit.
“* see case 155/80 Oebel (night baking) 14.07.1981 (1981) ECR 
p. 1993; 286/81 Oosthoek 15.12.1982 (1982) ECR p.4574 (promotional 
gift); case 75/81 Blesaen 31.03.1982 (1982) EÇR p.1211 (sale of 
alcoholic beverage in public places); 382/87 Buet 16.05.1989 (1989) 
ECR p. 1235 (door step selling). Pifferent interpretations have 
been submitted as regeurds these second type of measures. For WHITE, 
Article 30 does not cover rules regulating circumstances in which 
goods are sold or used, in so far as they have a neutral effect on 
goods legally produced or marketed in another Member State. 
According to Advocate General Van Gerven in Torfaen it is the 
partitioning of the market which should be considered in deciding 
whether a measure falls under Article 30. See comments by 
GORMLEY,L. Note to Case 145/88 CMLRev 1990 pp.141-150. For 
MORTELMANS,K. Article 30... op.cit. are covered by Article 30 those 
measures which lack a "territorial element", that is which 
regulates the marketing of products but are not connected with 
activities taking place in a fixed location (e.g. shop hours) since 
the former only may threaten the completion of the internal market
In Dassonville and more precisely in the Cassis de Pi ion, 
however, the Court qualified the broad definition given to measures 
of equivalent effect introducing a "rule of reason", that is laying 
down the conditions under which a measure, which would be 
considered prohibited under Article 30 because of its effect to 
restrict trade between Member States, is on the contrary 
admissible. The conditions are the following: the measure must
pursue a legitimate objective2,9 which is not regulated at Community 
level290,* it must be necessary and proportional291 and cannot 
constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised
• * • 292restriction on trade (Passonville. para.7 ) .
152
whereas for the other goods they are a secondary consideration. He 
admits however, the existence of a "grey area". See pp. 130-131.
289 In the language of the Court "mandatory requirements". The 
burden of the proof lays on the importing Member State. See 178/84 
Commission v. Germany 12.03.1987 (1987) ECR p. 1227.
290 See in Passonville para. 6 "In the absence of a Community
system guaranteeing consumers the authenticity of a product's 
designation of origin.." and in Cassis de Piion the reference to 
the absence of common rules relating to the production and 
marketing of alcohol.." (para 8). The compatibility with Article 
30 of measures hindering trade can be also admitted when Member 
State adopt measures to regulate a subject which is only partially 
covered by Community law or where the Community itself allow the 
intervention of national regulation. See case 4/75 Rewe- 
Zentralfinanz v. Landwirtschaftskammar 8.07.1975 (1975) ££fi p. 843; 
65/75 Tasca 26.02.1976 (1976) p. 291; 148/78 Ratti 5.04.1979
(1979) EQfi p.1629.
291 Proportionality for equally and non-equally applicable 
measures. See 190/73 Officer van Justitie v. Van Haaster 30.10.1974
(1974) ECR 1123. It could be equally applicable under Article 30 
even if proportionate.
292 It could be noted that the Court seems to make a 
contradiction in this peœagraph, since on the one hand it states 
that it will not examine whether the contested measures fall under 
Article 36, but on the other it asserts the necessity for these to 
meet the requirements laid down in the second paragraph. If Article 
36 does not apply, why should its second paragraph apply?
In the Cassis de Diion the Court lists, as an example of a 
"mandatory requirement", "effectiveness of fiscal supervision 
(which will disappear in subsequent cases), the protection of 
public health, the fairness of commercial transactions and the 
defence of the consumer". It is clear from the use of the term, in 
particular at the beginning of that sentence, that the list is not 
exhaustive293, in fact the Court has admitted the legitimacy of 
restrictive measures in the case of environmental protection294,
• • # • 295 • 206protection of working conditions , and culture in general ... A 
second question is the relationship between Article 36 and the rule 
of reason. It should be noted that the Court mentions the 
protection of health, which is one of the grounds contained in 
Article 36 allowing Member State to derogate from Articles 30-34291. 
It has therefore been argued Cassis de Diion291 has filled a lacuna, 
amplifying Article 36 with reasons, which at the time of the 
conclusion of the Treaty had not been included in that provision. 
This interpretation could be justified by the observation, that the 
effect of the rule of reason of Article 30 is the same as Article
36, viz. derogation from the prohibition contained in Articles 30-
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293 Cassis de Diion. para 8, emphasis supplied.
204 Case 302/86 Commission v. Denmark 20.09.1988 (1988) ECR p.
4627.
295 ♦Oebel op.cit.
296 Case 95/84 Borello 10.07.1986 (1986) SÇR p.2453.
297 T he provisions of Articles 30 to 34 shall not preclude 
prohibitions or restrictions on imports, exports or good in transit 
justified on grounds of public morality, public policy or public 
security; the protection of health and life of humans, animals or 
plants; the protection of national treasures possessing artistic, 
historic or archeological value; or the protection of industrial 
and commercial property. Such prohibition or restrictions shall 
not, however, constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a 
disguised restriction on trade between Member States"
298 It will be remembered that the Court in Cassis quite 
surprisingly did not even mention Article 36.
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34. The requirements to be fulfilled bu both the conditions under 
Article 36 and the rule of reason are the same, e.g. necessity, 
proportionality, no eurbitrary discrimination and disguised 
restriction on trade. This interpretation, however, does not 
maintain a distinction between distinctly and indistinctly 
applicable measures. In other words, both may be justified under 
Article 36 and mandatory requirements.
The second theory, that Article 36 and the rule of reason are 
separate exceptions seems more consistent with the Court case-law 
that which had applied the rule of reason only to indistinctly
• 299applicable measures and always affirmed that Article 36, being 
an exception to a fundamental Treaty rule, must be narrowly 
interpreted300.
A restriction on trade is not justified if the good is 
lawfully produced and marketed in another Member State. This is the 
principle of mutual acceptance or of equivalence whereby a Member 
State cannot, for instance, claim protection of the consumer to 
justify the adoption of a measure restricting trade if this alleged 
aim has already been complied with in the exporting Member State.
The broad interpretation given by the Court to measures of 
equivalent effect, the question of the mutual acceptance and the 
possibility of derogation through the application of the rule of 
reason of Article 36 EEC Treaty should be considered in the light 
of the aim of creating a single market.
Faced with a prohibition which has been given very wide 
application, with a very limited possibility of derogation (Article 
36 and the rule of reason have both been narrowly construed and 
are subject to the further condition of necessity and 
proportionality), Member States are faced in fact with a double
299 See 113/80 Commission v. Ireland 17.06.1981 (1981) ECR
p.1625.
300 See case 7/68 Commission v. Italy op.cit.. 229/83
Association__ÛS&__Centres de distributions EL “Au ble vert"
10.01.1985 (1985) p. 17.
choice: either to endorse the harmonization of standards applicable 
to goods or to accept the standard applied by the exporting Member 
State.
This does not mean that all measures and regulations of Member 
States have to be harmonized at Community level. The "new approach" 
adopted in 1985 by the Commission301 distinguishes between those 
measures which require harmonization302 and those which can be 
regulated by the principle of mutual acceptance. The application 
of this principle allows the Community to concentrate on those 
measures where harmonization seems more urgent (health and safety 
in particular) and to avoid, at the same time, that the absence of 
harmonization could be interpreted as allowing Member States to 
apply their national legislation to imported goods, which would 
have resulted in the creation of obstacles to the free circulation 
within the Community303.
The mutual acceptance principle has other implications. A 
Member State can export a product in another Member State which 
complies with the standards of the country of destination but which 
could not be marketed in the country of origin. The products could 
then be exported in other Community countries since they have been 
legally marketed in one of them.
4.b) Measures of Equivalent Effect in the Cooperation Agreement.
Let us now consider the notion of measures of equivalent 
effect in Article 9 of the Cooperation Agreement.
It is clear, from what has been observed above, that the 
interpretation given by the Court of Justice in Dassonville cannot
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301 See O.J. C 136 1985 and MATTERA RICIGLIANO II mercato.. 
pp.93 ff.
302 Such as plant protection, animal health, pharmaceutical 
products.
303 See GORMLEY,L.W. Some Reflections on the Internal Market 
and Free Movement of Goods LIEI 1989 pp. 9-20 spec. p. 12.
¿0 applied to measures of equivalent effect in the rel&tlORStlipS 
between the Community and Maghreb countries.
The aim of provisions prohibiting measures of equivalent 
effect in the Cooperation Agreements is to eliminate protectionist 
measures which are applied by the Community on imports from Maghreb 
countries.
In discussing which national measures can be applied to 
imports from Maghreb countries we shall first consider the 
definition given in Article 9. Since equivalence is established in 
relation to quotas, measures of equivalent effect are those rules 
which apply to imported goods and whose effect is to reduce304 the 
quantity of products which would otherwise be imported or which 
make the imports more onerous. Rules of these type are those 
requiring that imported products satisfy specific requirements as 
regards its composition, presentation or its characteristics. When 
such rules formally discriminate, that is apply only to imported 
products and not to domestic goods, the measures should be 
considered as an infringement of Article 9. This would apply, for 
instance, if the sale of a product in the market is made 
conditional to its conformity to certain specification which are 
not required for domestic products.
It could be asked whether the prohibition of formal
discrimination should be limited to the characteristics of the 
products or should also be extended to the use of the products or 
the conditions of marketing.
This would be the case, for example, if the national rule 
requires a compulsory destination, such as the assembly only with 
domestically produced goods, or if it requires domestic industries 
to use a percentage of Community produced goods. If the destination 
is limited to imported products it seems that an infringement of 
Article 9 could be postulated.
Other cases of measures prohibited by Article 9 are those
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304 A total ban is considered a quantitative restriction which 
is also prohibited under the Agreement.
applied at borders, which make the importation of goods more 
difficult. Therefore any unjustified delay in the clearance of 
goods at customs (due to limited opening hours for example) should 
be covered by Article 9. Analogously, one could argue that the 
formal requirement of an import licence could be admitted under 
Article 9. However, if the issuing of the licence is subject to 
delay or formalities which make the importation more difficult this 
requirement falls under Article 9. Finally, since under the 
Cooperation Agreement, preferential treatment is granted only to 
products originating in Morocco305, the requirement of a certificate 
of the origin for these goods is obviously legitimized.
Would it be possible to enlarge this definition of measures 
of equivalent effect to include also those, which, although not 
formally, de facto discriminate between imported and domestic 
goods?
A possible solution would be to extend the notion of measures 
of equivalent effect to measures which do not formally discriminate
306 • • • ,between two products but which in practice are applied only to 
imported goods, unless a measure is justified by one of the grounds 
contained in Article 35 (corresponding to Article 36 of the EEC 
Treaty) and interpreted in such a way as to include a "mandatory 
requirement"(see below).
As discussed above, the broad interpretation given by the 
Court to measures of equivalent effect in the Community can be 
justified in the light of the possible harmonization and the 
creation of the common market. It seems, therefore, that the scope 
of the Cooperation Agreement cannot justify an interpretation of 
measures of equivalent effect applying the sole criterion of 
discriminatory effect.
A possible justification of the application of a broad
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305 See infra the chapter on rules of origin.
306 Conditions of use or marketing would be excluded.
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interpretation of measures of equivalent effect is that, in the 
EEC, the prohibition on measures of equivalent effect applies in 
a reciprocal way. Every Member State is obliged, in its trade with 
another Member State, to eliminate measures which could restrict 
trade. In the relationship between the Community and Morocco, only 
the Community is required to do so. If, therefore, a wider concept 
is applied the effect would be in any case more limited than within 
the EEC.
It should also be remembered that in all the cases where the 
Court has ruled on the interpretation of provisions contained in 
Agreements concluded with third countries it has been confronted 
with reciprocal provisions (free trade areas) and never with a 
preferential trade agreement.
However, Member States would probably be more inclined to open 
their borders and apply a wide concept of measures of equivalent 
effect if reciprocity was foreseen, and therefore it could also be 
eurgued that the notion of measures of equivalent effect should be 
interpreted restrictively because of the non-reciprocity set up in 
the Cooperation Agreement.
As has seen above, the Cooperation Agreement provides for the 
possibility of derogating from the prohibition of imposing quotas 
and measures of equivalent effect.
A system of derogations is envisaged in the Common market to 
balance the interests of the importing state with the requirements 
of the free movement of goods. Such a system of derogations from 
the prohibitions of quotas and measures of equivalent effect 
(Article 30 of the EEC Treaty) is laid down in Article 36 and in 
the so-called "mandatory requirement" as identified by case-law of 
the Court of Justice.
In the Cooperation Agreement, a system permitting derogation 
is contained in Article 35 reading as follows: "The Agreement shall 
not preclude prohibition or restrictions on imports, exports or 
goods in transit justified on grounds of public morality, public 
policy or public security; the protection of health and life of
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humans, animals or plants; the protection of national treasures of 
lurtistic, historic or archeological value; the protection of 
industrial and commercial property, or rules relating to gold or 
silver. Such prohibition or restrictions must not, however, 
constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised 
restriction on trade between the Contracting Parties"
It could be asked (i) whether the grounds for derogation of 
the Cooperation Agreement with Morocco only apply to the 
prohibition contained in Article 9 or if it has a more extensive 
application and (ii) whether there exist "mandatory requirements", 
and in this case, on which basis they can be founded, even in the 
Cooperation Agreement.
One could submit that Article 35 could be invoked by way of 
derogation from the prohibition not only to impose quotas and 
measures of equivalent effect but also customs duties, charges of 
equivalent effect and even discriminatory taxation307.
This hypothesis could be founded on the following observations.
Article 35 is contained in Title II, trade cooperation, letter 
C: Common provisions, this means that the application is not
limited to trade in industrial products, but it lays down a general 
derogation also applicable to agricultural trade. A broad 
interpretation of Article 35 is also supported by a literal 
argument. If a prohibition on trade means the establishment of a 
total ban, an import restriction has a wider meaning than a partial 
ban, viz., a quota. A charge of equivalent effect and even 
discriminatory taxation could be considered restrictions of
307 In Community law it is well established that Article 36 can 
be invoked only to justify a derogation from the prohibition set 
up in Article 30 and never as a derogation from Articles 9, 12, 13 
and 16 (see case 7/68 Commission v. Italy 10.12.1968 (1968) ECR p. 
423. not even in the case of pecuniary charges corresponding to 
measures (like for instance sanitary inspections) which are 
justified under Article 36. According to the Court, the place of 
Article 36 and its express reference to Articles 30-34 (prohibiting 
quemtitative restrictions and measures having equivalent effect in 
trade among Member States) excludes any different interpretation.
trade308. The grounds invoked must, however, not be out of 
proportion and must be necessary, that is if various instruments 
could be used to attain the objective pursued by this measure the 
less restrictive for trade should be applied
The wide interpretation given to Article 35 could also be 
invoked to enlarge the ground of justification. The "public policy" 
notion could be interpreted as covering protection of the consumer, 
of the environment and fairness of trade.
It should also be emphasized that the derogation in the 
Cooperation Agreement does not have provisional application, as in 
EEC law.
Article 9 of the Cooperation Agreement with Morocco does not 
specify whether this prohibition applies to the measures in force 
at the time of the conclusion of the Agreement or if it forbids the
• • 1AQ ,introduction of new quotas and measures . It is submitted that the 
character of absolute prohibition established in the Article, the 
absence of any further specification, and in particular, the aim 
of the agreement could lead to an affirmation that all quotas and 
measures should be abolished as between Morocco and the Community.
This enlarged system of derogation could be applied to 
"moderate" the effects of a broad interpretation of the notions of 
measures of equivalent effect as the one suggested above.
5) Maghreb Exports aji d the Single Europe an Market.
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308 In Demacr the Court considered that charges of equivalent 
effect have a "restrictive consequence on free movement of goods", 
while in Commission v. Italy. (art treasures), it seems to consider 
a restriction a quota.., but it was helped in this interpretation 
by the reference in Article 36 EEC Treaty to Articles 30-34 which 
only concern quotas and measures of equivalent effect. See also 
Advocate General Capotorti in case 225/78 Bouhelier where he 
criticizes the drafting technique consisting in reproducing Article 
36 of the Treaty in International Agreement concluded by the EEC 
without amendment and adaptation of the content "according to the 
varying scope of the individual agreements". p. 3166.
309 It shall be remembered that Articles 31-35 set up a 
timetable for the progressive abolition of quotas.
The relationship between the internal market emd exports from 
Maghreb countries in the Community can be discussed from two 
different perspectives. The first concerns the regime which is 
applied within the Community to products of third country origin, 
whilst the second is more generally related to the effect that the 
establishment of a Community integrated market can have on third 
countries' exports.
As regards the first problem, one should consider which is the
regime applied within the Community to products originating in 
third countries once they have been cleared at Community borders, 
and whether this regime differs according to the origin of products 
imported in the Community, or, alternatively, whether the 
privileged treatment applied to Maghreb products when imported in 
the EEC extends to the regime applied once they circulate within 
the Community.
Goods imported into the Community are in free circulation when 
they have been cleared at customs and have paid customs duties. 
More precisely Article 10 specifies that "Products coming from a 
third country shall be considered to be in free circulation in a 
Member State if the import formalities have been complied with and 
any customs duties or charges having equivalent effect which are 
payable have been levied in that Member State..." Article 9.2 
extends the provisions contained in Articles 12-17 (elimination of 
customs duties and charges of equivalent effect) and in Articles 
30-37 (elimination of quotas and measures of equivalent effect) to 
products of third countries in free circulation.
This has been confirmed by the Court of Justice.
In Donckerwolke.310 the Court had to decide whether a French 
import quota applied to products imported from Belgium whereas they 
had previously been imported from Syria and Lebanon. The importer 
was also required to declare the actual origin of the goods. The
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310 Case 41/76 Susanne Criel nee Donckerwolke v. Procureur de 
la République 15.12.1976 (1976) P* 1921.
Court ruled that "the result of this assimilation is that the 
provision of Article 30 concerning the elimination of quantitative 
restrictions and measures of equivalent effect are applicable 
without distinction to products originating in the Community and 
to those which were put into free circulation in any one of the 
Member States, irrespective of the actual origin of these products" 
(para IB).
Another example of this argument is evidenced in the case of 
Commission v. Ireland311. This case concerned a system of import 
licenses for potatoes imported into Ireland coming from countries 
outside the Community. A measure imposing restrictions on imports 
was applied to potatoes from Cypjrus regardless of the fact that 
they had first been imported via the United Kingdom.312 The Court 
declared that this measures infringed Article 30. "In accordance 
with those principles, laid down in Article 9,10 and 30 of the 
Treaty, the measures intended to free intra-Community trade are 
applicable...without distinction to products originating in the 
Member States and to those coming from non-member countries which 
have been put in "free circulation" in the Community..".
The cases mentioned above on measures of equivalent effect, 
however, concerned "classical" measures. The question whether there 
is a total and definitive assimilation of third countries goods as 
regards the extensive interpretation given by the Court to the 
concept of measures of equivalent effect (Cassis de DHon
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3n Case 288/83 Commission v. Ireland 17.05.1985 (1985) £££ p. 
1761. See also case 119 /78 Peureux 13.03.1979 (1979) ECR p. 975.
312 The importation of potatoes was taking place under a tariff 
quota provided for in the Association Agreement concluded between 
Cyprus and the Community. This circumstance however is not relevant 
for the resolution of the case: "it is of little importance whether 
that measure concern products subject to the general rules laid 
down in the applicable provisions relating to tariffs and trade or 
products subject to special rules under an agreement, such as the 
quota accorded to the Republic of Cyprus" p. 1775 para. 26.
principle) remains open313. Another question is whether the 
prohibition of discriminatory taxation is also extended to goods 
in free circulation.
As for the first questions, in the EMI v . CBS314 case, the 
Court seems to make a distinction between goods originating in the 
Community and third countries' products. The EMI case arose out of 
a dispute between EMI and CBS when the former, holder of the trade 
mark "Columbia" in all the Community Member States, claimed 
infringement of its rights by the subsidiary of CBS, holder of the 
same trade mark Columbia in the US before Danish, German and 
British Courts. If the same situation had occurred in the Community 
without involving non-EC countries, EMI could not have prevented 
the imports of Columbia records from a Member State where Columbia 
was held by a different owner, in the present case, Columbia CBS 
records. Thus, products bearing a trade marJc applied in a third 
country, even if put in free circulation in the Community, were not 
assimilated to records bearing a trade mark applied in the Member 
States. According to the Court, "neither the rules of the Treaty 
on the free movement of goods nor those on the putting into free 
circulation of products coming from third countries nor finally the 
principles governing the common commercial policy prohibit the 
proprietor of a mark in all Member States of the Community from
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313 See BOURGEOIS,J. Panel: Europe 1992 MJIL 1990 pp. 531-549. 
See DAVENPORT, M.W.S. The External Policy of the Community and its 
effects upon the Manufactured Exports of the Developing Countries 
JCMSt. 1990, pp. 181-200. p. 194 where he eurgues that once the 
requirements of one Member States have been satisfied products 
from third countries can freely circulate throughout the Community. 
Doubts are expressed by STEVENS, C. The Impact of Europe 1992 on the 
Maghreb and Sub-Saharan Africa JCMSt. 1990, pp. 217-241 p. 224.
3.4 Cases 51, 86, 96/75 EMI Records Limited v. CBS United
Kingdom Limited 15.06.1976 (1976) ECR p. 811. See HAY,P .,OLDEKOP,D. 
EMI/CBS and the Rest of the World: Trademark Rights and the
European Communities Am.Jour. Comp. Law 1977, 120-151.
3.5 It should be noted that EMI owned Columbia in all the 
Community Member States.
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exercising his right in order to prevent the importation of similar 
products bearing the same mark and coming from a third country".
One of the arguments for the application of the Cassis de 
Pi ion principle to goods in free circulation is that any Member 
State is obliged to accept the product imported from another Member 
State if it has been "lawfully produced and marketed" there316.
This means therefore that if, for example, a product is 
imported in Spain from Morocco and then re-exported to France, the 
latter is obliged to accept it even if it does not meet its 
national standard,311 provided that the product has been marketed 
in Spain, because this means that the imported product satisfies 
Spanish steuidards. The same could also be applied to a product 
which is incorporated in a Community good, as for example in the 
case of a part of a motor installed in a German-produced machine. 
The finished product could be exported to Italy even if the part 
of Moroccan origin does not satisfy Italian requirements? In the 
event that the product acquires German origin, it would not seem 
to differ from the case of a German product exported to Italy and 
the ruling of Cassis could thus apply since there is no distinction 
in the final product between the German and the Moroccan component. 
In the event that the product has not acquired German origin 
however, could Italy require compliance with its standards? In 
other words, is the mere inclusion of a foreign part into a product 
of Community origin sufficient to say that the products has been 
"produced" in Germemy? Again it could be submitted that if the 
imported part satisfies German standards the Cassis principle 
applies, whereas if the product does not satisfy German standards 
and has merely been assembled in Germany without being put on the 
market and then immediately exported to Italy, Italy could require
316 MATTERA, A . L'achèvement du marché intérieur et ses 
implications sur les relations extérieures DEMARET,P. (ed.) cit. 
p.201-224 sp. p.214.
311 See GORMLEY, L.tf. Some reflections... op.cit. spec. pp. 
17-18; WHITE,E.L. In Search of the Limits... op.cit. spec. p. 239.
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the imported product to satisfy its requirements.
On the other hand, it has been argued that the Cassis de Diion 
doctrine "is a product of the EC's constitution, is based on the 
underlying solidarity between Member States, and it is justified 
by the automatic reciprocity which is inherent to the EC's 
constitution",318 and therefore should not apply to products in free 
circulation originating in third countries. It is clear that the 
danger of the application of the Cassis de Diion principle is that 
third countries' goods could be imported into the Community via the 
Member State applying the easiest regulation or the lower standard. 
The application of the Cassis de Diion ruling to the free 
circulation of third country goods could lead to a "reverse 
discrimination"319 against domestic products, which are required to 
comply with the national standards, whereas such conformity would 
not be required for products originating in third countries put on 
the market in another Member State. However, this "discrimination" 
is a consequence of the mutual recognition principle which is not 
limited to goods of third country origin and applies to products 
of Community origin as well.
However, the marketing of a Moroccan product in a Member State 
means that this state accepts the product according to its 
standards and "assimilates" it to products produced and marketed 
in its territory. On the other hand, in the above example, France 
could prevent the importation of the Moroccan good even if it has 
been cleared through customs in Spain without being msurketed there. 
In this case there has not been any verification of the conformity 
of the products to the standards applied in Spain.
Therefore the importation in to France of a product which is 
legally produced and marketed in Morocco but which does not meet 
the requirements applied by France (and provided that these are
318 BOURGEOIS Panel 1992.. op.cit. p. 549.
319 See MICHAELIS, J. Mutual Recognition of National Regulations 
in the EC Interec 1990 pp.215-219.
applied without discrimination to both domestic and imported 
products) can be stopped. If, however, the same product is imported 
into Spain and put on the market there, France ceumot prevent the 
subsequent importation into its territory because the Moroccan 
product can be considered assimilated to a good having Community 
origin.
A different interpretation would result in an hindrance to 
trade among the Member States and would seem inconsistent with the 
approach followed by the Court as regards the interpretation of 
free movement of goods.
In the light of the above remarks, the importance of a system 
of harmonization of requirements and standards in the Community 
seems even more evident when reference is made to goods in free 
circulation as regards the elimination of deviation of trade. It 
could also be argued that a system of harmonization at Community 
level would, presumably, be more welcome by third states than a 
system based on the mutual recognition principle, since it is not 
evident that a Member State would allow a product originating from 
a third country and in free circulation in another Member State 
access to its territory if it did not comply with its standards.
As for the prohibition on discriminatory taxation, the Court 
has acknowledged that third countries' goods are assimilated to 
Community goods for the purpose of applying Article 95. This 
decision made in the so-called banana case320. This case concerned 
a consumption tax imposed by Italy on imports of bananas 
originating in Columbia but imported into Italy from Belgium. The 
fourth question submitted by the national Court was whether Article 
95 applied also to products in free circulation. The Court, while 
recognizing that Article 95 only mentions products of "other Member 
States", referred to the aim of Article 95 and to the system of the 
Treaty and concluded that "..any interpretation of Article 95 which
166
320 case 193/85 gppgcrfltlrfl ç<?-Frwtta Sri t v, ¿ministra: jçps. 
delle Finanze dello Stato 07.05.1987 (1987) £££ p. 2085.
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precluded it from applying to products in free circulation would 
lead to a result which would be contreury both to the spirit of the 
Treaty expressed in Article 9 and 10 and to the system of the 
Treaty. Consequently, Member States cannot remain free to charge 
discriminatory taxation to products which originate in non-member 
countries but are in free circulation in the Community" (para 28).
As for the question of whether a distinction should be made 
between products originating in third countries to which the 
Community grants a preferential regime on imports. This would mean 
that the broad interpretation whereby measures of equivalent effect 
could apply only to such products cannot be held. Once a product 
originating in a third country is admitted to the Community no 
distinction should be made on account of its origin. The 
application of the prohibitions contained in Articles 12-17 and 30-
37, in Article 95 and the interpretation given to these provisions 
should be extended without discrimination to all third countries 
goods because the rationale behind the free circulation responds 
to a logic of internal market integration and has nothing to do 
with the treatment of third countries goods. If a preferential 
regime is applied to goods originating from a certain country this 
shall be limited to treatment at borders. Free circulation in the 
Community cannot be used to establish further privileges but to 
avoid distortion of competition within the internal market.
It seems, in other words, that the questions of free 
circulation within the Community and the regime applied at 
Community borders as regards third countries exports follow a 
different logic and the rules governing them shall be based on a 
different rationale.
* 321It is therefore not clear why the Court in the banana case" made 
reference to the exclusive Community competence in the field of 
commercial policy, to rule that Member States are not allowed to
321 Co-Frutta op.cit. para. 28.
apply discriminatory taxation on products of third country origin 
but in free circulation in the Community322.
Finally, it should be asked whether the free circulation of 
goods from third countries would make the prohibition of measures 
of equivalent effect or of a higher taxation on products from 
preferential third countries meaningless. Let us imagine that a 
product originating in State A (non-preferential) enters the 
Community via a member State which applies a low tax on import of 
this good and is then imported in another Member State which on the 
contrary apply a high tax on the same product if imported from 
outside the Community but which has to impose the lower tax levied 
on domestic goods on the product of "A" origin because it is in 
free circulation. If compared with a good originating in "M" with 
preferential treatment, which enters directly in the second Member 
State which is required on the basis of an agreement not to 
discriminate against M with regard to domestic products, the final 
result (the domestic tax applied to A and M) would be the sane for 
both M and A. The same could be applied to measures of equivalent 
effect. It should, however, be considered that "M" would probably 
enjoy a preferential position if compared to "A". First, the 
latter should look for a Member State where there is effectively 
a lower tax and then move to the lower tax Member State bearing the 
transport costs which may be relevant if the two Member States sure 
feur away from each other.
The second problem of this section concerns the effect of the 
Community integration on Maghreb countries.
Whether the creation of the internal market will have a positive 
or a negative impact on third countries' economies is still open 
to question. Economic analysis is in fact divided over the 
prediction of expected growth in productivity on imports from third 
countries, on the issue between a "trade creation" effect and on 
the increased competitiveness. This takes place between, on the one
168
322 See DANIELE, L II divieto di discriminazione... op.cit «. 
p.204.
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hand, EEC Member States and, on the other, third countries 
exporting to the Community, including developing countries323.
The question of harmonization of standards and regulations for 
imports from third countries324 and the mutual acceptance have been 
discussed above.
Another important effect for third country exports to the 
Community is the elimination of quotas assigned to Member States 
under the Multifiber Arrangement, The Generalized System of 
Preferences and those deriving from the application of Article 115 
of the EEC Treaty. This provision allows a Member State, which 
applies a quota to products of a third country to impose 
restrictions on trade against other Member States in order to avoid 
its quota being circumvented by indirect exports through another 
Member States. The elimination of national quotas will result in 
a more or less protective Community according to whether national 
quotas will be replaced by Community quotas which will be the 
cumulation of national ones or if Community quotas will be directed 
only towards certain countries325.
The impact of the internal market will also depend on the type 
of exports of third countries. Since developing countries like the 
ACP and Mediterranean States are mostly exporters of raw materials, 
they should not be as affected as those countries exporting 
principally industrial products. However, the imports of raw 
materials could decrease or increase according to the standards 
applying to some of the goods produced in the EEC. For example, the 
possibility of marketing chocolate with a lower cocoa content could
323 See the analysis of DAVENPORT,M.W.S. The External Policy 
.. op.cit. p.194 and STEVENS,C. The Impact of Europe...op.cit. 
pp.217-241.
324 it has been argued that Member States will be compelled 
to harmonize trade regulations as regards imports from third 
countries see BRÖNE,S. The EC Internal Market, Lomé IV and the ACP 
Countries Interec. 1990, pp.193-201.
325 See DAVENPORT and STEVENS op.cit.
influence the demand of cocoa which is a key exports from some ACP 
countries. t
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C) AGRICULTURAL TRADE.
The central question of this chapter is what preferential 
treatment on agricultural trade means and, in particular, within 
which limits this is applied to Maghreb countries.
The Cooperation Agreement provisions on agriculture are a 
rather technical and complex set of norms applied to Maghreb 
exports on products such as fresh and processed fruits and 
vegetables, live plants, olive oil, wine, fish and cereals.
These provisions cannot be clearly understood without a basic 
knowledge of the mechanisms governing the common agricultural 
policy of the EEC by which they have highly been influenced. 
Although this policy, - which consists of a set of binding rules, 
instruments and mechanisms governing trade of agricultural products 
within the Community and of mechanisms applying at the Community's 
external borders - has been mostly conceived as a way of 
stabilizing and supporting the internal market in agricultural 
produce it has important repercussions in the world food market326.
1) The Common Agricultural Policy in the EEC Treaty.
326 The basic norms of the CAP are to be found in the Rome 
Treaty (Arts. 38 to 47) but the rules governing agriculture have 
been set up by subsequent secondary legislation which has completed 
and made the framework drawn up in the Treaty more precise. 
Agricultural products covered by the common agricultural policy 
are broadly defined in Article 38 of the Treaty: products of the 
soil, stock farming, fisheries and products of first stage 
processing directly related to these products For the 
interpretation of this notion see case 185/73 Hauptzollamt 
Bielefeld v. Firma König 25.05.1974 (1974) P. 607, p.618. A
more detailed list is to be found in Annex II to the Treaty. With 
Regulation 7a, the Council has exercised the power conferred by the 
Treaty of adding products to this list. See 0.J. L 1961 p. 71, 
English Version Spec. Edition Vol. I p.68 For the interpretation 
of Annex II recourse should be made to the established 
interpretation and method of interpretation relating to the Common
Custom Tariff. Case 77/83 CILIFT v. Ministero della__ganitfr
29.02.1984 (1984) ££ß P* 1257, p. 1265 para 7.
The existence of special provisions governing trade327 in 
agriculture, as distinct from those concerning the free circulation 
of goods in the Community, finds its basis in the idea that the 
mere extension to agriculture32* of the norms of the free 
circulation of goods, would probably have resulted in a cut in
• 329prices and would have depressed farmers' income .
The objectives of the common agricultural policy as 
listed in Article 39 are the increase of agricultural productivity, 
a fair standard of living for the agricultural community, the 
stabilization of markets and the stability of supplies for
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327 Treaty provisions governing the establishment of the common 
market apply to agriculture "save as otherwise provided in Articles 
39 to 46" (Art. 38.2) . This means that the common market rules only 
apply to agricultural trade in the absence of a diverging provision 
in the chapter on agriculture. This derogatory system is to be 
interpreted restrictively. See case 2/3-1962 Commission v. 
T.uxemboura and Belgium. 14.02.1962 (1962) ECR p. 796; case 68/86 
(hormones) op.cit. and 131/86 (hen kept in battery)op*cit..
328 As regards the political and economic reasons explaining 
the inclusion of agriculture in the Treaty see Spaak Report cited 
by FENNELL,R. The Common Agricultural Policy of the European 
Community Second Edition BSP Professional Books, Oxford 1987 p. 5 
see Commission of the EEC Recueil des travaux de la Conference 
consultative sur les aspects sociaux de la politioue acrricole 
Bruxelles 1961. Several reasons required the setting up of specific 
rules governing this field. These were the particular 
characteristics of agricultural produce, the high level of 
intervention of the original member States in the agricultural 
field with the existence of national agricultural market 
orgemisations adopting divergent policy principles, the different 
level of prices in the various original member States and the 
interest of France in a common market for agriculture. For the 
"trade-off" (opening of French markets to German competition) with 
Germany see SWANN,D. The Economics of the Common Market. Penguin, 
London 1988 p. 205, and HINE The Political Economy of European 
Trade New York, Martin's Press 1985 p. 101.
329 See MARSH J.S. "The Common Agricultural Policy and the 
Mediterranean Countries in SHLAIM, A., YANNOPOULOS, G.N.(eds.) 
The EEC and Mediterranean Countries. Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press 1976 pp.75-97.
It should be noted that all these objectives, including the 
clearance of Community production shall be secured against the 
consequences of low priced imports into the Community and against 
the trends of internal production and demand. The Community thus 
applies an "import substitution strategy" whereby import levies 
make the import of lower priced products from third countries 
impossible while Community farmers are in substance encouraged to
331produce
The most important mechanisms used to attain the objectives 
set up in Article 39 are common market organisations.
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consumers330.
l.a) Common Market Organisations and Price Mechanisms.
Common market organizations are a set of binding rules (issued 
by the Council by regulations) applying to certain categories of 
agricultural products fixing prices, providing for intervention 
measures to be applied and regulating imports and exports between
» • • 332the Community and third countries .
330 On the difficulty of reconciling these peurtially
contradictory aims see case 5/67 Beus v. Hauptzollamt München 
13.03.1968 (1968) ££g p. 83, p. 98. Case 5/73 Balkan Imp, v.
Hauptzollamt Berlin 24.10.1973 (1973) ECR p. 1091 where the Court 
held that "The Community Institutions must harmonize the vsurious 
objectives of the CAP which, taken separately, appear to conflict 
with one another and, where necessary, allow temporary priority to 
one of them in accordance with the demands of those economic 
factors or conditions in view of which their decisions are made". 
In this case Community preference was given priority over the other 
CAP objectives.
331 See HARTMANN,M. Old Wine in New Bottles: Agricultural 
Products in the EEC Interec. 1991 pp.58-63.
332 Regulations establishing CMO, after having listed the
products covered, are mainly divided into three titles: one
concerning internal price fixing to intervention measures such as 
buying-in and storage aid and to quality standards; a second 
concerns trade with third countries; a third sets out "general 
provisions" such as rules on state aid, the obligation of 
infoirmation between member States and the Community and the
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Mechanisms, instruments and criteria applied within common 
market organisations - established for each main category of
products333 - are far from homogenous, and the differences are often 
remarkable. The terminology itself may be misleading, where the 
same term used in two different common market organizations may 
refer to completely different concepts. There are, however, some 
common principles at the basis of all common market 
organisations334: community preferences and unity of the market335. 
The first means that the agricultural products of the Community 
have priority on the market over products imported from third 
countries; the second that prices of products have to be harmonized 
within the Community (unity of prices). These factors, combined 
with the principle that agricultural producers' income should 
derive from the selling of their products on the market, may
explain why price mechanisms are at the heart of the agricultural
régime in the Community and why direct financial support or
reimbursement, in this respect, play only a very marginal role.
Since a study of the mechanisms applied at borders cannot be 
carried out without a basic knowledge of the internal price system, 
an outline of the main mechanisms applied within the most relevant 
common market organisations will be provided in the following.
Within each market organization several prices are
establishment of a management committee. See written question 71 
in J.O.C.E. 1960 p.1531. For a definition of CMO case 90/91-1963 
Commission v. Luxembourg 13.11.1964 (1964) ECR p.1203, p. 1216.
333 Cereals; milk and milk products; beef; eggs; pigment; 
poultrymeat; sugar; wine; tobacco; fruits and vegetables; oils and 
fats, products processed from fruits and vegetables, live plamts 
etc.
334 For an indication of the sources of these principles see 
SNYDER,F. Law of the Common Agricultural Policy Sweet and Maxwell, 
London 1985 p. 15.
335 A third principle usually referred to is financial 
solidarity, meaning that the financing of the common agricultural 
policy has to be assured by all member States regardless of the 
benefits they receive.
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established. Their role in the stabilization of the market explains 
why the common agricultural policy is defined as a price policy.
Broadly speaking a reference price - called target price for 
cereals or milk products, basic price for fruit and vegetables, or 
norm price for wine - is established by the Council for each 
marketing year. This price is the " ideal price", i.e., the price 
which agricultural producers should obtain from the sales of the 
product on the market. Often this price is used as a basis for 
calculating the other prices provided for in the same common market 
organizations. The second important idea is that of the minimum 
price guaranteed. This is called intervention price in many market 
organisations (but here, as well, the terminology changes - 
withdrawal, buying-in price..) and it acts as a sort of N alarm 
system": when market prices go below the intervention price a range 
of intervention measures are foreseen to raise market prices, such 
as, for instance, the buying of certain quantities of the products 
concerned. Since the reference price (target) is always higher than 
intervention price, the two are often called as the upper and lower 
ends of a bracket (or band) within which the prices of the products 
may fluctuate. The major internal market support mechanisms are 
buying-in or withdrawal of products taking place when prices go 
below the level established by the Community. Their application, 
however, differ from one common market organization to the other.
Firstly, not all market organizations provide for such 
measures. Secondly, buying-in is not always mandatory. There is, 
for instance, an obligation to purchase butter, cereals, olive 
oil, and sugar, whilst such intervention is not always possible 
with respect to pigmeat. In the case of fruit and vegetables, 
buying-in is not obligatory. In this latter case, instead of 
intervention agencies, authorized producers organisations perform 
such an operation.
A minimum import price is also established (threshold price 
for cereals and milk, sluice-gate price for eggs, poultrymeat or 
pigmeat). This is the term used for the calculation of import
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levies and will be discussed in relation to mechanisms applied at 
external borders.
Besides internal price mechanisms, common market organizations 
set up two specific instruments applied at the Community external 
borders, these are variable levys and countervailing charges336.
Even if they are not directly related to the provisions of 
the Cooperation Agreements and in general to exports of Maghreb 
countries, it should be remembered that mechanisms are also applied 
to exports of agricultural trade from the Community whereby 
Community's producers receive a subsidy equal to the difference 
between prices within the Community and world market prices. This 
system have repercussions on the trend of world market prices.
l.b)Import Levies.
As a peculiar instrument of the common agricultural policy, 
import levies are provided for in Article 40(3) of the Treaty as 
one of the measures which can be included in common market 
organisations. This means that import levies apply only to the 
extent that they are expressly provided for in common market 
organisations, which, in other words, means that not all 
agricultural products are covered by this mechanism.
It is thus clear that the creation of a supplementary 
instrument to be applied at Community external frontiers means that 
the general protection supplied by customs duties had not been 
considered adequate for agriculture.
To understand why a new mechanism was necessary one has to 
make reference to the common agricultural policy objectives 
(Article 39) and, in particular, to the rigid internal price system 
adopted by the Community with its main feature of guaranteeing the
336 Customs duties as instruments of protection and obstacles 
to trade are not, as seen above, peculiar to agricultural trade 
but apply to both industrial goods and agricultural products. 
Therefore, they will not be discussed here. For reference see the 
introduction to this chapter.
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producers the sale of their products at a certain price established 
by the Community itself. It is not by chance that import levies are 
usually provided for in the common market organisations 
establishing internal price support schemes.
To prevent prices within the Community being undercut by 
supplies of products offered by third countries at lower prices, 
the Community had recourse to the mechanism of import levies which 
cover the difference between Community and world prices. The same 
result could not have been achieved by customs duties, since these 
are a fixed element and cannot therefore respond to the requirement 
of following the price trends. The variation of the import levy can 
be considered per se a protective means since this prevent the 
adoption of an export strategy and of planning by exporters. Quite 
significantly one of the proposal advanced by the (US) negotiators 
in the Uruguay Round has been the "tariffication" of import levies, 
that is their transformation in a fixed tariff as a prelude for its 
dismantling337
The European Court of Justice, in one of its earlier 
judgments33* on common agricultural policy, defined import levies 
as "a charge regulating external trade connected with a common 
price policy". In the statement of reasons of those regulations 
providing for import levies this link is also clearly defined 
"whereas a trading system including levies and export refunds, 
combined with intervention measures, also serves to stabilize the 
Community market, in particular by preventing price fluctuations 
on the world market from affecting prices ruling within the
337 VON CRAMON-TAUBADE, S ., KÜHL, R . Turning Point for European 
Agricultural Policy? The Agricultural Negotiations and the Uruguay 
Round Interec. 1990 pp. 280-286.
331 Case 17-67 Neumann v. Hauptzollamt H.S. 13.12.1967 (1967) 
ECR p.441.
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As seen above, the system of import levies does not apply to 
all agricultural products. In fact the products covered are 
cereals, milk and milk products, olive oil, and, to a different 
extent, pigment, poultrymeat, eggs and beef. Olive oil and milk 
are modelled on the archetypal cereal system - the first market 
organization to be established - and are thus almost identical340: 
for these products, import levies are the difference between cif341 
price and the minimum import price called threshold price (see 
infra).
These above mentioned common market regulations provide for 
a system of internal support measures such as support prices 
(target, intervention and threshold), buying-in by intervention 
agencies, storage payment or aids, premiums (in the case of milk 
for the slaughter of cows) consumption and production aids. In 
these cases import levies are supplementary support measures.
Let us now see how the import levy is calculated. For the 
first term of reference, account is taken (for olive oil, cereals 
and milk) of the most favorable purchasing opportunities on
• 342 •international trade as the first term of reference. The 
collection of this data may be complicated by the fact that various 
quotations may be available for the same product. The Community, 
however, enjoys a certain discretion in the choice of the price 
to which it makes reference. Since the quality of a product sold
178
339 See for instance, Regulation 2727/75 establishing a common
market for cereals O.J. L 281 1975 and Regulation 804/68 setting 
up a common market for dairy products O.J. L 148 1968.
340 The olive oil system of import levies was modified in 1976.
The price of goods which covers cost, insurance and
freight.
342 In some cases - olive oil for instance - when the offer 
price is lower them the world price, the cif price is substituted 
by a price determined on the basis of the offer price (Art. 14 of
the market organisations for oils emd fats).
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on the world market and in the Community do not correspond 
perfectly and world transactions are usually made in dollar - while 
the levy is calculated in ECU - coefficients are applied for the 
"transformation" of qualities and prices into EEC values343.
The second term of reference, the EEC price, is a minimum 
import price. As seen above, it has a different denomination, and 
in the case of cereals, dairy products and olive oil is called 
threshold price and is calculated on the basis of the target price 
for the same common market organisations. The relationships between 
internal and external price support is particularly evident in 
these cases. Threshold prices are in fact the result of subtracting 
from target prices the cost of transport from Community ports and 
particular Community areas of high price production costs344.
Some market organizations applying import levies prohibit 
custom duties and measures having equivalent effect, quantitative 
restrictions and equivalent measures .
2) Basic Features of Common Market Organisations Relevant for 
the Cooperation Agreements.
343 See HARRIS,S., SWINBANK, A., WILKINSON, G. The Food and 
Farm Policy of the European Community Chichester, Wiley £ Sons 
1980 p. 74 for a comprehensive explanation of these calculations.
344 It could be remarked that market organisations like those 
created for eggs and poultrymeat do not provide for a system of 
internal price support but only for import levy. This seems to 
contravene the idea that import levies are linked with a system of 
internal pricing. The marginal importance of these productions for 
the Community metrket and the industrial type of production they 
require may explain the absence of internal support mechiuiisms, 
moreover, these two products are considered as "processed cereals". 
Since it is the price of feed grains which influences the price of 
the product, the introduction of a levy on feed grains should 
maintain the level of price within the Community.
345 See Article 18 of Regulation establishing a common market 
for cereals; Article 19 for dairy products and Article 21 of the 
regulation 1785/81 estetàlishing a common market for sugar. See O.J. 
L 177 1.07.1981 p. 4.
Fresh fruits and vegetables346.
This common market organization provides for an internal 
support mechanism which applies only to certain products "which 
are of special importance to the income of producers" (preamble of 
regulation) listed in Annex II of the regulation347. For each of 
these products a basic price and a buying-in price are fixed for 
each marketing year, or for each period in which the marketing year 
may be subdivided. Similar to intervention mechanisms in other 
market organisations, these two prices are relevant to the 
operation of intervention measures. Buying-in takes place when the 
market price remains below the buying-in price, a percentage of the 
basic price which, in its turn, is calculated on the basis of the 
average of the prices recorded the three preceding years on the 
most representative Community markets.34*
Regulation 1035/72 provides for the establishment of "quality 
standards". The products to which they apply cannot be sold, 
delivered or marketed unless they are in conformity with these 
standards. Quality standards also apply to imported products (Art. 
9). In this respect it can be observed that the application of the 
quality standards to imports coming from third countries should not 
be considered a barrier to trade because they apply to Community 
products as well. The same could be concluded in the case of the
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346 Reg. 1035/72 O.J. L 118 20.05.1972 p. 1.
347 Cauliflowers, aubergines, tomatoes, sweet oranges, 
mandarins, lemons, peaches, table grapes, apples, pears, apricots, 
This is a limited number of products if compared with those covered 
by the market organization which includes all temperate zone 
agricultural products with the exception of olive oil, wine grapes 
and potatoes.
341 In the market support mechanisms a central role is played 
by established producer organisations which may fix a withdrawal 
price below which products supplied by their members will not be 
sold. The granting of an indemnity is assured for Annex II products 
which remain unsold. Producers' organisations receive financial 
compensation for the indemnities paid to their members.
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adoption of sanitary or phytosanitary measures which would apply, 
without distinction, to domestic (Community) and to imported 
products. These measures would be considered trade barriers only 
in cases of discriminatory application.
As a general rule, only customs duties are applied to imports 
of the products covered by this organization (see Article 1 of 
Regulation 1035/72) while charges having equivalent effect to 
custom duties and quantitative restrictions or measure having 
equivalent effects are prohibited.
The only exceptions to this principle are national quotas 
applied before 1970 which continue to be in force and to apply for 
the periods and the products listed in Annex III of Regulation 
1035/72 (art. 22). As regards Mediterranean countries, national 
quantitative restrictions should be abolished following the 
enlargement of the Community to Spain and Portugal at the same
« 349 •rates applied to the new members . It should be noticed that these 
quotas apply during the periods when Community production is at 
its highest (for instance for melon from the first of July to the 
15th of October). In the periods during which the duty reductions 
are granted to Mediterranean exports to the EEC (out of season 
periods) no quotas apply350.
The regulation provides for a supplementary means of 
protection which seems to confirm that custom duties are not 
sufficient to avoid disturbances which may be caused by produce 
offered by third countries Nat abnormal price", which in practice 
means at a price lower than that established within the Community. 
This supplementary mechanism works as follows:
a reference price is established. The method of calculating the 
reference price - modified in 1983 - is rather complex. For the 
sake of simplification it could be said that such calculation takes
349 COM(85) 405 final 17 July 1985 Communication of the
Commission to the Council p.9 footnote 4.
350 See Joint Declaration by the Contracting Parties on Art.
15 Annexed to the Cooperation Agreement.
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into account producer prices (the average producer price in each 
member States), transport costs from production to consumer regions 
and production cost trends of the Community.
For each product subject to a reference price351, an entry 
price is calculated daily for each country exporting in the 
Community: this is the price of third country produce (the lowest 
price, or the arithmetic mean of lowest prices recorded at the 
import /wholesale stage) for at least 30% of the quantity) offered 
in teh Community less customs duties and of any import charges.
When the entry price for an imported product remains below 
the reference price for two consecutive market days a 
countervailing charge is applied, equal to the difference between 
the reference price and the arithmetic mean of the last two entry 
prices calculated for this country. This charge does not replace 
the customs duty applying to the product concerned but is added to 
it. The charge is withdrawn when the entry prices of two 
consecutive market days are at a level at least equal to the 
reference price.
The reference price is thus in practice a minimum entry price 
and these countervailing charges are a supplementary means of 
protection which vary according to the entry price variation. 
However, there are some differences between such charges and the 
import levies applied in other common market organisations. First 
of all, import levies are established on imports without 
distinction among exporting countries352 or of the level of the 
single offer price - import levies have to be paid even if the 
offer price of an exporter is higher than those registered to 
calculate the levies -. Countervailing charges may be applied only
Not all products are submitted to a reference price. The 
period of application may vary. Prices are protected by internal 
intervention mechanisms and import measures.
352 . See case 58/86 Cooperation Agricole d'Approvisionnement 
des -Avirons v. Receveur des Douanes de St. Denis. 26.03.1987 £££
(1987) p. 1525, paras. 5-10.
to a single country and only when the entry price is below the 
reference price. If the offer price is equal or higher than the 
reference price only custom duties are levied.
What is very important to understand is that this calculation 
and the ensuing consequences are also applied to preferential 
countries. To understand more clearly in what consists the 
preferential treatment as regards products object of the reference- 
entry price regime it seems useful to depict the mechanism in a 
different way353. If full customs duties applied by the Community 
for the product concerned are added to the reference price, the 
result is a Community minimum wholesale price for each imported 
product.
The products exported to the Community by third countries 
(including those enjoying a customs duties reductions) cannot go 
below this wholesale price. The advantage of having to pay reduced 
customs duties does not mean therefore that preferential countries 
are more competitive (in terms of lower prices) on the Community 
market in relation with other third countries exporters. The 
combination of having to respect the minimum wholesale price and 
the advantage of reduced customs duties implies therefore that they 
can charge higher prices than other third countries competitors and 
thus they can obtain higher import earning. In the case of a 
minimum wholesale price of, let us say, 10, and a full rate of 
customs duties of 3, non-preferential countries will be able to 
supply the EEC market at the price of 7 without triggering 
countervailing charges, whereas preferential countries paying a 
reduced rate of 2 will be able to sell the same product for 8 
without going above the minimum wholesale price and remaining 
competitive in relation with third countries selling at 7.
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353 The Community Regulations only refer to entry and reference 
prices. See Agra Europe Special Report EEC Fruit & Vegetables 
Policy in an International Context n. 32 1986 p.22.
Products processed from fruits and vegetables354.
It has been argued that this organization provides more for 
an integration of the common market organisations for cereals, 
sugar, fresh fruits and vegetables than for a set of autonomous 
rules. It is certainly true that the price system established for 
fresh fruits, vegetables and sugar, cannot but influence the regime 
applied to these processed products.
Thus, since prices of fresh products are higher in the Community 
than those applied in third countries, a production aid system has 
been established for certain sensitive products (Annex I, part A) 
to make up this difference and to render Community products 
competitive355. The granting of such aid to Community processors is 
conditioned by respect for the minimum price which they have to pay 
for raw materials356. This minimum price is calculated on the basis 
of the minimum price applied during the previous marketing year, 
the movement of basic prices for fresh fruits and vegetables and 
the need to ensure normal market outlets of fresh products for the 
various uses.
Market protection is mostly ensured by the system applied at 
external borders.
As a general rule ad valorem custom duties apply.
A minimum import price is also established every marketing year 
for certain products listed in Annex I B, for which the Community 
is a major importer. The price is established taking account of 
free-at-frontier prices, world market prices, the situation within
184
354 Regulation 426/86 24.02.1986 O.J. L 49 1986.
355 This regime was introduced in 1978 as part of the so-called 
Mediterranean package. See Regulation 1152/78 O.J. L 144 1978 p.l. 
See HARRIS op.cit. pp. 147-151.
356 A guarantee threshold to limit production aid was 
introduced for certain products in 1984. The production aid is 
reduced if the threshold is exceeded. See Regulation 1989/84 O.J. 
L 103 16.04.1984.
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the Community and the trend of trade in non-member countries. 
Minimum import prices should encourage market stability and 
facilitate the operation of the aid system. If this minimum import 
price is not observed a countervailing charge is applied. This 
charge is calculated on the basis of the prices of the main non­
member supplier countries and is levied in addition to custom 
duties. This charge however is not levied on imports coming from 
third countries which guarantee that the import price of the 
products originating and exported from their territory is lower 
than the minimum import price.
A supplementary levy is charged in the case of products 
containing sugar. This levy corresponds to 2% of ad valorem customs 
duties for products listed in Annex II; it is equal to the 
difference between threshold and cif prices for 1 kilo of white 
sugar for those products listed in Annex III.
The issuing of a licence is required for imports of a number 
of processed fruits and vegetables listed in Annex IV of regulation 
426/86. The issuing of the licence is conditional to the lodging 
of a deposit guaranteeing that the import will take place during 
the period indicated in the licence. If the import is not 
accomplished the deposit is not refunded.
Import licenses are surveillance measures applied to sensitive 
products. They are a way for the Community to monitor the
357quantities of products entering the common market and may 
constitute potential trade barriers since their refusal will lead 
to the stopping of imports358. However, they can be considered a 
real obstacle to trade if their extreme complexity is taken into 
account.
Olive oil.
357 See HARRIS op.cit. p. 162.
358 HARRIS reports that this happened once in 1978 for canned 
mushrooms. Ibidem p. 162.
The rules applied to olive oil are contained in the CMO for oils 
and fats359.
This CMO provides a target price for olive oil representing 
the price at which producers should sell their olive oil and an 
intervention price. Two other prices are established in this CMO 
:a selling price, above the intervention price, and a 
representative market price, fixed at such a level as to allow 
olive oil to compete with cheaper oils. Two subsidies are applied, 
the first, called production aid, makes up the difference between 
the selling price and the target price: the second, called consumer 
aid, should bridge the gap between the representative market price 
and the selling price.
A threshold price is established for imports equal to the 
representative market price. Import levies are applied when the 
c.i.f. price - calculated on the basis of the most favorable 
purchasing opportunities on the world market - is lower than the 
threshold price. Since the determination of this representative 
world market price has proved rather difficult360 a new system 
applies. Importers have to submit to a tender the import of the 
levy they are prepared to pay. This levy is confronted with a 
minimum import levy established by the Commission. Imports of olive
oil (at the quantity and at the level submitted at the tender) will 
be allowed if the import levy is higher or equal to the Community 
fixed level.
It should be taken into account that the Community has 
reached complete self-sufficiency (esteemed at around 109% ) after
the entry of Spain and Portugal.
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359 Regulation 136/66 22.09.1966 O.J. L 3025/66 p. 221.
360 See HARRIS OP.cit. p. 168 and FENNELL o p .cit. p. 174.
361. See Commission of the EEC __JlgttY.ea.UJC__accords
mediterraneens de la Cee a partir de 1988 Bruxelles Agence Europe, 
Promethee 1989 p. 30.
Wine362.
Guide and activating prices are fixed for each representative 
type of Community table wine. Intervention measures are applied 
when market prices are below the activating prices which are fixed 
as a percentage of the guide prices. Storage and distillation aids 
are the main internal market support regimes.
As a general rule customs duties are applied at external 
borders.
A reference price is fixed on the basis of the guide price 
for red and white wine and for other products such as grape juice 
and liqueur wine. The reference price is calculated on the basis 
of the guide price with the addition of the cost of bringing 
Community wine to the same marketing stage as imported wine. For 
the same products for which a reference price is fixed, a free- 
at-frontier price is also established. Although the mechanism 
governing countervailing charges for wine is similar to that for 
fruits and vegetables, it is important to note that reference 
prices are calculated by a different method. It is to be remembered 
that the entry price and the free-at-frontier price, in the case 
of fruits and vegetables, are calculated for each importing 
country, whereas for wine they are calculated for the product. 
Customs duties applying to wine are added to the free-at-frontier 
price: when this price is lower than the reference price,
countervailing charges are levied.
Thus, in the case of wine countervailing charges seem more 
similar to levies, depending on the price of products and thus 
apply to all imports.
363Fishery products .
This organization provides for an internal support system 
comparable to that established for fresh fruits and vegetables. 
Guide prices are established for certain products (similar in
187
362 Regulation 822/87 O.J. L 84 27.03.1987.
363 Regulation 3796/81 O.J. L 379 31.12.1981.
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concept to the basic price for fruit and vegetables) . Withdrawal 
is carried out by producer organizations at a withdrawal price 
fixed on the basis of guide price . Common quality standards are 
included in the system. On the import side, custom duties are 
applied. A reference price is also established for certain species 
(Annex I-IV). In this market organization, however, no 
countervailing duties are provided for.
364Live plants, bulbs, cut flowers .
The application of common quality standards - referring to 
quality grading, wrapping, presentation and marketing - is the only 
internal measure. Products cannot be sold if they are not in 
accordance with the standards. Provision is made to ensure that 
these standards are applied. While a minimum price is established 
for exported products only customs duties apply to products 
imported in the Community.
As seen above, it clearly emerges that import levies and 
customs duties are not the only obstacle which third countries have 
to face when exporting into the Community.
An important element which must be taken into account (as will be 
seen below for Maghreb countries' exports in the Community) is the 
reference price. The levying of countervailing charges on products 
imported into the EEC at a price below the reference has important 
consequences. The difference between these charges and import 
levies has already been underlined above. It should be taken into 
account that countervailing charges are applied not on the shipment 
whose import price is lower than the reference price, but on the 
subsequent shipments coming from the same country. This means that 
the exporter country should control supply to prevent the selling 
of a shipment at lower prices triggering the application of
364 More precisely, common organization in live trees and other 
plants, bulbs, roots and the like, cut flowers and ornamental 
foliage Regulation 234/68 27.02.1968 O.J. L 55 2.03.1968.
countervailing charges on subsequent exports365.
Countries enjoying preferential treatment, that is a reduction 
of customs duties, will not be able to sell at a lower price on the 
Community market. As seen above, the calculation made to check 
whether the import price is lower than the fixed reference price 
takes into account, for all countries, the full amount of ad 
valorem duty. With respect to the import price of the countries 
having to pay the full custom duty rate, the cif price of a country 
which has been granted duty preferences could be higher - the 
reduced customs duties compensating for this higher import price - 
without becoming less competitive. The preferred country thus has 
an advantage in terms of sale proceeds, but the results for the 
Community market will not change: the system of reference price and 
countervailing duties ensures that Community prices are not 
undercut by the offer of products at lower prices coming from third 
countries.
Preferential countries have therefore an interest in having 
relatively higher prices. In order to maintain such a price level 
they would probably rather prefer to reduce their exports to the 
Community.366
3) The Régime of Agricultural Imports from Maghreb Countries.
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the 
discussion over the provisions of the Cooperation Agreement with 
Maghreb on agricultural trade will focus on the question of the 
preferential treatment granted to agricultural products imported 
by the Community from Maghreb and on the limits of such 
preferences.
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365 HARRIS o p .cit. p. 159.
366 See TOVIAS,A. Les effets extérieurs des politiques internes 
des Communautés Européennes sur les pays tiers: le cas des pays 
Méditerranéens Rev.Int.Eur. 1988 pp.51-70.
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3.a) The Cooperation Agreements.
The rules applied to agricultural imports are established in 
Articles 15 to 25 of the Cooperation Agreement, in the exchange of 
letters annexed to the Agreement or annually concluded between the 
Contracting Parties and in the declarations also annexed to the 
Agreement. Both the exchanges of letters and the Joint Declarations 
contained in the Final Act form an integral part of the Agreement 
(Art. 56). The exchange of letters concluded in subsequent periods 
are Agreements in simplified form which define in more detail the 
particular conditions to which certain products are submitted 
(infra).
The preferential treatment granted by the Community to imports 
of agricultural products from Maghreb countries is the reduction 
of customs duties covering 80, 90 % of the exported products.
The products and the rate of reductions, varying from 20% to 
100%, are indicated in Art. 15, 20 and 21.
It should however be considered that this advantage has been 
limited by other instruments or conditions which have to be met by 
the exporting Maghreb country.
These are: calendars, tariff quotas, reference prices and import 
levies.
Calendars. For some products (potatoes, tomatoes, aubergines, 
courgettes and berries), the reduction of duties applies only 
during certain periods of the year: Morocco is free to export to 
the Community during the other periods, but in this case, it will 
not be granted a reduction of duties which apply at full rate.
For instance, tariff reductions concerning aubergines, 
courgettes and berries are limited to the periods December-April, 
December-February and November-March respectively, that is when 
the production of the same products in the Community is at its 
lowest. This means that the duties' reductions are granted when 
the imported products do not compete with Community production.
Let us consider, for instance, the case of potatoes. Morocco 
is one of the principal exporters of this produce367 to the 
Community and its exports are mainly concentrated in the first 
period of the year368. The reduction of the customs duties (50%) is 
granted in the period from the first of January to the 15 of April, 
when competition in the Community is lower.
This lead to a more general consideration concerning 
calendars. The limitation of tariff preferences during specific 
period of the year can receive a different evaluation. On one hand 
it can be considered that the Agreement encourage the planning of 
production in the Mediterranean area harmonizing the production 
calendars, on the other hand the provisions examined could be 
interpreted as away of "encouraging" the producers of Maghreb 
countries to specialize in the production of first fruits and 
vegetables in order to protect the Community market in the other 
periods369
A second relevant condition which applies to certain products 
are tariff quotas.
When a tariff quota is established the reduction of customs 
duties is granted within the limits of a given quantity which can 
be exported in one year. When this quantity has been used up, the 
full customs duty rate is re-established. It shall be remembered 
that when quotas are established, on the contrary, only a fixed 
amount of a product may be exported and when this quantity is
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367 • • • •Potatoes are not included in the common market organization 
for fruits and vegetables (see Regulation 1035/72 Art. 1) . The 
protection towards imports from third countries is limited to the 
application of custom duties. It is interesting to note that a 
proposal of the Commission for a common regime included the 
establishment of reference price for new potatoes. HARRIS op.cit. 
p. 143.
368 See Agence Europe Les nouveaux accords en Méditerranéenne 
en 1989 Bruxelles, 1990 p. 33-36.
369 See Discussions de la communication de M. Dammak NABLI,M.K. 
Coopération Cee-Maahreb çptçjts
192
exceeded no more imports may be accomplished.
Tariff quotas are established in the Agreement with Morocco 
for apricot pulp whose tariff reduction of 30% applies within the 
limit of a quota, which for Morocco is of 8250 tons370. A second 
kind of product covered in the Agreement by tariff quotas are fruit 
salads. The duties reduction is 55%. In this case, however, the 
quota is not provided for directly in the Agreement but reference 
is made to an Agreement in the form of an exchange of letters which 
is to be concluded annually by the Community and its associated 
partner in which such quota (literally "the conditions and detailed 
rules for such reduction") shall be established371.
The reduction of duties, however, does not always compensate 
for the limitation in the quantity of the exported product. This 
is the case for tomato concentrates. Among Maghreb countries 
Morocco is the biggest exporter of this product, but the Agreement 
concluded with this country does not contain any article providing
370 No quota is provided for Algeria, whilst for Tunisia the 
quota is fixed at 4300 tons.
371 It has already been mentioned that the exchange of letters 
are agreements concluded by the Contracting Parties defining the 
conditions which are applied to certain products. What should be 
noticed is that some of these exchanges of letters - and, more 
precisely, those referring to fruit salads - are voluntary self 
restraint agreements. These could be defined as the modern 
instrument of trade protection used by industrialized countries, 
in particular in the textile sector, to limit the import of 
competitive products from third countries. For the exporting 
countries the advantage of such agreements lies in the certainty 
of being able to export the fixed quantity of product without 
triggering other measures of protection on the part of the 
importing countries. The difference between an import tariff quota 
and a self-limitation agreement lies in the fact that the former 
is administered by the importing country (the Community in this 
case) whilst the latter is under the control of the exporting 
country. In the exchange of letters between Morocco and the 
Community, it is specified that the exports to the Community of 
fruit salads "will be effected exclusively by exporters whose 
operations are controlled by the 'Office de commercialization et 
d 'exportation (OCE) ' (Marketing and Export Office) O.J. L 169 1977. 
For a more extensive discussion of voluntary restraint agreements 
see infra Part Four, the Chapter on Safeguard Measures.
for a reduction of the duties conditioned to the application of a 
tariff quota, whereas such a clause exists in both the Agreements 
concluded with Algeria and Tunisia (Art. 19). What is to be noted 
is that these countries are not exporters of tomato concentrates372, 
and that the only country concerned, that is Morocco, has refused 
to limit its exports of tomato concentrates to the Community, even 
if this would have meant a tariff reduction for its exports, which 
are therefore exported to the Community without any customs duty 
reduction. This seems to indicate that under certain conditions, 
in this case a high exporting potential373, tariff quotas are mainly 
conceived as an instrument of protection.
The third case in which tariff quotas are applied is that of 
wine of designation of origin put up in bottles of less than two 
liters, which are granted an exemption of duties within the quotas 
established in the Agreements374. The tariff suspension is to be
375 ♦applied after the conclusion of an exchange of letters containing 
the list of wines entitled to the designation of origin under 
Moroccan legislation. Such an Agreement was to be concluded after 
verification of the equivalence of Moroccan and Community 
legislation.
A third main limit to the preferential treatment granted to 
Maghreb countries is that of the reference price. It has been 
underlined above that for the calculation of reference prices the
193
372 The established quota of 100 tons established for Algeria 
has never been used, while Tunisia has never concluded the exchange 
of letter provided for in the agreement. Les nouveaux accords 
Metfiteixansens.? •_ pptcit? p. 56.
373 Ibidem.
374 Morocco and Tunisia 50 thousand hectoliters, Algeria 500 
thousands. The much higher quota for Algeria is explained by the 
fact that wine accounts for a very high percentage of Algerian 
agricultural exports and that there is a very limited internal 
demand for wine. Wineyards were in fact planted when Algeria was 
part of France for the consumption in the mother country.
375 O.J. L 65 1977 Regulation 482/77.
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full rate of customs duties is taken into account, even for those 
countries enjoying preferential treatment and that this means that 
their import price can be higher in respect to those countries 
having to pay full custom duties. The reference price cannot be 
undercut. Why then provide expressly that the prices of certain 
imported products shall not be below the reference price ? It is, 
in practice, the import price (the price of the products offered 
for imports into the EEC) which has to be at a certain minimum 
level.
The system of protection created by reference prices may be 
tightened by technical formalities of application (as denounced by 
Morocco during the Cooperation Council of April 1989).
The obligation to respect the Community reference prices are 
provided for lemons and wine in bulk376. A comparable provision is 
that applied to preserve sardines which are granted duties 
exemption if a minimum price, annually agreed by exchange of 
letters, is observed. The comparison can be made because reference 
prices are in practice minimum price that have to be observed by 
countries exporting to the EEC (otherwise countervailing duties are 
applied).
Import levies are applied to very few products covered by the 
Cooperation Agreement. These are olive oil, products deriving from 
the milling of cereals (with the exclusion of rice and maize), such 
as bran and sharps, and durum wheat. For the latter, and this 
provision is not included in the Agreement with Algeria and 
Tunisia, Morocco has been granted a reduction of the import levy377. 
The provision on olive oil is much more complex. The import levy 
on non refined olive oil is reduced provided that Morocco levies 
a special charge on its exports. The amount of the reduction,
376 Wine in bulk is also forced to respect certain requirements 
concerning containers (closing, labelling, capacity).
377 See Regulation 2727/75 and in particular Art. 13 which has 
replaced regulation 120/67 cited in the Agreement.
within the limit of 10 units of account378 per 100 kilograms, 
corresponds to that of the special export charge. This means that 
Morocco's olive oil import price does not undercut the Community's 
price. This is a sort of financial aid to Morocco which does not 
therefore constitute an advantage for Moroccan exporters. If 
Morocco does not levy this special charge, the import levy is 
reduced by a minimum amount of 0.5 unit of account per 100 
kilograms. For certain agricultural products having undergone a 
manufacturing process, the import levy is made up of two 
components, a fixed element which should protect the processing 
industry and a variable component which is applicable to the basic 
agricultural product. In the case of refined olive oil and with 
respect to the cereals mentioned above, the fixed component is not 
imposed. For cereals, a reduction of the variable component is also 
provided on conditions similar to those applying to non refined 
olive oil, that is, provided Morocco levies a special charge on 
its exports, a charge which shall be reflected on the import price.
# • 379If this condition is not met no reduction is granted .
(wine for Algeria, different provisions. Importance of this export 
for Algeria. To note that there exist other regulation in the EEC 
with protectionist effects: the prohibition of (coupage) of eec 
wine with imported ones. See Tunis colloque p. 123)
3.b) Additional Protocols380.
The entry of Spain and Portugal into the EEC had important 
consequences for the Mediterranean third countries: the self­
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378 The ECU has replaced the unit of account since the first 
January 1981.
379 See exchange of letters O.J. L 169 1976.
380 Additional Protocol with Morocco O.J. L 224 13.08.1988; 
with Algeria O.J. L 297 21.10.1987 p.l; with Tunisia Ibidem p.36.
sufficiency3*1 which the Community was going to attain for the great 
part of Mediterranean type agricultural produce could lead, to say 
the least, to a decrease of the associated Mediterranean countries 
traditional agricultural exports to the EEC; secondly, as a 
result of the extension of the common agricultural policy 
mechanisms to the two new entrants, Maghreb countries risked to 
loose the trade preferences they enjoyed over Spanish and
382Portuguese exports
However, the enlargement could not occur to the detriment of 
the Community Mediterranean policy for a number of political and 
economic reasons. A deterioration of the economic situation in 
third Mediterranean countries could, in fact, lead to social and 
political upsets which may have particularly dangerous consequences 
in this region; it should be remembered moreover, that 
Mediterranean non-member countries are the third external market 
for Community exports383.
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381 See for an analysis of the various productions concerned 
European Parliament Report On Economic and Trade Relations between 
the EEC and the Mediterranean Countries Following Enlargement of 
the Community Rapp. GALLUZZI,C.A. A 2-325/88 19.12.1988.
382 Mediterranean Member States (Greece and Italy) required a 
form of compensation from the entry of Spain and Portugal which 
would have implied an increase of competition for Mediterranean 
producers. Since tightening of the external protection for excluded 
for budgetary reasons the choice turned towards a policy of 
investment under the integrated mediterranean programs whereby the 
Community finances re-structuring to further new types of 
productions which should not be concurrent with classical 
mediterranean ones. The consequences for third Mediterranean 
countries are not clear and largely depends on the success of the 
programmes and on the effective re-structuring of the productions. 
A reduction of classical Mediterranean products could be positive 
for the exports of Maghreb. On the other hand competition would 
increase for third countries producing the products which should 
be financed within the Mediterranean integrated programs. See 
TOVIAS Les effets extérieures., op.cit. p.62-63.
383 COM (85) 405 final op.cit p. 6-10 and COM (85) 517 final 
Communication by the Commission to the Council The Community and 
the Mediterranean Countries: Guidelines for Economic Cooperation
26.09.1985 pp.1-4.
One could ask whether Maghreb countries may invoke a right 
for a re-examination of the cooperation Agreement in case of the 
enlargement of the Community. Article 50.2 of the Agreement 
concluded with Morocco establishes that "In the event of a third 
State acceding to the Community, appropriate consultations shall 
be held within the Cooperation Council so that the interests of 
the Contracting Parties as defined in the Agreement may be taken 
into consideration". More specifically, in an exchange of letters 
annexed to the Agreement, the Contracting Parties agree to re­
examine the Agreement in the event of an enlargement to other 
Mediterranean countries in order to safeguard the advantages which 
Morocco derives from the implementation of Art. 15. Although the 
reference made to imports of citrus fruit could be interpreted as 
an obligation to limit the re-examination of the Agreement 
provisions related to these products, it should be pointed out that 
the commitment is very precise, especially if compared with the 
consultation procedure provided for in Article 50.2. The non 
application of these provisions in the case of the enlargement to 
Greece could then be considered a violation of the Agreement in the 
presence of an express request made m  this respect by Morocco .
In the case of the enlargement to Spain and Portugal the 
solution adopted was the conclusion of an Additional Protocol to 
the original Cooperation Agreements providing for a set of rules 
to be applied to Maghreb countries exports of agricultural produce 
to the Community which aimed at maintaining the traditional flow 
of trade with the Community3*5. The Member States more exposed to
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384 See COM (80) 495 final, COM (81) 485 final cited by Raux 
"Chronique des Accords Externes de la CEE" RTDE 1981.
3,5 The calculations of the "traditional trade flow were based 
on the period from 1980 to 1984 which was one of lower export 
growth. It is clear, moreover, that this type of calculations favor 
the countries with higher production and that in a certain sense 
"freeze" the possibility of increasing exports at preferential 
treatment.
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the competition of non-member Mediterranean countries, such as 
Italy and Greece, were more favorable to find a compensation in a 
higher financial cooperation rather than granting new trade 
concessions3*6. The reason seems obvious since financial protocols 
are financed through the Community budget the costs are partitioned 
among all the Member States whereas trade concessions are "paid" 
in terms of competition only by Mediterranean Member States.It 
should be underlined that the scope of the Protocol is not the 
improvement of the terms of trade for the exporting countries but 
the maintaining of the existing one.
The cornerstone of the Protocol is the phasing out of the 
customs duties for certain products (listed in Annex A) paralleling 
the phasing out of customs duties of the same products imported in 
the Community by Portugal and Spain (as provided in their 
respective Act of Accession). Thus, at the end of the transitional 
period provided for Spain and Portugal, Maghreb products which are 
phased out enter the Community market free of custom duties. The 
granting of this concession is, however, limited by a range of 
conditions.
The first is related to the parallelism established with Spain 
and Portugal and is twofold: 1) in case of a divergence between the 
customs duty rates of Spain and Portugal, the phasing out is 
carried out with reference to the higher of the two, 2) for certain 
products, Maghreb countries were granted a more preferential 
treatment by the Cooperation Agreement with respect to that applied 
to Spanish and Portuguese exports to the EEC before accession. In 
these cases, the phasing out begins once the Spanish and Portuguese 
duties have fallen below Maghreb customs duty rates.
The second condition is a more complex version of the tariff
See RAUX, J. "Le maintien des exchanges traditionnels de
produits agricoles entre la C.E.E. elargie et les pays 
mediterraneens tiers" RTDE 1987 pp. 633-648 p. 634.
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quotas applied in the Agreements. The phasing out shall take place 
within the quotas indicated in the same Annex A. When the quotas 
are exceeded the custom duties as provided for in the Cooperation 
Agreements are applied.
Tariff quotas are established for the most sensitive products. 
For two of them, tomatoes and orange juices, sub-quotas are also 
provided. In the case of tomatoes, out of a quota of 86,000 tons 
only 10,000 tons can be exported during the month of April3®7. In 
the case of orange juice, the sub-quota concerns 4,500 tons 
imported in packaging with a capacity not exceeding two liters. The 
tariff quotas which were applied in the Agreement (for apricot pulp 
or fruit salads388) continue to be applied to the phasing out.
Reference quantities are established for a second group of 
products. Reference quantities are not quotas , but surveillance 
measures. The exhaustion of reference quantity does not result in 
a re-introduction of customs duties but in the establishment of a 
tariff quota. Thus the normal regime applied to this second group 
of products is the phasing out of customs duties, if exports exceed 
these reference quantities, the Community may decide to establish 
a tariff quota.
For the remaining products, (also listed in Annex A) which 
thus constitute a third group, no quantitative limits are provided, 
but the Community is free to establish reference quantities in case 
the volume of imports threatens to cause difficulties in the 
Community market. The reference quantities thus established could 
be transformed in a tariff quota if the conditions set out for the
387 This provision can be explained by the will of protecting
the greenhouse production of Netherlands which are concentrated in 
this period See Les accords.. op.cit. p. 38.
388 The tariff quota for fruit salad was to be agreed by
exchange of letters.
389 They do not seem to be a tariff ceiling either, (see Art.
12 of the Agreement) . Tariff ceilings are similar to tariff quotas,
yet in the case of tariff quotas the re-introduction of custom 
duties is automatic, whereas for tariff ceiling is possible.
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second group of products are met.
A sort of pyramid of progressive restrictions is thus 
established. What should be noticed is that the annual review of 
trade flow, on which the introduction of tariff quotas or of 
reference quantity, for products of the second and third group 
respectively, is based, is the sole responsibility of the 
Community.
An examination of Annex A shows that the products phased out 
are those listed in Cooperation Agreement (for Morocco products 
see Art. 15) with the obvious exclusion of the products for which 
duty free entry was already granted in the Cooperation Agreement.
Only few products, such as certain fresh fruits, pectin 
substance and grapefruits are excluded from the phasing out. For 
them the provisions of the Cooperation Agreement are applied. 
These provisions, although representing an advantage with respect 
to the tariff reductions provided in the original Agreement, show 
that the new mechanisms cannot constitute an additional charge for 
the Community agricultural production.
The phasing out of custom duties is also extended to certain 
products which had not been originally included in the Cooperation 
Agreements390, but for which a trade flow has since developed. Since 
no preferential treatment was applied in the Cooperation Agreement, 
when the tariff quotas are exceeded the full customs duty rates 
apply. In the case of fresh cut flowers and flower buds, the 
elimination of the customs duties are subject to further conditions 
established in an exchange of letters annexed to the Protocol. Here 
the Contracting Parties agree to suspend the tariff preference if 
the Moroccan import price level falls below 85% of the Community 
price level during two successive marketing days. The two prices 
are calculated taking into account, for Morocco, the price of
390 In a Joint Declaration annexed to the Agreement the 
Contracting Parties declared their readiness "to foster, so far as 
their agricultural policies allow, the harmonious development of 
trade in agricultural products to which the Agreement does not 
apply".
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imported products from which customs duties are not deducted. For 
the Community, the price is based on the prices registered on the 
representative producer markets of the main producer Member States.
An important question related to the establishment of tariff 
quotas concerns their administration at Community level.
When a tariff quota is set up by the Community two 
possibilities are open. One is the division of the quota into 
national shares (sub-quotas), the other is the administration of 
the quota by the Community. The consequence deriving from these 
two regimes are rather different both for Member States and for 
importers. In the first hypothesis, when the national sub-quota is 
exceeded the full rate of customs duty is re-introduced and there 
can be no other import of the product subject to the quota in that 
member state even if the total Community quota is not exceeded. On 
the contrary, in the case of the administration of the quota by the
Community, the unused sub-quota or sub-quota shares can be re-
• • 101 allocated to the obvious advantage of importers .
The system of national sub-quotas has not been applied to 
tariff quotas provided for in the Additional Protocol (whereas the 
allocation of quotas among member States did take place for tariff 
quotas set up in the Cooperation Agreements). In the case of the 
tariff quota established for fresh cut flowers and flowers' buds 
(see above) Member States draw an amount corresponding to their 
requirements, to the extent permitted by the available balance of 
the quota (300 tons in this case). In the event that a Member 
States does not use up the quantities drawn within 14 days it is
391 The system of national sub-quotas has been sanctioned by 
the Court of Justice in case 51/87 Commission v. Council 29.09.1988
(1988) ECR 5476 although within the limits of quotas concerning 
industrial products. The existence of national sub-quota has 
important consequences concerning the free circulation of goods 
within the Community and the application of Art. 115 of the 
Treaty. See case 59/84 Tezi Texitel v. Commission 5.03.1986 (1986) 
ECR p.887 and comments by CREMONA, M., The Completion of the
Internal Market and the Incomplete Commercial Policy of the 
European Community E.L.Rev. 1990 pp. 283-297.
obliged to return the unused portion to the Community392.
Besides the phasing out, the second type of measure which is 
provided for in the Additional Protocol is the adjustment of entry 
price for certain sensitive products listed in Art. 3 of the 
Protocol. The adjustment consists of a reduction of the customs 
duties in the calculation of the entry price for each of these 
products. It should be remembered that the entry price is a 
theoretical price which is calculated daily for each imported 
product for which a reference price has been established for the 
corresponding products produced within the Community; when the 
entry price is below the reference price, countervailing charges 
are applied. The entry price is calculated on the basis of the 
lowest price recorded from the exporting country concerned from 
which custom duties are deduced. If customs duties are diminished 
in such a calculation a higher entry price will result as compared 
to the reference price and as a result, a lower countervailing 
charge will be paid.
This modulation of entry price is, however, only a possible 
measure which can be applied only in 1990 (two years after the 
entry into force of the Protocol) and it is decided by the 
Community on the basis of an evaluation based on statistical review 
and analysis of the Moroccan exports situation for the products 
concerned and within the limits of the quotas established in the 
Protocol. The procedure followed by the Community is that of the 
Management Committee created by the Regulation on the common market 
organization for fruit and vegetables (Art. 32). The Commission 
decision could be repealed by the Council voting by a qualified 
majority, (Regulation 1035/72 Art. 33) which cannot be reached by 
the votes of the four Member States most concerned (Spain, 
Portugal, Greece and Italy).
Wine, a product which is very important for the economy of 
Maghreb countries, and Algeria in particular, is the object of
202
392 See Regulation 3552/88 O.J. L 311 1988 at p. 12 in
particular Art. 1.3.
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detailed provisions replacing the rules of the Cooperation 
Agreement applicable to this product. The access of wine to the 
Community market is, to a certain extent, improved by the extension 
of the preferential treatment. A different regime applies to a) 
wine in bulk b) wine bottled in containers holding two liters or 
less entitled to a designation of origin (i) and not entitled to 
a designation of origin (ii) c)wine presented in containers of more 
than two liters.
a)Imports of wine are subject to the phasing out of customs 
duties within the limit of a tariff quota and provided that - as 
established in the Cooperation Agreement - the import price plus 
customs duties actually levied are not less than the Community 
reference price . b) (i). This wine is exempt from customs duties 
within the limits of a tariff quota. A second condition to the 
application of the tariff exemption is the equivalence between the 
legislation of the two contracting parties as regards the 
designation of origin of wine. An exchange of letters should be 
concluded for this purpose, (ii) within an annual quota this wine 
is granted the progressive elimination of the fixed amount provided 
in Art. 53 of regulation 822/87 on the common organization of the 
market for wine and which is added to the reference price (the rate 
of the reduction is indicated in the Protocol). This fixed amount
• 394corresponds to the normal packaging costs . Wine may be granted 
the application of a special frontier price in case of a fall in 
the level of exports of these wines. This special price also 
applies within the limits of a quota.
393 85 thouseuid hi for Morocco, 200 thousand for Algeria and 
160 thousand for Tunisia.
394 See Regulation 3488/89 21/11/89. O.J. L 340 1989. The 
adjustment of entry price for certain fruits and vegetables is 
taken by the Commission in accordance with the relevant management 
committee procedure.
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The rules established for wine are especially designed to 
favor the exports of Maghreb bottled wines. It should be noticed, 
and this is another example of the limit of the preferential 
treatment, that Maghreb export wine in bulk and that the advantage 
they may take from the preferential treatment granted is very 
limited395.
Special rules, derogating from those established in the 
Cooperation Agreement, are applied in the Protocol concluded with 
Tunisia as regards unprocessed olive oil wholly obtained in this 
country and directly exported to the Community. This specific 
preferential treatment has been granted on the basis of the vital 
importance of olive oil exports for this country. Within the limits 
of a quota of 46 thousand tons and during the period between the 
entry into force of the Protocol and 31 December 1990, a special 
levy is charged on exports of unprocessed olive oil equal to the 
difference between the threshold price and the cif price. The 
regime is particular in so far as the free-at-frontier price is 
fixed by the Community, taking into account the price guaranteed 
by the Tunisian Government to its producers and the transport costs 
to the Community borders. The regime should be revised from the 
first of January 1991.
4) Final Observations.
From the above discussion it seems clear that the common 
agricultural policy mechanisms and the need to maintain prices 
within the common market at a certain level, heavily condition, 
together with the application of a range of non-tariff measures,
395 Les Accord Mediterranéen.. Q£.git, p. 131. The difficulties 
for Maghreb countries to profit from the preferential treatment is 
illustrated by the fact that the EC had applied the preferential 
treatment provided for wine of designation of origin in the 
Cooperation Agreement to wine exported in bulk for the first two 
years of application of the Agreement, within certain quotas, 
"until such time as Morocco has sufficient plant to bottle the 
wines referred to in Art. 21(2) of the Agreement. Ibidem.
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the tariff preferences granted by the Community to the agricultural 
exports of Maghreb countries. It seems, in other words, that the 
objectives of the CAP and, in general, the protection of the EEC 
market, do prevail over the objectives of the cooperation with 
maghreb and Mashrak countries.
The reasons are to be found on the very special status of 
agriculture in the Community.
The result of CAP is the protection of the Community market 
from imports of agricultural products coming from third countries. 
It has already been said that CAP is an internal policy and as 
such is not negotiable and that the instruments applied to 
imports coming from third countries are functional to the 
objectives set up in Art. 39. It should be asked, however, if there 
is not contradiction between these internal objective and the 
consequence they have on trade with third countries if one 
considers that "by establishing a customs union between themselves 
the member states intend to contribute to the harmonious 
development of world trade, the progressive abolition of 
restrictions on international exchanges and the lowering of customs 
barriers" (Article 113 EEC Treaty) where no distinction is made 
between trade in agricultural and in industrial products.
It can be observed that it is expressly provided in the 
chapter on agriculture that the common market provisions apply to 
agriculture, unless otherwise stated. It can be imagined that this 
derogation was conceived more for the application of rules such as 
competition, free circulation of goods or state aids than for the 
external dimension of the common market.
On the other hand, the rules governing trade in agricultural
396 This was expressed in clear terms in the Kennedy Round 
where it was affirmed in the Community's negotiating mandate that 
CAP'S 'principles and mechanisms shall not be called into question 
and therefore do not constitute a matter for negotiations' Cited 
in HARRIS, SWINBANK.. op. cit. p. 278. The character of nor being 
negotiable is confirmed by the above mentioned provision on CAP 
contained in the Cooperation agreements with Maghreb countries 
(Art. 25 for Morocco).
products should be analyzed in the general framework of 
international trade.
The main instrument governing trade at international level is 
the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT). No distinction 
is made, in this Agreement between industrial and agricultural 
exchanges and in theory the rules established in GATT apply to both 
industrial and agricultural products. There are, however, rather 
important exceptions which testify to the special status of 
agriculture397. These are the application of quantitative 
restrictions which are admitted, under certain circumstances, for 
agricultural trade (Art. XI.2) and the possibility of applying 
export subsidies to agriculture (XVI.3). Duties bound in GATT are 
very limited (they apply to maize gluten, oilseeds, sheepmeat 
decided in the Dillon round as a compensation for the trade 
diverting effect caused by CAP). Moreover, it should be considered 
that in the field of agricultural trade, the negotiations on 
customs duties have lost much of their importance because, in order 
to protect national markets, non-tariff barriers are more widely 
applied than customs duties.
There are two other consequences of CAP which are worth 
noticing : the uncertainty effect caused by some CAP mechanisms 
and the influence that CAP has on the flow of trade between the
♦ • • 1QICommunity and its Mediterranean partners .
Uncertainty is due to the system of import levies and to 
reference prices. Import levies for some products are calculated 
daily, such as in the case of cereals or sugar and this may 
constitute a further difficulty for exporters, making advanced
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397 See TANGERMANN,S . Will Agriculture Always Remain a Problem 
in GATT? Interec. 1987 pp.163-167.
39* See YANNOPOULOS,G.N. "The Impact of the Common Agricultural 
Policy on Developing Countries Following the Enlargement of the 
European Community" Development Policy rev. 1983 pp.197-218; 
BEIBNER, K.H., HEMMER, H.R. "The Impact of the EC's Agricultural 
Policy on Its Trade with Developing Countries" Interec. 1981 
pp.55-60.
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planning more difficult. The uncertainty may, however, be overcome 
thanks to the possibility of fixing the levy in advance.
Reference prices may be subject to periodical variations and this 
means that an exporting country is faced with the possibility of 
paying countervailing charges even if it monitors its offer price.
As for the flow of trade, it has been argued399 that 
Mediterranean countries tend to orient their agricultural 
production toward those products which they can sell in the 
Community market. Mediterranean agricultural produce is, in fact, 
much less protected in the Community than other products such as 
cereals, sugar or milk. On the other hand, the over-production of 
this second category of products (itself a consequence of the high 
level of protection and internal support ) has led to an increase 
of their exports towards third countries and, in particular, 
towards developing countries which are facing a situation of food 
deficiency, due to their growing population and to a consequent 
high food dependency from the Community.
In 1982 a proposal for the conclusion of multiannual 
agricultural supply was submitted by the Commission to the Council. 
This proposal concerned more precisely the conclusion of long-term 
framework agreements between the Community and the countries of 
Maghreb and Mashrak (exploratory talks had place with Algeria, 
Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt) whereby the Community would have 
undertaken the obligation of supply specific quantities of food 
produce (either raw materials, like cereals, sugar and products for 
direct consumption, eggs, butter, rice, pasta) to these countries 
which would have imported the same quantities of products from the 
EEC. The interest of these agreements for the Community would have 
been to provided an outlet for Community products in excess and at 
the same time contributed to the security of food supply for the 
Community's partners. The interest of this type of agreements went
399 BASILE,E., CECCHI, C. Modelli commerciali e scambi
agricoli. Analisi dei rapporti_tra QES e Passi Mediterranei t
Milano, F. Angeli 1988.
208
beyond trade since they would have also ensured regular supply of 
raw materials for the food processing industry. The agreements were 
conceived as distinguished from the Cooperation Agreement although 
Morocco interpreted them as a way of restoring the balance with the 
Community "since infringements or distortions by the Community of 
some of the provisions of the (Cooperation Agreement)...could be 
offset by favorable terms of sale of Community agricultural 
products" The proposal was not followed by the Council and these
400agreements have never been negotiated
Trade preferences, moreover limited, cannot solve these 
specific problems of Maghreb and Mashrak countries which require
401 • • • •the application of other instruments . When discussing financial 
and technical cooperation it will be very interesting to examine 
which projects, if any, have been financed in the agricultural 
field, which specific problems have been considered and if they 
aim at balancing the limits deriving from the CAP.(rural 
development).
Finally, the advantages of tariff preferences cannot be 
discussed in absolute terms and the preferences granted to other 
countries, especially if having a production in competition, should 
be taken into consideration. Although such a comparative analysis 
is not the object of this study, to set the Cooperation Agreements 
concluded with Maghreb countries in context, a short reference to 
the regional and international context is necessary.
Besides the Cooperation Agreements with Maghreb and Mashrak 
countries the Community has concluded preferential agreements 
concerning agricultural trade with ACP countries under the Lomé 
Conventions. Only these preferences are, in terms of their
400 See COM(82) 73 Final, p. 15.
401 An instrument of development cooperation, outside the 
Cooperation Agreement, is the food aid policy of the Community. 
For discussion see SNYDER,F . The European Community's New Food ... 
o p .cit. or in New Directions in European Community Law Weidenfeld 
and Nicolson, London 1990, pp. 146-176.
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magnitude, comparable to those granted to Mediterranean countries. 
The preferential treatment concern a free duties entry, Stabex 
system and Protocols guaranteeing the access of important products 
like bananas, rum and sugar. Without going into the details of the 
arrangements, it should be remarked that the majority of 
agricultural products exported to the Community from ACP countries 
are not in competition with Community production. For instance 
preferences do not cover the products such as oranges or temperate- 
zone fruits and vegetables.
It is well known that the Agreements concluded with Maghreb 
countries are part of a network of agreements concluded by the 
Community with Mediterranean countries, in particular with Mashrak 
countries, Cyprus, Malta, Israel and Yugoslavia402. With few 
exceptions these countries exports the same kind of products to the 
Community and the preferences granted by the Community are limited 
by the same mechanisms that have been discussed above for Maghreb 
countries. However, since the agreement with Malta and Cyprus and 
the agreement with Israel provide for some form of reciprocity.
Agricultural trade preferences are also granted by the 
Community to developing countries within the (autonomous) scheme 
of the SGP. These are rather limited, especially if compared with 
the preferences granted to industrial products. This can be 
explained by the fact that the SGP has mainly been conceived as a 
means of encouraging industrialization. The preferences granted to 
sensitive agricultural products are limited by quotas. Other trade 
preferences are granted in agreements concerning beef to certain 
Latin America countries in the form of a reduced or levy-free 
quotas403.
It can be concluded that the Maghreb and Mashrak countries 
seem to enjoy a relative preferential position even in relation
402 We leave aside Spain and Portugal for obvious reasons and 
the Association Agreement with Turkey which should lead to 
membership, although it seems for the moment "frozen".
403 HARRIS o p .cit. p. 271.
with other third developing countries.
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D) RULES OF ORIGIN
1) General Considerations on Rules of Origin.
The origin of goods indicates the place where these have been 
produced, a concept which shall be distinguished from that of 
provenence, which refers to the place from where the goods have 
been shipped to their final destination.
The relatively large space devoted in this thesis to the rules 
of origin is explained only in part by the complex and technical 
nature of these rules. The main reason is founded on the 
observation that rules of origin are a crucial question for the 
application of trade preferences. The rules of origin applied to 
trade with Maghreb countries will be discussed to see whether their 
application can limit the preferences gremted in the Cooperation 
Agreement or if these can be used to enhance some of the scope of 
the Agreement.
As established by each Cooperation Agreement concluded by the 
Community with Maghreb countries, tariff preferences are granted 
only to products - both industrial and agricultural - originating 
in, respectively, Morocco, Algeria ¿md Tunisia404.
Goods exported from Maghreb countries could enjoy preferential 
duty treatment only if, on the basis of the criteria laid down by 
the rules of origin, they are produced therein.
If the determination of origin may be rather easily made when 
the products are completely obtained in one country, it shall be
211
404 See, for example, Art. 9 of the Agreement with Morocco 
applying to industrial products "...products originating in 
Morocco..shall be imported into the Community free of quantitative 
restrictions..", and Art. 15 for agricultural products "Customs 
duties on imports into the Community of the products originating 
in Morocco which are listed below shall be reduced..".The question 
of origin is particularly important as far as industrial products 
are concerned, agricultural products, in fact, are covered by the 
category of "wholly obtained" goods, which presents less problems 
of interpretation as compared with that applicable to industrial 
goods produced with imported materials.
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considered that the number of such products is limited, whereas it 
is often necessary to establish the origin of goods which are 
produced with parts and materials manufactured in other countries.
For preferential trade, it shall be considered that if the 
criteria laid down by rules of origin are very restrictive - viz. 
a high domestic imput is required, in terms of originating products 
used in the manufacture of the final good, or of processing carried 
out in the country of alledged origin - it will be more difficult 
for those countries to export goods at preferential duty rate. On 
the contrary, if the rules of origin are loos more export will be 
possible and, consequently, the highest export profit will be 
obtained.
On the other it should be considered that there exist a 
conflict of interest between the EEC (granting preferences) and 
Maghreb. The former has an interest in laying down rules of origin 
strict enough to avoid that other third countries could profit from 
preferences by, for instance, setting up a stage of production in 
one of the Maghreb countries but using a very limited amount of 
domestic labour or originating paurts and materials.
On the other hand, too restrictive rules of origin may have 
a negative effect for Maghreb because non-originating component 
used in the manufacture of the final product exported by Maghreb 
countries may have a higher quality and/or a cheaper price than 
originating components, and may therefore affect the cost and 
quality of the final product. Moreover, Morocco, Algeria and 
Tunisia are developing countries and they may simply lack the 
technology and the know how to produce certain materials used in 
the manufacture of goods. The result of too restrictive rules of 
origin may at the end discourage investments by third countries' 
firms and consequently limit the transfer of technology.
The fact that rules of origin are applied to both preferential 
and non-preferential trade does not mean that identical rules are 
applied in both cases, in fact an examination of the rules of
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origin applied by the Community to trade with preferential 
countries (contained in Protocols annexed to Cooperation or Trade 
Agreements providing for a preferential access to the EEC market, 
are stricter than those governing trade with third countrie in 
general. In S.R. Industries v . Administration des douanes405 the 
Court was requested to pronounce on the validity of a Commission 
regulation (3749/83) for the definition of rules of origin for the 
application of the system of generalized preferences. The criteria 
laid down for the definition of the origin of sails under the 
contested regulation, applied to the system of generalized 
preferences, sure stricter than those required for sails for the 
application of common rules (under regulation 802/68).The Court 
held that "..in the field of general tariff preferences, the 
Commission may apply the concept of the origin of goods in a 
different and stricter manner than in the framework of the common 
rules drawn up by regulation 802/68. Such an application may, in 
fact, be necessary to attain the objective of the general teuriff 
preferences of ensuring that the preferences benefit only 
industries which are established in developing countries and which 
carry out the main manufacturing processes in those countries" p. 
2929. This seems could be applied, mutatis mutandis, to the rules 
of origin of preferential agreements. It has been observed, as 
regards textile products, that certain criteria that shall be met 
by preferential countries are more restricitive if compeured with 
the "last substantial process" requirement laid down by Article 5 
of Regulation 802/68406.
Before reviewing the rules of origin applied to the 
imports of Mediterranean products in the Community it seems 
necessary to make a few general observations on the question of the 
rules of origin and, in peurticular, those applied by the Community.
405 See case 385/85, S.R. Industries v. Administration des 
douanes 8.10.1985,(1986) ECR p.2929.
FEENSTRA,J. Rules of Origin and Textile Products: recent 
Case-Law of the Court of Justice CMLRev, 1985, pp.533-559, p.557.
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Rules of origin are a common feature of all customs 
legislation, to be more precise these are, together with the norms 
on the customs value amd some specific customs regime (warehouse, 
inward and outward processing), the main instruments of customs 
legislation. (see in Fordham Journal Int.Law on rules of origin US)
A number of measures such as quotas, safeguard measures, 
anti-dumping duties exists which are implemented on the basis of 
origin407. Statistical analyses and statistical surveillance are 
made up taking into account the origin of the products.
Notwithstanding the important consequences for international 
trade of rules of origin no binding rules have been enacted so far 
at international level. Although the concept of the originating 
product is present in various GATT Articles (Arts. I, VIII, IX), 
the Contracting parties are not bound by a common definition ofiMorigin .
One should however mention the International Convention on 
the Simplification and Harmonization of Customs Procedures409 which
401 On the relevance of the determination of origin during the
process of anti-dumping investigation and after the proceeding see
VERMULST,E., WAER,P. "European Community Rules of Origin as
Commercial Policy Instruments ?" JWT1 1990, pp.55-99, p. 74-91. 
During investigation it is to be ascertained whether dumped 
products are originating in the third country exporting them and 
whehther domestic EEC products alleged to be damaged are
originating in the Community after the investigation origin rules
are relevant to determine whether circumvention has taken place.♦
408 Such a common definition was not even thought as desirable 
see JACKSON, World Trade., op.cit. p. 468. More recently, rules 
of origin have been discussed within the framework of the Uruguay 
Round. Proposals have been submitted by the United States, Hong 
Kong, Japan and the EC. Some of the difficulties and obstacles 
hampering the way towards am harmonised system of rules of origin 
are illustrated by PALMETER, N.D. The U.S. Rules of Origin proposal 
to GATT: Monotheism or Polytheism? JWTL 1990, pp.25-36.
409 Q.J. L 100 21.04.1975 p.l the decision adopting the 
Convention is based on the Treaty without express reference to amy 
Treaty Article.
contains two Annexes410 (D.l and D.2) on irules of origin.
The purpose of these Annexes is to propose "those rules for 
the determination of origin which is felt can be most easily 
applied and controlled, with least risk of misunderstanding and 
fraud and the least interference with commercial activities". The 
provisions of these Annexes are conceived in the form of 
standards411 and recommended practices412 but this seems to leave 
open the choice of methods which states can apply413. These, 
however, vary within limited categories since the problems to be 
solved are analogous for all of them.
The Community adopted the Convention in 1975, together with 
the Annex on customs warehouse414. In 1977415 it adopted Annexes on 
origin, making reservations for certain standards.
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410 Other Annexes concern customs warehouse, customs transit 
(E.l), temporary admission for inward processing (E.6) and 
temporary exportation for outward processing (E.8).
411 Standards are "provisions the general application of which 
is recognized as necessary for the achievement of heurmonization and 
simplification of customs procedures".
4,2 These are "provisions which are recognized as constituting 
progress towards the harmonization and the simplification of 
customs procedures, the widest possible application of which is 
considered to be desirable" Ibidem.
413 For instance, the description of the methods which can be 
applied to determine origin is accompanied by consideration of 
their advantages and disadvantages. Moreover, no preferences among 
the standards are established "Nor does (the Annex) impose on its 
Contracting Parties obligations in the form of acceptance of 
general principles, such as, for example, most-favoured nation 
treatment, transparency, etc." VERMULST,E., WAER, P. European 
Community Rules of Origin as Commercial Policy Instrument? JWTL 
pp.55-95,.p.60.
414 O.J. L 100 21.04.1975.
4,5 Ibidem. The Annexes have been accepted in the Community by 
Council Decision 77/415 O.J. L 166 4.07.1977.
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The definition or origin may be more or less complex 
depending on the product taken into consideration. Two categories 
of products are usually distinguished:
a) products completely obtained in a country ("wholly produced"), 
in which case the origin may be more easily verified (e.g. 
agricultural products);
b) products for whose manufacture more countries are involved 
(e.g. their production entails the use of imported materials or 
components coming from third countries). In this case, the 
definition of origin is a much more complicated process and the 
problem is to determine the contribution of the local economy to 
consider the product as originating.
The criterion commonly referred to is that of the "substantial 
transformation" which the product has to undergo in the beneficiary 
country to be deemed as originating therefrom. Various methods may 
be applied to verify that the criterion has been fulfilled and 
these can be summarized416 as follows:
a) detailed rules concerning single products describing the 
processing operations which have to be performed in a country to 
acquire origin.
b) reference to the tariff heading of the finished product which 
is to be different from that of each of the materials utilized. 
This method is usually accompanied by a list of exceptions: change 
of tariff heading not conferring origin, or conferring origin if 
further criteria are also satisfied, operations which do not result 
in a change of tariff heading but which confer origin. It is clear 
that this procedure requires that donor and recipient countries 
make use of the same customs nomenclature.
c) ad valorem percentage. This method may be applied having regard 
to the materials utilized (the non-originating materials cannot 
exceed a given percentage of the value of the finished product)
416 The detailed rules and conditions will be examined infra 
when applied to the rules of origin concerning Maghreb exports to 
the EEC.
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and/or to the processing operations performed in the beneficiary 
country (the valued added has to reach a given percentage). This 
technique requires, in its turn, the setting up of criteria for the 
definition of the value of the products.
These three methods can be used individually or cumulatively.
2) The Community Rules of Origin.
Although rules of origin are an important element of customs 
legislation, the Treaty of Rome does not provide for an express 
power to legislate in this field*17. The establishment of a Common 
Customs Tariff requires, however, the setting up of common rules 
of origin to avoid deflection of trade which could possibly take 
place towards the member State applying more liberal rules of 
origin. The correlation between the CCT and the rules of origin 
is confirmed by the fact that the basic Community instrument 
establishing rules of origin (Regulation 802 / 6841*; has been adopted 
in concurrence with the entry into force of the CCT (1 July 1968) .
Community rules of origin may be distinguished in
• • . . .  419(a)"commercial" origin rules and (b)"preferential" origin rules
2.a) "Commercial" Rules of Origin.
The most relevant instrument is regulation 802/68420 which 
applies when required by the uniform application of the Common 
Customs Tariff, quantitative restrictions or any other measures
417 In this respect it is worth noticing that an express 
competence is not provided for any of the elements of customs 
legislation. This explains why the acts enacted in this field by 
the Community are founded, besides other provisions such as Art. 
113, and for rules of origin Articles 155 and 227, on Art. 235.
4I* O.J. L 148 1968.
4,9 These terms are used by GIFFONI,M. II Consolidamento 
dell'Unione Doganale in vista della Realizzazione del Mercato Unico 
DCSI 1990, pp.259-285, p.274.
420 O.J. L 148 1968.
concerning the import of goods by the Community or Member States421 
(art.l). The Regulation distinguishes between wholly obtained 
products and goods for whose production "two or more countries., 
(are) concerned". Article 4, wholly obtained products, has not 
given raise to particular problems. In 1985 the Court has clarified 
the meaning of the phrase "products of sea fishing" holding that 
origin of fish is attributed to the country of the vessels 
performing the essential part of the operation, that is locating 
the fish and separating them from the sea by netting422.
Art. 5 provides that goods for whose manufacture more 
countries are involved "..shall be regarded as originating in the 
country in which the last substemtial process or operation that is 
economically justified was performed, having been carried out in 
an undertaking equipped for the purpose, and resulting in the 
manufacture of a new product or representing an importemt stage of 
manufacture"423. This very general formulation424 of the rule can be 
explained by the need to cover the widest range of cases and to 
take into account technological progress.
In practice it may be of some difficulties to establish when 
the last substantial process" has effectively taken place. The
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421 As mentioned above, these rules of origin do not apply to 
customs duties of the Common Customs Tariff but to other duties 
such as anti-dumping, measures such as quotas or for the 
application of Art.115 EEC Treaty.
422 Case 100/84, Commission v. United Kingdom. 28.03.1985,
(1985) ECR p.1169.
423 These two criteria do not seem to have played a very 
important role in the definition of origin, see case-law reported 
infra.
424 This has been the object of some criticisms : "The
explanation, as with some of the other obscurities of the origin 
rules, lies in the fact that the rule when first formulated was a 
pastiche of several Member States' different rules, which were 
pressed into one rule which was not altogether internally 
consistent" FORRESTER, I.S. EEC Customs Law: Rules of Origin and 
Preferential Duty Treatment - Part I Eur. Law. Rev. 1980 p. 167, 
p.174.
Court of Justice, with a consistent line of cases, has clarified 
the criteria laid down in Article 5 of regulation 802/68. Even if 
the majority of the cases refer to rules of origin applying to 
specific goods (contained in regulation adopted on the basis of
• 425 •egulation 802/68 ) the holding of the Court are of general
application to clarify the criteria contained in Article 5.
The Court has first held that a comparison shall be made 
between what existed before the processing of manufacturing and 
the outcome of this one. The criterion applied is that of
significant qualitiative change between raw materials and processed 
products.
In Gesellschaft fur Überseehandel mbH (casein case)*26 the 
Court affirmed that "the determination of the origin of goods must 
be based on a real and objective distinction between raw material 
and processed product, depending fundamentally on the specific 
material qualities of each of these products." Excluding that a 
change of tariff heading could be considered a sufficient
criterion, the Court asserts that "the last process operation 
referred to in Art. 5 ..is only substantial if the product
resulting therefrom has its own properties and a composition of its 
own, which it did not possess before that process or
operation" (ground 6)421.
* • 428 •In the important Yoshida case an eccessive local content 
condition in the manufacture of slide-fastener was considered as 
exceeding the Commission competence under regulation 802/68. (The
219
425 See Articles 5 auid 14.
426 case 49/76 ££g (1977), p.41.
427 This interpretation is confirmed in case 93/83
Zentraloenossenschaft v . Hauptzollamt Bochum 23.02.1984 (1984) E£R 
p. 1095 para 13, and case 162/82, Directeur des Douanes v. 
Cousin.23.03.1983 (1983) p.1101 .
42> case 34/78, Yoshida v. Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken. 
31.09.1979 (1979) ESR P* case 114/78 Yoshida GmbH v. Industrie
und Handelskammer Kassel.31.01.1979 (1979) ECR p.151.
Commission required the slider being of Community origin to confer 
Community origin to the finished product) . The Court held that "the 
requirement that all component of a product must be of Communty 
origin, even those of little value are of no use in themselves 
unless they are incorporated into a whole, would amount to a 
repudistion of the very objective of the rules on the determination 
of origin".
2 .b) "Preferential: Rules of Origin.
These are the Lome' Convention, the Trade Agreements 
concluded with EFTA countries429 and the Cooperation Agreements with 
Mediterranean countries (Maghreb, Mashrak, Cyprus, Malta, Israel 
and Yugoslavia). Although with respect to many aspects they are 
very similar, these rules of origin constitute separate groups of 
norms which can be modified only by agreement between the Community 
and its Partner(s) . Within this group it is possible to include the 
rules applied to imports of the products enjoying preferences under 
the Community System of Generalized Preferences. Although these 
preferences are autonomously granted by the Community the rules of 
origin (equally autonomously enacted by the Community) have the 
same scope and are founded on the same criteria as those applied 
to preferential trade agreements.
The rules of origin applied to the system of generalized 
preferences are contained in a separate Regulation430.
As mentioned above, the rules of origin applied to
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429 Rules of origin are also contained in a Protocol annexed 
to the Agreement establishing an European Economic Area concluded 
with EFTA countries and in the Cooperation Agreemnts concluded with 
some Eastern European Countries.
430 At present Reg. 693/88 is in force. See O.J. L 77
4.03.1988. It takes into account the adoption of the International 
Convention on the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding
System. It applies to the annual scheme and provides for
derogations (in favor of the least developed countries). See
introductory notes Annex A and B. It refers to the Treaty as its 
legal basis.
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preferential trade are stricter than those contained in regulation 
802/68 and in the other regulations concerning specific products.
The Community does not refer to a single criterion to 
determine the origin of imported goods. On the contrary, the whole 
range of possible criteria, mentioned above, are used, although 
they may differ according to the purposes of the application of the 
rules of origin.
The rules of origin applied to preferential trade with Maghreb 
countries will be more deeply analysed under 3) . References to the 
rules applied to other preferential agreements will be made in the 
course of the discussion only when relevant.
3) Rules of Origin Applied to Maghreb Countries' Exports to the 
Community.
3 .a)Substantive Rules.
For the definition of originating products Art. 31 of the 
Cooperation Agreement with Morocco refers to a Protocol annexed to 
the Agreement .
The general notion of originating products is contained in 
Art. 1 of the said Protocol431. These are i) products 'wholly 
obtained'in Morocco and ii) products obtained in Morocco from the 
manufacture of third countries goods provided that *sufficient 
working or processing' has taken place.
The definition of the concept of originating products is 
extended to Community products: the criteria applied are identical 
to those applying to Morocco. Products considered as originating 
in the Community are products "wholly obtained" there and those 
obtained in the EEC by "sufficient working or processing" of non- 
originating goods.
The determination of origin of Community products could be 
required for the application of cumulation rules (see infra) . When
431 Protocol 2 concerning the definition of the concept 
'originating products' and methods of administrative cooperation.
a product is manufactured, say, in Tunisia, with Community parts, 
these do not count against origin if originating in the Community. 
(a microchip of Community origin for the manufacture of a 
computer).
(i)Wholly obtained products.
With respect to the goods classified under (2), wholly 
obtained products are, as mentioned above, easier to identify as 
it emerges from the list provided for in the Cooperation Agreements 
Protocols on the rules of origin432. Of course, not all the products 
which are completely obtainable in a single country are described, 
the ten item list analyzed hereafter identifies the categories to 
which these goods can be referred.
- "mineral products extracted from their soil or from their 
seabed".
The distinction between soil and seabed is rather new, it 
did not exist in the Protocol on origin annexed to the Association 
Agreement concluded with Morocco in 1969.
In the absence of any qualification of the term "seabed", it 
is not clear to what extent minerals extracted from the seabed can 
be considered as originating products.
It is suggested that originating status should be conferred 
on minerals extracted from the seabed to which the state concerned 
can legally claim an exclusive right of exploitation. In this 
respect two concepts of the international law of the sea are 
relevant: the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone.
The continental shelf of a coastal state is defined by Art. 
76 of the Convention of Montego Bay433 as he portion of seabed and
432 A virtually identical list is contained in the other 
contractual and autonomous instruments on origin taking the 
criterion of 'wholly obtained' products into account. See Art. 2 
of Lome' IV and Article 4 for Regulation 802/68.
433 Signed the 10th of December.1982 at the end of the third 
United Nations Conference for the codification of the law of the 
sea, the Convention has not yet entered into force. See TREVES,T. 
La Convenzione delle Nazioni Unite sul Diritto del Mare del 10 
Dicembre 1982 Milano, Giuffref 1983. The text of the Convention is
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subsoil extending beyond its territorial sea which constitutes the 
natural prolongation of the land. For the definition of the 
external limit, reference is made either to a geological criterion 
(the outer edge of the continental margin) or to a conventional 
limit of 200 miles from the baseline applied when, following the 
first criterion, the continental shelf would be inferior to a 
breadth of 200 miles from the baseline.
The exclusive economic zone, the most important institution 
of the new law of the sea, is the area beyond and adjacent to the 
territorial sea which extends up to 200 miles from the baseline 
from which territorial sea is measured (Art. 57 of the Montego Bay 
Convention).
The coastal state has sovereign rights of exploitation of 
mineral resources and living organisms of sedentary species on the 
continental shelf (art.77), whereas in the exclusive economic zone 
this right extends to living and non-living resources of 
superjacent waters (Art. 56).
It can be concluded that originating status should be granted 
to the minerals extracted from the continental shelf or from the
* 434exclusive economic zone of a coastal state.
Minerals extracted from seabed are originating even if the 
plants and equipments used for extraction are not originating or 
are owned by a third country's company or firm. In other words,
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reproduced there. It should be reminded that the institution of the 
continental shelf has been the specific object of one of the four 
Convention on the law of the sea concluded in Geneva in 1958. See 
CONFORTI, B. Diritto Internazionale. Napoli, Ed. Scientifica 1987 
pp.234-256.
434 The two institutions coincide as feur as the rights over 
minerals are concerned up to a distance of 200 marine miles. It is 
necessary to mention an important question related to the 
continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone, that of the 
delimitation between states with opposite and adjacent coasts. See 
Arts. 74 and 83 of the Montego Bay Convention. For an exhaustive 
treatment of the question relating to the Mediterranean sea, see 
LEANZA,U.(ed.) The International Legal Regime of the Mediterranea 
Sea. Giuffre', Milano 1987.
since no specification is made the "neutral elements" rule435 
applies.
To conclude, one is reminded that oils and petroleum products 
- of which one could instinctively think when considering this 
category of products - are excluded from the application of the 
rules of origin, not only as far as Maghreb Agreements are 
concerned, but also in the case of the autonomous rules applied by
436the Community.
- "vegetable products harvested there"
- "live animals born and raised there"
- "products from live animals raised there"
- "products obtained by hunting or fishing conducted there"
These classifications do not seem to raise any particular 
problems. Since sea fishing is mentioned under f), fishing 
mentioned under e) seems to refer to internal waters such as lakes 
or rivers.
- "products of sea fishing and other products taken from the sea 
by their vessels"
- "products made aboard their factory ships exclusively from 
products referred to in subparagraph (f)"
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435 See Annex I Explanatory Notes Note 2 "In order to determine 
whether goods originate in the Community, Morocco, Algeria or 
Tunisia it shall not be necessary to establish whether the power 
and fuel, plant amd equipment, and machines and tools used to 
obtain such goods originate in third countries or not". The rule 
applies as well to products obtained by the manufacture of non 
originating goods ("sufficiently processed" products) on condition 
that the above mentioned elements do not enter into the final 
composition of the goods.
436 See List C of the Protocol of origin annexed to Maghreb 
Cooperation Agreements and regulation 802/68 statement of reasons 
par. 12 op.cit..
Although the term "sea" used under f) is very general it shall 
be remarked that two other notions are contained in the Protocol 
(explanatory note 1), more specifically, those of "territorial 
waters" and "high seas" . As regards territorial waters, it is 
established that: "the terms 'Community' or 'Morocco'also cover the 
territorial waters of the Member States of the Community or of 
Morocco respectively"437.
This assimilation implies that sea products fished in this 
area would unquestionably be considered as originating in the 
coastal state regardless of the characteristics of the vessels 
performing fishing operation. Thus, in the (although unlikely) 
hypothesis of country A fishing in the territorial water of country 
B, the catch of A would be considered as originating in B438.
Beyond territorial waters sea products are originating only 
if the conditions concerning vessels, illustrated below, are 
fulfilled.
Explanatory note 6 provides that "The term 'their vessels' 
shall apply to vessels:
- which are registered or recorded in a Member State, Morocco, 
Algeria or Tunisia,
- which sail under the flag of a Member State, Morocco, Algeria 
or Tunisia,
- which are owned to the extent of at least 50%439 by nationals
437 The same applies, mutatis mutandis, to Algeria and Tunisia.
438 FORRESTER, I .S. EC Customs Law, .ov.cit. p. 258.
439 The condition regarding ownership for Maghreb and ACP 
countries are less stringent than that applied to the SGP (70%). 
An interesting provision has been added to Lome' IV Convention as 
regards fishing. The Community will consider as "their vessels" 
those third countries' vessels chartered or leased by ACP countries 
provided that a fishing agreement has been offered to the Community 
and that the latter has not availed itself of such an opportunity 
and that 50% of the crew, masters and officers included, are 
nationals of ACP states and that the charter or lease contract has 
been accepted by the Commission as providing adequate opportunity 
for developing the capacity of ACP states to fish on its own 
account. This seems to answer, at least in part, to the critical
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of the Member States, Morocco, Algeria or Tunisia or by a company 
with its head office in a Member State, Morocco, Algeria or 
Tunisia, of which the manager, managers, chairman of the board of 
directors or of the supervisory board, and the majority of the 
members of such board are nationals of the Member States, Morocco, 
Algeria or Tunisia and of which, in addition, in the case of 
partnerships or limited companies, at least half the capital 
belongs to the Member States, Morocco, Algeria or Tunisia or to the 
public bodies or nationals of the Member States, Morocco, Algeria 
or Tunisia,
- of which at least 50\ of the crew, captain and officers 
included, are nationals of the Member States, Morocco, Algeria or 
Tunisia".
The same conditions are to be met by factory ships where sea 
products are processed.
This strict requirement (the four conditions have to be 
satisfied simultaneously) deviates from the neutral elements 
general rule illustrated above and concerns only preferential 
trade440.
Ignoring the distinction between high sea and exclusive 
economic zone the Protocol seems to indicate by the term high sea, 
sea beyond territorial waters without any further
226
observations of McQUEEN Lomé and the Protective..op.cit.. 1982 p. 
130 arguing that the conditions laid down for fishing have, as a 
consequence to favor the use of EEC vessels on the part of ACP 
states which do not possess their own fishing fleet. This should 
not apply to Maghreb countries due to the importance of fishing for 
their economies and to their tradition.
440 Jjj Regulation 802/68 only the conditions regarding 
registration and flag shall be met (Art. 4.f). In case 100/84 
Commission v. United Kingdom 23.03.1985 (1985) E£E p. 1169 the Court 
of Justice has indicated the criteria to be followed in the case 
of fishing operations conducted by vessels flying different flags 
and registered in different countries (in the case Polish and 
English).
differentiation441. It should be considered however that at the time 
of the conclusion of the Cooperation Agreements with Maghreb 
countries (1976), the exclusive economic zone was a developing 
notion in the international law of the sea (the Montego Bay 
Convention was concluded in 1982).
Should the rules contained in the Protocol be interpreted in 
a different way in the light of the new provisions of the law of 
the sea?
It is here submitted that the establishment of the exclusive 
economic zone as an institution of customary international law 
should not modify the rules set up in the Protocols as far as the 
origin of sea products is concerned. It is true that the coastal 
state has sovereign rights over living resources of sea waters in 
the exclusive economic zone, but this does not mean that these 
resources, and specifically fishing, shall be considered as 
originating in the coastal state. The rationale of the origin rule 
establishing the conditions regarding vessels is that of assuring 
a connection between the vessels operating beyond territorial 
waters and the tariff preferences' beneficieury country. 
Furthermore, it esnsures that origin is conferred on sea products 
(including living organisms of sedentary species) only on this 
basis, excluding consideration of the place where fishing 
operations take place.
The application of the rule concerning vessels only in the 
high seas would, moreover, be meaningless in the Mediterranean sea 
due to the fact that no point on this sea is beyond 200 miles from 
the baseline of any coastal state.
Finally, the exclusive economic zone is to be proclaimed by
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m This is the definition given in the explanatory notes of 
the Lome• Convention fO.J. C 185 09.08.1976, Chapter II, C, p. 4-
5). It is clear that these notes, which do not have legal status, 
apply only to ACP products and could not be extended to other EEC 
trade partners. However, although the contractual rules of origin 
are a distinct set of norms. They are very similar in many 
respects, especially when the general criteria applied are 
concerned.
the coastal state. This means that different regimes could be 
applied before and after such a proclamation.
- "used articles collected there fit only for the recovery of raw 
materials".
This is the case, for exemple, for imported bottles of beer 
which, once empty, can be used for the recovery of glass. The 
letter of the provision seems to exclude that used article could 
be utilized in any other way than recovery of materials and still 
be considered as originating: e.g. a tire of a (non-originating) 
wrecked car could only be melted down and not re-employed for its 
original use442.
In the case of the first example given to the contrary, 
bottles could be employed as containers of a locally produced beer 
since "packing shall be considered as forming a whole with the 
goods contained therein..m443
- "waste and scrap resulting from manufacturing operations 
conducted there".
It seems clear that this is a matter of waste resulting from 
the manufacture of non-originating goods. In the other case, in 
fact, the waste would irrefutably be originating.
After the manufacturing operation (which is not further defined) 
waste and scrap become: (i) distinct by-products or (ii) products 
requiring further processing to be utilized. According to 
Forrester444 only the second type of scrap and waste is to be 
considered as originating. It is submitted, on the contrary, that 
in both cases waste and scrap are to be regarded as originating.
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442 See contra FORRESTER Customs Law., op.cit. pp.178-179.
443 Expleuiatory note 5 which continues "..This provision, 
however, shall not apply to packing which is not of the normal type 
for the article packed and which has intrinsic utilization value 
and is of a durable nature, apart from its function as packing".
444 FORRESTER Customs Law, .op.cit. p. 179.
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In fact by-products would not have come into existence without the 
processing operation which has taken place in the country deemed 
of origin.
- "goods produced there exclusively from products specified in 
subparagraph (a) to (i)".
No specific questions seem to emerge from this category of 
goods. It seems clear that when e.g. agricultural product obtained 
in Morocco are processed there (when, for instance, orange juice 
is produced from oranges) the product obt&ined is considered as 
originating in Morocco.
(ii) Sufficiently Processed Products.
Products obtained in Morocco, Algeria or Tunisia by 
manufacturing or processing of third countries goods are considered 
as originating if a "sufficient working or processing" has teOcen 
place in Morocco, Algeria or Tunisia445.
What is considered as "sufficient working or processing" ?
A common criterion has been identified in the change of tariff 
heading. More precisely, products obtained must "receive a 
classification under a heading other them that covering each of 
the products worked or processed.." (Art. 3 of Protocol). In other 
words a comparison is established between the materials used before 
the processing operation and the outcome of such em operation: the 
change of teuriff heading means that the country has contributed 
to the transformation of the materials in such a way that the 
resulting product may acquire originating status.
Par. 3 of the same Article enumerates the working or 
processing operations which, regardless of the fact that the 
product obtained has a different tariff heading, do not confer 
origin. In practice, the common feature of these operations is that 
they do not alter significantly the nature and the qualities of the
445 Cumulation rules will de discussed infra.
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products since they are rather simple operations not requiring 
particular skills or the use of complex techniques. Such activities 
comprise operations of packaging (labelling, marking, breaking up 
and assembly of consignment included), preservation (ventilation, 
placing in salt, removal of damaged part..) and simple operations 
of assembly of part of the article, mixing products and lastly, the 
slaughter of animals.
It is clear that the rule esteblishing that such operations 
do not confer origin only applies to non-originating products. 
Thus, while the labelling of a product wholly obtained in Morocco 
would not change the origin status of those goods, the assembly in 
Tunisia of third countries articles would not confer Tunisian 
origin on the assembled product. On the contrary, in the case of 
the mixing of products the status of originating product of one or 
more components seems sufficient to confer origin on the product
446obtained (Art. 3, p.3 under (e)) .
The Protocol provides for two categories of exceptions to the 
general rule illustrated above. For a number of products, contained 
in List A annexed to the Protocol, the change of tariff heading is 
not sufficient and origin is conferred if, together with the change 
of teuriff heading, the conditions laid down in List A are 
fulfilled.
Products of list B are entitled originating status on the 
basis of criteria different to that of the change of tariff heading 
which is therefore not required.
It should be remarked that there is no direct link between 
products exported by Maghreb countries and those contained in list 
A and B of the Protocols of origin. This means, in other words that 
these lists may contain eurticles which would never be produced or 
exported by Morocco, Algeria or Tunisia. At the same time, one
446 The formulation describing mixing operations has been 
modified in the case of Lome' since 1979. See comments in FORRESTER 
Customs Law., op.cit. p. 186.
should notice that lists A and B are very similar, if not 
identical, in all Protocols of origin annexed to preferential trade 
agreements. As compared with the general rule of the change of 
tariff heading the conditions laid down in lists A and B are more 
restrictive which could mean that these are sensitive products for 
the Community.
List A.
This list is divided into four columns. The first one contains the 
CCT heading corresponding to the products of column two. Column 
three contains the description of the operations which do not 
confer origin, notwithstanding the chernge of tariff heading. Column 
four describes the operations which confer origin if, together with 
a change of tariff heading, the conditions indicated therein are 
met.
Thus, for instance, butter (CCT heading 04.03447 ) manufactured 
in Algeria from imported milk (tariff heading 04.01) would not be 
considered as originating although a change of tariff heading 
results from such a manufacturing operation, tuid this because list 
A provides that the manufacture of butter from milk or cream is not 
considered an operation conferring origin .
The criteria laid down in the fourth column of list A, where 
manufacturing or processing operations conferring origin are 
described, are not always the same, but it is possible to identify 
a common denominator in the fact that a significant contribution 
on the part of the country concerned is required. This 
contribution can be evaluated in the terms of the processing 
required to obtain certain products. Thus, to establish that origin 
is granted only if the product is obtained by the manufacturing of
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441 Reference is made here to the old tariff classification 
since the Protocols on origin have not yet been modified as a 
consequence of the adoption of the harmonized system of customs 
classification (see above chapter on agriculture). In the case of 
a modification of tariff heading, however, the criterion we are 
referring to here would not be modified.
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specific products means that particular processing operations have 
to take place in the country concerned. For instance, macaroni, 
spaghetti and simileur products are originating in Morocco only if 
manufactured from durum wheat, which implies that a number of 
operations have to be performed in Morocco (grinding of wheat into 
flour, manufacturing of flour into pasta..). Likewise, in the case 
of men's and boys' outer garments origin is weurranted only if those 
products are manufactured from yarn, which means weaving operations 
to transform yarn into fabric and making up garments from the 
latter .
A second important type of condition is the ad valorem 
percentage rule. The method may be applied in different ways: (i) 
materials and parts used cannot exceed a given percentage of the 
value of the final product, this means that manufacturing 
operations csurried out in that country shall make up for the 
remaining value.(ii) a minimum percentage of originating products 
have to be used as a percentage of the final value of the 
product. (Hi) the value of non-originating components cannot exceed 
a minimum fixed percentage of the value of the final product. In 
certain cases conditions (ii) and (iii) have to be met 
simultaneously. See, for instance, the case of refrigerators and 
refrigerating equipment (electrical and other) (CCT tariff heading 
84.15) which are considered as originating only if "the value of 
the non-originating materials and parts used does not exceed 40\ 
of the value of the finished product, and provided that at least 
50% in value of the materials and parts used are originating 
products". #
In other cases the condition laid down in column four regards 
the quantity of originating product that shall be used. Thus 
cigarettes, cigars and smoking tobacco (CCT heading 24.02) 
manufactured from raw tobacco (CCT heading' 24.01) are not 
considered as originating unless the product meets the condition 
that at least 70% of these products is originating.
List B
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The products enumerated under List B are considered as 
originating even if no change of tariff heading results from the 
operation described in column three. This means that these 
operations are considered significant enough to consider the 
outcoming product as originating. Thus, for instance, prepared 
mustard (cct tariff heading 21.03) is considered originating if 
manufactured from mustard flour (same CCT heading) because this 
trems formation is considered as a qualifying operation. Articles 
of mother of pearl (CCT heading 95.02) are originating if they are 
manufactured from worked mother of pearl although the two have the 
same tariff heading.
In some cases List B also requires the fulfillment of 
percentage criteria regeurding non-originating and/or originating 
parts and materials. In these cases the specific conditions 
established have to be fulfilled to confer the final product origin 
status. Thus, for instance, certain chemical products (cct tariff 
heading 28 to 37) are originating only if the non-originating 
products used do not exceed 20% of the value of the finished 
product. Engines and motors, excluding reaction engines and gas 
turbines (CCT heading 84.08) are originating if working, processing 
or assembly has taken place "in which the value of the non­
originating materials and parts used does not exceed 40% of the 
value of the finished product and provided that at least 50% in 
value of the materials and parts used are originating products". 
With regard to sewing machines (84.41), besides a double percentage 
rule concerning originating and non-originating parts, the thread 
tension, crochet and zigzag mechanisms are required to be 
originating products.
Some products are contained in both list A and B. In these 
cases the percentage rule has to be co-ordinated. Art. 3.2 of
the Protocol provides that when the two rates are identical the 
common rate applies, when they are different the higher applies. 
In practice this means that the two lists have to be read together.
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In the case of motor vehicles, for instance (CCT heading 87.06), 
in List A the value of the imported materials used cannot exceed
40% of the value of the finished product, whilst in List B the
fixed percentage is 15 %. Thus, no more them 40% of imported 
materials can be used (the highest percentage). Of this 40%,
however, 25% can be made up of imported products which have the 
same tariff heading as the final product (87.06).
The application of the percentage rule requires a definition 
of the value of both the materials and parts used in the
manufacturing of a product and of the final product. For the value 
of materials emd components, reference is made to the customs 
value at the time of importation as laid down in the Convention 
concerning the Valuation of Goods for Customs Purposes, or, when 
the origin of the parts and eurticles cannot be determined, to the 
"earliest ascertainable price paid for such products in the 
territory of the Contracting Party where manufacture has taken 
place". For the evaluation of the finished product "ex-works price" 
is taken into account, that is "the price which is paid to the 
manufacturer in whose undertaking the last working or processing 
is carried out, provided the price includes the value of all the 
products used in manufacture" less "internal taxes refunded or 
refundable on exportation" (art. 4 and explanatory note 7).
When the components used for the manufacture of a product have 
third country origin and thus their value is expressed in foreign 
currency, the exchange rate applicable is that in force at the time 
of the importation in the country where the manufacturing operation 
takes place and not that applicable at the time of the importation 
of the final product448. This is not a marginal question since a
448 This question has been dealt with by the Court of Justice 
in case 218/83 Les Rapides Savoyards v. Directeur General de 
Douanes 12.07.1984 (1984) ECR p.3105. This case concers the free 
trade agreement concluded in 1972 between Switzerland and the 
Community and the rules of origin applied to their trade. However, 
it can be affirmed that - due to the identity of the norms 
concerning the determination of the value, to the relationship
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different exchange rate applied to the components of the final 
product may modify their value and consequently the relationship 
with the value of the final product with the consequence that this 
latter may not comply with the conditions established in List A or 
B of the Protocol of origin.
iii) Cumulation Rule.
Cumulation is the exception to the general rule which confers 
origin taking exclusively into account products obtained or 
processing operations performed in a single country.
The protocols of origin annexed to the Cooperation Agreements 
concluded with Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria consider these 
countries and the Community as constituting a single territory for
449origin purposes .
Thus, taking Morocco as an example, products wholly obtained 
in Tunisia, Algeria or in the Community undergoing working or 
processing in Morocco are considered as wholly obtained in Morocco. 
Processing operations taking place in Algeria, Tunisia or in the 
Community are considered as being carried out in Morocco when 
products are successively processed in Morocco.
In practice the origin of a product is defined in relation to 
Maghreb (Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria).
A few examples could help to cleurify this definition.
As seen above, one of the conditions required to consider a sewing 
machine (CCT 84.41) as originating is that the value of non­
originating materials and parts does not exceed 40% of the value
between the customs authorities of the exporting and importing 
states and to the purpose of the rules - the same conclusion 
applies to the rules for the calculation of value provided for in 
the protocols of origin of the Agreement with Maghreb countries.
449 For Mashrak countries only bilateral cumulation applies, 
that is between the Community and one of these countries. Bilateral 
cumulation is also provided in the Agreement with Israel, Cyprus 
and Malta.
236
of the finished product. Furthermore, at least 50% in value of 
materials and parts of the head must be originating as well as the 
thread tension, crochet and zigzag mechanisms. Let us imagine that 
a sewing machine is obtained in Morocco from parts and materials 
imported from Japan and Germany (EEC) . If the value of Japanese 
originating parts does not exceed the established percentage the 
product is considered of Moroccan origin even if the value of the 
materials of Japanese and German origin together exceeds these 
percentages and even if the thread tension and the other mechanisms 
are of German origin.
The calculation is much more complex when third country 
components are incorporated in the German part which is 
successively manufactured in Morocco. When a value added test must 
be fulfilled the third country part will count against origin, 
unless the German part have acquired Germem origin. Thus, let us 
suppose them the value added test requires than non-originating 
peurt must not exceed 40% of the final value of the product. If this 
is 100 emd the value of Moroccan parts is 50, the German is 40 
(incorporating 25 USA value) and 20 is Japanese, the product will 
be considered as originating in Morocco (the country of last 
processing operation) only if the German parts have acquired German 
origin (according to the rules set up in the Protocol), otherwise 
the 25 value of USA origin will count against origin, and, since 
they shall be added to the Japanese value, the final product could 
not meet the 40% value added rule. If paper is manufactured
in the Community from paper pulp, cut to size (CCT 48.15) then sent 
to Tunisia where it is rolled in sheets (48.06) it will be 
considered originating in Tunisia although under the normal rule, 
Tunisian origin would have been granted only if the paper had been 
manufactured from paper pulp in Tunisia.
When processing takes place in more than one country the 
final product is considered as originating in the country where 
the last working or processing operation has taken place (Art. 
1.4) . Insufficient working or processing as listed in Art. 3.3 (see
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above) are not considered as "last working or processing" in the 
sense referred to above.
Cumulation allows the various phases of a working processing 
to be split smong the countries to which the rule applies. Thus 
men's and boys' outer garments (tariff heading 61.01) may be made 
up in Tunisia from fabric originating in Algeria using Moroccan 
yarn smd, in conformity with the rule set up in List A,
(manufacture from ysurn) may be considered as originating in 
Tunisia.
The rule may also be illustrated with reference to the 
percentage rule. Let us suppose that a rolling machine (tsuriff 
heading 84.16, list B) (calendar) whose final value is 100 is
manufactured in Morocco and that the value of the parts
originating in the Community sure 10, that the value of USA 
components is 20 and that the value of materials originating in 
Tunisia is 5. The final product has Moroccan origin since it
conforms to the percentage rule laid down in the list which 
provides that non originating parts cannot exceed 25% of the value 
of the final product. In this case non-originating parts are those 
imported from the USA, EEC and Tunisian products do not count 
against origin.
iv) Direct Transportation.
One of the conditions laid down in the origin Protocols is that 
originating products have to be transported directly from the 
country of origin to the Community. For the application of this 
rule Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and the Community are considered a 
single territory. Thus, if a good originating in Morocco is 
transported into Algeria before being shipped to the Community the 
good is considered as transported directly from Morocco. The only 
exception to this rule is the possibility of transporting the 
originating product through a territory of a third state when "the 
crossing of the latter territory is justified for geographical
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reasons" and a number of conditions are met. These concern the 
operations which are allowed to be performed on the goods which 
are: unloading or reloading and those aiming at maintaining the 
goods in good conditions. Commercial and home used are 
prohibited.The surveillance of customs authorities in the country 
of transit is also required. These provisions aim at avoiding any 
fraud which could change the status of originating products and the 
fulfillment of the above mentioned conditions is to be proved with 
appropriate documentation (Art. 5.2).
3 .b) The Proof of Origin.
Once the criteria conferring the status of originating 
products have been defined, it must be proved that the products 
exported conform to the said criteria and are therefore eligible 
for preferential customs treatment.
To this end it is established that the customs authorities of 
the exporting state have the responsibility of issuing a 
certificate of origin guaranteeing that the product exported is 
originating. The reason why this charge has been conferred on the 
exporting state's customs authorities is that they are the best 
suited to take into account all the elements determining the origin 
of a product. The usual procedure is the following: the exporter 
submits to the customs authorities a formal request (a specimen is 
given in the in Annex V of the Protocol) for the issue of a 
certificate attesting the originating status of the product to be 
exported. The application shall be accompanied by all the documents 
proving the origin of the product.
The verification of the originating status is the 
responsibility of customs authorities which have the right to 
request any documentary evidence which they may need from the 
exporter. When the goods qualify as originating under the 
cumulation rule, customs authorities shall take into account the 
declaration issued by the exporter of the materials and parts from
which the final products have been produced (see supra) and where 
further information is necessary, they may require as well the 
information certificate for parts and materials issued to the 
exporter by the customs authorities of the state from which these 
materials have been exported.
This provision explains why Art. 1.6 makes the application of 
the cumulation rule between the three Maghreb countries conditional 
on the establishment of the necessary administrative cooperation 
between them.
The movement certificate is issued only when the customs 
authorities consider that the product is originating according to 
the rules laid down in the Agreement.
In the case of Maghreb countries the movement certificates 
used are of the type EUR.l and EUR.2450. The EUR.2 certificate is 
used for products of modest value shipped by post (art.6) . A sample 
of both certificates is reproduced in Annex V of the protocol and 
specific rules are established as regards their form and conditions 
of printing (Articles 9 and 16).
The movement certificate is, as a rule, issued when the goods 
are exported even if, in specific cases, a delayed issue is 
admitted (art.7.2). The document is then submitted to the importing 
state within five months from the date of issue.
The cooperation and mutual assistance between customs 
authorities of the exporting and importing states required for the 
ordinary administration of the system becomes more imperative when 
the contracting parties are called to assist each other in checking 
the authenticity of the certificates, the exactness of the 
information (Art. 24) or when inquiries take place (art. 26). The 
disputes over the authenticity or accuracy of the information and 
of the movement certificates are submitted to the Customs 
Cooperation Committee which is also competent to interpret the
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450 This is the certificate used with all other Mediterranean 
Community's partners, with ACP countries and in the case of 
agreements with EFTA countries.
Protocol. This institution is composed of customs experts of the 
member States, officials of the Community responsible for customs 
questions and Moroccan (Algerian, Tunisian) customs experts. The 
Committee's competence is not only limited to that mentioned above 
but it is very extensive being "charged with carrying out 
administrative cooperation with a view to the correct and uniform 
application of this Protocol and with carrying out emy other task 
in the customs field which may be entrusted to it" (art. 29).
The annual examination of the protocol is, however, the task 
of the Cooperation Council, which may make the "necessary changes* 
(Art. 28).
The imposition of penalties is provided for in case of fraud 
(Art.25) .
The issue of a movement certificate is not requested for the 
export of small packages, goods used for personal use, or products 
part of a traveller's luggage (Arts.17).
Products which, after having been sent to a third country to 
be shown in an exhibition are afterwards sold for importation into 
the Community (or in one of the three Maghreb countries if these 
are Community goods) are eligible for preferential treatment upon 
issuing of the movement certificate EUR.l, indicating name and 
address of the exhibition, provided that the goods are originating 
and that the other conditions laid down in the Article are 
respected.
4) Concluding Remarks.
•
To evaluate if the domestic value added requirements that 
products exported from Maghreb countries have to meet to be 
considered originating is greater than that required to avoid 
deflection of trade, a deep knowledge of the industrial processing 
required to produce certain goods would be necessary. Sane general 
observations can however be drawn from what discussed above.
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If the stricter requirements that preferential products have 
to fulfill are explained by the will of the importing countries of 
limiting preferences to products really originating in the 
exporting countries it could be asked whether this is consistent 
with the scope of fostering trade. The result of severe rules of 
origin may be to discourage investments451 from industrial countries 
other than European, whose industries will take advantage from the 
cumulation rules even if the products they offer are less 
competitive than other third countries'. In fact Morocco, Algeria 
and Tunisia will prefer to use intermediate materials of Community 
origin for the manufacture of their goods, since the utilization 
of these intermediate products would not modify the status of 
originating goods of the finished products, whilst this could 
happen if third countries components were used instead.
As regards cumulation, the aim of this rule is to foster a 
degree of regional cooperation and the division of labor among the 
countries concerned and should encourage the creation of a 
processing industry in the Maghreb. However, it should be taken 
into account that the cooperation between Maghreb countries is 
almost non-existent and a serious limit exist in the fact that 
the rules of origin amd, therefore, cumulation are not extended to 
oil products (Article 1) which means that an integrated industry 
of transformation of these products - which constitute the greatest 
percentage of exports in particular for Algeria - cannot profit 
from cumulation452.
Another significant limit are the strict rules established for 
certain textile products which are the most important exports for
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451 KALER,M. Europe and Its 'Priviledged Partners' in Africa 
and in the Middle East" JCMS 1982/1983 Vol.XXI pp. 199-226.
452 DAMMAK, A . Perpectives d'integration maghrebine et relations 
Cee-Maghreb NABLI, Coopération.. o p .cit. pp. 201-207.
Maghreb. Although the Protocols453 of the Maghreb agreements do not 
contain a general rule providing for the possibility of derogation 
from the origin rules454 derogations are possible.
As far as Morocco is concerned for example a derogation has 
been provided for by regulation 528/79455. This concerns the 
provisions of List A and, more specifically, products under the 
tariff heading 61.01-61.04 (boys, men's, women's and girls' outer 
and under garments). The derogation concerns a modification of the 
conditions laid down in the list which confer the status of 
originating products. The original version of the list (see example 
above) provided, in fact, that these products were to be considered 
as originating if manufactured from yarn, whilst the modified 
version provides for their manufacture from unbleached cloth. This 
means that a less complex processing operation is required from 
Moroccan textile industries (the transformation of yarn into fabric 
is not required) . The derogation was motivated by the need to take 
into account "Morocco's special situation" and of enabling "the 
industries concerned to adapt their production to the conditions 
required by the protocol..".
The example is significant, in particular, if one considers that 
the derogation was only temporary (the regulation applied from the 
1 July 1978 to 30 june 1980) and applied to a limited number of 
products (2,500 t. per year). This may be interpreted in the sense 
that the conditions laid down in the Protocol are restrictive and 
that the rules of origin may constitute an obstacle to trade.
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453 The Protocol has been amended to take into account the 
modifications of the nomenclature of the Customs Cooperation 
Council as regarding sets, which are regarded as originating 
"provided that the value of the non-originating articles does not 
exceed 15% of the total value of the set" Regulation 561/79 O.J. 
L 80 31.03.1979.
454 See Art. 31 of the Protocol annexed to Lome' IV Convention.
455 O.J. L 71 22.03.1979.
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A) TECHNICAL AND FINANCIAL COOPERATION
Article 2 of the Cooperation Agreement specifies that "The 
Community and Morocco shall institute cooperation with the aim of 
contributing to the development of Morocco by efforts complementaury 
to those made by Morocco itself, and of strengthening existing 
economic links on as broad a basis as possible for the mutual 
benefit of the Parties."
The two instruments of this cooperation sure technical and 
financial assistance.
Technical cooperation indicates a range of activities relating 
to the transfer of know-how, such as the preparation of specific 
projects (pre-investment) , the sending of experts, the organization 
of workshops, vocational training and the granting of 
schol arshi ps456.
Financial cooperation is the transfer of capital through aid or 
loans451.
Provisions regulating financial and technical cooperation are
456 See for comparison the IV Lomé Convention where technical 
and financial cooperation are the object of different chapters. See 
Articles 275 and following. The case of the Agreement concluded 
with Israel in 1975 can be taken as an illustration of the 
distinction between the two instruments. The Agreement (O.J. L 136 
1975) concluded by the Community under Article 113 of the EEC 
Treaty contains a single provision on "cooperation" (Article 18). 
This Article institutes cooperation as a factor complementary to 
trade in fields of mutual interest for the Contracting Parties. 
Mention was made of transfers of technological know-how, contact 
and cooperation between industries and promotion of trade. In 1978 
the Agreement was supplemented by an Additional Protocol laying 
down the principles of economic, financial and technical 
cooperation and by a Protocol relating to financial cooperation 
establishing the amount of financial aid to be given through losuns 
from the European Investment Bank. See O.J. L 270 1978.
457 See for a distinction MARCHISIO, S. La cooperazione allo 
sviluppo nel diritto delle Nazioni Unite Jovene, Università di 
Camerino, 19.., p.33 and FEUER,G . Les aspects juridiques de
l'assistance technique dans le cadre des Nations Unies et— des, 
institutions spécialisées LGDJ, Paris, 1957 p.5.
contained in Title I "Economic, Technical and Financial 
Cooperation".
The idea of contributing financially to the development of 
developing countries is contained in the Treaty itself. More 
precisely, among the objectives of the Association, Article 132 
(Part Four, Association of the Overseas Countries and Territories) 
mentions the financing of investments "required for the progressive 
development of these countries and territories." Provisions on 
financial cooperation were contained in the Association Convention 
annexed to the Treaty.
Financial and technical cooperation later became an element 
of the Community's development cooperation policy.
For the first time, financial and technical cooperation was 
provided for in the Yaounde' Conventions and later in Lomé 
Conventions.
In this case, aid is financed through the European Development 
Fund made up by contributions by Member States. The principles 
governing financial assistance of Lomé, such as the multiannual 
basis of aid, certain types of financial instruments, planning, co­
financing and structural adjustment had first been experienced in 
the framework of Lomé and then applied by the Community in its 
relations with Mediterranean countries.
As far as Maghreb countries are concerned, financial and 
technical cooperation was included in the agreements only in 
197645*.
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45t Financial and technical cooperation and preferential trade 
have also been established with non-associated developing 
countries. See the system of generalized preferences and technical 
and financial aid to so-called non-associated countries. Financial 
and technical aid to Asian and Latin Americem developing countries 
founds its legal basis in a Community Regulation, 442/81 O.J. L 48 
1981. The budget allocation is however very limited (1986 280 
million ecu, for a region covering more than 1,5 billion people). 
See NTUMBA,L.L. L'aide financière et technique de la Cee aux pays 
en voie de développement d'Asie et Amérique latine (PVD-ALA) RMC 
1989 pp.336-346. For an analysis of technical cooperation with 
Latin American countries see MARCHISIO,S. Cooperazione tecnica 
della Cee con 1'America Latina Comunità Intemazionale 1984,pp.386-
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The principles governing financial and technical cooperation 
are contained in Title I of the Agreement, while the detailed rules 
of application are contained in a Financial and Technical Protocol 
annexed to the Agreement which specifies the amount of the 
financial commitment, its division (apportionment) among the 
different financial instruments, its application and the 
beneficiaries of the financing and the priorities of cooperation.
Regulation 1762/92459 lays down the rules for application and 
administration of the aid by the Community.
1) Title I of the Cooperation Agreement (Articles 2-7).
The provisions contained in Title I do not regulate economic 
and technical cooperation in detail, they are rather conceived of 
as framework rules laying down the general principles wh'ich should 
govern the cooperation.
The reference to the "complementarity of efforts" made in 
Article 2 (see above) means that financial aid is conceived as the 
Community's contribution to supplementing the financial 
intervention and actions of Morocco itself.
It seems that the Contracting Parties wished to emphasize the 
fact that the financial aid has no neo-colonialist connotations. 
The same concern appears in Article 3, where it is specified that 
the cooperation shall take into account the objectives and 
priorities of Morocco's development plans and programmes.
Article 4 contains a list of fields and activities where 
cooperation can take place. It mentions: production and economic 
infrastructure, in particular connected with industrialization and 
modernization of Moroccan agriculture; marketing and sales 
promotion; acquisition of patents and industrial property; removal 
of non-teuriff and non-quota barriers; science and technology eund
459 O.J. L1B1 1972.
407.
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protection of the environment; fisheries sector; private investment 
and the exchange of information on the economic and financial 
situation.
The list is not exhaustive since according to Article 4 
paragraph 2, the Contracting Parties "may decide on further areas 
of cooperation". This allows in practice intervention and financing 
of any project provided its being consistent with the scope of the 
Agreement.
The Cooperation Council has the task of periodically revising 
cooperation guidelines. It is also responsible for "seeking ways 
and means" of cooperation and as such is empowered to take 
decisions.(Article 5).
2) The Protocols Annexed to the Agreement. The Structure and the 
Content.
2.a) Duration, Amount of Aid and Allocation.
While Cooperation Agreements were concluded for an unlimited 
duration, the length of application of the Protocol is five 
years460. This does not mean, however, that the actual period of 
application corresponds to this term. From the date of entry into 
force to the date of expiry the medium period of application is 
three years.
Each Protocol in fact establishes its date of expiry which is 
calculated on the basis of the date of expiry of the previous 
Protocol and is independent from the date of entry into force of 
the Protocol itself. Thus, for instance, the third Protocol with 
Morocco provides in Article 2 that the period of application 
expired on 31 October 1991. It should be noted that the second 
Protocol expired on 31 October 1986 and therefore the five years 
of application of the third Protocol were calculated with reference 
to the second Protocol. However, the third Protocol was signed only
460 The first protocol was due to expire in October 1981.
on 26 May 1988 and entered into force on the first November 1988. 
Thus the actual period of application of the third Protocol was 3 
years.
These delays are caused by several factors.
Each Protocol provides that negotiations for renewal shall 
begin one year before its expiry date. However, negotiations are 
very slow and progress is often closely linked to negotiations of 
other international instruments. Such was the case of the third 
Protocols whose entry into force were slowed down by questions 
connected to the entry of Spain and Portugal in the Community and 
by negotiations for the renewal of the provisions concerning trade 
cooperation.
Moreover, ratification procedures further delay the date of 
entry into force of the Protocols.
This happened in the case of Israel (third Protocol) and more 
recently for Morocco and Syria. The Protocols negotiated with these 
countries were blocked by Parliament which refused to give its 
assent, according the procedural requirements of Article 238, for 
political considerations linked to violations of human rights 
committed by these countries.
As a result the cooperation, which is supposed to extend over 
a five year period is reduced to a much shorter one. This means, 
in other words, that the spreading out aid on a multiannual basis 
is of little application461. This also implies that it is very 
difficult to evaluate the results462 of the cooperation in order to 
adjust the cooperation objectives and to adapt the projects to the 
changing requirements of the recipient developing countries.
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461 However, funds which have not been committed at the end of 
the implementation period can be used after the expiry of the 
Protocol, e.g. funds can in principle be spent during an indefinite 
period,
462 See BOURIN, P . La troisième génération de protocoles 
financiers avec les pays du Maghreb et du Mashrak RMC 1989 pp. 19- 
24.
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The first two Protocols are, apart from the amount committed, 
very similar. With the third Protocol, some innovations regarding 
instruments and priorities, were introduced. The fourth Protocols 
take into account the so-called renewed Mediterranean policy.
The amount of financing provided for in the Protocols varies 
from country to country and has been the object of a steady 
increase at any renewal of the financial cooperation.(see table).
The criteria applied to decide the amount of funds are 
probably not only objective (population, geographical extension, 
pnb, level of development) but are also political463.
Each Protocol sets up the distribution of the commitment. The 
main distinction is between financial assistance from the (i) 
European Investment Bank and (ii) from the EC budget. The financial 
contribution of the Europeem Investment Bank is in the form of 
loans. Aid from the Community budget took the form of loans on 
special terms and grants in the first two protocols, in the third 
and fourth protocols aid was provided in the form of grants and 
contributions to risk capitals.
The loans on special terms were a form of financing granted 
over a long period of time (40 years) . The reimbursement was due 
after 10 years at an interest rate of 2\ (see Article 6.2 second 
Protocol). In practice these loans were 80% subsidized. They have 
since been replaced by grants. With the third Protocol, the loans 
on special terms were abolished and now a specific amount is 
committed as a contribution to risk capital formation. The 
contribution to risk capital was also envisaged in the first two 
Protocols, where it was charged on the amount committed for the 
loans on special terms, but this form of financing was seldom 
used464.
463 BRODIN, La politique d'approche globale., op.cit. p.232
464 Only once for Morocco (industrial development office, see 
annual report BEI 1980, p.63, see BOURIH op.cit. .
Grants are used to finance non-profit projects like technical 
assistance (see Article 5.2 of the fourth Financial Protocol with 
Tunisia465) or to finance interest rate subsidies to the EIB loans 
in order to reduce the interest rates that recipient countries must 
pay to the EIB.
The amount for risk capital466 should be used for the
establishment of equity capital available to Moroccan private and 
public undertakings and undertakings with State participation. Risk 
capital is granted and administered by the European Investment Bank 
but it forms part of the budget of the Community.
A co-financing between the EIB and the Community is thus
established. The advantage, at least in principle, of this form of 
lending is that the conditions and terms of Community aid are more 
flexible theui those applied by the Bank to the loans from its own 
resources. However, the EIB and the Community approach to lending 
are different. The Bank acts as a credit institutions, whilst the 
Community applies a developing cooperation approach.
Risk capital can take different forms: (i) subordinate
loans, which are granted by the EIB and must be paid back after all 
other creditors have been reimbursed and (ii) conditional loans, 
where the repayment is subordinated to the fulfillment of the 
conditions laid down at the time of granting of the loan. In 
practice, reimbursement depends on the success of the project
financed. The conditions of the loan, such as interest rate emd 
methods of reimbursement can be modified if the project is not as 
profitable as expected.
Risk capital can be used for the acquisition of temporary 
minority holdings in the capital of undertakings established in 
Morocco, for the acquisition of holdings, in the form of
conditional loans granted to Morocco or, with the latter's consent,
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465 O.J. L 18 1992
466 For Morocco 11, for Algeria 4 and for Tunisia 6 million 
ecu. The fourth Protocol provides for a sensible increase. In the 
case of Tunisia, the amount is 15 million ecu.
to financial institutions (Article 2).
Projects feasibility can also be financed and if the outcome 
is negative, the promoter is not obliged to reimburse the expenses 
incurred in the carrying out of the study.
The introduction of risk capital must be seen in the light of 
an effort by the Community to foster private investment and in 
particular joint ventures between the Community and Moroccan 
undertakings.
The idea is that private investments should become a primary 
instrument of development since the intervention of the Community 
and other bilateral and multilateral providers of funds is limited 
and developing countries are faced with enormous problems of 
debt461. The role of the Community and other international 
institutions should that of stimulating the flow of investments. 
The various financing instruments provided for in the Protocols 
could be used to finance the same project. Thus grants from the 
Community budget could finance the technical or feasibility studies 
and projects, part of the grant could be used for interest rate 
payment to the loans from the Bank.
Article 7 of the third Protocol with Morocco provides that 
certain projects could be financed by Community aid together with 
intervention of Moroccan credit or development bodies and 
institutions, member States, third States or international 
organizations. It is not, however, further specified which kind of 
projects could be co-financed and what form this type of 
intervention could take46*.
Co-financing has been experienced successfully in the ACP 
countries469 and has the advantage of harmonizing developing aid at
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461 GAZZO,Y. Le monde Arabe face à l'endettement: le cas des
pays du Maghreb, Maghreb Mashrak 1986, pp.30-43.
468 See on the contrary the more detailed rules contained in 
Lomé Conventions. Lomé III Article 200, Lomé IV Article 251.
469 See Les co-fineuicements Le Courier 1978 n.50.
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the international level, thus avoiding waste and overlap, 
facilitating the financing of projects which requires large 
investments. In the Mediterranean, co-financing took place in 
conjunction with the World Bank, the Arab Funds and other 
bilateral aid institutions.
2.b) Fields of Application.
As has been seen above, Article 4 of the Cooperation Agreement 
with Morocco contains a very general and non-exhaustive list of 
projects that can be financed with the priority objectives of the 
cooperation being identified in each Financial Protocol.
Protocols I and II indicated as a main field of cooperation 
economic infrastructure, technical cooperation complementary or 
preliminary to capital projects (like marketing, sales promotion, 
participation in fairs, exhibitions etc) and cooperation for 
training (such as the organization of stages or granting of 
scholarships..).
These priorities were modified by the third Protocol which 
states in Article 3 the objectives of financial cooperation as:
(i) Cooperation in agriculture.
Projects in this field should aim at the diversification of 
agricultural production in order to reduce the food dependence of 
Morocco and increasing the complementarity of the different 
Mediterranean regions. As seen in chapter II of Part II 
preferential treatment does not seem to be an adequate instrument 
to solve the serious problems of food deficiency which these 
countries face. The Protocols thus indicate as the priority of the 
cooperation the reduction of food dependency. Another question is 
that of complementarity to avoid direct competition between 
Community and Mediterranean productions. Emphasis has been put on 
the development of food crops and on the development of the 
production through mechanization, stockage and transformations of 
primary products.
(ii) Cooperation in the fields of industry, training, research, 
technology commerce and other services.
Paragraph 2 of Article 3 specifies the priorities in each of 
these sectors. In reality this provision very generally mentions 
financing of economic and social infrastructure and industrial 
capital projects. It should be noted that in the first two 
Protocols, priority was given to the financing of capital projects 
in the field of industry and infrastructure.
It is well known that one of the problems in the Mediterranean 
region is the low level of private investment. This is explained 
by the economic policies of these countries, which are perceived 
as inadequate by the investors, by the low levels of productivity 
and by the dimension of national markets which are too small, 
accompanied by a low level of economic integration with the 
neighboring countries (due for example to the poor quality of 
transport communication).
The primeury scope of industrial cooperation, as renewed by the 
third protocols, is therefore
to foster investments, promote joint-ventures, support small and 
medium-sized enterprises and finance actions preliminary to the 
investments, such as promotion of contacts with investors, exchange 
of information and research.
In the service and industrial sector priority is given to the 
promotion of joint ventures between firms from Member States and 
Moroccan firms, promotion of investment, contribution of private 
capital. In the field of science and technology financing should 
be used to expand training and research capability.
In the trade sector financing aims primarily at developing 
contacts between firms end research institutions.
(iii)Regional and multilateral cooperation.
Regional cooperation is not a new field of intervention but rather 
a way of operating through the financing of projects involving 
more than one country.
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Financing of projects at regional level was introduced with 
the third Protocol. However, promotion of regional cooperation is 
provided for in other Articles of the Cooperation Agreement470.
The financing of projects with funds provided for in Protocols 
concerns the preparation of projects, transport, telecommunication, 
energy, to he financed also by other sources (BEI, World Bank); 
technical assistance to regional action, regional institutions, 
vocational training institutions, environment, interest rate 
subsidies and loans of the EIB.
The reference to regional cooperation as a financing priority 
has, peculiarly, disappeared in the fourth Protocols. This can be 
explained by the fact that the financial cooperation provided for 
in the Protocols has been supplemented by another form of financial 
support for all the third mediterranean countries focusing on 
intervention of regional interest auid to finance projects 
concerning the environment471.
In the fourth Protocols environmental protection has become 
one of the priority fields for projects to be financed. The term
470 Article 3 mentions regional cooperation as one of the 
elements to be taken into account in achieving the aim of 
contributing to the development of Morocco. Article 27 provides for 
the possibility of derogating from the application of the most- 
favored nation clause by Morocco in the case of measures adopted 
for the economic integration of Maghreb, or in the case of measures 
benefitting the developing countries (cooperation south-south) 
Finally, the definition of rules of origin takes into account the 
possibility of a transformation of products taking place in the 
three countries. It should be remembered that in February 1989, 
Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Libya and Mauritania signed the Treaty 
establishing the "union du Maghreb Arabe" (for Mashrak CCA) . This 
regional cooperation was viewed with interest by the Community as 
a way for each Maghreb country to enlarge its market. For am 
analysis of these provisions with reference to the integration of 
Maghreb see DAMMAK,A. o p .cit. Perspectives d'integration Maghrebine 
et relations CEE-Maghreb and the discussion on this report 
NABLI,M.K. Coopération CEE-Maahreb Colloque, Tunis 1979, Centre 
d'Etudes et de Recherches et de Publication de la Faculté de Droit 
et des Sciences Politiques et Economiques de Tunis, Tunis. See also 
LECA,J. (ed.) Le Grand Maghreb Economica, Paris 1989.
471 Regulation 1763/92 O.J. L 181 1992.
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environment is used in a broad sense and includes demographic 
policy and family planning programmes. In this field, financing 
attempts in particular to support technical assistance and 
contribute to investments (see Article 3.2 fifth indent).
An important innovation introduced with the fourth Protocols 
is the contribution to projects in the framework of a "structural 
adjustment programme" (the reform of economic structures mid 
policies undertaken by the Mediterranean countries). In other 
words, the Community commits a specific amount (300 million ecu for 
a period ending the 31 October 1996472) to support economic reforms 
in the form of grants to finance technical assistance and the 
programmes accompanying the reforms (to moderate the social 
consequences of the reforms. However, this finding is conditional 
upon the recipient country engaging in specific economic policy 
reform473.
The Protocol indicates two criteria for eligibility: i) the 
carrying out by the country concerned of a reform programme which 
shall be approved by the Bretton Woods institutions and ii) the 
economic situation of the country evaluated on the basis of level 
of indebtedness and debt service burden, balance of payment 
situation and availability of foreign currency, budgetary 
situation, monetary situation, gross national product (per capita) 
and level of unemployment.
The financing aims in particulier at supporting import 
programmes to strengthen production capacity and to minimize
472 The original proposal of the Commission was 600 million
ecu.
473 Aid linked to structural adjustment was introduced in the 
fourth Lomé Convention. The Parliament express its doubts whether 
Community fimuicing in the context of development cooperation 
should be used for supporting structural adjustment programmes, 
especially because it causes "a diversion of resources from the 
neediest sectors of society". European Parliament Report A3-0016/92 
p.10.
negative consequences deriving from this reform and to finance 
technical assistance.
The contribution of the Community is not financed with funds 
provided for in the Protocol but rather with a specific amount 
which is committed in the budget. A limited proportion of the aid 
committed in the Protocols, however, can be used for this purpose 
(Article 4.3)
The principles to be applied while implementing projects in 
the framework of structural adjustment programmes are laid down in 
Regulation 1762/92.
2 .c) Beneficiaries of Financial and Technical cooperation.
The principal beneficiary is the Moroccan state and other 
potential beneficiaries, which have some institutional links with 
Morocco such as official Moroccan development agencies, private 
agencies working in Morocco for economic development, undertakings 
carrying out their activities in accordance with industrial and 
management methods and set up as legal persons according to 
Moroccan legislation; groups of producers who are nationals of 
Morocco and, exceptionally, when such groups do not exist, the 
producers themselves; scholarship holders and trainees sent by 
Morocco under training schemes financed by the Community (see 
Article 3).
Until the third Protocol, requests for financing were only 
presented by the government of Morocco acting either on its own 
account or on behalf of the other beneficiaries.
The fourth Protocol establishes that requests for financing 
can be submitted directly by the other possible beneficiaries with 
the approval of the government of the country. When a loan by the 
Bank is granted to a beneficiary other than Moroccan state, the 
latter has to provide a guarantee as a condition to the granting 
of the loan.
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The decision regarding the request for financing is the 
responsibility of the Commission which "shall appraise the requests 
..with the competent Moroccan authorities and other beneficiaries 
in accordance with the objectives referred to in Article 3,.".
Morocco shall accord the "regime of the most favored bilateral 
donor or development organization"474 as regards fiscal and customs 
¿arrangements applied to contracts awarded for the execution of 
projects or operations financed by the Community (Article 14).
2 .d) Programming.
One of the new features brought into being by the third 
Protocol was the introduction of the "indicative programme"475. 
According to the first two protocols, the Community and Morocco 
were to agree on the specific objectives to be financed. In 
practice, a list of projects was drawn up by the Cooperation 
Council476. This list did not commit the parties.
The third Protocol, in Article 9, established that by mutual 
agreement the Community and Morocco are to draw up an indicative 
programme containing the specific objectives of the financial and 
technical cooperation, the priority sectors of intervention and 
the action envisaged. Before drawing up such a programme, the 
parties examine the priority of development of Morocco and the 
sectors of Community contributions, considering financing of other 
bilateral and multilateral providers of funds. The programme can 
be revised by mutual agreement if there is any change in the
474 See RAUX,J. Chronique des accords externes de la Cee RTDE 
1984 p. 489.
475 Programming was provided for in the Association set up in
the Treaty (article 132) and in the Yaoundé and Lomé conventions. 
In the case of Lomé the indicative programme is submitted by each 
ACP State to the Community and it is object of an exchange of 
views. It is then adopted by mutual agreement. See MAGASZA,G. is. 
Çonvçntiçn meg ret Droit de la CEEE Vol. 13, pp.270-275.
476 ♦See BOURIN, P. La Troisième génération de protocoles 
financiers avec les pays du Maghreb at du Mashrak RMC 1989, pp.
economic situation of Morocco or of its development objectives and 
pri ori ties477.
3) Sources of Financing.
As mentioned above the sources of financial cooperation in the 
framework of the Protocols with Maghreb countries are the European 
Investment Bank and the Community. This system has the advantage 
of offering the Maghreb countries different financial facilities 
to respond more flexibly to the vaurious requirements of 
development.
The softer form of assistance, granted from the EC budget, 
aims at financing technical assistance, while the Bank loans are 
mainly addressed to economic infrastructure (road, ports, water 
supply), projects for the development of energy resources and for 
the expansion of productive sectors (agro-industry projects, small 
and medium sized enterprises)479.
3.a)The European Investment Bank.
3.a.i) The Legal Status of EIB Financial Aid to Developing 
Countries.
Article 3 (j) and, more particularly, Article 129 (Part III of 
the Treaty, Policy of the Community) provide for the establishment
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477 Programming was introduced in Lomé III. According to 
Article 215 an indicative programme is to be submitted by the ACP 
countries on the basis of their development objectives and it is 
adopted by mutual agreement between the Community and the ACP 
States. It seems that the programme in the third Protocol with the 
Mediterranean countries is drawn up by mutual agreement whereas in 
Lomé III at least the draft is prepared by the ACP countries.
478 See for comparison in Lomé I Article 43 where it was
specified that Bank loams and risk capital should finance projects 
of investments in the productive sector, industry, transportation 
and mines.
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of the European Investment Bank. The Bank is an independent and 
non-profit making organization whose task is that of contributing 
to the development of the Community479. The structure of the Bank 
and the technical rules governing its functioning are defined in 
the Statute annexed to the Treaty.
The Bank, which has its own legal personality distinct from 
that of the Community (Article 129 of the Treaty), has its own 
institutional organization4*0, budget and sources of financing which 
are separate from those of the Community and it is cannot 
considered am organ of the EEC4**. Its institutional task is
479 Article 130 reads "The task of the European Investment bank 
shall be to contribute, by having recourse to the capital market 
and utilizing its own resources, to the balance and steady 
development of the common market in the interest of the 
Community.."
490 Members of the Bank are all the Member States of the 
Community. The organs of the Bank are the Board of Governors, 
composed of the Ministers of Finance of each Member State, the 
Board of Directors and the Management Committee. The Board of 
Governors is the chief organ of the Bank whose task is to lay down 
general directives of the Bank credit policy. The Board of 
Directors, composed of officials chosen on the basis of their 
competence and professional qualifications among high officials of 
financial institutions, or financial, industrial and economic 
ministries, has the responsibility of taücing decisions for the 
granting of loans, guarantees, raising loans, fixing the interest 
rate of loans and ensuring that the Bank's administration conforms 
to the Treaty, Statute and directives of the Board of Governors. 
The Management Committee fulfills executive tasks and prepares the 
decisions of the Boaurd of Directors. See SPIROU,C. La banque 
européenne d'investissement Schulthess Polygraphischer Verlag, 
Zurich, 1990, pp.45-49.
481 MOSCONI,F. La Banque Européenne d'investissement in MEGRET 
Droit des CEE Vol. VIII, p. 5. ID. La banca europea per ali 
investimenti Cedam, Padova 1976 p.15; the mandate given to the Bank 
by the Community for the administration of aid in the EC budget is 
proof of the distinction between the Bank and the Community; 
PUGLISI La Banca Europea per gli Investimenti Pennacchini, Monaco, 
Ferrari Bravo (ed) Manuale di diritto comunitario Utet, Torino, 
1984, p. 235. See also LEANZA Banca europea per gli investimenti 
QUADRI, MONACO, TRABUCCHI Commentario Cee Milano, Giuffrê, 1965, 
pp.996. See case 85/86 Commission v. EIB, ECR (1988) p.1281 pauras. 
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functional to the scope of the Community482.
The Bank is first mentioned in Article 3 .j of the EEC Treaty. 
Article 130 EEC Treaty specifies that the Bank shall contribute to 
the development of the common market in the interests of the 
Community. In particular the activities of the Bank were directed 
towards the financing of projects in less developed regions in the 
Community, for the conversion of undertakings amd for projects of 
common interest to several Member States. The resources of the Bank 
come from the capital provided by the Member States and from the 
funds it borrows from the international capital markets.
If the role of the Bank was originally limited by statute to 
interventions within the Community, later, the actions of the Bank 
were extended to financing projects outside the Community in the 
framework of the Association and Cooperation Agreements concluded 
by the Community with ACP and Mediterranean countries483.
It could be questioned whether the role of the Bank has been 
modified by these interventions outside the Community.
It should be noted that the Statute of the Bank has not been 
amended484. One of its provisions, Article 18, mentions the 
possibility for the Bank to grant loans to finance investment 
projects carried out, in whole or in part outside the territory of 
the Community. This provision could therefore constitute the legal 
basis for the Bank's interventions in third countries. As it has
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482 See TIZZANO,A. Sulla natura giuridica della BEI foro It. 
1988, pp. 236-242. "..la Banca é un segmento specifico ed autonomo 
dell'apparato organizzatico comunitario" p. 240.
483 The first interventions of the Bank outside the Community 
took place in the context of the Yaoundé conventions. See 
ALBERT,M., La Banque Européenne des investissements: évolution et 
continuité RMC 1965, 448, where the author emphasizes that the Bank 
action in these countries had the effect of limiting the financial 
burden on the Member States' or Communities' budgets since the Bank 
operates having recourse to capital market resources.
484 The Statute was concluded by Member States, is an 
international agreement having the same rank as the EEC Treaty.
been observed**5, the Agreements concluded with ACP and 
Mediterranean countries certainly require a more extensive and 
systematic intervention of the Bank if compared with the financing 
of single investment projects as provided for in Article 18 of the 
Statute. It has been therefore submitted that the actions of the 
Bank within the framework of the Lomé conventions and in the 
Cooperation Agreements with the Mediterremean countries, find their 
legal basis in the internal agreement concluded between the Member 
States**6 which determines the financial means of the Bank in its 
interventions in the ACP countries487 (Lomé) and in the Association 
or Cooperation Agreements which have been ratified by the Member 
States*** (Maghreb) .
Since the Bank is not a part of the above mentioned Conventions and 
Agreements, is the Community which assumes an obligation vis-à-vis 
the "associated" countries4,9.
However, in the practice. Article 18 of the Statute is still 
referred to as the basis of the action of the Bank in third 
countries. This is confirmed by the Europe Agreement with some 
Eastern European copuntries. Article 98 of the Agreement with 
Hungary reads;" Hungary shall benefit from temporary financial 
assistance..including loans from the EIB according to the 
provisions of Article 18 of the Statute of the Bank..".
Article 130VI.2 of the Treaty on European Union, as approved
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483 MOSCONI La banca ♦ . op. cit. p. 278.
4.6 It should be remembered that only the Member States of the
Community are members of the Bank.
4.7 MOSCONI, La Banca.. op. op.cit. p.278-279. For the methods
and principles of EIB intervention in the ACP countries in Lomé IV 
see the internal agreement creating the seventh EDF O.J. L 229 1991
4.8 See KÂSER,J. The European Investment Bank: Its Role and 
Place within the Community System Yb.Eu.Law 1984 pp.303-322 p.310.
489 If the EIB was an organ of the Community this would not be 
necessary, since the act of the organs are attributed to the 
Community.
in Maastricht in December 1992, confirms that the legal basis of 
the EIB actions with developing countries is its Statute when it 
establishes that the Bank shall contribute to the implementation 
of the measures in the filed of development cooperation (see 
Article 130U) "according to its statute".
This Article would codify the inclusion of the Bank in the 
development cooperation policy of the Community.
An agreement is concluded between the Bank and the Community 
where the Bank commits itself to provide the funds required. More 
precisely the amount which is to be committed for each Financial 
Protocol is the object of a decision by the Board of Governors upon 
a request of the Council of Ministers. There is a limit which is 
established by the Board of Governors for the total amount of EIB 
resources that can be committed outside the Community490.
The commitment is authorized by the Board of Governors, acting 
unanimously on a proposal from the Board of Directors.
3.a.ii) The Bank's Role in the Management of Financial Aid.
EIB intervention takes the form of loans made from its own 
resources491. The criteria and the rules followed by the Bank in the 
granting of loans to Maghreb countries are those laid down in its 
Statute and which apply for the Bank's intervention within the 
Community492 (Article 6.1 third Protocol) .
This means that the Bank acts as a financial institution
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490 For the period 1985-1991 3000 million ECU. See EIB
Information n.57 1988.
491 The sources of the EIB funds are its own resources and what 
it borrows on the capital market, see Statute Article 4 and 6 and 
Article 22. The capital of the Bank is made of the contributions 
of the Member States.
492 See BERMEJO, R . BEI: Banque Européenne de développement 
Rev.Int. Droit Econ. 1987 pp.447-530, p.501 and 1988 pp.37-67.
although it remains a non-profit making organization. Therefore, 
every project undergoes an examination by the Bank's experts to 
verify its financial and economic viability and the impact on the 
environment. The appraisal of the impact on the environment is the 
approach followed by the Bank in its actions within and outside the 
Community. The role of the Bank in this respect in developing 
countries is significant especially in cases where the country 
concerned has not developed environmental standards, or where the 
pressure for economic growth is stronger and where there is limited 
experience in examining the consequences of projects in depth493.
Loans are not "tied": this means that there is not obligation 
on the beneficiary to purchase certain supplies or services in the 
Community. Competitive bidding, at national or international level 
is established. Undertakings from the EEC Member States and 
Mediterranean countries may participate in international tenders, 
The financing of projects in these countries is subject to a 
maximum amount defined in each Financial Protocol. This is a 
ceiling and does not mean that the whole amount has to be spent.
The duration of the loans varies and depends on the 
characteristics of the projects financed. It can vary from 10-12 
years to 15-20 years for infrastructure projects.
The conditions of loans and the rates of interest are also 
fixed on a case by case basis,494 but the rate depends on the cost 
of borrowing, although in the first two protocols it was provided 
that part of the grants were to be used to provide for an interest 
subsidy of 2\ on the EIB loans in order to soften the conditions 
applied by the Bank. *
The Bank does not finance a project in its entirety, in fact 
EIB loans are part of a financial scheme which includes the 
participation of other development banks and the contribution of
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w  EIB 25 Years (1958-1980) p.51.
494 Mashrak countries enjoy more favorable conditions as 
compared with Maghreb countries due to their lower level of 
development.
the promoters of the project.
When loans are granted to beneficiaries other than the 
associated States the Bank requires a guarantee from the State495 or 
from other adequate guarantors. The Community provides for a 
"blanket guarantee" for loans contracted in ACP and Mediterranean 
countries.
The global loan scheme is a form of intervention, which aims 
in particular at fostering the activities and development of small 
and medium sized undertakings, first experienced within the 
Community where it was introduced in 1968496. In this case the Bank 
opens a line of credit to financial institutions which divide up 
the credit in smaller amounts to finance small and medium sized 
ventures. The advantage is that the institutions and the banks 
which receive the credit are better suited to evaluate, according 
to financial, technical and economic criteria the single projects 
to be financed497.
For each project a loan contract is signed between the Bank 
and the beneficiary. The contract contains a clause indicating the 
Trade Tribunal of Zurich as the competent forum in the case of a 
dispute between the Bank and the beneficicüry of financing.
Besides the ordinary operations financed by the Bank on its 
own resources, the Bank also manages other funds from the EC 
budget. These operations are accounted for separately from the
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495 See Article 18.3 , the granting of credits to member States 
is considered as the granting of credits to undertakings, the Bank 
is required to obtain special guarantees for loans to subjects 
different from Member states, See also Article 29.1 Statute and 
MOSCONI, La banca.. op.cit. p.37.
496 SPIROU, o p .cit. p.54.
497 Global loans have been granted in Morocco to the Office 
pour le développement industriel, to the Banque Nationale pour le 
Développement Economique and to the Caisse Nationale du Crédit 
Agricole. See Bei Information 1988 n.57, p.7.
• • 498ordinary Bank activities .
In this respect, the £anJc is responsible for the granting and 
the administration of the funds from the Community's budget 
committed for risk capital formation, for the administration of 
interest rate subsidies and for special loans.
As mentioned above, by means of these operations the EIB and 
the Community carry out a form of co-financing, with the EIB 
granting loans subsidized by the Community, which requires 
cooperation between the two institutions.
Regulation 1762/92 establishes two different procedures for 
financing decisions which are related, respectively, to interest- 
rate subsidies and risk capitals.
For interest-rate subsidies, the Bank submits a financing 
proposals to the Commission and to a special Committee, made up of
499representatives of member States (Article 9 Committee ) . The 
Committee issue am opinion on the Bank's proposal. On the basis 
of this consultation the Commission adopts a draft decision 
authorizing (or refusing) the funding of interest-rate subsidies amd 
submits it to the Med Committee (as set up by Article 6),
Only in the case of a positive decision , the Bank may gramt the 
loan.
For risk capital finamcing projects, the procedure is simplified, 
since the decision is taken, after consultation with Article 9 
Committee, by the Commission,
Regulation 1762/92 modifies considerably the procedures 
applied under Regulation 3973/86 which governed the administration
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491 In a special section created in 1962 by a decision of the 
Board of Governors, when for the first time the Bank acted on a 
Commission mandate in Turkey, See SPIROU op.cit. p.66.
499 It is interesting to note that in the proposal of the 
Commission the Article 9 Committee had disappeared.
of aid for the second and third Protocols500.
Under that Regulation a draft financing decision for risk 
capital and for interest-rate subsidies was submitted by the Bank 
to the Committee of Article 9. The Commission merely expressed its 
opinion. In the case of unfavorable opinion by the Committee and 
the Commission, the question was brought before the Council. Only 
when the Council confirmed the Committee opinion the Bank had to 
withdraw its proposal. For interest-rate subsidies the last 
decision was taken by the Board of Directors of the Bank.
The financing of the Bank takes place in the field of 
infrastructure and in particular of transport (to improve 
communications between the countries of the region and to promote 
trade), energy and agriculture501.
For instance, in Algeria, in the framework of the first and 
second Protocols EIB loans were granted to help finance the road 
linking Jijel and the city of Constantin and the motorway between 
Alger and Blida (135 million ecu).
In the energy sector loans have financed the expansion of 
electricity generating capacity. Loans from the third Protocol have 
been used to improve the sewerage system of Algers and irrigation 
facilities in the Mitidja plain. In Tunisia in the framework of the 
first and second Protocols the loans were employed in particular 
in the agricultural and agro-industrial sector with the financing 
of farm complexes for the improvement of the production of milk and 
meat and the construction of a dairy building fertilizer storage 
centre. Global loans for the development of small and medium-sized 
ventures were channelled through the Banque de Développement 
Economique de Tunisie and the Banque Nationale de Développement
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500 In reality, Regulation 3973/86 was the correct legal basis 
only for the second Protocols (see preambles, where express 
reference to these protocols was made) . The new regulation has been 
enacted for the implementation of financial and technical protocols 
with third mediterranean countries, without further specifications.
501 See Annual Report 1985 p.66.
Agricole (44 and 50 mecu respectively). Thirty-two million ecu 
helped to finance the railway line between the Gafsa phosphate 
deposits and the port of Gabes.
In the third Protocol loams were used in the tourism sector. 
For Morocco loans committed in the first two protocols financed the 
construction of facilities in the ports of Jorf Lasfar, Safi and 
Agadir and Mohammedia, to improve shipping, and therefore trade, 
in phosphate rocks. Eighteen million ecu were used to help finance 
the building of the dam of Ait Chouarit to provide irrigation and 
water supplies to the city of Marrakech and 34 million were 
allocated to the hydroelectric power station of the same dam. 
Eight and a half millions ecu financed global loans502.
3.b) The Community Budget
3.b.i) The Distinction Between Compulsory and Non-compulsory 
Expenditures.
Since the entry into force of the "second generation" of 
Protocols with Mediterremean countries, the second source of 
financing of cooperation in Maghreb countries is the Community 
whose contributions have replaced those from the Member States 
which financed cooperation under the first Protocols.
The amounts committed by the Community budget take the form 
of grants and risk capitals, which in the third Protocol have 
replaced loans on special terms.
The entry of these amounts in the EEC budget503 means that the
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502 See EIB Information n.57 1988, EIB Annual Report 1989.
503 It should be noted, by way of comparison, that cooperation 
within the framework of Lomé is financed by loans of the European 
Investment Bank and by contributions from the Member States through 
the European Development Fund. This was set up by an agreement 
concluded by the Member States which had the same period of 
application as the Convention. The EDF is administered by the 
Commission on the basis of a Regulation which also provides for 
the setting up of two Committees of representatives of Member 
States who give their opinions on the financing proposals of the
Community has the exclusive competence to conclude the Protocols 
and that it is the sole party responsible for the administration 
of funds504.
In relation to the presentation of the funds in the budget, 
a first distinction should be made between the funds committed in 
the Protocols, which are compulsory expenditure and the funds "hors 
Protocols" which are classified as non-compulsory expenditure.
The funds of the financial Protocols enter the budget without 
distinction among the Mediterranean countries but under the heading 
"Financial Protocols with the southern Mediterrsmean countries". 
The Protocols with Malta and Cyprus, on the contrary, constitute 
two separate headings. The differentiation among the countries, 
with the indication of the specific sums allocated for each single 
country are reported in the column entitled "remarks".
Each year a specific commitment appropriation is authorized. 
This is contained in the remarks column together with the amount 
of payment appropriations expected to be needed.
The funds under the Protocols, in fact, as all the 
appropriation for multi-annual activities, are distinguished in 
commitment and payment appropriations505.
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Commission and the EIB. As for financing to developing countries 
in Asia and Latin America, aid is financed by the Community budget 
(chapter 93) but there is not multiemnual programming.
The entry of the EDF in the EEC budget was proposed by the 
Commission in 1973 and again in 1979, but has not been so feur 
accepted by the Member States.
504 "..in so far as aid granted to a non-member country by an 
Agreement with that country is financed from the Community budget, 
only the Community has the authority to conclude such an Agreement. 
This hold true whatever the source of the funds contributing to the 
Community budget. However, it may transpire that Agreement between 
the Community and non-member countries also contain provisions 
falling within the competence of member States requiring..Member 
States' participation in the Agreement in accordance with their 
respective constitutional procedures." See Written question 396/77 
O.J. C 277 1977 p.7.
505 See SOPWITH, C. Legal Aspects of the EC Budget CMLRev. 1980, 
pp.315-347, STRASSER,D. Les finances de 1fEurope LGDJ, Paris 1990.
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Commitment appropriations cover the total cost of the legal 
obligations entered into. In practice they indicate a ceiling of 
expenditure that can be authorized in the financial year.
Payment appropriations are506 the credits which allow to meet 
the obligations undertaken in that financial year or in previous 
financial years. This explains why the appropriations for payment 
can be higher than commitment appropriations.
Within the framework of cooperation with Mediterranean 
countries other appropriations enter the budget, but under a 
different heading and article (in 1991 budget B7-408, former item 
8670). These are the operations to promote the implementation of 
an overall approach in the Mediterranean and are to be 
distinguished from operations to promote regional cooperation and 
operations to promote investments. As mentioned above these can be 
described as non-compulsory expenditures.
The distinction between compulsory and non-compulsory 
expenditure is of fundamental relevance in the procedure of 
adoption of the EEC budget. The power of the European Parliament 
to make chemges in the budget is based on this distinction 
introduced by the Budget Treaty of 1970 with an amendment of
507Article 203.4 and applied for the first time in the 1975 budget .
The European Parliament has in fact the power to amend the 
so-called non-compulsory expenditure but only to propose 
modifications for compulsory expenditures508. In amending non- 
compulsory expenditures the Parliament must respect the maximum 
rate of increase annually fixed by the Commission on the basis of
506 See financial regulation 21 December 1977 applicable to the 
general budget of the European Communities, O.J. L 356 1977, 
Article 1
507 The second budgetary Treaty of 22 July 1975 maintained the 
distinction between compulsory and non-compulsory expenditure.
508 EHLERMANN,C.D. Applying the New Budgetary procedure for the 
First Time (article 203 EEC Treaty) CMLRev. 1975 pp.325-343 and 
KAPTEYN, The European Parliament, the Budget and Legislation in the 
Community CMLRev. 1980, pp.386-405.
economic data509.
According to Article 203 compulsory expenditure is that 
"necessarily resulting from the Treaty or from acts adopted in 
accordance therewith". This definition is not sufficiently clear 
and has given rise to conflicting interpretations on the part of 
the three institutions involved. A compromise was finally reached 
in the Joint Declaration of the Commission, Council and Parliament 
adopted in 1982510 where the three institutions defined as 
compulsory expenditure "such expenditure as the budgetary authority 
is obliged to enter in the budget to enable the Community to meet 
its obligations, both internally and externally, under the Treaties 
and acts adopted in accordance therewith"511.
This means that the adoption of a legal act is not per se 
sufficient to classify the expenditure it provides for as 
compulsory, but the act must in addition contain precise financial 
commitments and the principles and criteria of its use, by this act 
the Community undertakes an obligation as regards third parties
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These are trends in gross national products in the EEC, the 
average variation in national budgets and trends in the cost of 
living in the preceding financial year (article 203.9). The rate
can be increased by agreement between the Council and the
Parliament on the majority determined in Article 203.
5.0 O.J. C 194 1982
5.1 The Court of Justice in case 204/86 Greece v. Council
27.09.1988 (1988) ECR p. 5323 was required to pronounce on a
question involving the power of Parliament in the budgetary 
procedure (Greece argued that the transfer of credits from chapter 
100 to the chapter cooperation with Turkey required the assent of 
the Parliament since the credits in article 100 were classified as 
non—compulsory expenditures whereas in the new chapter they were 
classified as compulsory expenditures). The Court did not enter in 
the merit of the question and made reference to the Joint 
Declaration holding that the problem of classification must be 
solved in the framework of the conciliation procedure. See 
JAQUE,J.P. Le parlement européen RTDE 1989 pp. 225-243, spec. pp. 
237-239.
(third countries, individuals, corporations or Member States)512.
Ir. practice the act which constitutes the legal basis of the 
expenditure must provide for a financial commitment which does not 
give the authority competent for its administration any 
discretionary power over whether to engage the funds.
A related question is whether the entry of an appropriation 
in the budget is sufficient for the execution of the funds.
It is clear that this is not merely a question of terminology 
but one involving the power of the institutions in matters of the 
budget and, in a certain way, of legislative initiative.
According to the Parliament the budget is a sufficient legal 
basis to spend the credits which are entered therein. In other 
words, the creation of an item is sufficient to initiate a new 
action.
For the Council, on the contrary, the budget is a record of 
engagements taken by the Community, it is the expression of a 
policy and the payments are possible only if based on an act of the 
Council.
For the Commission the budget is not in itself a complete 
legal basis since another legal act is required which lays down the 
conditions and use of the funds.
If the theory of the European Parliament was correct, this 
institution would have a power of initiative, with the creation of 
new items, albeit limited to non-compulsory expenditure5,3.
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5,2 DE WOST, J ,L., LEPOIVKE, M . La déclaration commune du 
Parlement Européen du Conseil et de la Commission relative à 
différentes mesures visemt à assurer un meilleur 'roulement de la 
procédure budgétaire, signée le 30 juin 1982 RMC 1982, pp.524-; 
DANKERT, The Joint Declaration by the Community Institutions of 30 
June 1982 on the Community Budget Procedure CMLRev 1983 pp.701-712.
513 This question arose in the context of aid to non-associated 
countries. In 1976 a new line of credit for financial aid to non­
associated countries was entered into the budget. According to the 
Commission this was enough to allow the execution of the programme 
of aid, whereas the Council held that legislative intervention by 
the Council was required, in this case a Regulation based on 
Article 235. An ad hoc procedure, whereby the Council approved the
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The financial Protocols lay down the specific financial 
commitments of the Community towards its Mediterranean partners. 
The corresponding appropriations in the budget are therefore 
compulsory expenditure. This does not mean, in the case of 
financial and technical cooperation that the Community is obliged 
to utilize the funds committed. In other words if the criteria laid 
down in the protocols are met, the Commission would not have any 
discretion in granting the aids, but this does not mean that just 
any projects could be financed.
3.b.ii) The Administration of Aid by the Commission.
For the implementation of the fineuicial emd technical 
Protocols concluded by the Community with Mediterranean countries, 
in 1986 the Community adopted Regulation 3973/86sl4 laying down the 
detailed rules for the administration of aid by the Community. As 
mentioned above this Regulation referred explicitly to the second 
Protocols with Maghreb and Mashrak countries although it was also 
applied to third Protocols. A new Regulation for the application 
of the Protocols was adopted the 29 June 1992515.
aid programme of the Commission, was then adopted until the 
adoption of Regulation 442/81 of the Council (O.J. L 48 1981, p.8. 
See the Commission point of view regarding the Commission's 
competence on the basis of Article 205 in O.J. Débat du Parlement 
O.J. Annex 221 1977 75-76.
5,4 Regulation 3973/86 concerning the application of the 
Protocols on financial and technical cooperation concluded between 
the Community and Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon, 
Jordan, Syria, Malta and Cyprus. O.J. L 370 1986. Legal basis 
Articles 235 and 209. Israel is not included because this country 
does not receive aid from the Community budget, only loeuis from 
the Bank. The reason is to be found in the more advanced level of 
development of this country as compared with the other 
Mediterranean countries.
5,5 Regulation 1762/92, see O.J. L 181 1992.
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The task of the Commission, which is the competent institution 
for the administration of aids516, is that of preparing the 
decisions on projects to be financed. These decisions shall contain 
an explemation of the relevance of the project in the framework of 
the development objectives of the recipient country, the effects 
that such projects should produce in relation to the resources 
invested in the project and the measures aimed at promoti îg the 
participation of undertakings of the recipient country.
The Commission is assisted by a Committee, set up by Article 
6 • of Regulation 1762/92 and hence designed as "Article 6 
Committee", consisting of representatives of the governments of 
Member States and chaired by the Commission. A representative of 
the EIB takes part in the proceedings without voting right.
The Committee votes by qualified majority and the votes of the 
Member States are weighted according to what is established in 
Article 148.2 EEC Treaty.
The task of this Committee is to provide an opinion on draft 
decisions submitted to it by the Commission.
The Committee created by Article 6 of Regulation 1762/92 is 
not peculiar to the administration of aid to Mediterranean 
countries. Simileur Committees also exist in the framework of 
financial aid to non-associated developing countries and food 
aid517. More generally these organs can be compared to the so-called
516 The general rule is that the Commission cannot delegate to 
an external agency the administration of the budget. An exception 
is provided for in the Financial Regulation (Article 105.3) 
applicable to the Community budget whereby the Commission confers 
a mandate to the EIB to administer risk capitals and interest-rate 
subsidies.
5,7 Regulation 442/81 O.J. L 48 1981. The procedure followed 
by the Committee of Article 11 is very similar. However, when the 
Council has not expressed its position on the decision of the 
Commission within the period established (two months) the 
Commission may submit a new project to the Committee. For food aid 
see Regulation 3331/82 Article 5. For comments see CRETIEN,Y. La 
politique d'aide alimentaire de la Communauté européenne MEGRET, 
Le droit de la CEE. Vol. XIV, op.cit. pp. 128-178, spec. 149 ff.and 
L'aide financière et technique aux pays en voie de développement
"management Committees" which were first created in the Community 
in the field of agricultural policy, whose task is that of giving 
an opinion on the projects of Regulations submitted by the 
Commission acting on powers delegated by the Council. In practice, 
through these Committees Member States exert a control over the 
Commission.
Council Decision 87/373 of 13 July 1987 lays down the rules 
governing the procedures followed by the Commission when exercising 
implementing powers conferred by the Council. Three different 
procedures are established but it is not specified to which cases 
the different procedures apply318.
The procedure followed in Regulation 1762/92 corresponds to 
the second procedure, variant b, of "comitology".
The Commission adopts the draft measures submitted to the 
Committee when the latter opinion is positive. In the case that the 
Committee does not give an opinion or when this is negative, the 
draft measures are submitted to the Council which shall act within 
a period of three months. If the Council has not acted within this 
period, the Comission's proposal is adopted.
Some doubts can be expressed as regards this procedure if one 
considers that the Commission alone has the power to implement the
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non associés Ibidem pp. 114-127, spec. p.120 ff.
î,s See O.J. L 197 1987. Thus in the case of Procedure I the 
Committee has advisory nature and its opinion is not binding. When 
procedure II is applied the Committee cannot block the decision of 
the Commission which may (variant a) or shall (variant b) defer 
the application of its decision until the Council has expressed its 
opinion. Under a third procedure the Committee can block the 
decision of the Commission. Two variants are provided for whereby 
the Commission can adopt its decision if the Council has not made 
a different decision within a certain time limit (a) while (variant 
b) if the Council has not taken a decision, the Commission decision 
is revoked. The third procedure and in particular the second 
variant (contre filet) has been the object of many critiques 
because the decision is not referred back to the Commission. 
NICOLL,W. Qu'est-ce que la Comitologie? RMC 1988, pp. 185-187. See 
also BRADLEY,K. Comitology and the Law: Through a Glass, Darkly 
ÇfiLRSy, 1992, pp. 693-721.
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budget. If one compares Regulation 1762/92 to Regulation 3973/86, 
one notices that the former does not mention Article 209 of the EEC 
Treaty any longer, the only legal basis of the regulation remains 
Article 235519. Moreover, the Regulation at present in force seems 
to emphasize the intergovernmental aspect of the procedure. For 
example. Regulation 3973/86 established that the financing 
decisions of the Commission entered into force immediately, in the 
event of an unfavorable opinion of the Committee the decision was 
suspended until the final decision of the Council.
The alternative, enhancing the community aspect of the 
financial aid, could have been the adoption of the first variant 
of "comitology". The role played by Member States, which can block 
the financing, (through the negative opinion of the Committee 
and/or the Council) could furthermore be used as instrument of 
pressure in the case of existing dispute between one member State 
and a recipient country520 .
It should be noted that the Committee's competence had been 
the object of an inter-institutional dispute which delayed the 
entry into force of Regulation 3973/86.
When the proposal for this Regulation was first submitted by 
the Commission521, the Member States and the Commission could not 
agree on the competence of the Committee that was to be 
established. According to the Commission the final decision on the 
projects to be financed was within its competence. If the
519 Article 209 provides for the Council 's competence to adopt 
financial regulations. Why is the recourse to Article 235 
required? The regulation lays down, as seen above, detailed rules 
for the administration of the aid to associated Mediterranean 
countries listed in the Regulation, and creates two Committees 
(article 6 and 9) . In its proposal for regulation 3973/86 the 
Commission indicated as the only legal basis Article 209. See O.J. 
C 99 1977. In the case of the new regulation the Commission as well 
indicated Article 235 alone.
MA
See European parliament A3-0016/92 p.22.
521 O.J. C 99 1977.
Committee's opinion was negative, its decision would only be 
suspended to allow the intervention of the Council. According to 
some Member States, in the case of an unfavorable opinion by the 
Committee, the Commission projects were to be submitted to the 
Council which was competent to take the final decision.
Until the adoption of Regulation 3973/86 an "ad hoc" procedure 
was followed: the projects were examined by an ad hoc group of the 
Council and then transmitted to the Council for approval. A 
declaration was however written into the minutes (verbal) where 
the Commission stated that such an approval was not necessary for 
the adoption of the financing decisions511.
One should ask what kind of power the Commission is exerting 
under Regulation 1762/92. The approval of individual financing 
projects could be considered covered by the Commission's competence 
to implement the budget. It could, however, be questioned whether 
the adoption of substantive decisions on the choice of projects 
that can be financed by the funds made available under the 
financial Protocols does not go further than a mere implementing
• * 523power. As pointed out by Advocate General Tesauro in case 30/88 
the solution adopted in Regulation 3973/86 (similar to Regulation 
1762/92) is a compromise between the exclusive power of the Council 
to implement association agreements and the exclusive power of the 
Commission to implement the EEC budget under Article 205.
The question of the competence of the Commission seems in fact 
to find its resolution in the framework of the procedure for 
adoption of the projects. In fact, while the Commission is 
competent to adopt decisions on specific projects, the Council, 
which exerts control through the Article 6 Committee, has the final
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322 BRODIN QD.cit. pp. 268-270
523 Case 30/88 Greece v. Commission 14.11.1989 ECR (1989) p. 
3711, p. 3731.
say on the projects524.
An exchange of information takes place between the Bank, the 
Commission and the Member States on the financing they envisage 
granting (article 2 of Regulation 1762/92), the three institutions 
shall also communicate all relevant information as regards other 
bilateral or multilateral aids granted to the recipient countries, 
within the framework of the Article 6 Committee.
The question of coordination with Community action has been 
a Community concern since the adoption of the Commission memorandum 
on the development cooperation policy of the Community525. The 
preamble of Regulation 1762/92 refers to the Council's resolution 
of 5 June 1984 and 16 May 1989 on harmonization and coordination 
of Member States cooperation policy.
It is not clear how effective the coordination could be if 
limited to an exchange of information, it should however, be noted 
that in the new Regulation the exchange of information should take
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524 The case referred to above is significant in this respect. 
In adopting financing projects as special aid for Turkey the 
Commission consulted the Article 6 Committee created by Regulation 
3973/86. This procedure was contested by Greece which submitted 
that the "ad hoc" procedure which applied before the entry into 
force of Regulation 3973/86 continued to apply to Turkey since this 
country was not covered by this Regulation. The Commission on the 
contrary submitted that the ad hoc procedure did not apply any 
longer, not even to Turkey even though Regulation 3973/86 did not 
apply to this country. The Commission submitted that it had 
consulted the article 6 Committee "by analogy" (p.3716). It shall 
be noted that the Article 6 Committee expresses its opinion by 
qualified majority, while the ad hoc group voted by unanimity. The 
Court has recognized the competence of the Commission "to lay down 
the detailed rules and arrangements for the use of the aid and for 
the approval of specific projects. That power involves the 
possibility of using specific procedures for examining specific 
projects. The commission may therefore seek, from both the Council 
and the member States, any opinion necessary for the management of 
the aid, it may consult experts and it may have recourse to 
procedures laid down in similar fields" (ground 22)
525 •EC Bulletin Supp. 5/1971. See also Communication of the 
Commission Com(75) 94 final; guidelines for a development
cooperation policy for the decade 1980-1990 EC Bull.Supp. 5/82.
place in the phase of adoption of financing interventions, whereas 
in Regulation 3973/86 member States were required to inform the 
Commission when the decision to provide aid had already been taken, 
no involvement of the Bank was provided for.
At least once a year the Commission reports to the Council 
and to the Parliament. The Council holds, on the basis of a report 
submitted by the Commission, an annual policy debate on the future 
course of the cooperation.
Both the Bank and the Commission proceeds to an evaluation of 
each project completed to see whether the objectives established 
in the projects have been achieved and to establish guidelines for 
future interventions. Such evaluation reports are available to all 
Member States.
This provision seems to respond to the critiques put forwards 
by the Court of Auditors in its Special Report n. 3/91 cited above 
concerning the necessity of continuous evaluation (during and after 
the implementation of projects) to assess the effectiveness of the 
Community aid526. (Article 10) The seune conclusion can be drawn as 
regards the joint examination of projects by the Commission and the 
Bank in order to establish whether the objectives set up by the 
financing interventions have been achieved. The very limited 
control of the Commission as regards aid from the Community budget 
administered by the EIB was seriously criticized by the Court of 
Auditors521.
Regulation 1762/92 takes into account the structural 
adjustments programme introduced in the fourth Protocol (see 
supra), Article 3 indicates the principles that should govern 
operations financed by the Community in the freuoework of this 
programme. It is specified that aid must be linked to the 
adjustment operations and measures of the recipient countries and
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526 Special Report p. 17.
521 IfritelRt
that the procedures for the awards of contracts must be 
sufficiently flexible to be adapted to the practices in force in 
the recipient country.
Interventions aim in particular finance measures to offset the 
detrimental consequences which can derive from the structural 
adjustment programmes.
4) Other Operations of Financial Cooperation Outside the Protocols
4.a) "Horizontal" Financial Cooperation
With the scope of integrating financial and technical 
cooperation contained in the Protocols, the Council, in the 
framework of the renewed Mediterranean policy, adopted a Regulation 
concerning financial cooperation for all Mediterranean non-member 
countries528.
This financial intervention does not have as legal basis the 
technical and financial Protocols concluded with third 
Mediterranean countries. Although conceived as funds supplementing 
those committed under the Protocols, they are specifically provided 
for finamcing actions in the field of regional integration and 
environment.
The financing programme is multiannual (five years). The 
amount committed is 230 million ECU, which are qualified as non 
compulsory expenditures. The creation of this budgetary line for 
non-compulsory expenditure is important insofar as it enlarges the 
power of the European Parliament in the field of cooperation with 
Mediterranean countries. The Parliament cam modify the amount 
committed to this form of expenditure although it is not involved 
in the procedure of decision making for the administration or 
mamagement of these funds.
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528 Regulation 1763/92 O.J. L 1992.
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Measures of regional interests which can be finamced are 
technical cooperation, in the forms of seminars, training measures, 
studies and missions. These operations should involve Mediterranean 
non-Member Countries or Mediterranean non-Member Countries and the 
Community. The amount committed should also finance feasibility 
projects for regional infrastructure.
In the field of environment measures with a "catalytic"
effect, like pilot and demonstration projects, can be financed.
The form taken by the Community financing are interest-rate 
subsidies, which are managed by the EIB, risk capital and grants.
Different procedures apply for the administration of these 
aids by the Commission and the EIB. In practice the rules governing 
the adoption of financing measures are identical to those
established for the management of funds provided for in the 
technical and financial Protocols and discussed above.
4.b) EC International Investment Partners.
This instrument, which is not provided for in a Regulation, 
is addressed not only to Mediterranean countries but more generally 
to the more developed countries in Asia, Latin America and
Mediterranean. The idea is to encourage private investments and 
industrial cooperation in the form of the creation of joint- 
ventures between European enterprises and enterprises from those 
developing countries. Financing is directed mainly towards the 
identification of partners, technical assistance for management and 
training. Finamcing is not provided directly by the Community but 
through the intermediary of development bamks or international 
financial institutions. Finamcing can take various forms.
The funds entered in the budget under the title promotion of 
investment and regional cooperation are non-compulsory
529 See COM (86) 603 final.
expendi turei30.
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530 According to STRASSER Les finances.. op.cit. the funds for 
the promotion of investments in Mediterranean countries (Asia and 
Latin American countries) (facilité Cheysson) have no legal basis 
p.140.
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EIB LOANS BUDGET RESOURCES
Amount Growth % Amount Growth %
ALGERIA:
2° protocollo: 70
20 protocollo: 107
3° protocollo: 183
4° protocollo: 280
+ 53% 
+ 72% 
+ 53%
44
44
56
70
+ 27% 
+ 25%
MAROCCO:
2° protocollo: 
2° protocollo: 
3° protocollo: 
4° protocollo:
TUNISIA:
2° protocollo: 
2° protocollo: 
3° protocollo: 
4° protocollo:
EGITTO:
2° protocollo: 
2° protocollo: 
3® protocollo: 
40 protocollo:
56
90
151
220
41
78
131
168
93
150
249
310
74
+ 52% 
+ 58% 
+ 45%
+ 90% 
+ 59% 
+ 28%
+ 52% 
+ 55% 
+ 24%
109 + 47%
173 + 59%
218 + 25%
54
61 + 23%
93 + 52%
116 + 25%
77
126 + 54%
200 + 59%
258 + 29%
GIORDANIA:
2° protocollo: 18 22
2° protocollo: 37 +205% 25 + 28%
3° protocollo: 63 + 70% 37 + 42%
4° protocollo: 80 + 27% 45 + 24%
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SIRIA:
2° protocollo: 
2° protocollo: 
3° protocollo: 
4° protocollo:
LIBANO:
2° protocollo: 
2° protocollo: 
30 protocollo: 
4° protocollo:
34 26
64 + 88% 33
110 + 72% 59
215 + 5% 43
20 20
34 + 7% 16
53 + 56% 20
45 - 25% 24
+ 27% 
+ 79% 
+ 29%
+ 60% 
+ 64%
+ 20%
B)SOCIAL COOPERATION
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1) Introduction.
Among all the agreements concluded by the Community in the 
Mediterranean area531, only the Cooperation Agreement with Maghreb 
countries, the Cooperation Agreement with Yugoslavia and the 
Association Agreement with Turkey contain rules applicable to 
migrant workers who are nationals of these countries and employed 
in one EEÔ Member State532.
However, the Association Agreement with Turkey can be
531 •Outside this area the new EEA Agreement provides for the 
free circulation of EFTA workers in the Community (see Article 28) 
contained in the EEC Treaty Article 48. The possibility of adopting 
measures in the field of the mutual recognition of diplomas is also 
provided for (Article 30 and Annex VII). EFTA workers certainly 
enjoy the most priviledged position in the Community as compared 
with workers of other third countries which have concluded with the 
Community agreement of association or cooperation. The Agreement 
creates in fact a very close integration defined as an European 
Economic Area where the four basic freedoms of the Treaty (goods, 
persons, services and capitals) and the rules of competition are 
applied. As regards the European Agreements, concluded with 
Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia, the provisions on social 
cooperation are similar to those contained in the Cooperation 
Agreements with Maghreb countries with some improvement. The Europe 
Agreements for instance establish that the spouse and children of 
legally employed workers have access to the labor market of the 
EEC Member States during the period of the worker's authorized 
period of employment, this does not mean, however, that the right 
of family reunion is established since the members of the family 
of the worker can accede to the labor market only if already 
legally resident in the Community.
532 To be more precise two other agreements concluded with 
Mediterranean countries contained rules on migrant workers: the 
Association Agreement with Greece concluded in 1961 (English 
version in O.J. Sp. Edition, 2nd. Series, I, Ext. Rel.) and the 
Additional Protocol to the Agreement between the EEC and Portugal, 
(O.J. L 274 1978) . See RAUX,J. La mobilité des personnes et des 
entreprises dans le cadre des accords externes de la CEE RTDE 1979, 
pp.466-479, p.473. Since Greece euid Portugal have become Member 
States of the EEC, the agreements concluded with them will not be 
discussed here.
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considered as a special case because it establishes Turkish 
membership of the Community533 as the ultimate goal of the 
association. The provisions concerning Turkish migrant workers are 
conceived to be in preparation for possible integration of Turkish 
workers in the Community. Therefore, these rules can hardly be 
compared with the social cooperation provisions of the Cooperation 
Agreements with Maghreb countries and Yugoslavia, which only aim 
at "contributing to the economic and social development" of the 
EEC partners534.
It is in fact only the Agreement with Turkey which provides, 
albeit as a long term objective, for the free circulation of 
Turkish workers, for the freedom to provide services and of 
establishment535.
At first sight it may seem contradictory to the global policy 
that the "volet" on social cooperation was not included in the
533 See Arts.2 to 5 of the Association Agreement providing for 
a preparatory, a transitional and a final stage.ÛüZj. L 217 1964, 
English Ed. O.J. C 113 1973.
534 See Article 1 of the Cooperation Agreement with Morocco.
535 Articles 12, 13 and 14 of the Association Agreement provide 
that the freedom of movement , of establishment and to provide 
services for Turkish workers shall be guided by the corresponding 
provisions of the EEC Treaty. See also Article 36-42 of the 
Additional Protocol concluded in 1970 creating the competence of 
the Council of Association for the progressive application of the 
circulation of workers. O.J. L 293 1972. "Le régime juridique qui 
découle des accords est envisagé à la lumière du modèle 
communautaire dams la perspective plus ou moins avouée d'une 
admission ultérieure, sans que pour autant il puisse y avoir une 
adoption rigoureuse de ce modèle.." RAUX, la mobilité..op.cit.. p. 
168. The Protocol of 1970 also establishes the principle of non­
discrimination based on nationality as regaurds working and living 
conditions in relation to other Member state migrant workers. The 
situation of Turkish workers legally employed in the Community is 
regulated by Council Association decisions 1/80 and 3/80 O.J. C 110 
1983.
other cooperation agreements, concluded with Mashrak536 countries, 
Malta, Cyprus or Israel.
A first explanation is that a high number of the third country 
workers employed in the Community who come from the Mediterranean 
area are nationals of Algeria, Tunisia or Morocco531, whereas 
Mashrak countries, Malta or Cyprus are not traditional countries 
of migration to the EEC. This consideration has been judged to be 
a sufficient reason for excluding the social cooperation chapter 
from these latter Cooperation Agreements53*. Moreover, workers' 
salaries have represented an important item in the Maghreb external
• 539balance (for Morocco 22% in 1987) and migration a way of easing 
a high level of unemployment, also due to strong demographic
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536 Within the framework of the Euro-Arab Dialogue a 
declaration on the principles governing working and living 
conditions of migrant workers living in the two regions was adopted 
in 1978. The principles affirmed therein are very advanced in 
respect to those contained in the Cooperation Agreements (for 
instance the right to family reunion and vocational training), but 
the declaration is not binding. The text is reported in 
BOURRINET,J. Le dialogue Euro-Arabe Pauris, Economica, 1979, pp. 
341-342.
531 Within the EEC Maghreb workers are concentrated in Belgium 
(Moroccans), France (Algerians, Moroccans and Tunisians) and 
Netherlands (Moroccans), see Commission report on the social 
integration of third country migrants residing on a permanent and 
lawful basis in the Member States, SEC(89)924 final. For a 
statistical analysis of the presence of migrant workers in Europe 
see LEBON,A. "Resortissants communautaires et étrangers originaires 
des pays tiers dans l'Europe des douze" Rev.Eur.Mig. Intern. 1990, 
pp.185-202; for data regarding the presence of Maghreb workers in 
the Community in the 70s see SAFAR,H. Problèmes des travailleurs 
arabes en Europe KHADER,B. Coopération Euro-Arabe, symposium 
organized by the Centre d'Etude et de Recherche sur le Monde Arabe 
Contemporain de 1'Université Catholique de Louvain 1982, 
Vol.I,pp.153-175, the same author analyses the reasons of migration 
from Maghreb countries. Ibidem, pp.155-160.
53* BRODIN,J. "La politique d'approche globale méditerranéenne 
de la Communauté" MEGRET,J. Le Droit des Communautés Economiques 
Européennes Vol. XIV, pp. 197-298. p.259
539 See SEC (89) 1958 10.11.1989 Bilan de la Politique
Méditerranéenne de la CEE.
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pressure. It is not surprising, therefore, that Maghreb countries 
urged540 the inclusion in the Cooperation Agreements of provisions 
granting certain rights to their nationals employed in the 
Community. Their demands were, however, only partially met; in 
particular access to the Community and the principle of the free 
circulation within the Community for Maghreb workers were 
excluded541 from the Agreements.
One may ask whether the limited number of workers from Mashrak 
countries in the Community should be considered as a sufficient 
reason to exclude social cooperation rules from the Cooperation 
Agreements concluded with them. It seems that coherence in global 
policy would have required the inclusion of those principles in 
the Cooperation Agreements, especially if one considers that those 
Agreements were concluded for an unlimited period and the presence 
of migrant workers originating from these countries may increase 
in the future.
The Cooperation Agreement with Yugoslavia541, as noted above, 
contains provisions identical to those of the Cooperation 
Agreements with Maghreb countries. It has been submitted543 that,
540 • • ♦ # •"C'est la pression des Etats d'origine qui a conduit la CEE 
à accepter l'insertion d'un volet social dans certains de ces 
accords" TORRELLI,M. La coopération sociale: bilan et perspectives 
TOUSCOZ, La CEE élargie et la Méditerranéenne.. 1982, çp,çjt,, 
pp.163-188, p.179. See also EC Bull. 1/1976, p.16.
541 DUPOUY,A. Le statut juridique de la coopération entre
l'Algerie et la CEE Revue Algérienne des Sciences Juridique, 
Economiques et Politiques 1979 pp.7-36,p.27. Among the
considerations that weighed against the inclusion of free 
circulation in the Maghreb Cooperation Agreements, Torrelli points 
to the "effet d 'entrainement" that these agreements could have on 
future agreements with other third countries (see Yugoslavia), and 
the possibility that Turkey required improvement of the social 
provisions contained in its association Agreement if those of 
Maghreb were aligned to its regime. TORRELLI La coopération.. 
ÇP,Çjtt, 1982, p.173.
542 O.J. L 41 1983, Articles 43-47.
543 TORRELLI, M. "La coopération sociale... op.cit. .1982 p.165.
as regards social cooperation, Yugoslavia has benefitted of a sort 
of "effet d'entrainement" produced by the Maghreb Cooperation 
Agreements and that, at the same time, the inclusion of these 
provisions is a sign of the Community's will to develop social 
cooperation in the Mediterranean area. However, some doubts can be 
expressed about this second observation: there seem to be no sign 
of a Community policy on migration from third countries, even 
restricted to the area of its Mediterranean preferential policy. 
It seems significant, in this respect, that some of the provisions 
of the Cooperation Agreements, requiring action by the Community, 
have not yet been applied (see infra for Article 41.2).
Outside the Mediterranean area, the Final Act of the IV Lomé 
Convention contains a Joint Declaration "on workers who are 
nationals of one of the Contracting Parties and are legally 
resident in a territory of a Member State or an ACP State"544. The 
Declaration establishes the principle of non-discrimination between 
the ACP and nationals of each Member State as regards working 
conditions, pay and social security benefits linked to employment 
(extended to the member of the worker's family).
It is also established that these provisions do not affect the 
rights and obligations deriving from bilateral conventions when 
these are more favorable.
Some doubts may arise as to whether the Joint Declaration is 
legally binding or only has a programmatic character. The second 
solution seems more accurate when one considers that Lomé 
Convention establishes that annexed Protocols "form an integral 
part of the Convention", while Joint Declarations are not 
mentioned. On the other hand, the contracting peurties, declaring 
in the Final Act545 their intention to conclude the Convention, the
544 The text of the Convention is reported in The Courier. 
n.120, March-April 1990.
545 In international law a Final Act is an instrument 
indicating the contracting parties of a treaty or of a conference, 
the conventions concluded, the resolutions adopted. "Certaines 
Actes Finals contiennent des engagements conventionnels des
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Protocols and the Joint Declaration, seem to give all these 
instruments the same legal value. However, some of these 
Declarations do undoubtedly have a programmatic character and 
further acts are required for the application of the principles 
outlined. This does not seem to apply to the Declaration of Annex 
VI546. In paragraph 4 of the Declaration "The Parties agree that the 
matters referred to in the declaration shall be resolved 
satisfactorily, and, if necessary, through bilateral negotiations 
with a view to concluding appropriate agreements" (emphasis added) . 
This seems to imply that the adoption of agreements is not a 
prerequisite for the application of the principle of non- 
discrimination. Moreover, in particular, if compared with the other 
Joint Declaration (Annex IV) which also concerns migrant workers, 
the wording used is a form used for binding rules (each Member 
State shall accord, .shall enjoy. .)i47.
However, the content of the Joint Declaration is more limited
signataires. En droit, il faudra alors considérer que les
dispositions qui contiennent ces engagements produisent ces effets 
qui s'attachent à un traité international." PREVOST,J.F. 
Observations sur la nature juridique de 1'Acte Final de la
conférence sur la securité et la cooperation en Europe AFDI 1974, 
pp.129-154, p.131 and 132.
546 See contra NADIFI,A. Le statut juridique des travailleurs 
maghrébins résidant dans la CEE RMC 1989, 289-295, p. 289 footnote 
(4) "..ces dispositions sont formulées en des termes assez vagues 
et généraux figurant à l'annexe de ces conventions d'où la
spécificité des dispositions sociales des accords de coopération 
CEE-Maghreb".
541 Annex V contains a Joint declaration on ACP migrant workers 
and ACP students in the Community. The Member States and ACP States 
"will grant workers who are nationals of the other Party legally 
carrying out am activity in its territory, amd the members of their 
family residing with them, the fundamental freedoms as they derive 
from the general principles of international law." The Community 
also declares that it is prepared to support the finamcing of 
programmes to train ACP nationals returning to their countries amd 
to encourage the training of ACP students in their country of
origin or in another ACP country. ACP countries declare that they 
will take the necessary measures to discourage illegal immigration 
to the Community.
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than the chapter on social cooperation of the Agreements with 
Maghreb countries (infra) . The Joint Declaration does not lay down 
rules for the transfer of pensions and annuities or for the 
addition of insurance periods.
At first sight, therefore, Maghreb workers employed in the 
Community enjoy a privileged status compared with other third 
country workers. To check this one should look both at Community 
action as regards third country migrant workers and to national 
legislation. Before reaching any conclusions, however, it is 
necessary to analyze the provisions contained in Title III of the 
Cooperation Agreements.
2) Articles 40-43.
The norms applicable to third country migrant workers by the 
"host" country may be distinguished from norms concerning a) entry 
into the territory and access to employment and b) conditions 
provided to workers when they are already employed, which relate 
to working and living conditions, remuneration, social security and
<4*
education.
As seen above, the question of entry to a Member State's 
territory and access to employment is excluded from the Chapter on 
Social Cooperation. This can be considered as a limit on the 
provisions of social cooperation, and it may be explained by a 
desire of the Member States to maintain control on immigration 
policy549.
549 For this distinction see HAMMAR, T. (ed) European 
Immigration Policy A comparative Study. Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1985, pp.6 ff. For this author immigration policy 
has two elements: immigration regulation ("the rules governing the 
selection and admission of foreign citizens") and immigrant policy 
(which "refers to the conditions provided to resident immigrants") . 
The author emphasizes the reciprocal influence of these tiro 
components.
549 See in this sense BRODIN La politique.. op.cit. p.359.
Article 40 establishes the principle of non-discrimination 
based on nationality between Moroccam workers and the nationals550 
of the Member State where they are employed551 as regards working 
conditions and remuneration.
These provisions do not establish one relationship between 
Community and Morocco, but rather twelve bilateral relationships 
between Morocco and each Member State.
In Article 41.1 the principle of non-discrimination is 
extended to social security, which also covers members of the 
workers' family living with the worker. This does not, however, 
imply the right of a member of a worker's family to join the worker
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550 It has already been noted that in the 1970 Protocol 
concluded with Turkey non-discrimination was to be applied as 
regards other Member State's migrant workers. The reference to 
Member State nationals in the Maghreb Cooperation Agreements seems 
to reflect the desire to apply a higher standard.
551 This excludes the guarantee of equality of treatment to
self-employed Maghreb nationals. There exist no provisions in the 
Cooperation Agreements with Maghreb countries which are related to 
services or to establishment. As regards the right to provide 
services and the right of establishment, Maghreb nationals could 
enjoy, like other third country nationals, the general rights 
established in the EEC Treaty. In particular Article 59 establishes 
that "The Council may, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal
from the Commission, extend the provisions of the Chapter to
nationals of a third country who provide services and who are 
established within the Community", amd Article 58 provides that 
once they have set up in a Member State according to the
requirements of Article 58, "Companies or firms formed in 
accordance with the law of a Member State and having their
registered office, central administration or principal place of 
business within the Community shall, for the purposes of this 
Chapter, be treated in the same way as natural persons who are 
nationals of Member States". It shall be noted that in these cases, 
as well as the question of entry remaining a competence of Member 
States, Community legislation would, in amy case, only intervene 
after the establishment of third country nationals:"..it is at the 
discretion of each Member State to permit the first leap towards 
its territory.." KAPTEYN,P.J.G., VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT,P. 
Introduction.. o p .cit. p.443.
in the Member State where he/she has found a job332.
The second and third paragraphs of Article 41 add a Community 
dimension to the relationship established between Morocco and each 
Member State which can be considered to be a progress, in 
comparison with bilateral agreements553.
Article 41.2 establishes that all periods of insurance, 
employment or residence that Moroccan workers have accumulated in 
each Member State shall be added for the calculation of pensions 
and annuities for old age, invalidity, death and medical care. This 
means that for the calculation of pensions Member States are 
considered as a single territory. It ought to be noted that periods 
which Moroccan workers may have completed in their own country are 
not counted.
Paragraph 3 of Article 41 establishes that Moroccan workers 
will receive family allowances for the members of their families 
who are resident in the Community. This means that the member of 
a worker's family will receive family allowances even if he/she 
resides in a State different from the one where the worker is 
employed. On the contrary if a member of a Moroccan worker's family 
resides in the country of origin of the migrant worker he/she has 
not right to receive these family allowances554.
Finally, Article 41.4 establishes that pensions or annuities 
in respect of old age, death, industrial accident, occupational 
disease and invalidity resulting from industrial accident or 
occupational disease may be transferred freely to Morocco "at the 
rates applied by virtue of the law of the debtor Member State or
293
332 On the question of the right of family reunion see LEBEN,C. 
Le droit international et les migrations des travailleurs Les 
travailleurs étrangers et le droit international , Colloque, Paris, 
Pedone, 1979, pp. 45-107, p.95.
333 NADIFI Le statut... o p .cit. p.292.
334 On the basis of the European Agreements family allowances 
are paid to members of the family of a worker regardless of their 
being resident in the Community or in another country.
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States".
Some questions of interpretation of Article 41 have recently 
been the object of a decision555 of the Court of Justice. It will be 
remembered that the case arose out of a dispute between Ms. Kziber, 
the child of a Moroccan national legally established in the 
territory of Belgium, and the Belgium national labor office (Office 
National du Travail (ONEM)). Ms. Kziber was refused - by reason of 
her nationality - unemployment benefits that Belgian legislation 
provides for young national workers who are unemployed after their 
studies or a period of apprenticeship.
In considering whether Article 41.1 is to be interpreted to 
mean that a member State cannot refuse unemployment benefits to a 
member of the family of a worker of Moroccan nationality, the Court 
had to decide, besides the question of direct effect, discussed 
above: a) if the notion of social security contained in this 
Article covers unemployment benefits, and b) on the basis of what 
entitlement could Ms. Kziber apply for these unemployment benefits 
provided for young persons seeking employment.
2.a) The Notion of Social Security.
The question was to interpret the notion of social security 
as inscribed in Article 41.1 to see whether it covered unemployment 
benefits.
The silence of Article 41 and the fact that unemployment 
benefits do not exist in Morocco were the two arguments submitted 
by France, which were seriously considered by Advocate General Van 
Gerven, to deny that unemployment benefits could be covered by 
social security under Article 41.1.
The Court rejected this reasoning by first making an analogy 
between the notion of social security contained in Article 41 and
555 Case 18/90, Bahia Kziber op.cit..
that of Regulation 1408/71556 which explicitly refers to
unemployment benefits. In other terms the notion of social security 
shall be read at the light of Regulation 1408/71. It should be 
remembered that the question of the analogy of expressions 
contained in agreements concluded by the Community with third 
countries and in the Treaty depends on the context and on the 
scope of the rules. The Court affirmed that the fact that
unemployment benefits are not included in Article 41 paragraph 2, 
creating the principle of the addition of insurance periods, is 
relevant only for the application of this principle: that is, that 
unemployment benefits are not taken into account for the
calculation of pensions. The silence of Article 41 about
unemployment benefits cannot be interpreted, in the absence of a 
clearly expressed intention of the parties, as excluding, from the 
concept of social security, unemployment benefits, which are 
traditionally considered a Jbranch of social security.
The reference to Regulation 1408/71 seem to have been made 
with the purpose of indicating that "traditionally" unemployment 
benefits are part of social security and that there is no reason, 
based on the scope of the Agreement or of the provision, to give 
a different interpretation to the notion of social security in the 
Community law and in the Cooperation Agreement.
2 .b) The Sphere of Application of Article 41.1.
The other point discussed was whether Ms. Kziber could apply 
for unemployment benefits on the basis of the non-discrimination 
principle established in Article 41.1.
The question was whether the members of a Moroccan worker's 
family could enjoy non-discriminatory treatment only as regards the 
rights that are granted to the members of a family of a worker who
295
556 The consolidated version of this Regulation is reported in
O.J. c 138 1980 p.l See Article 4 which reads "This Regulation 
shall apply to all legislation concerning the following branches 
of social security:...(g) unemployment benefit..".
is national of a Member State, or, if non-discrimination also 
applies to rights they may claim on their own.
As seen above, the unemployment benefits in question were provided 
by national Belgian legislation for young persons who, after their 
studies or a period of apprenticeship, were unemployed. Therefore, 
the status of member of a worker's family did not seem relevant to 
the application of this legislation.
Advocate General Van Gerven denied the right of Ms. Kziber to 
be granted unemployment benefits based on Article 41. His reasoning 
was based on the distinction, made by the Court of Justice in 
Kermaschen557 and then confirmed in Peak55*. between the rights that 
workers can claim as rights of their own and derived rights granted 
to the members of their feunilies. According to the Advocate General 
this distinction, made for Community workers, applies to Article
41 as well.
Even if in Peak the Court recognized the right of the child 
of a Community migrant worker (regardless of the nationality of 
the child) not to be discriminated as regards unemployment benefits 
compared with nationals, the decision of the Court was based on 
considerations related to the free movement of workers. "A worker 
anxious to ensure for his children the enjoyment of the social 
benefits provided for by the legislation of the Member State for 
the support of young persons seeking employment would be induced 
not to remain in the Member State where he had established himself 
and found employment if that State could refuse to pay the benefits 
in question to his children because of their foreign nationality" 
(para 23).
The Advocate General submitted that since the scope of the 
Cooperation Agreemenz with Morocco is not to assure free access to 
employment in the EEC but to guarantee equality of treatment for
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557 Case 40/76 Kermaschen 23.10.1976, (1976) ££g p.1669.
551 case 94/84 Office national de l'emploi v. Josef Peak, 
20.05.1985 (1985) £££. P- 1873.
workers already employed, the reasoning of the Court in Peak could 
not be applied to the case at hand.
It should be noted that the Advocate General made reference
to the object and nature of the Cooperation Agreement to arrive
at his conclusion. As already mentioned, this is a form of
reasoning that the Court has used in previous case-law where it had 
to pronounce on the interpretation of provisions contained in 
agreements concluded with third countries having a formulation 
identical to certain Treaty Articles559. In this case, however, the 
question was even more complex, since it was not the identity of 
two Articles contained in two different instruments which was at 
stake, but rather a matter of transposing to a Cooperation 
Agreement a Court decision on Community (derived) legislation. 
However, if one applies the same reasoning used in the case-law and 
if a provision is to be interpreted according to the objective it 
pursues, the reasoning of Advocate General seems correct. The 
reason given by the Court in Peak to justify the granting of 
unemployment benefits can hardly be applied to Kziber.
The Court did not follow the reasoning of the Advocate
General. It simply stated that the prohibition on discrimination 
of Article 41 implies that Ms Kziber, who met the other 
requirements provided for in the national legislation, could not 
be refused unemployment benefits on the basis of her Moroccan 
nationality.
What seems to imply from the Court decision is that Ms. Kziber 
shall not be discriminated not as a member of the family of a 
Moroccan worker but as the direct addressee of the prohibition of 
non-discrimination. This is not very convincing because in the 
Community context the prohibition of non-discrimination for the 
members of the family of a Community worker derives from the 
prohibition of non discrimination of the worker itself, therefore 
the decision of the Court would imply a regime for third countries
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559 See above, Polvdor.op.cit. paras. 14-15;
Bresciani.op.cit..para 25.
nationals which is more advanced that applied to Community workers. 
On the other hand the extension of the Court's case-law 
to members of the family of the Moroccan worker would meet the 
objections arisen by the Advocate General.
Another question which may be relevamt in the light of case 
18/90, even if it was not discussed by the Court, is the 
interpretation of the notion of family of a worker contained in 
Article 41.
The notion of family could be limited to the spouse and minor 
children560, but could also be enlarged to include relatives in the 
ascending lines of the worker or spouse561.
How should the notion of family be interpreted in the 
Cooperation Agreement in the absence of any specification ? As 
regards EEC law, for the purpose of family reunion. Article 10 of 
Regulation 1612/68561 on the freedom of movement for workers within 
the Community adopts a notion of family which includes spouse, 
children under the age of 21 or who are dependant, dependant 
relatives in the ascending lines of spouse and worker. It is also 
established that "Member States shall facilitate the admission of 
any member of the family not coming within the provisions of 
paragraph 1 if dependant on the worker referred to above or living 
under his roof in the country from whence he comes". This wide 
notion of family can be explained by virtue of the purpose this
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560 • • # ♦"'family is generally defined as husband, his wife amd any 
minor children. There is, however, no agreement as to whether other 
dependents should be included within the concept of family" ANSAY 
"Legal Problems of Migrant Workers" op.cit. p.24. For instamce, in 
the European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers of 
the Council of Europe family is composed of the spouse of the 
migrant worker, his unmarried children, who are minors according 
to the legislation of the receiving State and who are dependent on 
the worker, see Article 12 on family reunion. The Convention is 
reproduced in International Legal Materials 16, 1977, p.1381.
561See ILO recommendation 151 which refers to spouse, children 
amd ascendants.
561 O.J. L 257 1968, English Sp. Ed. p. 475.
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Regulation seeks to achieve: guaranteeing the freedom of movement 
for Community workers563.
In Regulation 1408/7156A, adopted for the application of social 
security schemes, it is specified that "members of family" meems 
"any person defined or recognized as the member of the family or 
designated as a member of the household by the legislation under 
which benefits are provided..". The solution adopted in regulation 
1408/71 could be applied to the notion of family contained in the 
Cooperation Agreements with Maghreb countries. Therefore, if a 
Member State's legislation grants to a worker's ascendant certain 
benefits, the principle of non-discrimination requires that, if all 
the conditions are met, the same benefits are granted to a Moroccan 
worker's ascendant as well.
The provisions of Articles 40 and 41 also apply to Community 
workers employed in Morocco565. Article 40.2 provides that "Morocco 
shall accord the same treatment to workers who are nationals of a 
Member State and employed in its territory." According to RAUX566 
this provision requires that Morocco shall not discriminate among 
nationals of Member States. He affirms that "II appartient...aux
563 See the statement of reason of regulation 1612/68 "Whereas 
the right of freedom of movement, in order that it may be 
exercised, by objective standards, in freedom and dignity, requires 
that equality of treatment shall be ensured, .and also that 
obstacles to the mobility of workers shall be eliminated, in 
particular as regards the worker's right to be joined by his fwily
#r0 • • m
564 Consolidated version in O.J. C 138 1980 p.4.
565 It should be noted that reciprocity of rights and duties 
is provided for only in this chapter. It is well known that one of 
the distinguishing features of the Cooperation Agreements with 
Maghreb countries is the granting of non-reciprocal preferences. 
However, the principle of applying different rules to compensate 
a different level of development would not make sense if applied 
to working conditions.
566 RAUX "La mobilité des personnes et des entreprises.." 1979, 
o p .cit. p.474.
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Etats Maghrébins de prendre les mesures propres à assurer le 
traitement le plus favorable accordé jusqu'ici aux nationaux d'un 
Etat membre", It can be submitted that if Article 40, paragraph 2 
provides for reciprocity, the term "same treatment" refers to the 
principle of non-discrimination and that Morocco is obliged under 
Article 40.2 not to discriminate, as regards pay and working 
conditions, between its nationals and Community workers employed 
in its territory. It is not clear why the treatment granted to 
Member States' nationals working in Morocco should be that granted 
to the most favored Member State nationals and not that of Moroccan 
nationals. This interpretation seems to be confirmed by the fact 
that the principle of reciprocity is also established in Article
41.5 providing that "Morocco shall accord to workers who are 
nationals of a Member State and employed in its territory, and to 
the member of their families, treatment similar to that specified 
in paragraphs 1, 3 and 4".
This rule may raise some problems of interpretation. For example, 
should social security benefits be granted to workers of EEC Member 
States even if the same benefits do not exist in Morocco ?
As seen above, the absence of unemployment benefits in Morocco 
was used by France in case 18/90 as an argument to deny that the 
notion of social security in Article 41 could cover unemployment 
benefits. In other words, since Article 41.5 provides reciprocity 
in the application of the rules contained in paragraphs 1,3 and 4, 
Moroccan workers could not claim the granting of unemployment 
benefits when these would not be given to Community workers 
employed in Morocco. This argument was not examined by the Court 
which, therefore, seemed, implicitly, to reject it when it 
recognized the right of Ms. Kziber to receive unemployment 
benefits.
According to Article 42.1 the principles outlined in 
Article 41 should be implemented before the end of the first year 
following entry into force of the agreement, by the Cooperation 
Council, which shall also adopt "detailed rules for administrative
301
cooperation providing the necessary management and control 
guarantees for the application of the provisions referred to in 
paragraph 1" (second paragraph) . This provision has not so far been 
applied even if a proposal for a Council Cooperation decision was 
submitted by the Commission in 1980567 . This proposal concerned the 
application of the social security regimes to Moroccan workers 
employed in the Community and to their families568. Morocco 
considered the project insufficient as compared with the more 
favorable regimes established by bilateral conventions between 
Morocco and some Member States. For the Commission the project was 
certainly advantageous for Moroccan workers "sans porter atteinte 
aux dispositions plus favorables decoulant des conventions 
bilaterales"*69.
An element of disparity of treatment among the workers coming 
from Maghreb is contained in Article 43, which establishes that the 
provisions set up by the Cooperation Council under Article 42 
"shall not affect any rights and obligations arising from bilateral 
agreements linking Morocco and the Member States where those 
agreements provide for more favorable treatment of nationals of 
Morocco and of the Member States". This means that Moroccan workers 
may receive different treatment if they are employed in a Member 
State having concluded an agreement with Morocco favorable to its 
nationals. The agreements concluded by Member States (France in 
particular) regulate aspects of the life of migrant workers that 
sure not mentioned in the Cooperation Agreement and are, in general 
terms, more advanced. For instance France pays family allowances 
to the children (up to a maximum of four) of Algerian workers 
established in France, even if the children reside in Algeria 570.
567 DOC. CEE-MA 2707/81 cited in SEC(89) 1958.
568 See BRODIN La politique d'approche..op.cit. p.271.
569 See SEC(89) 1958 op.cit.
570 See Dossier et Documents Les negotiations France-Alg&rie 
Maahreb. Mashrak 1980 p.83-88, p.83.
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Even if the rights of Maghreb workers are limited in respect 
of those granted by bilateral conventions, the advantage of the 
Cooperation Agreement is that it created rules which are applied 
in all Community Member States. The fact that the rights guaranteed 
constitute a minimum common denominator in respect of those granted 
by a single Member State may be considered the obvious consequence 
of an extension of social cooperation provisions to the whole 
Community. Some Member States are ready to guarantee specific 
benefits only to workers coming from certain third countries 
because the historical origin of that immigration and of the 
particular links they have with those third countries.
The provisions examined so far are completed by an exchange 
of letters annexed to the agreement. The Community and the Member 
States affirm that they are ready to hold exchanges of views as 
regards Maghreb workers employed in the Community with the purpose 
of examining the "possibilities of making progress towards the 
attainment of equality of treatment for Community and non-Community 
workers and the members of their families in respect of living and 
working conditions..". It is also specified that these exchanges 
of views would pertain to social and cultural questions and "would 
not be concerned with matters covered by the Agreement".
The merit of these declarations is that they open the 
possibility of filling in the gaps of the Agreement371. Social and 
cultural questions are very general terms which may indicate 
matters such as vocational training, education, housing372. So far,
371 As remarked by DUPOUY op.cit. p.22 the exchange of views 
shall not necessarily take place within the Cooperation Council. 
In the exchange of letters referred to above, it is specified that 
those exchanges of views will be held "in the context of talks to 
be arranged for that purpose".
372 See the opinion given by the Commission of Social Affairs 
of the European Parliament on the 24th September 1976 on the 
Cooperation Agreements concluded with Maghreb countries, cited by 
DUPOUY op.cit. p.28, and the Declaration of Algeria annexed to the 
Cooperation Agreement as regards the interpretation of the term
however, this declaration has not been followed by any concrete 
initiatives.
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3) An Evaluation of the Social Cooperation Provisions in the Light 
of Community Action Towards Third Country Migrant Workers.
An evaluation of the content of the social cooperation 
provisions depends on the terms of comparison applied. Member 
States legislation573, for instance can be restrictive as regards 
third country migrant workers and, therefore, in comparison, the 
rights granted in the Cooperation Agreement may be considered more 
progressive574.
'social and cultural matters'.
573 For Member State national legislation on residence, family 
reunion and employment see Commission report on social 
integration..op.cit.. pp.8-13.
574 As regards, for instance, the question of non­
discrimination, in Italy the principle of equal treatment of 
migrant workers in relation to national workers was introduced in 
1986 by an act of Parliament (Legge 943, 30 dicembre 1986) . This 
legislation set up the norms for the effective application of the 
ILO Convention 143 (5 June 1975) on migration in abusive conditions 
and the promotion of equality of opportunity and treatment of 
migrant workers. Therefore, it can be said that before the entry 
into force of this legislation, Maghreb workers enjoyed 
preferential treatment as compared with other workers coming from 
other third countries. See, for comments, PANICO.G. "L'estensione 
agli stranieri extracomunitari del trattamento nazionale in materia 
di esercizio di attività lavorative autonome" DCSI 1989, pp.17-38, 
p.19; ADINOLFI,A. "La nuova normativa sul collocamento dei 
lavoratori stranieri" RDI 1987, pp.73-100. Those who consider the 
principle of equal treatment as a minimum guarantee for migrant 
workers, should consider that The European Social Charter (ratified 
in Italy by an act of Parliament (legge 929/1965 GO 123, Suppl. 
3 August 1965) provides for "no less favoredsle treatment" for 
migrant workers of the area of the Council of Europe. The Charter 
of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, adopted by the European 
Council in December 1989, establishes, in the preamble, that extra- 
Community migrant workers shall be accorded "treatment comparable 
with that granted to the nationals of the Member State concerned": 
"Non si sancisce, quindi, il principio della parità di trattamento,
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On the contrary, as seen above, these sane provisions may be 
considered very modest if compared to some bilateral conventions 
that certain Member States have concluded with one or more of the 
Maghreb countries.
As regards the Community, general rules applicable to third 
country workers employed in one of the Community Member States do 
not exist.
However, the Commission has dealt with the question of third 
country migrant workers in the resolutions and programmes that it 
has adopted in the field of migration policy*75.
These resolutions and action programmes are not binding for 
the institutions and the member States, but aim to set up 
guidelines and principles for a future Community migration 
policy576. Based on a Council resolution adopted in 1974577, the 
Commission adopted a programme of action for migrant workers and 
their families. In the 1974 programme the Commission indicated, as 
the main objective of a migration policy, the application to third 
country migrant workers of the principle of equality of treatment 
with Community workers. Other actions proposed were the elimination
ma si 'legittimano' gli Stati membri a mantenere, o ad introdurre, 
un trattamento meno favorevole - sia pure di natura comparabile - 
per i lavoratori cittadini di Stati terzi".. ADINOLFI,A. Quale 
progresso con la Carta comunitaria dei diritti sociali? RDI 1989, 
pp.907-911, p.909, 910. In the words it allows the possibility of 
"levelling down".
575 See Commission Communication to the Council on an action 
programme for migrant workers and members of their families, 
submitted on 18 December 1974, EC Bull. Svop. 3/76; the 
Commission's guidelines for a Community policy or. migration, EEC 
Bull, SUPP - 9/85.
576 The Commission Decision for a procedure of preliminary 
consultation on migration policies as regards third countries will 
be discussed when examining the question of competence.
577 O.J. C 13 1974 p.l. The Council expressed its political 
will of adopting measures to achieve equality of treatment of 
Community and extra-Community workers as regards working auid living 
conditions, and other economic rights.
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of the requirement of nationality for the granting of certain 
services; the right of transferring pensions to the country of 
origin, the addition of insurance periods completed in the country 
of origin and in one or more Member States for the calculation of 
pensions, the application to third country workers of the treatment 
provided for in Community social security legislation for the 
period they reside in the Community.
Even if the Commission's proposals were for some aspects more 
ambitious them those contained in the Cooperation Agreements, it 
should be noted that Maghreb (with Turkish and ACP) nationals 
employed in the Community were, before the conclusion of agreements 
with EFTA and some Eastern European countries (see below) the only 
third country migrant workers were granted, at least in theory, 
some of these rights. The question which remains open is their 
effective application.
On the basis of Article 118519 of the EEC Treaty the Commission 
adopted Decision 85/381 in 1985 setting up a prior communication 
and consultation procedure on migration policy in relation to non- 
member countries579. It is worth noting that Commission Decision 
85/381 did not set up substantive rules in the field of migration 
policy concerning third country workers but rather provided only 
for a compulsory procedure of consultation and communication in 
this field*90. More precisely, Decision 85/381 required Member
578 This Article, contained in Title III of the EEC Treaty, 
social policy, empowers the Commission to promote close cooperation 
between Member States in the matters listed therein. It also 
establishes that the Commission shall act in close contact with 
Member States "by making studies, delivering opinions and arranging 
consultations".
579 O.J. L 217 1985, p.25.
590 It should be noted that consultation on migration policy 
as regards third country migrant workers was envisaged by the 
Council in its resolution of 1974, and in the action programme of 
the Commission, op.cit. p.25-27, and in the guidelines for a 
Community policy on migration op.cit. p.14. "..promotion of
consultation is only a first, esitant step in the direction of 
concertation and common action.." DUYSSENS,D. Migrant Workers from
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States to provide advance information on the measures they intend 
to take concerning third country migrant workers as regards "the 
entry, residence and employment, including illegal entry, residence 
and employment, as well as the realization of equality of treatment 
in living and working conditions, wages and economic rights, the 
promotion of integration into the workforce, society and cultural 
life, and the voluntary return of such persons to their countries 
of origin" (Article 1).
In joined cases 281, 283 to 285 and 287/85itx, five Member 
States, Germany, France, Netherlands, Denmark and the United 
Kingdom, asked the Court of Justice to declare this decision void 
on the grounds, inter alia, that the Commission lacked the 
competence to a) enact binding acts under Article 118 and b) deal 
in its Decision with the question of migration policy from third 
countries582.
The argument that Article 118 does not cover the field of 
migration policy in relation to non-member States583 was rejected by
Third Countries in the European Community CMLRev. 1977, pp.501-520, 
p.514.
5,1 Federal Republic of Germany and Others__ v. Commission.
9.07.1987, (1987) p. 3203.
582 The second main iurgument submitted by the parties was 
infringement of essential procedural requirements, since the 
Commission failed to consult the Economic and Social Committee as 
provided in Article 118: "Before delivering the opinions provided 
for in this Article the Commission shall consult the Economic and 
Social Committee". This argument was rejected by the Court on the 
ground that consultation of the Social and Economic Committee is 
not compulsory when the Commission arranges studies and 
consultations (para 39).
583 The reasons behind the proceedings were clearly explained 
by Advocate General Mancini: "..the Member States are genuinely -
or better, vitally - interested in preserving full control over 
the admission to their territory of workers from non-member 
countries, inter alia because of its obvious political and public- 
policy ramifications. Hence, their fear that in time this section 
will come within the ambit of the Community is a genuine one." 
"Community social policy has an individual role to play and should 
make an essential contribution to achieving the aforementioned
the Court5*4, which stated: "..the employment situation and, more 
generally, the improvement of living and working conditions within 
the Community are liable to be affected by the policy pursued by 
the Member States with regard to workers from non-member countries" 
(para 16)5*5.
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objectives by means of Community measures or the definition by the 
Community of objectives for national social policies, without 
however seeking a standard solution to till social problems or 
attempting to transfer to Community level anv responsibilities 
which are assumed more effectively at other levels "Council 
Resolution for a social action programme O.J. C 13 1974 p.l,
emphasis added, "..matters relating to the access, residence ernd 
employment of migrant workers from third countries fall under the 
jurisdiction of the governments of the Member States, without 
prejudice to Community agreements concluded with third countries" 
Council Resolution of 16 July 1985 EEC Bull. S 9/85 p.18. The 
Commission speaks of the overlapping of competencies between 
Community and national competence for migrant problems. EEC Bull. 
Supp. 9/85 p.9. See HEYNING,E. RMÇ 1974, p.112.
584 The Court has, however declared Decision 85/381 void on the 
ground that the a) it extended the scope of consultation to 
cultural integration, whereas its links with employment and working 
conditions is too vague and b) it required Member States to draft 
national measures and agreements to be in conformity with Community 
policies and actions (grounds 22 and 35) . See critical comments of 
SIMMONDS,K.R. The Concertation of Community Migration Policy 
CMLRev. 1988, pp.177-200, DECAUX,E. Note Arrêt 9 Juillet 1987,
aff.jtes 281,283,284,285 et 287/85 RTDE 1987 pp.701-716, who 
remarks that the Court's decision emphasized the economic-centred 
conception of social policy, p.715. The Commission adopted on June 
1988 a new Decision which took into account this decision of the 
Court of Justice. See O.J. L 183 1988 p.35.
5,5 The Court also rejected the argument that Article 118 
does not empower the Commission to adopt binding decisions to 
arrange consultations among Member States. "Where an article of the 
EEC Treaty - in this case Article 118 - confers a specific task on 
the Commission it must be accepted, if that provision is not to be 
rendered wholly ineffective, that it confers on the Commission 
necessarily and per se the powers which are indispensable in order 
to carry out that task" According to TRAVERSA,E. II coordinamento 
delle politiche migratorie nazionali nei confronti degli stranieri 
extracomunitari Riv.Dir.Eu. 1988, pp.5-22. p.15-16, the Court 
applied the principle of "effet utile" and not the theory of 
implied powers, since what was implied was not the power but the 
legal instrument. Contra see HARTLEY,T. The Commission as
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The decision of the Court does not seem to enlarge Community 
competence to the field of non-member States' migration policy***. 
However, its decision seems important for future development of the 
competence.
Improvement of living and working conditions are objectives 
pursued by the Community, as confirmed by the Court in Defrennei%1. 
Migration policy, the entry of third country migrant workers in the 
Community and the working and living conditions which are granted 
to them have important consequence in the functioning of the common 
market: the free movement of persons, which is one of the features 
of the internal market (see Article 8a EEC Treaty), could be 
jeopardized by the absence of harmonization of the rules applied 
at the Community external borders to third country migrant workers. 
The different treatment granted to third country workers as regards 
working conditions, pay, social security can affect the labor 
market and lead to distortion of competition (social dumping)5U.
Legislator under the EEC Treaty ELRev. 1988, pp.122-125, p. 124, and 
PLENDER,R. Competence, European Community Law and Nationals of Non- 
Member States ICLP 1990, pp.599-610, p.606.
586 The Court acknowledged the competence of the Member States 
in this field when it stated that "..in the present stage of 
development of Community law the subject-matter of the notification 
and consultation falls within the competence of the Member 
States" (peura 30) . Member States' exclusive competence to act in the 
matter of migration policy seemed to be confirmed by the Court when 
it stated that Decision 85/381 could not require Member States 
agreements and measures to be in conformity with Community policies 
(para 33).
5,7 Case 43/75, Defrenne v. Sabena 8.04.1976 (1976) p.455.
su The question was emphasized by the European Parliament in 
its resolution on migrauit workers from third countries "whereas 
the absence of a common immigration policy may have adverse 
consequences euid provoke increasingly acute tension on the European 
labor market, particularly as regards the illegal entry of 
manpower, clandestine employment, non-contractual working and pay 
conditions, the absence of social security protection and the 
development of a precarious economy based on social dumping" O.J. 
C 175 1090 p.180 (E). For the consequences of the discrimination 
between Community emd third countries workers on the labor market
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It could then be submitted that the Commission, on the basis 
of the link (established by the Court) between the improvement of 
living and working conditions within the Community and migration 
policy as regards third country workers could enlarge its 
competence to regulate this matter**9.
In 1985 a new programme (Guidelines for a Community policy on
590migration) was adopted by the Commission. Some of the questions 
concerning third country migrant workers (equal protection in the 
field of social security in relation to Community nationals, 
equality of treatment, aggregation of the insurance periods) seem 
to indicate that little progress has been achieved in this field 
since the 1976 Commission action programme591.
One of the issues arising from the Communication of 1985 has been 
the question of the policies of return migration. In this respect 
the Commission in its Guidelines for a Community policy on 
migration affirms that action in this field "should equally form 
one of the elements of the Community policy on cooperation and be 
implemented within the framework of the agreements concluded 
between the Community and those states, several of which contain
See GAJA La normativa comunitaria.. op.cit.. pp.153-154. The Social 
and Economic Committee of the Community in its opinion of 24 
October 1979 affirmed that "la mise en place d'un marché 
communautaire de 1'emploi devra comporter le transfert progressif 
à la compétence de la Communauté de la politique migratoire vis-à- 
vis des pays tiers" cited by TORRELLI, op.op.cit.. p.181.
589 For the competence of the Community to enact directives 
regulating those aspects of migration policy as regards third 
countries related to the free circulation in the Community see
ADINOLFI,A. I lavoratori extracomunitari.__ Norm__interne__Ê
internazionali. Bologna, il Mulino, pp.445-500.
590 EC Bull. Supp. 9/85
591 The proposal for a directive on the education of children 
of migrant workers was, according to the proposal of the 
Commission, addressed to the children of third country migrant 
workers as well (O.J. C 213 1975). Directive 77/486 only concerned 
the children of Member States workers, see O.J. L 199 1977.
* • • 592social provisions" .
It is possible, in a perspective of developing cooperation 
policy, to link this question with the issue of vocational 
training. The return to their country of origin of a specialized 
labor force could be an important element in the development of
• 503these countries .
The EEA Agreement with EFTA countries and the Europe 
Agreements with Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia contain 
provisions on workers. The former Agreement provides for a freedom 
of movement for workers among EEC Member States and Efta States.
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592 The question of vocational training may be very relevant 
in the framework of the reintegration of third country workers to 
their country of origin. As noted above, this matter is not 
regulated in the Cooperation Agreement. Bull EEC Supp. 9/85 1985 
p.11
593 There is of course an interest on the part of 
industrialized countries to foster the return of migrant workers 
to their countries of origin in a period, like the present, of high 
unemployment. The question of the relationship between migration 
and development cooperation policy is obviously much more complex, 
and because it goes beyond the scope of this section will not be 
discussed here. It sufficient to observe that it would be necessaxry 
to intervene at the root of the problem, with the elimination or 
the abatement of the necessity and interest of emigration by the 
creation of new jobs. It is, in the last analysis, a question which 
involves all the sectors of the economy. See PIERUCCI,A. Spunti per 
un'analisi del problema dell'emigrazione dai paesi meditemmei 
verso la Comunità Europea TIZZANO,A. La politica mediterranea...
op.cit.. p.436.
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DEVIATION FROM THE COOPERATION AGREEMENT PROVISIONS: DEROGATING AND 
SAFEGUARD CLAUSES.
The object of this section is to discuss the provisions of 
the Cooperation Agreements that authorize the contracting parties 
to deviate from certain rules established in the Agreement.
Under these rules the contracting parties are allowed to take 
measures which would, "per se", be in breach of the regime, but 
are, on the contrary, lawful for the reasons and within the limits 
which are going to be discussed in more detail hereafter.
A distinction may be made between a) derogation clauses which 
permit one or more contracting parties to depart, even permanently, 
from certain rules of the agreement to protect interests or values 
which have priority over the rules established in the agreement and 
b) safeguard clauses, allowing the contracting parties to deviate 
temporarily from the established regime to face certain events 
haurmful to their economy. The insertion of such clauses in an 
agreement may be justified by the fact that the "normal life" of 
an agreement may be hampered by several circumstances which can 
be anticipated only approximately, in particular if the agreement 
is concluded for an unlimited period. When the equilibrium of the 
regime is perturbed by such facts, safeguard clauses are a means 
available to a contracting paurty to modify, even if for a limited 
period, contractual obligation to protect its own interests 
("safety valves"594) without recurring to revision or amendments
595of the Agreement .
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594 The expression seems to have been used for the first time 
by Advocate General Dutheillet de Lamothe in case 37/70 ECR (1971) 
p.43. See TALGORN, C. Les accord externes de la C.E.E.. Les mesures 
de sauvegarde dans le cadre des accords externes de la C.E.E. RTDE 
1976 pg. 695-727, pp.697.
595 The problem of adaptation of international agreement to 
changing circumstances has been discussed by WEILER,J.H. 
Obsolescence amd adaptability in Mediterranean Cooperation 
Agreements: a Case Study in TIZZANO,A. (ed) La Politica mediterranea 
__ op.cit. pp.476-490. According to this author derogations are
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It emerges from this definition that the two types of clause 
differ with respect to the reasons justifying the deviation, the 
extension of the deviation and the subjects which can legitimately 
invoke them.
What then is the common denominator and what is the value of 
discussing these provisions ? As regards the first question, it 
should be noticed that, with perhaps one exception, these articles 
allow for deviation from those trade rules established in the 
Agreement which are at the core of the relationships between the 
Community and its the Mediterranean Partners.
Besides, both types of clauses have the effect of conferring 
a certain degree of elasticity on the system which provides for 
them (in particular if this is established, as in this case, by an 
agreement of indefinite duration) and, as a consequence, favor the 
conclusion of the agreement. In other words, each contracting party 
is more disposed to accept the contractual obligations deriving 
from the agreement because it has the possibility of revoking 
them596. The agreement is thus not perceived as a permanent 
limitation to its sovereignty. On the other side of the coin, 
safeguard clauses may be perceived as introducing an element of 
uncertainty in the relations and rules of procedure governing the 
adoption of the measures may be adopted to water down this feature. 
Second, these clauses may be used as a means of protection or to 
evade at least some of the advantages granted to Maghreb countries, 
but can also be applied consistently with the scope of the 
Agreement.
Derogations and safeguard clauses are a common feature of 
international trade agreements and economic treaty. They are
one of the mechanisms of flexibility provided for in the agreement.
596 See LEJEUNE,M.A. Un droit de Temps de crise: les clauses de 
sauvegarde de la cee Bruylant, Bruxelles, 1975, MANIN,A."A propos 
des clauses de sauvegarde", RTDE 1970 pp.1-42, p.16.
contained for instance in GATT*97, in the EEC Treaty*9*, and in most 
agreements concluded by the Community with third countries in the
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§97 •The distinction between safeguard clauses and derogation 
measures could be applied as well to GATT which contains several 
clauses allowing the contracting parties to deviate from the 
provisions of the Agreement. Safeguard clauses are contained in 
Article XIX, permitting the partial or total suspension of the 
obligation or the withdrawal or modification of the concessions in 
the case of market disruption; Article XII allowing the adoption 
of import restriction (both in quantity or value) to safeguard the 
balance of payment; derogation provisions are Article XVIII 
providing for deviations from GATT provisions justified for 
economic development reasons; Article XXIV allowing derogations in 
the case of the establishment of free trade areas and customs 
unions, Article XX establishing the compatibility with the 
Agreement of measures taken to protect public morals, human, animal 
or plant life or health, importation or exportation of gold and 
silver. Article XXI authorizing the adoption of measures necessary 
for security reasons; Article XXV where departure is justified by 
exceptional circumstances.See J.H.JACKSON World Trade .... op.cit. 
pp.81-99.
cnm * • * «It is to be noticed that a certain parallelism exists 
between the articles of GATT and the EEC Treaty providing the 
possibility of deviating from the regime established by the two 
instruments. The general safeguard clause of the EEC Treaty, 
contained in Article 226 is, however, no longer applicable, since 
the provision only applied during the transitional period. 
According to Pescatore safeguard clauses are an element of 
unpredictability in a system of permanent integration and this one 
would be undermined by the maintenance of national safeguard 
clauses after the end of the transitional period. See intervention 
P.PESCATORE in L'Union Douanière à 1'Onion Economique Institut 
d'Etudes Juridiques Européennes, Liège, 1970 p.256. On the utility 
and necessity of having a general safeguard clause after the expiry 
of the transitional period see OPPERMANN,M.T. "La légitimité et 
1'opportunité des clauses de sauvegarde dans un régime de marché 
commun" Ibidem, pp.209-217. Specific clauses of derogation are 
contained in Articles 108 and 109 in the case of difficulties 
regarding balance of payments, and Article 115, which justifies the 
adoption of protective measures against third countries' products 
which are in free circulation within the Community due to 
differences between the commercial policies of member States.(see 
infra for an extensive analysis of this article) . Other clauses are 
contained in the EEC Treaty permitting the derogation from certain 
articles for non-economic reasons: Article 36 (see supra Part I, 
Chapter 1), 48(3), 56(1) and 224.
field of trade599.
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1) Derogation Clauses.
l.a) The "common agricultural policy" clause.
(Art. 25 of the Cooperation Agreement with Morocco).
This clause considers the possible modification which may take 
place in the field of the common agricultural policy of the 
Community. In the event that specific rules are adopted by the 
Community, as a consequence of the modification, implementation or 
development of the common agricultural policy, the Community is 
allowed to unilaterally modify the provisions of the Agreement 
which deal with the products concerned.
It should be observed that this clause does not provide for 
a temporeury deviation from a given regime (trade in agricultural 
products) to give a contracting party time to adjust to new 
circumstances, as is the case for safeguard clauses, but open the 
possibility of a permanent modification of the agreement. In 
substance, the clause permits amendment of the Agreement without 
reopening negotiations. As discussed above in the section on 
agriculture, the common agricultural policy constitutes a severe 
limit as far as agricultural trade preferences offered by the 
Community to Maghreb exports are concerned. This clause seems to 
guarantee the prevalence for this policy over the provisions on 
agricultural trade.
The Community enjoys a large discretionary power under this 
clause and can decide to modify the agreement even without
599 A comparative study of the various safeguard measures 
contained in the Agreement concluded by the Community indicates 
that the more complex are the relationships established, the more 
numerous and specific are these type of clauses. See TALGORN,C. 
Les mesures de sauvegarde dans le cadre des accords extemes de la 
CEE RTDE 1978 p.695-727, p.711.
consulting the other party if the latter does not require it 
expressly. The only condition that the Community has to respect 
is to maintain the balance of the regime. It is in fact established 
that the Community shall in the case of modification of the 
arrangements made in the Agreement accord the other contracting 
party advantages comparable to those conferred by the Agreement. 
Such a comparison seems however rather difficult to establish in 
particular as regards the criteria that shall be applied: could a 
restriction on imports of, say, aubergine be compensated by a 
reduction of the reference price for artichokes, or a prolongation 
of a high season for oranges?.
Moreover, the advantages that the Community can grant under Article 
concern "imports originating in Morocco" and it could therefore be 
argued that the Community could balance the modified arrangements 
on agriculture with advantages on products other than agricultural 
ones.
l.b) "Development" clauses.
These are contained in Articles 27 and 28.
As already discussed above, Maghreb countries apply to trade 
with the Community the most favored nation clause (Art.27.1). The 
Cooperation Agreements in Art. 27 paragraphs 2 and 3 provides for 
the possibility open to Maghreb countries to derogate from such 
provision for two reasons. The first is the creation of more 
integrated systems such as free trade areas and customs unions.
This provisions does not require a specific comment since the 
derogation from most favored nation clause is provided for in 
Article XXIV of GATT600.
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600 The derogation provided for in this article is justified 
with the fact that customs unions and free trade areas are a means 
of increasing freedom of trade. It is obvious that these forms of 
commercial integration may as well be the origin of trade 
diversion, this is why the contracting parties in Article XXIV.4 
affirm that the "purpose of customs union or of free-trade area 
should be to facilitate trade between the constituent territories
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The second reason justifying the derogation, the economic 
integration of Maghreb or the application of measures benefiting 
developing countries, is more original. The two reasons may overlap 
if the integration of Maghreb take the form of a customs union or 
of a free trade area, but the fact of keeping the integration of 
Maghreb as a separate hypothesis seems to mean that this may take 
different forms and that it is considered a sufficient reason to 
justify the derogation from the application of the most favored 
nation clause. It should be remembered that the integration of 
Maghreb should be enhanced by other provisions of the agreement 
such as those establishing specific rules of origin for these 
countries601.
Article 28 does not provide for a deviation from a specific 
rule of the Agreement but establishes the possibility of 
introducing new customs duties, charges having equivalent effect 
to customs duties, new quantitative restrictions or measures having 
equivalent effect to imports and exports of the Community when 
these are justified by Morocco industrialization and development 
requirements. Articles 27 and 28 should be read together because, 
although the specific reasons for which derogation is admitted
listed in both the provisions are different they all respond to the
602same concern, the development of Morocco .
and not to raise barriers to the trade of other contracting parties 
with such territories", paragraph 5 lists the requirements that 
have to be fulfilled to this hand. It is interesting to note that 
the impulse for a regional integration clause in GATT came from 
developing countries. See JACKSON, World trade., op.cit. p.603.
601 See for comparison the Association Agreement concluded with 
Morocco in 1969 Art.4.3 where it was specified that the 
establishment of customs unions or free trade areas, which could 
justify a derogation from the most favored nation clause, could, 
on the contrary, not have "the effect of modifying the trade 
arrangements laid down in this Agreement, and in particular the 
rules of origin".
602 This can be extended to the creation of customs unions and 
free trade areas, which are likely to be concluded with countries 
of the same geographical areas, thus developing countries.
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The main reason for two parties to conclude an agreement is 
that of regulating certain aspects of their relationship to 
achieve a common goal. In the case of conflicting interests the 
agreement should secure an equilibrium between them. The derogatory 
clauses tend, on the contrary, to alter this equilibrium in favor 
of one contracting party, (although this "alteration" may be in 
certain cases only temporary), with the risk of deferring the 
achievement of the main scope of the agreement.
If applied, both articles 27 and 28 would undoubtedly modify 
the balance of the Agreement603, but in these cases the derogation 
does not aim at protecting a specific interest of a contracting 
party despite the aim of the agreement. On the contrary, the 
derogation takes place for the attainment of the Agreement ultimate 
goal.
The measures adopted for the economic integration of 
Maghreb and for the benefit of developing countries shall be 
notified to the Community. For new charges adopted under Art. 28 
consultations shall be held within the Cooperation Council if 
requested by the other contracting party. This possibility is 
provided for only by Art. 28 and this may be explained by the fact 
that this article provides not for a derogation (non-application) 
of the rules but for the adoption of new charges and those may be 
discussed with the Community if it requires so. This consultation 
does not mean that the charges may be negotiated, but discussions 
may be held, information exchanged to make the application of the 
measures less onerous for the other contracting party.
l.c) "Non-economic" and Security Derogating Clauses.
603 One should note that the Association agreement of 1969 was 
careful to establish that derogations were admitted on the 
condition that the balance of the agreement was maintained, see 
Articles 4.3 and 7.1.
Art. 35 of the Cooperation Agreement establishes that "The 
Agreement shall not preclude prohibition or restriction on imports, 
exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of public 
morality, public policy or public security; the protection of 
health and life of humans, euiimals or plants; the protection of 
national treasures of artistic, historic or archeological value; 
the protection of industrial and commercial property, or rules
604relating to gold or silver .
The interpretation of this provision has been discussed in 
Part I of this thesis and reference can be made to this analysis. 
This section will consider only the question of non discrimination.
There is a risk of misuse in the application of these types 
of derogatory measures and the danger of their being transformed 
in instrument of protectionism. Therefore Art.35 established that 
prohibitions or restrictions shall not be used as means of 
arbitrary discrimination or disguised restriction on trade, which 
means that the restriction must not be disproportionate as regards 
the aim they pursue.
As regards the question of non discrimination Article 35 has 
caused a problem of interpretation and to an exchange of letters 
annexed to the Agreement.
The principle of non-discrimination is further specified in 
the agreement in Art.54 which prohibit any discrimination by 
Morocco between member States, their nationals, companies or firms 
and by the Community between Moroccan national, companies or firms.
According to Morocco Art.35 and 54 of the Agreement do not require 
the repeal of laws and regulations in force "in so far as they 
remain necessary for the protection of its essential security 
interests. Morocco will see to it that such laws and regulations
320
604 This reason is the only one which is not contained in 
Art.36 EEC Treaty.
are applied in such a way as to ensure compliance with Art .51 .l^of 
the Agreement". In its declaration the Community affirms of 
expecting the full application of the principles of the 
Agreement,"including those in Articles 35 and 54..".
This question is related to the boycott of the Arab League 
against companies and undertakings which entertain relationships 
with Israel. In practice with this declaration Morocco intended to 
affirm that it is allowed to prohibit or restrict trade only 
against those Member States companies and firms trading with 
Israel606, (a discrimination justified on the ground that only those 
firms are a danger for its public security). However, prohibition 
of discrimination is clearly established in the Agreement and a 
breach cannot be justified by reasons of public security which only 
admits restriction of trade and cannot be invoked to justify a 
breach of any other provisions.
Thus in the case one Maghreb country prohibits trade with a 
specific European firm on the basis of its relationships with 
Israel, it breaches article 35, since the prohibition is not 
applied following the criteria set up in this provision, and 
Article 54 on the general prohibition of discrimination.
Leaving aside the question whether the fact of trading with 
Israel could constitute a threat for Arab countries security, one 
should ask whether the declarations annexed to the agreement modify 
the legal value of the obligations that the parties have assumed 
under the provisions here discussed. The emswer could not be but
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605 "The Contracting Parties shall take any general or specific 
measures required to fulfil their obligations under the Agreement. 
They shall see to it that the objectives set out in the Agreement 
are attained".
606 The boycott was also applied to firms whose managers were 
Jewish or even in cases where the Davis star was applied on the 
packing as reported by RUZIE,D. "Le principe de non-discrimination 
dans les accords de cooperation conclus entre la CEE et les pays 
du bassin mediterremeen" in TOOSCOZ.La Communauté Economique 
Européenne élargie et la Méditerranéenne: Quelle Coopération ? 
Colloque CEDECE, Puf, Paris, 1982 PP.228-234.
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negative when one considers that the Community clearly expresses 
its disagreement on the interpretation given to articles 35 and 54 
by Maghreb countries607,
The Cooperation Agreement contains in Title IV (General and 
Final Provisions) Article S3 empowering the Contracting Parties to 
take measures they consider necessary "to avoid disclosure of 
information contrary to their essential security interests", 
measures related to "trade of arms, munitions and war materials, 
to research, development or production indispensable tor defence 
purposes, provided that such measures do not impair the conditions 
of competition in respect of products not intended for specifically 
military purposes" and in general measures "essential to its 
security in time of war or serious international tensions". All 
these reasons allow deviation from any of the agreement provisions 
(the formula used is that "nothing in this Agreement shall prevent 
a Contracting Party from taking any measures.."). The competence 
of adopting these measures remains within the Member States in this 
case more clearly than in Article 35. Clearly in the field, of 
security and defence, the sovereignty of a state does not tolerate 
any constraint and require the highest freedom to act.
2) Safeguard Clauses.
As mentioned above safeguard clauses are "security valves" 
provided for in any trade agreement to allow contracting parties 
to protect their interests when certain events cause injury to 
their economy, perturbing the equilibrium between the advantages 
obtained by the agreement and the obligation deriving from it.
A07 All the other exchanges of letters annexed to the agreement 
contain a specific formula that the parties add to their 
declarations respectively asking for and giving acknowledgement of 
receipt of the letter", which can be considered the standard ways 
to express consent over the content of the declaration. See in this 
sense RUZIE,D. he principe de non-discrimination..op.clt. p. 232.
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The specific features of safeguard clauses (distinguishing 
them from other derogation clauses also provided for in the 
cooperation agreement), is that they react against events harmful 
for the economy of the parties and that they have a temporary 
application.
A distinction is usually made in international economic law60* 
between safeguard clauses and anti-dumping and anti-subsidies 
clauses. These latter are measures taken against practices of 
dumping and state aids. Dumping is the selling of products exported 
from a third country at a cheaper price them that paid in the 
country of origin for a like product. Bounties and subsidies are 
aids accorded by the state of origin of the product exported 
regarding its manufacturing,production or export and having an 
effect on its price.
Although the prejudice for the economy is also required for 
the application of safeguard measures, the two types of measures 
have different scope. Safegueurd measures aim at isolating the 
market and protecting it from the competition, giving the 
contracting party having adopted such measures time to adjust to 
the situation of crisis.
In the case of dumping injury for domestic economy is one of the 
condition for the application of anti-dumping duties which aim at 
eliminating an unfair trade practice. Anti-dumping and 
countervailing duties can be considered as "counter-measures" and 
aim at the abolition of the discrimination between prices of the 
imported and the domestic products. However, it has been argued 
that the method of application of anti-dumping duties in the 
Community has the scope of alleviating injury emd that the EEC
601 See Jackson, J .K. Legal problems., op. cit. p. 539. The 
criterion of distinction between safeguard and anti-dumping 
measures is the qualification of the commercial practices to which 
these measures respond as fair or unfair. This differentiation is 
opposed by Kleen which argues that the two concepts (fair and 
unfair) "are highly subjective and deeply rooted in Anglo-Saxon 
policy tradition" see KLEEN,P. The Safegueurd issue in the Uruguay 
Round-A Comprehensive Approach JWTL 1989 pp.73-91, p.80.
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anti-dumping policy is undistinguishable, as far as its effects 
are concerned, from those deriving from the application of
609safeguard measures .
Dumping and subsidies are not prohibited per se, and are the 
object of anti-dumping and anti-subsidies duties only when dumped 
or subsidized imports cause injury to the domestic industry 
concerned6,0.
The safeguard clauses (for simplification this term will 
include anti-dumping and emti-subsidies measures) of the 
Cooperation Agreement with Morocco are contained in Arts. 36- 
38(39) .
For each cooperation agreement concluded with Maghreb 
countries the Community has enacted a regulation611 laying down 
rules for the implementation of safeguard clauses (including anti­
dumping and anti-subsidies clauses and measures that can be taken 
under Art.51). These regulations contain the rules of procedure 
that the institutions concerned, EEC Council and Commission, have 
to follow when safeguard measures eire applied by the Community.
The parties of the Cooperation Agreement are also bound by 
the rules of procedure established in Art.38 which concern the 
phase of consultation (before and after the adoption of the 
measures) within the Cooperation Council.
609 See NICOLAIDES,P. Anti-dumping Measures as Safeguards: the 
Case of the EC Interec. 1990 pp.273-279, on the limitation of anti­
dumping as instrument of protecting trade see WEIDEMANN,R. The 
Anti-dumping Policy of the European Communities, Interec. 1990 pp. 
28-35.
610 See Article VI GATT "The contracting parties recognize that 
dumping.... is to be condemned if it causes or threatens material 
injury to an established industry in the territory of a contracting 
party ..." The same concept is expressed in Article 2 of EEC anti­
dumping Regulation 2423/88 11.07.1988 O.J. L 209 1988.
6,1 Regulation 1662/77 for Morocco, regulation. 1663/77 for 
Algeria and regulation 1664/77 for Tunisia. All are published in 
O.J. L 186 266.07.1977 pp.9-15. For further comments see infra.
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2.a) Anti-dumping and Subsidies Measures.
The first indent of Art. 36 provided for the possibility open 
to any Contracting Party to adopt appropriate measures against 
dumping. This practice is not defined in article 36 which 
establishes that anti-dumping measures may be taken "in accordance 
with the Agreement on implementation of Art. VI of the General 
Agreement on tariffs and trade"612.
The agreement mentioned in Art.36 is the GATT anti-dumping 
code613 laying down rules concerning the calculation of the normal 
value of a product and of the dumping maurgin (the difference 
between the price of the dumped product and that of the domestic 
product) , the determination of injury, the procedure of the various 
phases of inquiries and for the application of anti-dumping duties.
The second indent of Art. 36 providing for the possibility of 
the adoption of measures against subsidies and bounties also refers 
to Article VI of GATT.
In the event of anti-dumping or anti-subsidies measures it 
seems therefore that there is not distinction between the rules 
applied by the Community against exports from Morocco, Algeria or 
Tunisia the Community and those applied against dumping or 
subsidies from other exporting countries. The only exceptions are 
the rules of procedures contained in the regulations cited above. 
It should however be asked whether the Community can apply its own 
anti-dumping regulation614 to its Maghreb partners or it is linked
612 Article VI of GATT does not prohibit dumping, but 
authorizes the contracting parties to offset the effects of this 
practice. See JACKSON,J.H. DAVEY,W.J. Legal Problems.. op.cit. 
p.664.
6.3 The first code was adopted in 1967, replaced by a new 
version in 1979.
6.4 At present regulation 2423/88 O.J. L 209 02.08.1988 p.l is 
in force. The application of the community anti-dumping regulation 
to the anti-dumping measures that may be taken under the Morocco
only by the GATT anti-dumping code. It could be argued that the 
reference to this instrument in Article 36 of the Cooperation 
Agreement excludes the application of other rules. This does not 
seem a correct interpretation. Article 36 in fact does not say that 
the source of anti-dumping law is to be found in Article VI and in 
the Anti Dumping Code but that the measures will be taken "in 
accordance" with these instruments. It could therefore be submitted 
that since the anti-dumping regulation of the Community takes them 
into account615, the Community is legz mate to apply its regulation 
to Morocco, Algeria auid Tunisia. This seems to be confirmed by the 
fact that regulation 1662/77 laying down the rules for the 
implementation of Articles 36, 37 and 51 of the Agreement refers 
to the Community anti-dumping regulation which was in force at that 
time.
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2 .b) Safeguard Measures.
2.b.i) Regional and Sectorial Disturbances. Article 37.
Cooperation Agreement is established in regulation 1662/77 (o.J. 
L 186 26.07.1977) laying down rules for the implementation of 
Articles 36,37, aund 51 of the Agreement. The regulation obviously 
refers to the anti-dumping regulation in force in 1977. The anti­
dumping regulation (see preamble of regulation 2423/88) has been 
adopted taking into account GATT anti-dumping code even if as faur 
as some elements are concerned the regulation "cut loose from this 
textual bond". See NORALL,C. The Sew Amendments to the EC's Basic 
Anti-dumping Regulation CMLRev. 1989, pp.83-101.
615 See NORALL.C. Ibidem. In the Uruguay Round negotiations 
complaints had been advanced by some countries like Japan or new 
industrialized countries against the anti-dumping rules adopted by 
the Community. "Each country has its own procedures for dealing 
with alleged cases of dumping, though all are supposedly consistent 
with the broad rules of Article VI of the GATT and the GATT anti­
dumping codes..However, since the GATT rules are framed in very 
broad terms, the national procedures may respect the letter but not 
the intention of those rules" DAVENPORT,M. The Economics of 
Antidumping and the Uruguay Round Interec. 1990 pp. 267-273, p.268.
The circumstances allowing the adoption of safeguard measures 
provided for in Art.37 are rather indeterminate. Although in the 
case of application of dumping or subsidies the determination of 
the practice of dumping or state aid may be difficult to assess, 
the GATT anti-dumping code and GATT Article VI provide for specific 
criteria to be followed. The causes mentioned in Art.37 justifying 
the application of safeguard measures are very general and liable 
to be the object of different interpretations. The same applies to 
the measures that can be adopted. In case of dumping and subsidies 
these are anti-dumping duties and countervailing duties, whereas 
Article 37 leaves indeterminate the content of the safeguard 
measures. The article establishes that "If serious disturbances 
arise in any sector of the economy or if difficulties arise which 
might bring about serious deterioration in the economic situation 
of a region, the Contracting Party concerned may take the necessary 
safeguard measures under the conditions and in accordance with the 
procedures laid down in Article 38".
The indeterminateness as regards both the situations 
justifying the adoptions of the safeguard measures and the type of 
measures that can be adopted is explained by the impossibility to 
foresee all the situation of crisis that may arise and jeopardize 
the normal application of the agreement and that contracting 
parties should be free, within the limits established in the 
agreement itself, to adopt the measures most adapt to the 
particular situation.
The provision however, together with Article 38 - establishing 
the rules of procedure to be followed when safeguard clauses are 
applied - , gives some elements which may help to define the range 
of application of the rule and its conditions of application.
First, the market disturbance must be of a certain gravity, 
the provision speaks of "serious disturbances", "serious 
deterioration"; the injury caused to a contracting party adopting 
such measures is not explicitly mentioned but can be considered to 
be absorbed in the idea of gravity. In other terms if the market
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disturbance does not cause injury to the economy of a contracting 
party it cannot be considered a serious deterioration of the 
situation. The market disruption it is not however necessarily 
actual: measures of safeguard are in fact admitted "it difficulties 
arise which might bring about a serious deterioration in the 
economic situation of a region..". It seems nevertheless that the 
criterion of gravity should apply in this case as well and that the 
menace of the deterioration shall be real, based on factual 
evidence and not only supposed (for instance a trend of increase 
of imports of sensible products with a parallel increase of stock 
or the closing down of firms producing these products) likely to 
cause injury if it is not stopped.
In the second place it could be asked whether the disturbances 
shall be caused by the application of the agreement or/and by 
reasons not directly connected to it. The answer cannot be univocal 
for all safeguard measures and depends on the single provisions.
Article 27 of the Cooperation Agreement does not specify and 
therefore it can be submitted that safeguard measures may respond 
to market disturbances due both to the application of the agreement 
and/or to causes independent from it616.
As a second element of specification provided for in Article 
37 one should mention the case of serious disturbances in a sector
6,6 Article 27 may be compared with Article 177 of the IV Lomé 
Convention and with Article XIX of GATT. The former provision seems 
to require that the perturbation justifying the adoption of 
safeguard measures shall be caused by "the application of the 
present chapter". The text of the Convention is reported in The 
Courier n.120, March-April 1990. As regards Article XIX the 
conditions laid down in this provision are very definite, and for 
the application of safeguard measures it is required that the 
perturbation (that is the imports of any product into the territory 
of that contracting party in such increased quantities and under 
such conditions as to cause or threaten to cause serious injury to 
domestic producers in that territory of like or directly 
competitive products) is "a result of unforeseen development and 
of the effect of the obligations incurred by a contracting party 
under this Agreement, including tariff concessions..". See JACKSON, 
J.H. World Trade... o p .cit. pp.553-573.
of the economy or in the economic situation of a region.
Both these notions617 are left undetermined. The term sector 
of the economy may indicate a branch of economy like agriculture 
or industry, but it may also be referred to a "sub-sector" like 
the production of fruits and vegetables in agriculture or even a 
more specific sector like for instance, always in agriculture, the 
production of citrus fruits.
For the application of these criteria to safeguard measures 
applied in 1977 by the Community6lt within the framework of the 
Cooperation Agreements with Morocco and Tunisia it could be 
observed that the safeguard measures (import authorization within 
certain quota limits) were justified by the "market disruption" 
and by "substantial injury to Community producers" due to the 
increase of imports of specific textile products such as woven 
fabrics of cotton, men's and women's trousers, jerseys, men's 
suits, and dresses and skirts. The increase of imports were 
particularly relevant in the market of "one or more Member States" 
(the term "eureas" of the Community is also used) .
It seems thus to be confirmed that the notion of sector may 
cover very specific production and that the meurket disruption may 
be limited to one or more member states (the Annex of the 
regulation establishes the quantities of the products for which 
import authorization is issued automatically, and indicates the 
Member States to which these measures apply.
It can be submitted that both the terms region and sector mean 
that the economic deterioration should be enough determined and 
specific so that a safeguard measure could be effective. It would
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6,7 For the question of the possible overlapping of 
disturbances in a region or in a sector of the economy see TALGORN, 
C. Les Mesures de Sauvegarde de la Communauté Economique europeenne 
dans ses Relations avec les Etats Tiers. Université de Rennes, 
These 1979.pp.287-288.
618 Regulation 1860/77 10.08.1977 O.J. L 207 13.08.1977 p.30. 
applied until 31.12.1977.
be rather pointless to invoke a safeguard measure to face a general 
situation of difficulty. Evidence must be shown that the measures 
are effective to counteract the situation and to allow the return 
to the previous situation when possible. If this is true for 
safeguards measures in general, it should apply in particular in 
the case of Cooperation Agreement to avoid that the use of 
safeguard measures could be detrimental to the scope of the 
agreement.
The meaning of the term region may changes if this is related 
to Morocco or to the Community. In the first case it cannot but 
designate a part of the State, whereas in the second case it may 
indicate a geographical area covering more member States , a single 
State or even a part of a member State.
Do regional disturbances imply the adoption of regional 
safeguard measures?
The question is relevant for the Community when the region is 
identified with a Member State and not in the case of disturbances 
arising in a territorial part of a Member State: this second
hypothesis shall be identified with that of safeguard measures 
limited to one member State.
A declaration by the Community annexed to the Cooperation 
Agreement specifies that the application of the measures taken 
under Articles 36 and 37 "may be limited to one of its regions by 
virtue of Community rules".
It should first be considered that the possibility of adopting 
a regime applicable to the whole Community in the case of regional 
disturbances has been admitted by the Court of Justice6,9. Such a 
solution seems moreover more in conformity with the establishment 
of the common market than the application of regional protective 
measures which is on the other hand expressly provided for by the 
Community in its regulation 822/82, on common rules for imports
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619 Case 40/72 Shroeder 7.02.1973 (1973) p.125.
(Articles 15.3.a.) and 16.2.)620.
As it is well known products imported in a member State from 
a third country which have complied with customs duties and charges 
having equivalent effect are free to circulate within the common 
market as any other product which is produced in the Community (see 
EEC Treaty Article 10)621.
Thus, according to this principle regional protective measures 
could be sidestepped by third countries importing via other member 
States to which safeguard measures do not apply.
In reality the possibility for a member state to deviate from 
the principle of free circulation is admitted in the Treaty. It was 
in fact (correctly) assumed that even after the transitional period 
a common commercial policy would have not been fully achieved, 
therefore, to avoid that national measures622 of commercial policy,
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620 For the application of safeguard measures limited to one 
member State see regulation 1087/84 18.04.1984 for quartz clock 
imported in France , O.J. L 106 1984 p.31. See DEMARET, P. La 
politique commerciale commune:perspectives d'évolution et 
faiblesses présentes. SCHWARZE,J. SCHERMERS, H.G (eds.) Structure 
and Dimensions of European Community Policy Nomos, Baden-Baden 1988 
pp.69-110 p.88. According to Timmermans measures of regional 
protection are incompatible with a common commercial policy 
"Protective import arrangements under Article 113..should be 
based...on an overall assessment of the situation of Community 
producers", regional protection could be successful only in 
particular cases such as perishable goods or goods with high 
transport costs. TIMMERMANS, C.W.A. Community Commercial Policy on 
Textiles: a Legal Imbroglio, VÖLKER, E.L.M. Protectionism and the 
European Community Kluwer, Deventer 1987, pp. 159-183, p. 168. One 
should remark that according to Article 37 of the Cooperation 
Agreement with Morocco the assessment of disturbances is made on 
a regional or sectorial basis.
621 To avoid traffic deviation the principle of free 
circulation requires that a uniform regime is applied at the 
Community external borders, hence the establishment of a Common 
Customs Tariff and of a common commercial policy.
622 As an example the national quotas applied by the member 
States before the establishment of the Community and those 
permitted under regulation 288/82 (annex I) .
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maintained after the transitional period, and authorized by the 
Community, could be threatened by deviation of traffic causing 
economic difficulties in the member State concerned?*3 the 
application of a "safeguard clause of a transitional nature"624, 
contained in Article 115, was admitted.
Article 115 however, does not seem applicable to measures 
established by the Community even if these set up a different 
regime between Member States.
In a recent case however, the Court of Justice has admitted 
recourse to Article 115 for the application (case Tezi 59/84 (87) 
p.64) of national sub-quotas provided for in a Community regime 
for the application of the MFA625 on the basis of the lack of 
uniformity of the regime established by the Community626.
623 See for the requirements to be fulfilled and the procedures 
to be followed in the case of the application of Article 115, 
Commission Decision 87/433 22.07.1987 O.J. L 238 21.08.1987. This 
decision applies to imports in a member state of third countries's 
products which are not the object of a common regime.
624 This expression is used by TIMMERMANS, Community Commercial 
Policy on Textile., op.cit. p.170.
625 The Multi Fiber Agreement. Global ceiling are set up for 
imports of textile products. These ceilings are divided into 
national sub-quotas. Extended several times it provided for the 
possibility of applying restriction on textile trade to protect 
the industry of importing countries when these are threatened by 
market disruption. Article 4 of the MFA provided for the 
possibility of concluding bilateral agreement to this purpose.
626 The Court justified the application of Article 115 on the 
basis of the non uniformity of the regime established by the 
Community. As underlined by TIMMERMANS the question of uniformity 
of a regime would require further specification for the application 
of this case-law to other measures, such as those of regional 
protection. See TIMMERMANS C.W.A. La libre circulation des 
marchandises et la politique commerciale commune in DEMARET, P.
fielutiçns Extérieures <He 1*__Communauté Européenne et marché
intérieur:__aspects juridiques et fonctionnels Colloque 1987,
Collège d'Europe, Bruges, Story-Scientia pp.91-108, on p.102. This 
judgment of the Court has been criticized by mauiy authors see 
TIMMERMANS, C.W.A. The Community Commercial Policy on Textiles.. 
op.cit. pp.174-177, CREMONA, M. The Completion...op.cit. pp. 293- 
297. For a positive evaluation of these cases see LENAERTS, K. Les
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The case discussed in Tezi is different from that of 
safeguard measures, but both MFA national sub-quotas627 and 
safeguard measures: a) are established by the Community, b)maintain 
a regime of disparity among the member state and c) may be 
undermined by the application of the principle of the free 
circulation. Therefore the reasons justifying the adoption of 
Article 115 in the case of national sub-quotas discussed in Tezi 
could be justified the application of this provision to regional 
safeguard measures as well628.
The application of Article 115 in these cases, if admitted, 
is to be criticized, in particular in the perspective of 1992629 
because it would maintain national differences and delaying the 
establishment of a common commercial policy630.
répercussion des compétences de la Communauté européenne sur les 
compétences externes des Etats membres et la question de 
'preemption' DEMARET, P. Relations Extériures.. 1987 pp.37-62 on 
pp. 44-45.
627 There are in fact other cases in which the Community quotas 
are split up into national sub-quotas which are justified as method 
of administer import restrictions. See regulation 1023/70 O.J. L 
124 1970. See VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT Introduction to the Law of the 
EEC pp. 809, and TIMMERMANS, C.W.A. Community Commercial Policy on 
Textiles., op.cit. p.167 who submits that the national sub-quotas 
under the MFA are national protective measures.
628 Article 115 has been applied as a consequence of a measure 
of regional protection concerning France against Turkish imports 
of textile products. See decision 82/577 O.J. L 243 1982 (July 
1982). Cited by Timmermans in Community Commercial Policy on 
Textiles., p. 177.
629 See MATTERA RICIGLIANO,A. II Mercato Unico.. o p .cit. 
pp.643-644.
630 See CREMONA, M. The Completion. .o p .cit.. A very convincing 
explanation of the reasons behind the Court of Justice case law has 
been given by Timmermans who has underlined that this leave the 
possibility for member states of following a protectionist or 
liberal trade policy according to their interests. TIMMERMANS, 
C.W.A. La libre circulation .... o p .cit. p.105. This applies to 
regional safeguard measures as well which are "une solution facile 
de compromis qui permet de réconcilier en matière de politique 
commerciale les points de vue souvent diamétralement opposés des
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To avoid recourse to Article 115 but at the same guarantee 
the effectiveness of safeguard measures it would be necessary to 
extend them to all Member States. For third countries exporting to 
the Community, regional safeguard measures have the advantage of 
closing only a part of the market, leaving this country free to 
export in the other member States, and this would be consistent 
with the Cooperation Agreements which requires the adoption of 
safeguard measures "which least disturb the functioning of the 
Agreement".
Even if the production of goods object of safeguard measures 
is concentrated in one market the application of safeguard 
measures631 at Community level would have the same effect than 
regional ones with the advantage of avoiding recourse to Article 
115. It should, however, also be considered that safeguard measures 
adopted by a Member State against one third country can indirectly 
advantage third countries whose products are not the object of the 
restrictive measures and which are in competition with the former 
third country, (like for example a quota on textile from India 
would advantage the exports of the same products from Tunisia) . In 
this case the elimination of national quotas (which also aimed at 
protecting traditional flow of trade) could result in an increase 
of the competition on the Community market.
2.b.ii) Balance of Payment (Article 39).
Article 39 justifies the adoption by one or more Member States
■#
or Morocco of safeguard measures in the case of serious 
difficulties or of serious threat of difficulties as regards their
Etats membres, certaines préconisant une politique de libre- 
échange, d'autres étant plus séduits par des approches 
protectionnistes" Ibidem p.104.
631 TIMMERMANS speaks in this case of "relevant market" 
admitting in this particular case that regional protection would 
be more suitable and easier to administer p.168.
balance of payment.
It should be observed that the adoption of safeguard measures 
provided for in Art.39 is the competence of the Community Member 
States and that prima facie they may act outside any Community 
control. This seems confirmed by the fact that the Community rules 
of procedure applying in the case of safeguard measures provided 
in the Cooperation Agreement do not cover the case of Article 39.
A correct analysis of this question cannot be done without 
making reference to the Treaty rules adopted in the field of the 
balance of payment.
The economic policy is the competence of Member States and 
the EEC Treaty requires in this respect a coordination of national 
economic policies aiming at the equilibrium of the balance of
• $ • 632 •payment (an objective set up in Art .104 ) . Such an equilibrium is
a requisite for the correct functioning of the common market and 
therefore the Community cannot remain indifferent as regards the 
policies and the instruments used by Member States in the case of 
a crisis regarding their balance of payments (some of the 
instruments that can be used to this end633 are not any more under 
the control of the Member States634) . Therefore Articles 108 and 109 
provide for the intervention of the Community institutions in the 
case of difficulties (actual or seriously threatened) in the 
balance of payment of a Member State. Under Article 108 the
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632 This article establishes that "Each member States shall 
pursue the economic policy needed to ensure the equilibrium of its 
overall balance of payment and to maintain confidence in its 
currency, while taking care to ensure a high level of employment 
and a stable level of prices". See also Article 102a, introduced 
by the Single European Act "In order to ensure the convergence of 
economic and monetary policies which is necessary for the further 
development of the Community, Member States shall cooperate in 
accordance with the objectives of Article 104..."
633 RICOSSA,S. Bilancia dei Pagamenti Dizionario di Economia. 
UTET, Torino 1982, pp.37-42.
634 MEGRET,J. (ed) Le Droit de la CEE. Vol. VI Politique 
Economique.
Commission is empowered to urge the adoption of certain measures 
which may be combined with the actions that the Member State 
concerned may take "in accordance with Article 104" (article 
108.1). If these measures prove insufficient the Council, on 
recommendation of the Commission, shall grant "mutual assistance" 
which can take different forms (Article 108.2.a.b.c.). Jt is when 
mutual assistance is not granted or proved insufficient that the 
adoption of safeguard measures is authorized by the Commission 
which shall determine as well the conditions and details of their 
application (Article 108.3a5) . As established by Article 109 Member 
States may take protective measures in the case of a "sudden 
crisis" making the immediate application of Article 108 impossible. 
These measures have a precautionary character and the intervention 
of the Community institutions shall follow (Article 109.2.3).
When a Member State faces a situation as that described in 
Art.39 the Community may intervene according to Articles 108 EEC 
Treaty: does this mean that these provisions apply in the case of 
safeguard measures adopted against third countries? The actions 
that the Community may suggest to the Member States or the 
safeguard measures do concern only the relationships between Member 
States and therefore, when the crisis of the balance of payment is 
invoked, Member States can adopt restrictive measures against third 
countries without requiring the previous authorization of the 
Community.
The intervention of the EEC institutions may take place as a 
consequence of measures established in Article 108.2.b where it 
is established that among the measures that the Council may take 
to help the member State concerned aure those "needed to avoid 
deflection of trade where the State which is in difficulties 
maintain or reintroduces quantitative restrictions against third 
countries". This seems to confirm that the measures taken against 
third countries fall outside the application of Article 108.
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633 These may be revoked or modified by the Council acting by 
a qualified majority (article 108.3).
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2.b.iii) Infringement of Cooperation Agreement Provisions. Article 
51.
Some doubts could be expressed about the classification of 
Article 51 as safeguard clause.
After having established in the first paragraph that "The 
Contracting Parties shall take any general or specific measures 
required to fulfil their obligations under the Agreement" Art.51.2 
provides for the possibility open to either Contracting Party to 
take "appropriate measures" when it considers that the other Party 
"has failed to fulfil an obligation under the Agreement".
It should be observed that unlikely other safegueurd clauses 
examined above, Article 51 is not contained in Titles II and III 
providing for rules applying to trade but in Title IV "General and 
Final Provisions". The place of the Article however does not seem 
to be relevant as far as its classification as safeguard clause is 
concerned: the infringement does not necessarily concern trade and 
consequently the measures that can be adopted might not concern 
trade measures either.
The reason justifying the adoption of "appropriate measure", 
viz. the non-fulfillment of an obligation, cannot exclude the 
insertion of this provision in the category of safeguard clauses 
either.
As seen above, safeguard measures are admitted in the case of 
an abnormal situation injuring the interest of one Contracting 
Parties, and the infringement of the agreement can be considered 
a disturbance detrimental for the contracting party victim of the 
violation. It should be reminded moreover that also in the case of 
dumping measures were adopted against an illicit behavior of the 
counterpart.
Art.51 does not qualify the type of infringement. As seen 
above a certain level of gravity was required for the application 
of safeguard measures both in the case of regional and monetary
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safeguard measures (Articles 37 and 39) whereas in the case of 
Article 51 the violation of the agreement is not qualified. It can 
be suggested that, in the absence of any practice, the violation 
of the agreement is per se considered a serious reason to invoke 
safeguard measures, but that in the application of these measures 
the principle of proportionality between the violation and the 
measures taken should be applied.
Article 51 allows the adoption of "appropriate measures" 
without any further specification of the type of measures. A 
question arising in this respect concerns the possibility of 
suspending the agreement. In other terms it could be questioned 
whether is possible to consider this provision as the codification 
in this agreement of the rule of general international law 
providing for a right of a contracting party to suspend or 
terminate, totally or in part, a treaty in the case of its breach 
by another contracting party ("inadimpleti non est adimplendum")636.
It is here submitted that the measures allowed under Article 
51 do not cover this hypothesis.
It should be noticed that the second indent of paragraph 
two of Article 51 establishes that "In the selection of measures, 
priority must be given to those which last disturb the functioning 
of the Agreement". This criterion is common to all safeguard 
measures (see above Articles 38 and 39) whose scope is exactly that 
of permitting the continuation of the agreement: it seems that the 
suspension of the agreement (not to speak of its termination) could 
hardly be consistent with this requirement. This of course does*
636 This rule has been codified in Article 60 of the Vienna 
Convention on the law of the treaties of 1969. This eurticle 
establishes procedural rules and set up the requirement of a 
material breach (sostanziale) to invoke the right of termination 
or suspension of the treaty. See for comments PISILLO MAZZESCHI,R. 
Risoluzione e sospensione dei trattati per inadempimento Giuffré, 
Milano 1984 pp.111-116. The analogy of this type of safeguard 
clause with this rule has been underlined by TALGORN,C. Les mesures 
de sauvegarde.. Thèse, 1979 pp.177-183 and by MANIN, A propos de 
clauses de sauvegarde RTDE 1970 pp.1-42 on pp.12-14.
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not mean that the suspension or the termination of the agreement 
are excluded, the principle non adimpleti being a rule of customary 
law may be invoked if the circumstances so required even if it is 
not expressly provided for in the agreement.
The scope of these safeguard measures should that of allowing 
the parties invoking them to cope with the difficulties arising as 
a consequence of the breach of the obligation. However, the fact 
that these measures are adopted as a consequence of the 
infringement of an obligation of the agreement means that the 
measure taken under Article 51, consisting in a deviation from the 
rules of the agreement, may be perceived as a sanction against the 
contracting party author of the breach. The risk of an escalation 
is real637, in particular if the breach is contested by the peurty 
that has been considered the author of this violation or if a 
measure adopted, for example under Article 27 is considered 
unjustified and thus evaluated as a breach of the agreement by the 
other contracting party.
It should moreover be observed that the breach is not 
declared by a common institution , such as the Cooperation 
Council, but is declared unilaterally by the contracting party 
concerned ("If either Contracting Party considers that the other 
Contracting Party has failed to fulfil an obligation under the 
Agreement.."). Although consultation is provided for within the 
Cooperation Council before the adoption of these measures, the 
final decision lies in the hand of the party adopting the measures.
From the scope of these measures it follows that the
637 See TALGORN,C. Les M&sures de.. op.cit. p. 178.
631 In the case of a dispute the arbitration clause provided 
for in Article 52 may apply. This establishes the possibility of 
placing the dispute before the cooperation Council and, in the case 
of a failure on its part to settle the dispute, for the possibility 
of appointing an arbitrator. This procedure seems however rather 
long in particular if one considers that the effective protection 
of the interests of the party invoking safeguard measures require 
a certain celerity of action.
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contracting parties allowed to adopt them are those which can claim 
to be injured by the breach of the obligations. As regards the 
Community, the procedures to be followed for the adoption of the 
safeguard measures under Article 51 are provided for in regulation 
1662/77 and are the same rules which apply for the application of 
regional and sectorial safeguard measures. The application of these 
rules seems to exclude an independent competence by the Member 
States. If national competence is excluded as regards commercial 
policy measures, it could be asked whether the exclusive competence 
of the Community also apply in the case of a breach of obligation 
in a field of the agreement different from trade and it in this 
case the measures may be adopted by Member States.
2.c) Rules ot Procedures for Safeguard Measures.
The rules of procedures will be distinguished in i) rules set 
up in the agreement concerning the relationships between the 
Contracting Parties in the case of application of safeguard 
measures and ii) rules set up at Community level and concerning the 
procedure which is to be followed in the adoption of safeguard 
measures by Community institutions and, in certain cases, by Member 
States.
2.c.i) Rules of procedures between the Contracting Parties.
Before establishing the rules of procedure that the parties 
shall follow when adopting safeguard measures Article 38 first 
paragraph lay down the obligation for each contracting party to 
inform the other parties of surveillemce measures it adopts. 
Surveillance measures may be adopted when there exist in a domestic 
market a situation of difficulty which has not reached the level 
of gravity requiring the adoption of safeguard measures but which 
dememds that the trend of imports of the product concerned is
attentively controlled639. Jn this case imported products are 
required to obtain an import document (licence) whose issue however 
is not subject to quantitative limits. Although safeguard measures 
do not require the previous application of surveillance measures 
it is probable that in practice the former follow the latter since 
it is likely that a market disruption is preceded by some sign of 
progressive deterioration of the situation. Thus, the reason of 
keeping the other Contracting Party informed is that this one may 
act to prevent a further deterioration of the situation (for 
instance imposing a quota to its exports to prevent stricter 
protective measures by the other party).
The second paragraph of Article 38 provides for the 
consultation between the contracting parties before the adoption 
of safeguard measures. More precisely the contracting parties 
invoking the adoption of safeguard measures "shall supply the 
Cooperation Council with all relevant information required for a 
thorough examination of the situation with a view to seeking a 
solution acceptable to the Contracting Parties".?????????? It is 
thus an obligation of the contracting party concerned to invest 
the Cooperation Council6*0, of the question. The information that 
it has provided to the Cooperation Council obviously concern the 
abnormal situation which it denounced and which, on its opinion, 
justify the adoption of the safeguard measures.
The second step is the examination of the situation by the 
institution. The scope of the consultation is that of informing 
the other contracting party of the situation and discussing the
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639 See for example Art. 12 of the EEC regulation on common 
rules for imports establishing that "Where developments on the 
market in respect of a product originating in a third country 
covered by this Regulation threaten to cause injury to Community 
producers.."and Art.15 "Where a product is imported into the 
Community in such greatly increased quantities and/or on such terms 
or conditions as to cause or threaten to cause substantial iniurv 
to Community producers.." Emphasis supplied.
640 it is the common institution created by the Agreement, see 
articles 44-46 of the Cooperation Agreement.
possible solutions that could be adopted without recurring to 
safeguard measures. Such discussion seems even more indispensable 
in the cases of infringement of an dbligation by the other 
contracting party or of practices of dumping or subsidies, where 
the rectification of the situation depends on the action of the 
other contracting parties more than in the case of regional or 
sectorial disturbances.
The obligation of consultation does not mean however that an 
agreement must be reached with the other contracting party (when 
an agreement shall be reached it is expressly provided for in the 
agreement) although this could be considered a better solution. 
Thus even in the case that the contracting party, object of the 
safeguard measures, disagree (over the examination of the 
situation, like for instance its gravity or the opportunity of 
applying the measures proposed by the contracting party concerned) 
safeguard measures may be applied.
The prior consultation has the merit of moderating the 
unilateral character of safeguard measures and of reinforcing the 
conventional relationships. Which also means a verification of 
the abstract definition of the situation given in the agreement 
with the actual situation denounced by the contracting party 
adopting safeguard measures641. The phase of prior consultation may 
however be omitted when "exceptional circumstances" require 
"immediate action". The consultation is in this case postponed, 
but should take place "as soon as possible". The consultation in 
this case would focus more on the measures adopted and on their 
opportunity than on the circumstances having required their 
application. In both cases the contracting party is obliged to 
notify the measures to the other contracting party or to the 
Cooperation Council. This is a rule applying even in the case of 
measures adopted because of difficulties in the balance of payment 
(Art.39) where prior consultation is not required.
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641 TALGORN Les M6sures.. op.cit.
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Once safeguard measures are in force the consultation between 
the contracting parties continues, taking place within the 
Cooperation Council "with a view to their abolition as soon as 
circumstances permit". The object of the consultation would then 
be the evolution of the situation, and in particular if the reasons 
justifying the adoption of safeguard measures still exist, the 
effects of the measures adopted, the conformity of the measures 
adopted with the criteria established in the agreement.
2 .c.ii) Rules of Procedures Within the EEC.
The question that it seems interesting to discuss is who is 
competent to adopt safeguard measures at Community level ?
It should be observed that the Cooperation Agreement does not 
make a distinction between the Community and the Member States. 
Article 37 for instance establishes that safeguard measures may be 
taken by "the Contracting Paurty concerned.."642. The answer is 
partially contained in the rules of procedure for the adoption of 
safeguard measures contained in the regulations that the Community 
has expressly adopted for each cooperation agreement.
These regulations do not set up detailed procedural rules 
but - after having established a general competence of the 
Commission to decide on the compatibility with the Agreement of 
practices liable to require the adoption of safeguard measures by 
the Community - provide for the application of the rules of 
procedure set up in the Community regulations on common rules for 
imports and on anti-dumping.
It should be observed however that the regulations for the 
application of safeguard clauses, which aure still in force, were 
adopted in 1977 amd therefore they refer to the regulations on 
common rules for imports and on anti-dumping that were then in
642 See on the contrary Article 177 of Lomé IV Convention which 
establishes that "..the Community cam take or authorize the Member 
State concern to take safeguard measures..*.
force643. Since then these have been replaced and now 
regulations 288/82 (common rules for imports) and 2423/88 (anti­
dumping) are in force. Therefore, when safeguard measures are to 
be applied the Community shall follow the rules of procedure of the 
regulations on imports and on anti-dumping that are now in force. 
According to regulation 822/82 the competence to take safeguard 
measures lies in the Commission and in the Council. Article 17 of 
this regulation admits the possibility for Member States to take 
conservatory measures in specific cases, providing for a successive 
intervention of Community institutions. The sane Article 17 
establishes that it will apply until 31 December 1984 and that 
before this date the Council shall act upon proposal of the 
Commission to amend it. Now it seems that no amendments have been 
made, and therefore that Member States are not allowed to act. 
Regulation 1662/77 provides for the possibility for Member States 
to take interim safeguard measures. Are Member States competent to 
act even if only to take conservatory measures? It should further 
be noticed that according to the procedural rules set up in 
regulation 822/82 the measures taken by the Member state should be 
replaced by those, taken by the Commission, unless the Member State 
refers the matter to the Council which shall decide within one 
month following referral, with the possibility of extending this 
period up to three months. The national safeguard measures may 
thus apply for a period long enough to have important consequences 
for trade with the third country concerned.(footnote) If the 
national .. has been abolished for trade with third countries there 
seem to be no reasons why it should be maintained in the relations 
with Maghreb countries, especially if one considers that the 
commercial policy is a competence of the Community.
3)Safeguard Clauses and Agricultural Products.
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643 Respectively 1439.74 O.J. L 159, 15.06.1974, p.l and 459/68 
O.J. L 93, 17.04.1968.
345
There exist on the subject a few points worth mentioning. The 
safeguard clauses of the Cooperation Agreements do not make a 
distinction between agricultural and industrial products, therefore 
safeguard measures also concern agricultural trade when the 
criteria indicated in the said provisions are fulfilled. As seen 
above in details, the Cooperation Agreements provides for specific 
mechanisms which are applied to agricultural trade aiming at the 
protection of the EEC market644. Within the framework of trade 
relations with Morocco the conditions of application established 
in Article 38 apply. Jt should be noticed that regulation 1662/77, 
on the application of safeguard clauses at Community level, cited 
above, provided in Article 4 that the regulation "shall not 
preclude the application of Regulations on the common organization 
of agricultural markets or of community or national administrative 
provisions resulting therefrom or of special Regulations adopted 
under Article 235 of the Treaty for processed agricultural 
products; it shall apply in addition thereto". All common 
agricultural market regulations contain a safeguard clauses 
allowing the Community to adopt appropriate measures when the 
Community market in one of the products concerned experiences or 
is threatened with serious disturbances which may endanger the 
objectives established in Article 39 EEC Treaty645. It is submitted
644 "..les instruments de regulation des échanges à 
l'importation ou à l'exportation sont de nature à éviter des 
perturbations sérieuses" TALGORN,C. "L'application à 1'agriculture 
des mesures générales de sauvegarde" in RAUX,J (ed.) Politique 
Agricole Communautaire et construction Communautaire Economica, 
Paris, 1984 pp.327-334 on p. 333.
645 Safeguard clauses are general provisions applying to all 
market organisations. The wording of this provision is also very 
general and applies to imports and exports. "Appropriate measures" 
may be applied in case of serious disturbance or threat of 
disturbance caused by imports or exports to the Community market 
that could endanger the objectives of the common agricultural 
policy. These measures are decided by the Commission on its own 
initiative or at the request of a member state. The Council, to 
which the measures are referred within three days following the 
adoption of the safeguard measures, may auoend or repeal them.
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that Article 4 of regulation 1662/77 shall not be interpreted as 
allowing the Community to take safeguard measures when the 
conditions set up in the regulations establishing cmo are met. The 
trade relationships should in fact take place within the framework 
of the agreement, whereas in the case of application of safeguard 
measures as provided in the cmo regulations the Community would 
act autonomously. Article 4 should be interpreted in the sense that 
the rules of procedure for the application of safeguard measures 
for agricultural products should be those indicated in the cmo 
regulations. See article 18 of the regulations establishing a cmo 
for processed fruits and vegetables where the Commission is 
competent, on its own initiative or on request of a member State 
to adopt the safeguard measures which are immediately applicable. 
These measures may be modified or repealed by the Council.
It can be observed that the safeguard measures are only a 
potential obstacle to trade. Uncertainty due to the very general 
aims listed in art. 39. A safeguard clause is also provided in the 
cooperation agreements with Maghreb Countries. The main difference 
between the two safeguard clauses lies in the fact that the first 
is contained in a Community act. It is, in other words, an 
autonomous rule whose application is limited only by respect for 
the conditions laid down in the regulation. The safeguard clause 
contained in the agreement is a contractual measure and the freedom 
of action of one contracting party is therefore much more limited, 
in addition because the application of the safeguard measure 
consists of a suspension of the agreement. A consultation 
procedure, taUcing place within the Cooperation Council, is
Member States may take protective measures within the limits and 
the conditions established by the Council. It is obvious that the 
so called "appropriate measures" are protective measures, such as 
quotas or, if the imports are subject to import licenses, the 
suspension of the latter.See regulation 1035/72 for fruits and 
vegetables Article 29, Regulation 426/86 for processed fruits and 
vegetables Article 18.
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therefore provided. The Cooperation Council shall be provided with 
all relevant information before the adoption of the measures, 
unless due to "exceptional circumstances" prior consultation 
within the Cooperation Council is impossible and precautionary 
measures are taken to remedy the situation. Once the measure is 
adopted the Contacting Parties shall periodically consult within 
the Cooperation Council "with a view of their abolition as soon as 
circumstances permit". The measures which can be adopted are not 
specified (see Israel ),but shall respect the limits of what is 
"strictly necessary to counteract the difficulties which have 
arisen, in their selection "priority must be given to those which 
least disturb the functioning of the Agreement".
4)Safeguard Measures and Voluntary Restraint Agreement (VRA).
After 1977 the Community has ceased to make recourse to 
safeguard clauses to protect its market from textile imports coming 
from its Mediterranean partners. As part of its trade policy on 
textile, the Community concluded voluntary restraint agreements 
with several of its Mediterranean partners, among which Morocco and 
Tunisia646.
The substitution of safeguard measures with voluntary 
restraint agreements in the Community textile policy towards 
Mediterranean countries is part of a more general trend which goes 
beyond this specific trade relations. These types of agreements 
have in fact become instrument of trade policy which, after the end 
of the sixties have known a growing expansion in sensitive sectors 
such as textile and steel641.
646 Egypt, Malta, Cyprus, Yugoslavia, and before accession 
Spain and Portugal. See Les Accords Méditerranéen en 1989 pp.175- 
184. The Turkish government refused to conclude a restraint export 
agreement, safeguard measures were applied in 1982.
647 For an account on the origin and development of voluntary 
restraint agreements see JONES,K. Voluntary Export Restraint: 
Political Economy, History and the Role of GATT JWTL 1989, pp. 125-
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Voluntary restraint agreements consist on an formal 
undertaking between an exporting and an importing countries whereby 
the former engage to export only an agreed quantity of products. 
The key concept is the free-will character of the engagement since 
in theory the exporting country could terminate the self- 
restriction on exports. This specific character include voluntary 
restraint agreement in the number of the so-called grey-area 
measures that are "beyond the reach" of GATT obligations. They 
seems to escape for example for the application of Articles XI and 
XIII. The ratio of this provision is to prohibit export restraint 
as a discriminatory measure against importing countries whereas the 
scope case of voluntary restraint agreement is that of protecting 
the importing country industry against competitive products of 
third country origin648.
The reason of their development is strictly related to this 
observations. They provide importing countries with a new 
instrument of protection which allows circumvention of GATT rules 
and in particular it avoid recourse to safeguard measures649.
The application of Article XIX of GATT requires a number of 
criteria to be respected like advanced notification, compensation 
and prerequisite like serious injury to the domestic industry 
caused by the increased imports. Moreover, safeguard measures 
should have temporary application. What is further object of 
discussion is the possibility of applying selective safeguard 
measures, that is if the restrictions can be target only one
140, JACKSON, DAVEY Legal Problems., op.cit. pp.609-615.
648 See FIEVET,G. Les accords d'auto-limitation, une nouvelle 
technique d'accords communautaires RMC 1982 pp.597-608 and JONES, 
Voluntary Export., op.cit. p. 132.
649 Export restraints on the part of exporting countries have 
been defined as "extra escape clause" techniques. See JACKSON,J.H., 
DAVEY W.J. Legal Problems.. 1986 op.cit. p.609. According to KLEEN, 
"orderly marketing arrangements" or "volunteury export restraints" 
are "grey area" measures which tends to replace the application of 
Article XIX GATT. KLEEN,P. The Safeguard Issue....pp.75-76.
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exporting countries or if this selectivity, which is not expressly 
prohibited by Article XIX, is inconsistent with the GATT system and 
with the non-discrimination principle650.
Voluntary export agreements have the advantage of not appear 
like restrictions imposed by the importing country, they are often 
negotiated between the relevant industries without formal 
involvement of governments, allow selectivity and cam be applied 
with indefinite duration. Exporting countries accept to "volunteer" 
in the fear that a refusal could trigger stricter alternative 
measures. The most attractive feature of voluntary restraint 
agreements for the exporting countries is that they can charge 
higher prices on the exported products and that they are sure that 
within the period of application no further protective measures 
will be triggered against their exports651. Quotas are managed by 
the third country (the competent authorities shall deliver an 
export licence which allows them to control the flux of quotas). 
The replacement of safeguard measures with voluntary restraint 
agreements in the relationships between the Community and Maghreb 
countries seems to reflect the general trend of international trade 
relations. The rules regulating the adoption of safeguard measures 
in the Cooperation Agreement lay down very precise requisite for 
their adoption and application (serious deterioration of the 
situation, notification, periodic consultation, limits on the 
selection to the measures strictly necessary to counteract the 
situation, temporary application included in the obligation to 
abolish them as soon as circumstances allow).
For their specific features, safeguard measures seemed unfit to
«so peteRSMANN,E.U. Economic, Legal and Political Functions of 
the Principle of Non-discrimination The World Economy 1986 pp.113- 
120 and Grey Area Trade Policy and the Rule of LAw JWTL 1988 pp.23- 
44.
651 For aul analysis of the effects of these agreements and in 
particular on the "collusion" they engender among companies in the 
exporting countries see NICOLAIDES,P. Safeguards and the Problems 
of VERs Interec. 1990 pp.18-24, p.21 ff.
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offset a chronic situation of economic difficulties for the textile 
sector due in particular to the growing export in the Community of 
textile products coming from developing countries. As for the 
specific features of the voluntary export restraint agreements with 
Morocco and Tunisia, these are concluded for a longer period if 
compeured with the application of safeguard measures. In the case 
of Morocco, the safeguard clause for textile was applied from 
August to December 1977, whereas the restraint agreement was first 
applied for three years.
These restraint agreements have been concluded as verbal notes or 
memorandum and have not been published in the EEC Official 
Journal652.
As regards the content of these agreements453 a distinction is 
made between quotas of products which are completely manufactured 
in the exporting country and those produced by third countries with 
raw materials which are produced in the Community (outweurd 
processing (piotas (OPT quotas)654. It should be noted that a 
comparison between the voluntary export restraint agreement 
concluded with Morocco and Tunisia provide for a growth rate of 
quotas much higher than that applied to other developing countries 
which are Community suppliers. This seems to indicate he EC's 
intention to grant the Mediterranean countries a preferential 
status as compared with other developing countries in the framework
652 • *Notice is given in the Annual General Report of the 
Commission and in the EC Bulletin.
653 Les Accords MeditSrran6en en 1989 op.cit. pp.175-184.
654 The rules governing the management of these quotas are 
established in regulation 636/82 O.J. L 76 20.03.1982, which also 
applies to Mediterranean countries. See VAN DARTEL ,R.J.P.M The 
Conduct of the EEC's Textile Trade Policy and the Application of 
Article 115 EEC v6LKER,E.L.M. Protectionism... op.cit. pp.121-156 
p.117 and footnote 58. OPT quotas are particularly important for 
Mediterranean countries, since "most of the EC"s outward processing 
is done with this area" ASHOFF, G. The Textile policy of the 
European Community towards the Mediterranean Countries: Effects and 
Future Options JCMS, vol. XXII, 1983 pp.16-45, p.24.
of its policy on imports of textile products655. Another important 
principle applied is flexibility: the possibility of using in the 
present year a part of the quota established for the coming one 
(carry forward); the possibility of using the part of the quotas 
which has not been used the previous year (carry over); the 
transfer of quotas between outward processing quotas and normal 
ones (swing).
The legality of voluntary export restraint agreement in the 
field of textile concluded with Morocco and Tunisia as well as with 
Egypt can be questioned.
As seen above exports of industrial products from Maghreb to 
Community are free from quotas, customs duties and measures having 
equivalent effect (see Article 9 of the Morocco Agreement) whilst 
trade restrictions are allowed only through the application of the 
safeguard clauses discussed above, therefore these voluntary 
restraint agreements seem to conflict with the Cooperation 
Agreements656.
It is however difficult, as it happens in GATT, to conclude on the 
infringement of a specific Cooperation Agreement provision due to 
the "voluntary" nature of the export restraint undertaking. The 
informal feature of these agreements aims precisely at avoiding any 
conflict with the Cooperation Agreements657 while formally 
respecting the preferential treatment accorded to Morocco and 
Tunisia.
The granting of some advantages as regards competitive exporters
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655 Ibidem p. 22.
656 The textile policy towards Mediterranean countries is part
of the global policy on textile imports aiming at
restricting/controlling imports of these products from low cost 
suppliers which compete with Community industry.Volunteury restraint 
agreements have been concluded between the EEC and many of these 
countries within the MFA.
657 VAN DARTEL,R.J.P.M. The Conduct of the EEC's textile Trade
Policy and the Application of Article 115 EEC V&LKER,E.L.M.
Protectionism... pp.121=156.
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if can dilute the impact of the agreement on textile exports does 
not modify the fact that these agreements are contrary to the 
spirit and the scope of the Cooperation Agreement as examined in 
the first Part of this study.
It should also be considered that textile products are the most 
importemt exports for Tunisia and the second tor Morocco after 
phosphate65%.
It should finally be noticed that the quotas are split up 
among the member States of the Community. The observations made 
above about the compatibility of national sub-quotas with the 
common commercial policy apply, mutatis mutandi, to the 
mediterranean textile policy*59.
651 STEVENS The Impact of 1992. .op.cit p. 229.
659 If export self restraints are agreed on a industry-to 
industry basis, recourse to Article 115 is not possible. This 
provision apply when the self restraint agreement are negotiated 
between governments and provided that the Commission approves them. 
See O'CLEIREACAIN Europe 1992 and Gaps., op.cit. p.211.
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CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS.
This thesis discussed the main provisions of the Cooperation 
Agreement with Morocco.
The legal framework of the Agreement was the object of the 
first part of the thesis: the legal basis, the Community
competencies, the role of the common institutions and the legal 
value of their acts and of the Agreement.
I then proceeded to analyze the rules governing industrial 
and agricultural trade, provisions in the field of financial and 
technical aid, social cooperation and safeguard measures.
In the following section I will return to these provisions to 
discuss them in the light of the two hypothesis proposed in the 
introduction.
Those two research questions related to (a) whether the 
Community interests prejudice the provisions of the Agreement 
leading, for example, to a watering down of preferences to protect 
the Community economy in the areas where it competes with Moroccan 
economy and (b) how the Agreement provisions should be interpreted, 
in other words, how can one verify to what extent the meaning of 
these provisions can be modified through different interpretation, 
which, in turn, leads to the modification of the type of relations 
between the parties.
It should be remembered that the Cooperation Agreement is 
founded on the principle of non-reciprocal preferences granted by 
the Community to exports of goods originating in Morocco.
In the case of agricultural trade, preferential treatment 
means a reduction, or for certain products, abolition of customs 
duties. However, as seen above, preferential regime is limited by 
a number of mechanisms such as quotas, reference prices, import 
levies and calendars (preferences are greuited only during some 
periods of the year).
It can be submitted that the reason for the application of 
these instruments lies in the competition between Community and
Maghreb productions.
The amendments set up in the Additional Protocols, as a 
consequence of the Community extension to Spain and Portugal, show 
that the improvement of the commercial regime is highly conditioned 
by the common agricultural policy.
On the other hand, one should consider that complementary 
relationship exists between Community and Moroccan agricultural 
production. Although EEC Mediterranean Member States grow the same 
type of products as Maghreb countries, ripeness periods are 
different. It would therefore be possible to apply some of the 
instruments to enhance the complementary nature of the two 
agricultural productions. Calendars could be applied to encourage 
harmonizing programmes of the two productions.
Rules of origin seem to limit the preferential treatment. 
Rules of origin are the provisions which lay down the criteria for 
the identification of products which can be considered as 
originating from Maghreb and which can take advantage of the 
references granted to then.
The relevance of these rules is too often neglected. However, 
their impact on preferential treatment is quite remarkable. A 
restrictive interpretation of origin, i.e. excessively strict rules 
of origin, means that the preferential treatment is limited to a 
restricted number of products.
This seems to occur in the case of the rules applied to 
textile products, that is to an industry which is in competition 
with that of the Community. *
Rules of origin can even protect or promote the developing of 
industries of the importing countries.
Let us consider for instance rules allowing a so-called 
cumulation, whereby in order to calculate the origin of products, 
the three Maghreb countries and the Community are considered as a 
single territory. This possibility is very seldom used as regards 
the inter-relation between Maghreb industries due to the lack of 
complementary production between them. This rule can, however,
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benefit European industries since the use of their materials by 
Maghreb countries does not compromise the origin of the finished 
products. The use of materials (spare parts; from third countries 
is thus discouraged even if the latter are more competitive since 
the finished products could not cfualify for cumulation.
A further example of the influence of Community interests over 
the agreement lies the fact that some of the provisions in the 
field of labor cooperation have not, so far, been implemented.
The Agreement establishes that it was the task of the 
Cooperation Council to adopt the measures for the implementation 
of the principles established in the Agreement like the summation 
of the periods of employment and insurance for the counting of 
pensions of old age, death and medical care and for the possibility 
of freely transferring pensions and salaries to Morocco.
One can submit that the non-implementation of these provisions 
is due to the difficult circumstances encountered in respect of the 
labor markets in almost all Member States. In other words, it is 
suggested that member States can consider that the application of 
the provisions set up in the Agreement could encourage emigration 
from these countries.
The preferences and advantages granted to Morocco under the 
Cooperation Agreement change according to the interpretation given 
to some of the notions contained therein.
This is so in the case of trade provisions concerning 
industrial products and those setting up the prohibition of 
discrimination between Maghreb workers and Member States' 
nationals.
As far as industrial trade is concerned, preferential 
treatment means that customs duties, charges of equivalent effect, 
quotas and measures of equivalent effects are abolished.
The consequences of this provision on the regime actually 
applied to products exported from Morocco to the Community can be 
evaluated only on the basis of the interpretation given to the
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notion of charges and measures of equivalent effect.
As far as the notion of charges of equivalent effect is 
concerned, once it is clarified that these are charges applied to 
imported products only by reason of their crossing a border, the 
main question is to verify whether their application can be somehow 
justified.
The effects of the rule are more limited where charges can be 
applied providing that the purpose of their application is not to 
protect national goods (but is levied, for example, as a 
contribution to statistical analysis). On the contrary, the 
prohibition of charges of equivalent effect has a different 
connotation if the notion includes any charge regardless of the 
scope it pursues.
In the first case, however, the declaration that the purpose 
is legitimate would be sufficient to avoid the prohibition.
It is, therefore, possible to advocate a narrow interpretation 
of the notion of charges of equivalent effect for the Cooperation 
Agreements.
Measures of equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions can 
refer to national regulations concerning the characteristics 
of products and their sale and usage. They can be exclusively 
addressed to imported goods, thus establishing that only imported 
goods need to conform to certain requirements. Alternatively, the 
national measures do not distinguish between imported and national 
goods but make "de facto" the situation for imports more perilous 
(for example when a national measure establishes the requirement 
which only domestic goods are capable of meeting).
The effect of the prohibition will be limited if measures of 
equivalent effect only prohibit national regulations which overtly 
discriminate between imported and domestic goods. On the other 
hand, in the framework of the relationships between the Community 
and Morocco, Member States can require imported goods to meet the 
requirements laid down by national regulation which may also apply 
to national goods, even if this could have a discriminatory effect.
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An intermediate solution could be to adopt an interpretation of 
measures of equivalent effect which prohibits "de facto" 
discrimination of imported goods, but only as regards the 
characteristics of the goods, unless the importing State could 
justify the application of the restrictive measures for one of the 
reasons provided for in the Agreement itself (i.e. non economic 
derogating clauses, Article 35J interpreted in such away as to 
include the mandatory requirements identified by the Court of 
Justice in Cassis de Pi ion.
In practice, a broad interpretation of this notion would be 
mediated by a broad notion of derogating reasons.
Similarly, a broad interpretation of the notion of charges of 
equivalent effect could be moderated by the possibility of the 
importing State having recourse to the same system of derogations, 
which, as has been submitted, can be applied in the framework of 
the Agreement to charges of equivalent effect and to the 
prohibition of tax discrimination.
Finally, the question of whether the preferential regime 
should be extended to products imported from Morocco and in free 
circulation within the Community has been discussed. In this case, 
it has been submitted that the treatment applied to Moroccan 
products in free circulation in the Community does not differ from 
that applied to goods imported from other third countries and in 
free circulation in the Community. In other words, the preferential 
regime only concerns treatment applied at borders.
The second provision whose effects are determined according 
to its interpretation, concerns the prohibition of discriminatory 
measures and fiscal practices between imported and national 
"similar" products.
If one interprets the notion of "similarity" as covering only 
identical products or products having minor differences then 
creates the possibility of applying differential fiscal treatment 
to products which satisfy uniform consumer requirements.
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On the other hetnd, this would be inconsistent with the 
provision's aim of extending the prohibition of fiscal 
discrimination to products which have different characteristics.
A possible solution would be to apply the concept of "cross 
elasticity". "Similar" products in this respect would be those 
satisfying a medium-high value of cross elasticity. If a lower 
value of cross elasticity is applied the effects of the prohibition 
would be extended, since this would cover a larger number of 
products.
Similarly, if the notion of "fiscal measures" does not include 
methods of payments and reimbursements, the rule prohibiting 
discrimination would be remarkably restrictive.
Let us now consider the provisions set up in the field of 
social cooperation and the different effects which could be derived 
from a diverse interpretation of the notion contained therein.
In this case, the scope of application of some of the relevant 
notions was clarified by the Court of Justice.
The prohibition of discrimination between Moroccan workers and 
nationals of EEC Member States was generously construed by the 
Court, which applied an interpretation by analogy, thereby 
establishing parallelism with the notion applied in Community law.
Had the provision been interpreted restrictively, a Member 
State would have been able to apply discriminatory treatment as 
regards unemployment benefits to Moroccan workers.
The most remaurkable outcome of this decision its enlargement 
of the beneficiaries of the provision.
The Court examined in fact the situation of Kziber (a Moroccan 
national) focusing more on the prohibition of discrimination based 
on nationality than on her status of family member of a Moroccan 
worker.
The interpretation contended by Advocate General, whereby the 
members of the family of a migrant worker enjoy only "derived 
rights", would have prevented Kziber from obtaining unemployment 
benefits as a right ensuing from the prohibition of discrimination.
A further problem of interpretation concerns the notion of the 
"family" of a worker. The position of migrant workers as regards 
nationals of the host state can vary according to the inclusion, 
within the members of the family, of the psurents or grand-parents 
of the worker or of his/her spouse.
A possible solution could be found through an interpretation 
of the notion of "family" which esteUalishes a parallelism between 
the notion of family as set forth in the Agreement and that 
applying in the legislation of the host state.
In similar fashion, a broad interpretation of the notion of 
"pay" could be adopted.
It should be considered that a broad interpretation of the 
rule prohibiting discrimination as regards pay, working conditions, 
and social security could weigh against the fact that other 
provisions provided for in the Agreement have not been enforced.
The relationships established in the Agreement do not depend 
exclusively on the interpretation given to its provisions, but also 
depend on the effect they have in the legal order of the 
Contracting Parties.
The possibility of individuals invoking a provision contained 
in an agreement contributes to guarantee its effective application.
Let us consider for example the rule prohibiting 
discrimination in the field of social security.
Kziber could only claim her right to unemployment benefits 
before the Belgian Court if the provision of the Cooperation 
Agreement had direct effect.
If this was not the case, enforcement of the rule would have 
been dependent on the intervention of Morocco on her behalf. Since 
diplomatic action is commonly conditioned by political 
considerations which, moreover, are often incompatible with the 
interests of nationals, one can assume that the rights of Kziber 
would not be pursued.
It should be considered, however, that in this case the 
violation of the prohibition of discrimination remained open to
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question and depended on the interpretation of the provision.
Acknowledgement that the agreement can have direct effect has 
important consequences for the scope of application of its 
provisions. Let us imagine that country "A" concluded an agreement 
containing a provision identical to that established in the 
Cooperation Agreement with Morocco but that the Court denies that 
the Agreement with A could have direct effect. Workers from A would 
have a less privileged position than Moroccan workers.
The same reasoning reaching like conclusions can be applied 
to the rules of the agreements with the conditions indicated by 
the Court (such as the prohibition of charges, quotas, measures of 
equivalent effects).
Finally, the agreement contains provisions regulating the 
adoption of safeguard and derogating clauses.
These provisions allow the Contracting Parties to depart from 
the provisions of the Agreement without re-negotiating the 
Agreement itself.
Derogating clauses leave certain room for interpretation, as 
was discussed in relation to the clauses regarding common 
commercial policy. The safeguard clauses also contain general 
notions which need to be specified. However, they also set up 
rather strict procedural requirements.
Consequently,it may be difficult, emd politically 
embeurrassing, to have recourse to these clauses without meeting the 
conditions laid down for their application.
The adoption of safeguard clauses has been limited, and it has 
now been replaced by the practice of recourse to self-limitation 
agreements which are much more flexible (as regards duration and 
conditions of application) and are politically more preferable 
since they do not appear as limitations imposed unilaterally by the 
importing state.
Self-limitation agreements are, however, to be severely 
disapproved of since they infringe the provisions established in 
the field of industrial trade. This practice diminishes the
credibility of the Community and its developing cooperation policy 
to a greater extent than it effectively provides protection for the 
Community market (often quotas have not been exhausted).
These agreements have been applied mostly to textile exports, 
that is in one of the few cases where Morocco exports industrial 
goods to the Community. This means, paradoxically, that the 
Community can suspend the agreement where a conflict of interest 
takes place.
Financial and technical cooperation is the second pillar of 
the Agreement.
The issue under discussion are different from those concerning 
the provisions of trade and social cooperation. The problem relates 
not so much to the evaluation of the provisions concerning fields
where there is, or there may be, a situation of competition, but
rather to the evaluation of methods and instruments which can be 
applied to contribute financially and with technological support 
to the development of these countries.
Financial cooperation is a flexible instrument which made 
possible the replacement of the instruments which had previously 
proved unfit for attaining those goals. Financial sources have also 
contributed to the flexibility of this cooperation instrument
allowing the introduction of new forms of financing such as funds 
allotted to all Mediterranean countries with a view to financing 
regional integration and projects in the field of environment.
It should be considered that the execution of projects
fineuiced by such cooperation are often commissioned to Community's 
firms which obtain therefore, considerable economic advantages.
The competition which exists in many economic fields gives 
rise to some doubts as regards the destination of financial or 
technical aids.
It should be asked, in other words, whether the Community is 
really prepared to finance or to contribute technologically (know­
how) to the development of the economic sectors where there is 
competition or where conflicts of interests could become real (let
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us take for Instance commercial promotion in sectors of competitive 
production).
One might conclude that the existing competition in mtmy 
economic sectors, between the Community and Maghreb countries could 
be the key to many of the provisions of the Agreement which limit 
the advantages granted to the partners.
It has also been submitted that the provisions of the 
Agreement can have a different effect depending on the 
interpretation given to them.
The criteria of interpretation then become the main issues.
A correct interpretation must be based on the aim pursued by 
the agreement.
In the case of prohibition of measures of equivalent effect, 
for instance, one should consider, on one hand, that the main aim 
of these provisions is the abolition of tariff and non-tariff 
protection which can make Moroccan importations of industrial 
products more onerous as opposed to leading to market integration 
as in the case of intra-Community relationships. On the other hand, 
it should also be considered that the provision is based on the 
principle that preferential access to exports from developing 
countries can stimulate their Industrialization. The scope of the 
agreement seems to justify a broader interpretation of these rules.
However, there are other factors to be considered, which can 
influence the interpretation of the agreement.
The analysis carried out in this thesis seems to confirm that 
competition can lead to a restrictive interpretation of the rules. 
Thus, for example. Community policy, as regards trade in textile 
products, given the application of self-restraint agreements and 
suspension of the preferences granted by the Agreement, suggests 
that the notion of measures of equivalent effect would probably be 
interpreted more restrictively than is proposed in this thesis, 
once Maghreb countries have developed an industry capable of 
competing with the Community's.
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The conclusions to be drawn from this analysis can also be 
applied to other agreements concluded with third countries and seem 
to corroborate the hypothesis that a classification or typology of 
external agreements must take into account the interpretation of 
the provisions of these agreements.
The Community is therefore faced with a choice.
It could interpret and apply the provisions of the agreement 
to intensify the instruments provided for and thereby stimulate 
complementeury relationships and partnership, even if this means, 
in the medium term, increased competition. Alternatively the 
Community can interpret the provisions in such a way which 
restricts the advantages laid down in the Agreement.
Ultimately, it must be said that the credibility of the 
Community's developing cooperation policy and of the Community 
itself as partner in the international relations will depend on 
this choice.
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SOMMARIO.
L'analisi degli accordi di cooperazione conclusi dalla Cee 
con i paesi del Maghreb, oggetto del presente lavoro, prende le 
mosse dall'osservazione che nella politica mediterranea della Cee 
esiste una contraddizione di fondo: la Comunità si trova ad essere 
ad un tempo partner e concorrente dei paesi mediterranei.
Se infatti si può riscontrare, da un lato, un rapporto di 
reciproca dipendenza dal punto di vista economico e di sicurezza 
tra Stati membri comunitari e paesi del Maghreb (Algeria, Tunisia, 
Marocco) dall'altra esistono tra di essi degli interessi divergenti 
ed elementi di concorrenzialità in molti settori economici.
I paesi mediterranei rappresentano il terzo mercato per le 
esportazioni comunitarie dopo quello costituito dai paesi EFTA e 
dagli Stati Uniti. Solo uno sviluppo costante del mercato 
mediterraneo, di cui il Maghreb costituisce parte rilevante, può 
garantire alla Cee 1 'assorbimento anche in futuro delle sue 
esportazioni.
II divario economico con 1'Europa (che rischia di essere 
accresciuto dall'integrazione tra Comunità e paesi EFTA e, in 
prospettiva, con i paesi dell'Europa dell'Est) contribuisce alla 
radicaiizzazione dei movimenti religiosi e ad aggravare, a causa 
di una esplosione demografica senza freno apparente, il tasso di 
disoccupazione e i bisogni alimentari di (juesti paesi.
L'instabilità politica e sociale che ne deriva é tanto più 
temibile per la Comunità in quanto i paesi del Maghreb e Mashrak 
sono non solamente produttori di materie prime, tra cui gas 
naturale e petrolio, ma anche territorio di passaggio per gli 
approvvigionamenti energetici comunitari.
D'altra parte, la Comunità é un tradizionale punto di 
riferimento per questi paesi. Si pensi che essa assorbe i due terzi 
del commercio maghrebino1.
Si é detto che la Comunità rappresenta un mercato di primaria
1 RICCI,L. Il Maghreb e L'Europa 1990 pp. 549-567.
importanza per le esportazioni maghrebine composte essenzialmente 
da materie prime: prodotti minerari di base e prodotti agricoli. 
Questi ultimi si trovano però in concorrenza con la produzione 
agricola comunitaria.
Bisogna ricordare che quest'ultima, specialmente a seguito 
dell'ingresso della Spagna e del Portogallo2, é divenuta 
autosufficiente per la maggior parte dei prodotti mediterranei.
La conflittualità, dal punto di vista dei produttori 
comunitari, è inasprita dal fatto che i meccanismi protettivi della 
politica agricola comune applicati ai prodotti mediterranei sono 
più deboli rispetto a quelli che garantiscono invece i produttori 
di cereali e latte.
Alla concorrenza sul pieuio comunitario, si deve aggiungere 
quella che i prodotti agricoli maghrebini si trovano a dover 
affrontare sui mercati dei paesi terzi. I prezzi offerti dai 
produttori comunitari infatti sarebbero più elevati di quelli 
applicati sul mercato internazionale se non intervenisse un
meccanismo previsto dalla politica agricola comune per cui ai
produttori comunitari viene rimborsata la differenza tra prezzi
applicati sul mercato comunitario e quelli internazionali.
Si deve inoltre segnalare che il mercato maghrebino 
costituisce una valvola di sfogo per le forti eccedenze cerealicole 
comunitarie.
A sua volta il Maghreb si trova ad essere fortemente 
dipendente dalle importazioni di beni alimentari. La crescita 
demografica e l'incidenza della spesa alimentare nel bilancio di 
questi paesi rendono la ricerca dell'autosufficienza una necessità 
assoluta per i paesi mediterranei. Progressi significativi in tale 
direzione non sembrano realizzabili a breve termine ma il
raggiungimento di questo obiettivo si tradurrebbe per la Comunità 
nella perdita o nella contrazione di un mercato che assorbe almeno
ii
2 Come si avrà modo di vedere questa adesione ha richiesto 
l'adattamento dei meccanismi preferenziali previsti negli accordi. 
See infra il capitolo sul commercio di prodotti agricoli.
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parte delle eccedenze di quei prodotti.
Per quel che concerne i prodotti industriali3 che il Maghreb 
esporta nella Comunità (si tratta soprattutto di tessili) sono in 
concorrenza sui mercati comunitari sia con l'industria nazionale, 
che si trova negli ultimi anni in uno stato di crisi permamente, 
che con le esportazioni provenienti da altri paesi in via di 
sviluppo soprattutto dell'estremo oriente. Bisogna inoltre tener 
presente che i più recenti piani di sviluppo dei paesi maghrebini4 
prevedono una concentrazione degli sforzi in direzione di un 
miglioramento della produttività ed un rafforzamento del potenziale 
di esportazione. In questo i paesi arabi sarebbero avvantaggiati 
dalla presenza di mano d'opera a basso costo5.
La Comunità, ed in particolare alcuni stati membri, hanno da 
sempre rappresentato una terra di emigrazione per i lavoratori 
algerini, tunisini e marocchini. Per i paesi europei interessati 
questo flusso migratorio garantisce una disponibilità di mano 
d'opera a buon mercato, mentre per i paesi maghrebini il fenomeno 
migratorio comporta un alleggerimento del tasso di disoccupazione 
e costituisce, attraverso le rimesse degli emigrati una voce 
positiva nella bilancia dei pagamenti.
In tempi più recenti tuttavia, il crescente aumento del tasso
3 KHADER,B. Le debolezze dell'industrializzazione nel mondo 
arabo Politica Intem. 1968 pp. 135-144.
4 GAZZO, Y. Les économies arabes face à la crise: solutions 
libérales et limites Maahreb-Mashrak 1988, pp.48-67, HARIK,I. 
privatisation et devéloppement en Tunisie Ibidem 1990, pp. 5-26. 
DAOUDI,Z. Privatisation à la marocaine: la loi sur le transfert au 
secteur privé de certaines entreprises publiques Ibidem pp.84-101.
5 Per far fronte all'alto tasso di disoccupazione i paesi 
maghrebini si trovano a dover favorire un'industria ad alta 
intensità di mano d'opera. Sui piani di liberalizzazione economica 
nei paesi arabi cfr. GAZZO,Y. Les économies arabes face à la crise: 
solutions libérales et limites Maghreb. Mashrak 1988 pp. 42-67, 
HARIK,I. Privatisation et développement en Tunisie Maghreb. Mashreüi 
1990, pp. 5-26 e DAOOD,Z. Privatisation à la Marocaine: la loi sur 
le transfert au secteur privé de certaines entreprises publiques 
Maghreb. Mashrak 1990, pp.84-101.
demografico e, conseguentemente, della disoccupazione, hanno 
condotto ad un aggravamento della pressione migratoria in direzione 
dei paesi dell'Europa comuniteuria.
Questi si trovano a dover affrontare a loro volta un periodo 
di recessione economica e di crescita della disoccupazione per cui 
sono molto meno disposti ad accogliere emigrati provenienti dai 
paesi in via di sviluppo il cui afflusso tende ad aggravare le 
tensioni sociali rimaste latenti in periodi di crescita economica. 
La chiusura, anche parziale, di questa valvola di sfogo incide 
inoltre sulla bilancia dei pagamenti in guanto vengono appunto a 
diminuire le entrate costituite dalle rimesse.
Sembra quindi di poter affermare che i rapporti di 
concorrenzialità tra l 'economia comunitaria e quella maghrebina non 
si realizzano con la stessa intensità in tutti i settori economici. 
Se in alcuni casi essi sono palesi, in altri settori sono solo 
potenziali e possono divenire attuali in seguito, ad esempio, ad 
una congiuntura economica sfavorevole (si veda il caso delle 
esportazioni tessili o quello dei lavoratori migranti).
Le osservazioni svolte sopra potrebbero condurre anche ad 
avanzare una ulteriore ipotesi, quella cioè che lo sviluppo 
economico dei paesi Maghrebini possa accentuare in alcuni settori 
posizioni di concorrenzialità già esistenti o, appunto, rendere 
attuali quelle latenti.
Se questa ipotesi fosse corretta si instaurerebbe una tensione 
tra lo sviluppo del Magherb - che risponde ad un interesse 
primario della Comunità ed è l'obiettivo dichiarato della sua 
politica mediterranea — e 1' accentuazione degli elementi di 
concorrenzialità con la Comunità a cui questo può condurre.
Bisogna tener conto infatti che il principale strumento con 
cui la Comunità si propone di contribuire allo sviluppo economico 
e sociale dei paesi di quest'area geografica é l'accordo di 
cooperazione. L'asse portante dell'accordo è il trattamento 
preferenziale che si fonda sulla teoria per cui lo sviluppo può 
essere stimolato da un aumento delle esportazioni. Su questa base
iv
Vai prodotti originari dei paesi del Maghreb viene concessa 
1 'abolizione, o, quanto meno, la riduzione unilaterale degli 
strumenti protettivi che possono ostacolarne 1 'ingresso sul mercato 
comunitario.
Ci si chiede come venga conciliata 1 *apertura alle 
esportazioni prevista dall'accordo con 1'esistenza di produzioni 
concorrenti che potrebbero invece stimolare richieste di soluzioni 
di tipo protezionistico.
Questa ipotesi, tuttavia, deve essere temperata proprio dalla 
considerazione che esiste anche tra i due sistemi economici un 
rapporto di complementarietà (partnership) ed é proprio questo che, 
se sviluppato adeguatemente, può contribuire alla realizzazione 
dello scopo prefissato.
Il presente lavoro si proponeva di esaminare, dal punto di 
vista strettamente giuridico, le singole disposizioni dell 'accordo 
di cooperazione concluso dalla Comunità e dagli Stati membri con 
ognuno dei paesi del Maghreb. L'ipotesi da verificare é se la 
contraddizione si riflette nell'accordo, ovvero se 1 'esistenza di 
interessi concorrenziali incida negativamente sulle relazioni che 
esso si propone di stabilire tra i
Ci siamo quindi chiesti come si pongono questi accordi nel 
quadro delle relazioni contrattuali della Comunità con i paesi 
terzi.
La più completa e strutturata teoria di classificazione degli 
accordi comunitari è stata compiuta da C. Flaesh-Mougin nel suo Les 
accords extemes de la Cee.Essai d'une tvpoloaie6.
La prassi comunitaria indica chiaramente che la Comunità si 
é discostata dalla tipologia di accordi prevista dal Trattato - 
fondata sulla nota distinzione tra accordi di associazione e 
accordi commerciali e tariffari
partnersZJ
6 Ed. Università de Bruxelles, Bruxelles, 1979.
Una serie di fattori politici, economici e giuridici hanno 
reso evidente 1 'insufficienza e l'inadeguatezza di questi strumenti 
ed hanno quindi condotto la Comunità a sviluppare le sue relazioni 
contrattuali sia in senso quantitativo che qualitativo.
Il risultato é quello di un insieme composito di accordi 
conclusi con paesi terzi di tutte le aree geografiche, dai 
contenuti più disparati e che utilizzano in maniera elastica sia 
gii strumenti espressamente offerti dal crattato in materia di 
relazioni esterne che altri non concepiti originariamente come tali 
ma avallati o addirittura individuati dalla Corte di Giustizia la 
cui giurisprudenza si trova ad essere particolarmente innovativa 
in questo settore.
La Flaesch-Mougin propone una ipotesi di classificazione 
di questi accordi.
Gli accordi comunitari vengono posti su di un asse le cui 
estremità sono rappresentate, rispettivamente, da una situazione 
di assenza di relazioni contrattuali tra Cee e stato terzo e 
dall'adesione dello stato terzo alla Comunità7.
Gli accordi vengono quindi classificati sulla base dei legami 
più o meno stretti che essi creano tra la Cee e lo stato terzo.
Gli accordi settoriali si troveranno quindi ad essere i più 
vicini all'estremità sinistra (assenza di accordi) in quanto le 
relazioni tra parti contraenti sono appunto limitate a disciplinare 
gli scambi di un prodotto o regolamentare uno specifico settore di 
attività. Invece, gli accordi di associazione che creano una unione 
doganale sono posti all'estremo opposto (vicini all'adesione) in 
quanto questo tipo di accordo istituisce il legame più stretto che 
la Comunità possa realizzsure con uno stato terzo, estendendo la 
libera circolazione dei beni ai servizi, capitali e persone e 
prevedendo anche 1'armonizzazione di alcune politiche come quella
vi
7 Correttamente l'ipotesi dell'adesione non viene considerata 
dalla Flaesch-Mougin come componente delle relazioni esterne 
comunitarie, in quanto 1'adesione significa appunto assunzione da 
parte dello stato terzo dello status di membro. Cfr. p. 215.
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agricola.
Quello della Flaesch-Mougin, per quanto sia il più elaborato, 
non é l'unico tentativo di classificare gli accordi conclusi dalla 
Comunità con paesi terzi.
Dna tipologia viene offerta anche da MISHLANI, ROBERT, 
STEVENS, WESTON*. si tratta in questo caso di una classificazione 
che concerne le relazioni della Comunità con i paesi in via di 
sviluppo9.
Il criterio di classificazione applicato da questi autori é 
quello del trattamento preferenziale offerto dalla Comunità ai 
paesi in via di sviluppo. Graficamente la tipologia viene 
rappresentata in forma di piramide.
Gli accordi che prevedono un trattameno preferenziale occupano 
il vertice della piramide (Convenzione di Lomé ad esempio), mentre 
quelli che contemplano un trattamento meno privilegiato si trovano 
in una posizione più vicina alla base. Il criterio proposto dalla 
Flaesch-Mougin, per cui gli accordi vengono classificati in 
relazione all 'intensità dei rapporti tra Cee e stati terzi, si 
ritrova in una tipologia che viene rappresentata con 1'immagine10 
dei centri concentrici.
Il centro rappresenta la Comunità ed i vari cerchi 
rappresentano graficamente gli accordi conclusi dalla Comunità con 
gli stati terzi: più il cerchio si trova vicino al centro più 
intenso sarà il legame con la Comunità.
Nessuna di queste tipologie, tuttavia, sembra offrire una 
corretta rappresentazione delle relazioni contrattuali della
1 MISBLANI,P., ROBERT,A., STEVENS,C., WESTON,A. The Pyramid 
of Privilege STEVENS,C. (ed.) EEC and Third World: a Survey. Vol.I, 
Holmes £ Meier, London, 1981, pp. 60-82.
9 Benché questa classificazione comprenda anche le azioni 
autonome della Cee (quali il sistema delle preferenze 
generalizzate) non sembra che questo elemento possa indebolire la 
validità dell'esempio.
10 Cfr. PESCATORE,P. La constitution, son conenu, son utilità 
Rev.Dr.Suisse 1992, p.64.
Comunità.
É chiaro che l'applicazione del criterio dell'intensità del 
legame e quello del trattamento preferenziale condurranno a 
tracciare due distinte classificazioni che rappresenteranno aspetti 
diversi della realtà.
La critica gui sostenuta non si appunta sul criterio di 
classificazione (intensità delle relazioni o trattamento 
preferenziale) quanto sulla metodologia applicata che sembra 
inficiare la validità di queste tipologie.
Per metodologia intendo riferirmi al modo in cui vengono 
selezionati gli accordi che rientrano in una stessa classe, ovvero 
alla scelta degli elementi che inducono la Flaesch-Mougin a 
considerare che un certo numero di accordi conclusi dalla Cee con 
partners diversi creino tra le peurti delle relazioni di eguale 
intensità e siano pertanto riconducibili ad una stessa posizione 
nel suo ipotetico spettro di relazioni.
Sia la Flaesch-Mougin come gli altri autori citati 
classificano gli accordi sulla base delle disposizioni in essi 
contenute.
Cosi ad esempio, sono classificati dalla Flaesch-Mougin come 
accordi di libero scambio11 quelli che prevedono disposizioni per 
1'eliminazione di ostacoli tariffari e paratariffari (dazi 
doganali, quote, misure di effetto equivalente), delle pratiche 
fiscali e di dumping nonché disposizioni relative alla concorrenza 
e in materia di pagamenti relativi agli scambi.
Benché il loro schema sia molto meno elaborato, Mishlani, 
Robert, Stevens e Weston sembrano applicare lo stesso metodo quando 
collocano gli accordi sulla piramide in base alle preferenze 
commerciali stabilite dagli accordi. Cosi ad esempio per situare, 
a partire dall 'apice della pireunide, gli accordi con i paesi del 
Maghreb dopo la Convenzione di Lomé e dopo quelli conclusi con
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n Cfr. p. 209.
Grecia, Spagna e Portogallo12 e prima degli accordi con i paesi del 
Mashrak, sono considerate le disposizioni ir. materia di preferenze 
tariffeurie (eliminazione dei dazi e delle quote e delle misure di 
effetto equivalente per i prodotti industriali e riduzioni dei dazi 
per i prodotti agricoli) e di aiuti finanziari contenute in questi 
trattati.
In realtà questo metodo, e le conseguenti classificazioni che 
ne derivarlo, inquadra le relazioni contrattuali tra la Comunità e 
gli stati terzi in uno schema troppo rigido inadatto a 
rappresentarne l'estrema compì essità.
Tutti questi studi omettono infatti di considerare la 
questione dell'interpretazione delle disposizioni dell'accordo.
Se si basa infatti la classificazione degli accordi sul loro 
contenuto si avrà, come si 6 visto, una situazione per cui due 
accordi che contengono disposizioni identiche verranno inclusi 
nella stessa categoria.
Ma se le disposizioni di questi due accordi, pur aventi una 
identica formulazione, sono interpretate in maniera difforme, anche 
le relazioni che gli accordi rispettivamente stabiliscono tra la 
Comunità ed i due stati terzi possederemmo una diversa valenza, sia 
in termini di intensità di legami, sia, se si tratta di 
disposizioni rilevanti in tal senso, di rapporti preferenziali.
La diversa interpretazione verrebbe cosi ad incidere sulla 
classificazione degli stessi.
Vi sono diverse disposizioni negli accordi di cooperazione 
la cui portata può variare notevolemente a seconda♦
dell'interpretazione che esse possono ricevere.
Il secondo scopo della nostra analisi è stato pertanto quello 
di esaminare queste disposizioni per verificare come esse possano 
essere interpretate e come questa diversa interpretazione possa 
modificare la portata delle preferenze e dei vantaggi accordati 
dalla Cee ai partners mediterrranei.
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12 All'epoca in cui viene redatto l'eurticolo questi non erano 
euicora membri della Cee
II presente lavoro si è fondato su due ipotesi. La prima é che 
la concorrenzialità tra Cee e Maghreb non può mancare di tradursi 
(negativeunente) nell'accordo. La seconda é che l'interpretazione 
delle norme incide sul tipo di relazioni che l'accordo si propone 
di instaurare tra le parti contraenti.
Si può anche ritenere che le due ipotesi siano collegate. 
Relativamente alla seconda questione sollevata (interpretazione) 
bisognerà chiedersi quali elementi incidano sulla interpretazione 
di una norma. Quest'ultima dovrebbe correttamente essere 
determinata secondo lo scopo perseguito dall'accordo, ma si può 
anche supporre che 1 'interesse di una delle parti contraenti possa 
prevalere e quindi orienteure l'interpretazione in senso favorevole 
a guest'ultima.
Benché gli accordi di cooperazione siano stati negoziati e 
conclusi sepelatamente dalla Comunità con ciascuno dei paesi del
Maghreb, essi sono concepiti come parte dello stesso sistema e
perseguono quindi gli stessi obiettivi. Questo implica che le loro 
disposizioni sono praticamente identiche. In questa tesi pertanto 
ho fatto riferimento agli articoli dell'accordo di cooperazione 
con il Marocco. Le disposizioni degli altri accordi sono state 
citate solamente quando queste differiscono sostanzialmente da 
quelle contenute nell'accordo con il Marocco.
La tesi é stata divisa in quattro parti.
Nella prima si sono è analizzato in quadro giuridico 
dell'accordo peurtendo dalla problematica della scelta della base 
giuridica, le procedure di conclusione, la creazione di organi
comuni e lo status degli accordi e degli atti derivati
nell'ordinamento giuridico della Comunità.
Si è passati quindi ad un esame delle norme che disciplinano 
i rapporti tra le parti in materia di commercio (seconda parte), 
di cooperazione tecnico finanziaria e cooperazione sociale (terza 
parte). Infine nell'ultima parte si sono discusse le disposizioni 
che regolano l'adozione di misure di salvaguardia e di deroga 
all'accordo.
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In materia commerciale e di cooperazione viene trasfuso negli 
accordi il principio del "trade and aid" sostenuto in sede 
internazionale (UNCTAD) dai paesi in via di sviluppo e adottato 
dalla Comunità come asse portante della sua politica di 
cooperazione allo sviluppo13♦
Sotto il profilo della cooperazione commerciale questo 
principio significa garantire senza reciprocità un trattamento 
preferenziale alle esportazioni dei paesi in via di sviluppo.
Nell'accordo il trattamento preferenziale si traduce 
nell'eliminazione degli ostacoli tariffari e nelle misure di 
effetto equivalente per i prodotti industriali e in una riduzione
o eliminazione dei dazi doganali per quelli agricoli.
La prima parte del lavoro ha cercato quindi di verificare in 
primo luogo 1 'interpretazione delle norme fondamentali che regolano 
il commercio dei prodotti industriali, prendendo come riferimento 
la giurisprudenza comuniteuria in materia tariffaria, paratariffaria 
e fiscale e in secondo luogo di discutere le disposizioni in 
materia agricola per appurare quale ruolo vi svolga la politica 
agricola comune.
Il regime commerciale è stato infine analizzato in relazione 
alle norme che regolano l'origine dei prodotti e quindi, l'accesso 
al regime preferenziale.
Le disposizioni dell'accordo e dei protocolli in materia di 
cooperazione finanziaria governano questioni quali la scelta dei 
beneficiari, i settori di applicazione e la preparazione dei 
progetti. Sulla portata di queste norme incide la problematica 
legata alle fonti di finanziamento costituite dal bilancio 
comunitario e dalle risorse della Banca Europea degli Investimenti.
Diversamente dagli altri accordi di cooperazione con i paesi 
del Mediterraneo, quelli conclusi con i paesi del Maghreb
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Si vedano a tale proposito i principali interventi 
comunitari in materia, come, oltre alla Convenzione di Lomé, gli 
aiuti finemzieuri ai paesi non associati ed il sistema delle 
preferenze generalizzate.
contengono delle disposizioni in materia di cooperazione sociale, 
per cui viene garantito ai lavoratori delle parti contraenti un 
trattamento non discriminatorio in materia di retribuzione, 
condizioni di lavoro e sicurezza sociale. Le questioni esaminate 
in questa parte riguardano principalmente la sfera di applicazione 
del principio di non discriminazione in materia di sicurezza 
sociale e la posizione dei lavoratori maghrebini in relazione ai 
lavoratori di altri stati terzi impiegati nella Comunità..
Nell'ultima parte si sono infine discusse la questione della 
possibilità di deviare dalle disposizioni dell'accordo attraverso 
l'applicazione delle norme di deroga e salvaguardia.
A quali conclusioni siamo giunti?
Ricordiamo che in materia di relazioni commerciali 1'accordo 
si fonda sul principio delle preferenze unilateralmente concesse 
dalla Comunità alle esportazioni provenienti dal Marocco.
Nel caso del commercio di prodotti agricoli il trattamento 
preferenziale si traduce nella riduzione o, in certi casi, 
sospensione dei dazi doganali. Tuttavia si é visto che il regime 
preferenziale é limitato dall'applicazione di una serie di 
meccanismi quali quote, prezzi di riferimento, prelievi 
all'importazione e calendari (le preferenze sono accordate 
unicamente in certi periodi dell'anno).
Il motivo del ricorso a guasto tipo di strumenti va ricercato 
nel rapporto di concorrenzialità che si verifica tra produzioni 
comunitarie e maghrebine. Le modifiche apportate con i protocolli 
addizionali, a seguito dell'ingresso di Spagna e Portogallo nella 
Comunità, indicano come il miglioramento del regime commerciale 
rimane comunque condizionato pesantemente dalla politica agricola 
comune.
Si deve d'altra peurte considerare che esistono anche elementi 
di complementarietà tra le produzioni agricole comunitarie e quelle 
maghrebine. Benché infatti i paesi membri comunitari dell'aurea 
mediterranea coltivino gli stessi tipi di prodotti dei paesi del 
Maghreb, la posizione geografica di questi ultimi si riflette sui
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periodi in cui le produzioni giungono a maturazione. Sarebbe quindi 
possibile concepire alcuni degli strumenti applicati in modo tale 
da migliorare gli elementi di complementarietà che esistono tra le 
produzioni agricole. Ad esempio i calendari potrebbero essere 
applicati più che per limitare le preferenze ai periodi in cui la 
produzione comunitaria é bassa per favorire dei programmi di 
eurmonizzazione delle produzioni.
Il secondo caso in cui le disposizioni dell 'accordo sembrano 
limitare il trattamento preferenziale 6 quello delle norme 
sull'origine. Si tratta delle disposizioni che stabiliscono i 
criteri per identificare quali prodotti si possono considerare 
originari dal Maghreb e quindi quali possono come tali fruire delle 
preferenze commerciali ad essi soli concesse.
L'importanza di queste norme é troppo spesso trascurata, in 
realtà il loro impatto sul trattamento preferenziale é notevole. 
Una interpretazione di origine restrittiva che si traduce in norme 
troppe severe può limitare di fatto il trattamento preferenziale 
ad un numero ristretto di prodotti.
É quanto sembra verificarsi nel caso sopra analizzato per 
le norme applicate ai prodotti tessili, cioè ad una industria in 
concorrenza con quella comunitaria.
Le norme sull'origine possouo perfino proteggere o favorire 
le industrie dello stato importatore.
Si pensi alle norme che permettono il c.d. cumulo, per cui ai 
fini del calcolo dell'origine i tre stati maghrebini e la Comunità 
sono considerati come un singolo territorio. Vista l'assenza di 
complementarietà tra le industrie maghrebine tale possibilità 
nelle relazioni intra maghrebine non viene praticamente sfruttata. 
Questa norma però può avvantaggiare le imprese europee in quanto 
l'utilizzo dei loro materiali da parte dei paesi maghrebini non 
incide negativamente nel calcolo dell'origine del prodotto finito. 
Si scoraggia quindi 1'utilizzo di materiali di paesi terzi anche 
se questi possono rivelarsi più competitivi in quanto il prodotto 
finito rischierebbe di non essere considerato originario.
Una ulteriore illustrazione di come degli interessi comunitari 
possano aver inciso sull'accordo è il caso della mancata 
applicazione di alcune norme previste in materia di cooperazione 
sociale, (preoccupazioni di ordine economico sono alla base della 
interpretazione restrittiva del divieto di discriminazione avanzata 
da alcuni Stati membri nel caso Kziber, cfr. infra).
Si ricorderà che il Consiglio di Cooperazione avrebbe dovuto 
entro il primo anno dall'entrata in vigore dell'accordo adottare 
i provvedimenti necessari per 1'applicazione dei principi in esso 
definiti, quali la possibilità di cumulare i periodi di 
assicurazione e di impiego completati nei vari Stati membri dai 
lavoratori maghrebini per il calcolo delle pensioni o la 
possibilità di trasferire liberamente in Marocco pensioni e salari.
Si può immaginare che la meuicata attuazione delle norme 
dell'accordo sia motivata dalla difficile situazione del mercato 
del lavoro in quasi tutti i paesi comuniteuri. Si ipotizza cioè che 
gli Stati membri possano ritenere che l'applicazione delle norme 
previste dagli accordi incoraggi 1'emigrazione da questi paesi.
Vi sono altre disposizioni dell'accordo che possono mutare la 
portata delle preferenze o dei vantaggi accordati a seconda 
dell'interpretazione che ne viene data. Si tratta principalemnte 
delle disposizioni commerciali per i prodotti industriali e di 
quelle che prevedono la parità di trattamento tra lavoratori 
maghrebini e cittadini degli stati membri.
Per le esportazioni di prodotti industriali originari dal 
Marocco il principio delle preferenze si traduce nella norma che 
proibisce 1'applicazione di dazi doganali, tasse di effetto 
equivalente, quote, e misure di effetto equivalente.
Le conseguenze di questa disposizione sul regime applicato 
effettivamente ai prodotti esportati dal Marocco nella Comunità può 
essere valutata unicamente sulla base dell'interpretazione data 
alle nozioni di tassa e misura di effetto equivalente.
Relativamente al concetto di tassa di effetto equivalente ad 
un dazio doganale, una volta chiarito che si tratta di oneri
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imposti ai prodotti importati in ragione del fatto che attraversano 
ima frontiera, il problema centrale consiste nel vedere se sono 
consentite delle giustificazioni alla loro applicazione.
Gli effetti della norma saranno ridotti se sono immessi ad 
esempio oneri imposti per fini non protezionistici (contributi alla 
redazione di una statistica). Diversamente la proibizione avrà una 
portata maggiore se la nozione di tassa include qualisasi onere 
indipendentemente dallo scopo con cui esso é imposto.
Nel primo caso, tuttavia, basterebbe dichiarare che lo scopo 
é legittimo per aggirare la proibizione.
Si può pertanto sostenere una interpretazione ampia della 
nozione suiche nel caso degli accordi di cooperazione. Questa 
interpretazione, inoltre, può essere temperata dalla possibilità 
di ricorrere ad un sistema di deroghe (cfr. infra).
Misure di effetto equivalente a restrizioni quantitative 
possono riferirsi a regolamentazioni nazionali relative sia alle 
caratteristiche dei prodotti che alle condizioni di utilizzo e di 
vendita degli stessi. Esse possono essere indirizzate 
esci usi v¿uoente ai prodotti importati stabilendo che solo questi 
ultimi debbano rispondere a determinati requisiti da cui sono 
invece esenti i prodotti nazionali. Oppure si può trattare di 
regolamentazioni che non distinguono tra beni importati e nazionali 
ma che impediscono o rendono di fatto più onerosa 1'importazione 
(vengono ad esempio stabiliti dei requisiti che solemente i 
prodotti nazionali possono soddisfare).
L'effetto della proibizione sarà molto limitato quindi se«
viene accolta una interpretazione di misura di effetto equivalente 
che proibisca solamente le regolamentazioni nazionali che 
discriminano apertamente tra prodotti importati e non. D'altra 
parte è difficilmente immaginabile, nel quadro dei rapporti tra 
Comunità e Marocco, proibire agli Stati Membri della Cee di imporre 
ai prodotti importati il rispetto di regolamentazioni applicate 
anche ai prodotti nazionali anche se da ció possa risultare un 
effetto discriminatorio. Dna soluzione intermedia potrebbe essere
1 'adozione di una soluzione esegetica che proibisca la 
discriminazione di fatto dei prodotti importati, ma solo 
relativamente alle caratteristiche dei prodotti, a meno che lo 
Stato importatore non adduca a giustificazione di una tale misura, 
uno dei motivi tra quelli contemplati dallo stesso accordo (deroghe 
non economiche, Articolo 35) interpretati in modo tale da 
includervi anche le "esigenze imperative" identificate dalla Corte 
nella giurisprudenza Cassis de Dijon. In pratica una 
interpretazione empia della nozione verrebbe temperata da una 
nozione altrettanto ampia dei motivi di deroga invochili.
Analogamente, una interpretazione ampia della nozione di tassa 
di effetto equivalente potrebbe essere moderata dalla possibilità 
per lo Stato importatore di /are ricorso allo stesso sistema di 
deroghe che, si é sostenuto, può essere applicato nel quadro 
dell'accordo anche alle tasse di effetto equivalente e alla 
proibizione di discriminazione fiscale.
Infine ci si é chiesti se il regime preferenziale si estende 
anche al trattamento riservato ai prodotti importati dal Marocco 
ed in libera circolazione nella Comunità. Non sembra, tuttavia che 
il regime di questi prodotti si distingua da quello applicato ai 
beni importati da altri stati terzi ed in libera circolazione.
Una seconda norma i cui effetti dipendono dall 'interpretazione 
data ad alcuni dei termini in essa contenuti é quella che proibisce 
1 'applicazione di misure e prassi fiscali discriminatorie tra 
prodotti importati e prodotti nazionali simili.
Ritenere che siano "simili" esclusivamente i prodotti identici 
o con differenze minime significa ammettere una diversa imposizione 
fiscale applicata a prodotti che soddisfino lo stesso bisogno dei 
consumatori. D'altra parte estendere la proibizione anche a 
prodotti con caratteristiche diverse sarebbe contrario allo scopo 
della norma. Una soluzione possibile sarebbe quella di ricorrere 
al concetto di elasticità incrociata facendo rientrare nella 
nozione di prodotti simili quelli con una elasticità medio alta. 
Inversamente applicando un valore più basso di elasticità si
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estenderà la portata della proibizione contenuta in questa 
disposizione.
L'altro temine che richiede di essere specificato é quello 
di misure fiscali. Anche in questo caso limitare il divieto di 
discriminazione alle tasse senza includervi metodi di pagamento e 
rimborsi restringerebbe in misura notevole 1'effetto della norma 
in questione.
Vediamo ora come le disposizioni in materia sociale possano 
variare a seconda dell'interpretazione che ne viene data.
Si tratta in particolare del principio di non discriminazione 
basato sulla nazionalità tra lavoratori marocchini e cittadini 
dello Stato membro in cui i primi sono regolarmente impiegati, in 
materia di condizioni di lavoro, remunerazione e sicurezza sociale 
(estesa anche ai membri della famiglia).
Contrariamente a quanto si é visto per le disposizioni in 
materia di commercio di prodotti industriali, non ci si limita in 
questo caso ad ipotizzare delle possibili soluzioni interpretative, 
in quanto la portata di alcune nozioni contenute in queste norme 
é stata recentemente chiarita dalla Corte.
Si é visto che quest'ultima ha riconosciuto ampia portata alla 
norma ricorrendo al criterio di interpretazione analogica e 
stabilendo un parallelismo con la nozione accolta nel diritto 
comunitario. Se il silenzio dell'accordo fosse stato interpretato 
in senso restrittivo, sarebbe stato invece lecito per uno Stato 
Membro applicare ai lavoratori marocchini un trattamento 
discriminatorio in materia di indennità di disoccupazione.
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Il risultato più considerevole della sentenza però é stato 
l'ampliamento della sfera dei beneficiari della norma.
La Corte ha infatti esaminato la situazione della Kziber dando 
rilievo alla proibizione di discriminazione sulla base della 
nazionalità e non alla qualifica della ricorrente come membro della 
famiglia del lavoratore.
L'interpretazione suggerita dall'Avvocato Generale, secondo 
il (piale i membri della famiglia del lavoratore emigrato godono
XVii
solamente dei diritti derivati dal loro status, avrebbe invece 
precluso alla ricorrente il diritto di ottenere le indennità di 
disoccupazione come diritto proporio conseguenza diretta del 
divieto di discriminazione.
Un ulteriore problema interpretativo, che può ampliare o 
restringere la portata della norma, può essere sollevato in 
relazione alla nozione di "famiglia" del lavoratore. La posizione 
dei lavoratori migranti rispetto ai cittadini dello stato ospite 
muterà a seconda che tra i membri della sua famiglia siano o meno 
inclusi gli ascendenti a carico del lavoratore o del coniuge.
Nel caso di specie si potrebbe stabilire un parallelismo tra 
la nozione di famiglia dell'accordo e quella accolta nella 
legislazione dello stato ospite.
Analogamente, si potrebbe accogliere una ampia interpretazione 
del concetto di retribuzione.
Quello che preme rileveure é che l 'espansione della 
disposizione che prevede il divieto di discriminazione in materia 
di retribuzione, condizioni di lavoro e sicurezza sociale può 
temperare la mancata applicazione delle altre disposizioni previste 
dall'accordo, rimasta, come si é avuto modo di rilevare sopra, 
lettera morta.
Le relazioni stabilite dall'accordo non dipendono solo 
dall'interpretazione che viene data alle norme materiali ma anche 
dall 'effetto che viene riconosciuto loro nell 'ordinamento giuridico 
delle parti contraenti.
La possibilità per il privato di invocare una norma contenuta 
in un accordo contribuir a garantirne infatti l'effettiva 
applicazione.
Si pensi alla norma che vieta la discriminazione in materia 
di sicurezza sociale. Se ad essa non fosse stato riconosciuto un 
effetto diretto, la signora Kziber non avrebbe potuto ricorrere 
daveuiti al giudice belga per veder riconosciuto il diritto ad 
ottenere i sussidi di disoccupazione. Il rispetto dell 'obbligazione 
sarebbe cosi stato subordinato ad un eventuale intervento dello
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stato di origine della Kziber (il Marocco). Poiché 1 'azione 
diplomatica é condizionata da preoccupazioni di ordine politico che 
spesso hanno poco a che fare con la preoccupazione di agire in 
difesa dell'interesse del privato cittadino, si può ipotizzare che 
il diritto della Kziber non sarebbe stato difeso.
Inoltre bisogna anche considerare che nel caso di specie la 
violazione del divieto di discriminazione non era affatto evidente, 
ma era subordinata ad una interpretazione della norma piuttosto 
liberale e anche, come si é visto, piuttosto discussa e 
discutibile.
L'aver riconosciuto la capacità dell'accordo ad avere effetto 
diretto è un risultato di rilievo che inciderà sulla portata delle 
singole norme.
Ipotizziamo che uno Stato A abbia concluso un accordo 
contenente una norma identica a quella qui discussa ma al quale 
venga negato effetto diretto. I lavoratori di A si troveranno in 
una posizione assai meno privilegiata rispetto ai lavoratori 
maghrebini.
Le stesse conclusioni si possono applicare naturalemnte anche 
ad altre norme dell'accordo che possiedono i requisiti indicati 
dalla Corte (come potrebbe essere il caso per il divieto di imporre 
dazi doganali, quote e misure di effeto equivalente).
Infine, l'accordo contiene delle disposizioni che regolano 
l'adozione di clausole di salvaguardia e di deroga. Si tratta di 
strumenti attraverso i quali le peurti contraenti possono deviare 
dalle disposizioni materiali dell'accordo senza tuttavia ricorrere
«
ad una sua ri-negoziazione.
Le clausole di deroga lasciano anch'esse un ceirto margine 
all'interpretazione delle parti dell'accordo, come si é visto per 
la clausola "politica agricola comune". Anche le norme che 
prevedono 1'adozione di misure di salvaguardia contengono alcune 
nozioni relativamente indeterminate. Tuttavia esse prevedono dei 
limiti procedurali abbastanza precisi per cui evadere le condizioni 
previste per la loro adozione non risulta sempre agevole e comunque
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può essere politicamente imbarazzemte.
L'adozione di misure di salvaguardia é stata molto limitata, 
ad essa si è sostituita la prassi di ricorrere agli accordi di 
autolimitazione che offrono una maggiore libertà di azione (in 
termini di durata e di condizioni di applicazione ad esempio) e 
sono politicamente preferibili in quanto non appaiono come 
restrizioni applicate unilateralmente dallo stato importatore.
Gli accordi di autolimitazione sono tuttavia censurabili in 
guanto costituiscono una violazione delle norme applichili al 
commercio di prodotti industriali. Questa prassi più che costituire 
una effettiva protezione del mercato comunitario (le quote spesso 
non sono state esaurite) influisce negativamente sulla credibilità 
della Comunità e della sua politica di cooperazione.
Tali accordi sono stati applicati per lo più in relazioni alle 
esportazioni tessili, ovvero in uno dei pochi casi di esportazione 
di materie industriali dal Maghreb alla Cee.
Ciò significa che, paradossalmente, la Comunità ha di fatto 
sospeso 1'accordo dove si é verificata una situazione di 
conflittualità.
Il secondo pilastro su cui si fonda la cooperazione con il 
Marocco é costituito dall'aiuto tecnico e finanziario. La 
problematica sollevata da queste disposizioni é molto diversa da 
quella discussa nel caso dei rapporti commerciali e in materia di 
cooperazione sociale. Non si tratta infatti in questo caso di 
valutare delle norme che vengono ad incidere in settori economici 
in cui esistono situazioni di concorrenzialità quanto piuttosto di 
valutare i mezzi con cui viene realizzato questo contributo 
unilaterale di beni e di tecnologia.
Come si é visto la cooperazione finanziaria é uno strumento 
flessibile che ha reso quindi possibile la sostituzione degli 
strumenti che si eremo rivelati poco adatti al raggiungimento degli 
scopi prefissati. Le fonti di finanziamento comunitario hemno 
parimenti contribuito alla elasticità di questo strumento 
permettendo 1'introduzione di forme di finanziamento nuove come
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quelle destinate all'insieme dei paesi mediterranei per finanziare 
1'integrazione regionale o progetti in materia di ambiente.
Non sono comunque assenti interessi economici da parte della 
Comunità stessa in quanto bisogna considerare che la realizzazione 
delle opere finanziate dalla cooperazione é affidata ad imprese 
europee che ne traggono quindi dei vantaggi economici 
considerevoli.
Il rapporto di concorrenzialità che esiste in molti settori 
solleva allo stesso tempo degli interrogativi relativi alla 
destinazione degli aiuti tecnici e finanziari.
Bisogna chiedersi, in altri termini, se la Comunità é 
effettivamente disposta a finanziare o a contribuire con apporto 
tecnologico e, in generale di know-how, allo sviluppo di quei 
settori economici in cui quel rapporto di concorrenzialità si 
realizza o si potrebbe attuare (si pensi ad esempio agli interventi 
di stimolo della promozione commerciale in settori di produzione 
concorrente).
Si può quindi concludere che la concorrenzialità che si 
riscontra in molti settori economici tra Comunità e paesi del 
Maghreb può costituire una chiave di lettura di alcune 
disposizioni dell'accordo di cooperazione sopra esaminate che 
limitano i vantaggi accordati ai partners.
Si é anche visto che una diversa interpretazione può incidere 
in forte misura sulla portata delle nome.
Il nucleo centrale della questione diventa quindi quello del 
criterio interpretativo che deve essere applicato.
#
Una corretta interpretazione deve essere fondata sullo scopo 
che l'accordo intende realizzeure. Nel caso della disposizione che 
proibisce 1fadozione di misure di effetto equivalente ad esempio, 
si dovrà tener conto, da una parte, che lo scopo principale di 
queste disposizioni é quello di eliminare le forme di protezione 
tariffaria e paratariffaria che possono rendere più onerose le 
importazioni dei prodotti industriali marocchini e non, come 
avviene nel caso dei rapporti intracomunitari di realizzare una
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integrazione dei mercati. D'altra parte bisognerà anche considerare 
che la teoria su cui questa norma si fonda é quella per cui 
1'accesso privilegiato alle esportazioni dei paesi del terzo nondo 
può agire da incentivo alla loro industrializzazione. Sembrerebbe 
quindi che lo scopo dell'accordo giustifichi una interpretazione 
non troppo restrittiva di queste norme.
Tuttavia, è pensabile che altre considerazioni possano 
incidere sulla interpretazione e applicazione dell'accordo.
L'analisi svolta nel presente lavoro sembra in effetti 
indicare che la presenza di elementi di conflittualità può condurre 
ad una interpretazione restrittiva delle norme.
Cosi, sempre in materia di commercio di prodotti industriali, 
la politica seguita dalla Comunità nel settore tessile, con il 
ricorso agli accordi di autolimitazione ed una sospensione delle 
disposizioni dell'accordo, induce a ritenere che le nozioni di 
misure di effetto equivalente potrebbero ricevere una 
interpretazione restrittiva, rispetto a quella qui proposta, una 
volta che i paesi maghrebini sviluppassero una industria 
concorrente con quella comunitaria.
Le conclusioni che si possono trarre da questa analisi possono 
essere, con le dovute modifiche, trasposte anche ad altri accordi 
e possono confortare 1'ipotesi iniziale della tesi, secondo la 
quale la qualificazione degli accordi comunitari non può 
prescindere dall'interpretazione che viene data alle disposizioni 
in essi contenute.
Su quest'ultima e, quindi, sulla realizzazione dello scopo 
dell'accordo, peserà la scelta che la Comunità vorrà fare.
Essa potrà interpretare ed applicare le norme dell'accordo 
privilegiando le soluzioni che amplifichino gli strumenti
utilizzati o stimolino la complementarietà anche se ciò può 
significare accrescere la concorrenzialità almeno a breve termine.
Oppure la Comunità potrà optare per una soluzione
interpretativa che se pur non costituisce una violazione
dell'accordo, di fatto, limiti o restringere i vantaggi previsti
dallo stesso.
In ultima analisi da questa scelta dipenderà la credibilità 
della politica di sviluppo della Cee ed in generale della Comunità 
stessa come partner nelle relazioni intemazionali.





HBRHM
1
